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ABSTRACT
Professionalisation, Policy Networks and the Development of French Health Policy: 
The Rise of Hospital Directors, the Syndicat National des Cadres Hospitallers^ 1976- 
1991.
As governments have grappled with the demands of cost containment policies in health 
care, a series of challenges have arisen to the ‘privileged’ position of medical professionals 
in public health care systems. Hospital managers and administrators have contested 
medical control of the health policy agenda and the allocation of resources. This 
managerial challenge raises important questions about how new groups or lobbies have 
emeiged in health policy-making, and about the capacity of governments to induce change 
within professional policy networks.
The thesis explores these issues by analysing the development of French hospital 
management policy from initial measures towards cost containment launched in 1976 to 
the complete re-writing of previous legislation on public hospitals in 1991. The policy 
netwoiks shaping hospital management policy have been transformed by the development 
of the French corps of public hospital directors and its largest trade union, the Syndicat 
National des Cadres Hospitaliers (SNCH). Through the 1980s, the SNCH evolved its 
own programme for hospital management reform, and its members rose to occupy pivotal 
positions during the decision-making process which led to the 1991 Hospital Law. The 
thesis highlights the role of politicians in transforming policy networks by making top- 
down changes in the regulation and financing of policy systems, aad by fostering bottom- 
up changes in the balance of influence between professional groups and in the local 
management of hospitals. In addition to political influence and contingent professional 
changes, the study examines how policy systems can have their own logic of development, 
which powerfully shape long-run patterns of change in the health policy sector.
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CHAPTER ONE
CHANGES m  THE MANAGEMENT OF HEALTH CARE
The post-war development of public health care systems has been characterised by three 
distinct periods of government policy priorities, evolving from expanding access, through 
imposing cost containment, on to increasing efficiency.^ Governments expanded access 
on the back of a state-profession compromise. To ensure doctors' participation in public 
health care systems, they conceded control of the delivery of services to medical 
professionals.^ The acceptance of clinical freedom ensured that fully-qualified doctors 
were not supervised in their clinical practice by managers or, for that matter, by other 
medical professionals. Such devolved regulation defined judgements about health 
treatments as a technical rather than a political issue/ It biased decision-making towards 
implementation, making the overall provision of health care services very sensitive to the 
aggregate of decisions made by individual physicians.* Indeed, governments withdrew 
from direct ‘hands-on’ intervention in the management of public hospitals. National policy 
networks institutionalised medical predominance and closed dedsion-making off from 
rival actors.*
Once governments sought to create public health care systems, they were caught 
in a complex web of resource dependendes with the medical profession. Hospital doctors 
required government to endorse their professional autonomy in the workplace. Yet, 
governments were dependent upon medical professionals to provide information and 
expertise in the provision of care and, ultimately, to allocate resources and ration care. 
Indeed, this dependency made health policy difficult to change as it obliged governments 
to enter into negotiated compromises with the medical profession.® The ‘shared vision’ 
of health policy-making in the UK National Health Service (NHS) characterised health 
care politics as the incrementalist outcome of a weak centre, with little operational control 
over the implementation of national policies, faced with both an entrenched ‘defensive’ 
medical profession and a complex health care system.^
The rising costs of health care were fiielled by rising demands, technological costs
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and demographic pressures. In the stagflation of the 1970s, governments were obliged to 
renegotiate the boundaries of medical predominance. They ceased to accept the quality 
of outcomes produced by the task-oriented clinical model of care inherent within the 
devolved regulation of the state-profession compromise. In the first instance, governments 
imposed top-down controls on health care financing. Although placed under strain, clinical 
fi'eedom remained firee fi’om any direct onslaught as doctors worked under the constraints 
of tightly controlled budgets. However, as governments were swept along on the rising 
tide of managerialism, the quest for efficiency began to contest the monopoly exercised 
by the medical profession over the setting of priorities, the allocation of resources and the 
nature of care. Changing priorities progressively called into question the boundaries of 
clinical fi^eedom.*
These top-down attempts by governments to re-negotiate the terms of the state- 
profession compromise were not dissociated firom the bottom-up emergence of rival 
lobbies within public health care systems. The work of self-help groups and their like 
brought to the fore patients as consumers who challenged the cultural authority of 
doctors.^ Health administrators and planners, as well as health economists, rival 
professionals and paraprofessionals contested medical autonomy in the workplace. Within 
public hospitals, managers ceased to be just supports to medical professionals who 
resolved internal conflicts rather than encroaching into the reserved domain of clinical 
fi’eedom^® Instead they attempted to assert their line-management hierarchy over medical 
professionals. Faced with such occupational challenges, the policy networks that 
institutionalised the influence of the medical profession and closed decision-making off 
fi’om rival actors in other policy networks, ‘exploded’.^ ^
This radical change in health policy networks seemingly belied the entrenched 
position of the medical profession. That the moves towards cost containment were 
accompanied by the emergence of rival lobbies and the breakdown of professionalised 
policy-making was somewhat paradoxical in policy sub-systems supposedly characterised 
by medical predominance, closed access, resource dependency and incremental change. 
In the light of such stabilising forces as professional exclusion and resource dependency, 
how did new groups or lobbies emerge in health policy-making? The changes call into 
question our understanding of both the stability of professionalised policy networks and
the capacity of government to reconfigure health policy networks so as to answer the 
changing demands of cost containment.
This thesis analyses these changes through a detailed study of French hospital 
management policy, firom the initial measures towards cost containment launched in 1976, 
through to the complete re-writing of the previous legislation on public hospitals in 1991. 
Like Britain, France has feced strong economic and social pressures to restructure health 
policy networks. However, in contrast to its ‘weak’ British counterpart, the French policy 
tradition has been that of a ‘strong’ state benefitting fi-om a series of tactical advantages.^^ 
Indeed, the market and institutional firamework of the insurance-based French health care 
sj^em stands in marked contrast to the nationalised, fi-ee-at-the-point-of-delivery service 
of the NHS.^^ The evolution of health policy networks in France, within a distinct 
institutional fi-amewoik, thus provides a valuable contribution to the understanding of the 
apparent convergence or internationalisation pressures in public health care systems.
The thesis focuses upon the emergence of hospital managers as new actors in 
French health policy networks. Hospital managers occupy a pivotal location within public 
health care sub-systems as both agents of the central state and local actors within 
decentralised hospital management coalitions. The policy networks governing hospital 
management have been transformed by the development of the French corps of public 
hospital directors and its largest trade union, the Syndicat National des Cadres 
Hospitaliers (SNCH). Through the 1980s, the SNCH evolved its own programme for 
hospital management reform, and its members rose to occupy pivotal positions during the 
decision-making process which led to the 1991 Hospital Law. The first half of the study 
analyses the evolution of the corps of hospital directors, its socialisation, growth and 
development in organised collective action. The second half provides a detailed analysis 
of how hospital directors in the SNCH interacted with policy makers in successive periods 
of hospital legislation through the 1980s and into the 1990s. The emergence of the SNCH 
took place against the background of the attempts by successive governments to 
reconfigure the health policy sub-system in France. Through these attempts at reform, 
politicians played a significant role in transforming the regulation and financing of policy 
systems, and inducing changes in professional groups and the local management of 
hospitals.
How health policy networks change has been the subject of much academic 
interest. The existing literature has focused upon the capacity of hospital managers and 
governments to challenge the professional dominance of doctors within the workplace of 
public hospitals. It has tended to ignore explanations of the emergence of lobbies and the 
evolution of national level policy networks. In the case of France, existing studies of 
health policy change, like many traditional studies in public policy, tend to provide partial 
accounts, content on the whole to explain the content of legislation rather than the 
evolution of decision-making mechanisms, There is no detailed decisional study of either 
the emergence of hospital managers as a distinct lobby or of the change within health 
policy networks in the period from 1976 to 1991. De Pouvourville has contributed 
interesting accounts of the specific development of the programme of Diagnosis-Related- 
Groups within France. But, this single case study remains confined to working groups 
within the Health Ministry throughout the 1980s, and does not address the emergence of 
hospital directors and wider theories of health policy change. In a similar vein, 
Hassenteufel’s comparative study of the French medical profession provides a partial 
account of hospital doctors’ involvement in health care reforms, but exploits in greater 
measure the policy maneouvres of specialists and generalist physicians in private practice 
and, says nothing of the emergence of hospital managers as a lobby in health policy 
networks.
However, there are two exceptions to this pattern which provide valuable accounts 
of the implementation of hospital management refonns between 1981 and 1988. Wilsford, 
m Doctors and the State, compares the capacity of French and American states to reform 
the medical profession.^* He argues that the French state possesses institutional 
advantages in its dealings with the medical profession. However, the study gives little 
attention to the emergence of hospital directors and the systematic analysis of detailed 
decision-making processes. It remains a macro-level institutional analysis where reference 
to general patterns of policy-making replaces the comprehensive study of each stage of 
the policy-making process. In contrast, Philippe Rollandin in La Santé en Danger provides 
a sporadic account of the decision-making process between ministers and pressure groups 
in health policy netw orks.H e provides interesting ‘behind the scenes’ insights into the 
decision-making process, but offers only an atheoretical account of health policy change.
The emergence of hospital directors is recognised, but treated as a side-issue. Neither 
work provides a satisfactory understanding of change in health policy networks and 
decision-making at the national level.
To outline a different strategy, the remainder of this chapter first evaluates 
competing macro-explanations of health policy change. The second section develops a 
framework for analysing health policy change and the emergence of new actors within 
health policy sub-systems. The final section deals with the organisation of the rest of the 
thesis.
1.1 COMPETING MACRO-EXPLANATIONS
Health policy studies have employed a range of theoretical models to understand the 
breakdown of professional policy networks and the emergence of new actors in health 
policy sub-systems. This section analyses the assumptions of five such theories: neo­
marxism, elitism and structural interests, new institutionalism, meso-corporatism and 
policy networks. It evaluates how far these theories both allow for open or closed 
decision-making arenas; whether they provide for a coherent dynamic of policy change; 
and how applicable each theory seems in a prima facie way to the study of health policy­
making in France. I conclude that each of these diverse approaches captures different and 
valuable elements of health policy change. But all approaches confront major problems 
in dealing adequately with either the process of policy formulation or the interactions 
between structures and agents within the policy process.
Neo-Marxism
Neo-marxist explanations of the moves towards cost containment in health policy 
subsystems derive from the fundamental assumption that the state works in the long-term 
interests of capital and that the changing demands of capital accumulation determine the 
evolution of public policy.^ ® In the first instance, the establishment of public health care 
systems simultaneously socialised the costs of the health services necessary for the 
reproduction of labour and increased the legitimacy of capitalist systems. Subsequent state 
moves towards cost containment are interpreted as the requisite response to the rising
unemployment and falling economic growth of the 1970s, which obliged the state to 
reduce the burden of public spending and taxation on business in order to maintain the 
conditions for capital accumulation. At the macro-level, health policy shifted from 
expanding access to top-down controls on hospital spending, increased planning and the 
centralisation of aggregate decision-making. At the micro-level, the state promoted the 
proletarianisation of doctors, instituting an increasing division of labour and promoting 
a managerial class to control the production of health care services. Somewhat like 
artisans during the Industrial Revolution, hospital doctors were deskilled to accommodate 
the needs of the production process under capitalism.^^ However, the measures destined 
to resolve the ‘crisis of accumulation’ raised a ‘crisis of legitimation’ whereby controls on 
the delivery of health services undermined the legitimacy which their provision was 
supposed to confer.^
Such determinist neo-marxist accounts hinge upon their capacity to prove that 
state managers worked deliberately in the interests of capital. Throughout the consultation 
process of the Seventh Plan, French business and its umbrella organisation, the 
Confédération Nationale du Patronat Français (CNPF) voiced its desire to impose 
controls upon rising health care costs.^ Equally, a cursory glance at moves to cost 
containment in France demonstrates that politicians were concerned to protect capital 
accumulation. Valéry Giscard dEstaing, elected to the presidency in 1974, publicly argued 
that France risked long-term structural evolutions in its society should public spending rise 
beyond the mystical figure of 40 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).^ The 
economic policy reversal undertaken by the Mauroy government in 1984, its endorsement 
of le Franc fort, a French Franc which shadowed the Deutschmark, and the constraints 
of competitive disinflation further point to the structural power of capital and the over­
riding demands of capital accumulation. The introduction in 1989 of the contribution 
sociale généralisée under the premiership of Michel Rocard aimed directly at lessening 
the burden of social security funding on employer-employee contributions by generating 
funds through central taxation.
However, that pohticians were voicing concerns parallel to those of the business 
community is not evidence that the state was working expressly in the interests of capital. 
Even where policies correspond to the demands voiced by business, we cannot necessarily
infer the dominance of capital. Such an interpretation fulfils Dowding's blame fallacy since 
it assumes that because one actor acts in the interest of another actor it must be because 
of power exerted by the latter. State managers will have their own distinct interests, 
although protecting these interests may lead them also to protect those of capital.^  ^
Indeed, that state managers are concerned with or constrained by economic performance 
is a common element in other rival accounts. Neo-pluralist accounts advance the 
privileged position of business.^ Rational choice approaches such as the political-business 
cycle recognise that politicians have their own set o f interests in the realm of economic 
performance, because macro-economic outcomes are significant determinants of general 
elections.^*
Neo-marxist accounts do not easily handle the fi*agmentation of the state, or, for
that matter, of capital. First, the French state is not a homogeneous entity, but a
segmented collection of competing ministries and civil service corps.^ This territorial
competition between civil service corps and ministerial divisions means that we cannot
simply see the emergence of hospital directors as a purposive state response to rising
health spending. More importantly, elected and unelected state managers will have
different interests and at times be tied to specific firactions of capital. In the realm of health
policy sub-systems, state managers are socialised into professional ethos and place a
relatively low emphasis on economic issues. There is consequently no obvious reason why
all state managers will protect the general interests of capital.^®
Second, not all fi*actions of capital will automatically support the introduction of
cost containment measures. Pharmaceutical industries discourage controls over hospital
doctors’ rights to prescribe. Manufacturing and research and development industries are
influential in spaiidng technological innovation, specialised services and more health care
spending.^  ^Within the Social Security funds, during the moves towards cost containment
at the end of the 1970s, the business delegates fi-om the CNPF were concerned with
protecting the interests of the health ‘industry’ rather than with the general interests of
capital accumulation:
‘around those years, the CNPF changed a little, that is to say that instead 
of being the representatives of a policy which was very, very, very  ^
spending controls [..] it found itself to be the representatives of a policy 
which defended the health policy actors within the CNPF, thus, [...] 
defenders of pharmaceutical companies, defenders of private clinics.
defenders of biological laboratories.’^ ^
Overall, neo-marxist approaches suffer from the same weaknesses as all functional 
models of policy-making. They provide an explanation of policy change, but can explain 
neither the timing, the priorities nor the variations in health policies. Even if we accept that 
policy makers recognise external functional pressures, neo-mandsm fails to explain in 
detail what takes place between the period of recognition by the state of external policy 
pressures and the implementation of its actual response to these problems. The 
formulation and nature of policy responses are deemed to be unproblematic. The actions 
of state managers are reduced to that of automatons working in the general interests of 
capital.
Structural Interests
Structural interest theory defines interests in relation to the way they are served, or not 
served, by the logic and principles of existing institutions and structures. In health care 
systems, Alford identifies three broad heterogeneous coalitions of interests who share 
common structural locations: dominant professional monopolisers, challenging corporate 
rationalisers, and repressed community populations.^^ The dominant interests of hospital 
doctors as professional monopolisers are served automatically by the wider structures and 
logic of health care Q^tems. While marxists see the dominant concepts of health as serving 
the bourgeoisie, structuralists see it as serving the medical profession, citing continued 
medical predominance in the workplace, despite attempts at organisational reform.^ 
Doctors are united by their common structural location against the threats to the status 
quo posed by corporate rationalisers as exemplified by hospital managers, planners and 
politicians. Patients or the ‘community population’ are repressed interests, largely 
excluded by existing institutions.
The underlying dynamic of health policy sub-systems is that of competing elites, 
with corporate rationalisers sponsoring moves to cost containment to challenge dominant 
professionals. Indeed, Harrop evokes the driving antagonisms of the ‘inherent antipathy’ 
between rule-oriented bureaucrats and self-regulating professionals.^^ This dynamic of 
emerging corporate rationalisers taps into a finitful seam of work which interprets policy­
making in France as the bastion of technocratic elites.^  ^For this tradition, the state-led
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public works programmes of the Fifth Republic coupled with the widespread acceptance 
of the state as the agent of modernisation in the immediate post-war period provide 
evidence of the influence of the technocratic French civü service elite. Equally, the models 
of recruitment and pre-eminence and organisation of the elite civil service, the grands 
corps, which spread into the private sector through the operation of pantouflage (whereby 
public officials acquire employment in the private sector), all lend support and legitimacy 
to the vision of a technocratic state.^  ^Indeed, studies by Thoenig, Suleiman and others 
have demonstrated how, by exploiting claims to possess general expertise, the grands 
corps pursue expansionist strategies in order to advance their interests across sectors/' 
This presence of grands corps across diverse policy sectors allegedly coordinates policy 
responses within the French state/^
However, positing a fundamental dichotomy between medical and administrative 
interests over-simplifies what is going on within health care systems. The configuration 
of interests will vary fi’om issue to issue and the 'play-off between professionals and 
corporate rationalisers cannot possibly account for all instances of health policy change. 
Jamous shows how the decision-making process surrounding the 1958 settlement between 
the state and hospital doctors (leading to the creation of regional teaching hospitals) 
hinged upon the emergence not of challenging administrative or political interests, but of 
a new category of young doctors fi*om ‘new’ disciplines.^ Even allowing for the fact that 
corporate rationalisers can at times ally with medical professionals, structural elitism 
retains a ‘broad brush’ approach which misconstrues the fi'agmentation and 
multidimensional alliances between hospital doctors and managers. French public 
administration and the medical profession are both characterised by fi'agmentation and 
internal competition. French hospital directors do not necessarily share the aims of their 
fellow corporate rationalisers in central government. They persistently ally with hospital 
doctors to ward off encroachments upon their managerial autonomy fi'om core executive 
actors (see Chapter Two).
In fact, the assumption that changes arose fi'om challenges by corporate 
rationalisers simply does not apply for most of the development of health care systems 
when managers and politicians were content to work as ‘diplomats’. I n  France, as in the 
NHS, hospital directors developed an alternative administrative hierarchy which did not
encroach into the domain of medical freedom."^  ^Indeed, as long as they were promoted 
from class to class according to the number of beds in their hospitals and could manage 
budgets to bear the costs of medical expansion, directors engaged in tacit alliances with 
hospital doctors.
This recognition of tacit alliances obliges structural interest accounts to explain 
why hospital directors began as diplomats but later became challengers to medical 
predominance. Alford ties the emergence of corporate rationalisers to the issues of wider 
economic, social and technological change. Yet, he qualifies this dynamic by accepting 
that challenges to medical predominance only occur when corporate rationalisers perceive 
a successful opportunity to undermine professional monopolisers, relegating social and 
economic developments to the realm of a ‘clue’ to understanding the timing of health 
policy change.^  ^ This position does not explain how coiporate rationalisers have 
interpreted changes in the wider environment, believed them to provide a window of 
opportunity to challenge medical predominance, and have seized that opportunity.
Consequently, structural elitist accounts also hinge upon the translation of changes 
in the broader economic and social environment into health policy networks. The inherent 
dominance of the professional monopolisers means that any explanation of change is 
problematic, as external change pressures might always be distorted by the structural 
dynamic of health care systems. There are also difficulties in isolating the apparent logic 
and structural interests that exist.
New institutionalism
New institutionalist accounts examine how formal institutions, informal rules, routines and 
procedures mediate the behaviour of actors within the decision-making process.^ 
Structures, rules, and routines shape the goals and interests of political actors. They 
structure power relations, attaching benefits and constraints to different patterns of 
behaviour. Individuals will consequently process issues according to a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ which fits issues into existing practices and underpins institutional 
stabUity.^  ^Thus, the configuration of institutions within political systems biases the path 
and outcomes of policies, and influences the relative power of actors within the policy 
process. The degree of centralisation within policy systems, the relations between the
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executive and the legislative, the rules of electoral competition, the nature of the party 
system and the relative strength of interest groups, will all have impacts upon the capacity 
of actors to induce policy change. Differences between institutional frameworks will make 
certain political systems less resistant to change than others.'^ However, in general, 
institutions, ‘are believed to be inherently inert, rigid, and change-resistant. They impose 
structure and continuity on an otherwise changing world...
The general culture of the French state, which frames the values and norms of elite 
policy-makers, leads them to favour statist responses to health policy reforms.^* Wilsford 
argues that the institutional framework fecilitates the executive’s domination of the policy­
making process.^  ^The French executive has several tactical advantages over the medical 
profession, which is both organisationally fragmented and poorly mobilised. These tactical 
advantages emerge from the French executive’s extensive proposal and decree powers, its 
commanding position over a weak National Assembly, the tradition of powerful ministerial 
cabinets, an extensive and homogeneously trained bureaucratic elite, a judiciary of limited 
powers and the ideological fragmentation of interests. As a result, health policy changes 
mainly derive from a series of state-led initiatives which have diminished the influence of 
the medical profession*
Hospital reforms were introduced in 1958, 1967, and 1969 under the 
Gaullists and in 1983 under the Socialists. Each time physicians opposed 
them. Each time physicians lost. Indeed, a linear decline is evident in 
French physicians’ political influence since World War II. ^
However, Wilsford, inspired by the Crozier thesis of a ‘blocked society’*', recognises that
the ‘strong’ French state is vulnerable to direct action. Such vulnerability arises because
the capacity of the state to over-ride interest groups leaves them with no option, but to
try and mobilize their supporters to take direct action.*^
Keeler offers support for this thesis, arguing that the structural assets and
constitutional weapons at the disposal of the French executive overcame the legislative
stalemate of the Fourth Republic,** The judicious use of these constitutional weapons
enabled the minority Rocard government not only to survive in office, but to force its
legislation through the National Assembly.*'* And Immergut illustrates how Parliament in
the Fourth Republic acted as veto point for health care legislation, arguing that it was the
extensive decree proposals attributed to government in the Fifth Republic which enabled
the Debré government to push through the 1958 ordinances.** Equally, Dunn, in a study
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of the highway lobby in France, shows how the bureaucracy was able to maintain policies 
opposed by the highway lobby because of the tactical advantages enjoyed by the state. 
Dunn attempts to refine Wilsford’s work by assuming that, although tactical advantages 
exist across sectors, leaders will only exploit them in areas which they perceive to be core 
state fimctions.^^
Yet, the same institutional arrangements which reinforce the dominance of the 
French executive attach constraints or incentives to decisions over time, thereby 
channelling policy along the same incremental paths. In his later work, Wilsford stresses 
the path dependency or ‘lock in’ which ties public policy in health policy sub-systems to 
previous decisions and the existing status quo of institutional arrangements.^^ Indeed, 
\^sford  accepts that radical policy change requires the existence of strong conjunctural 
forces, such as technological innovation, which alter incentives and disincentives, and 
existing balances of power, to enable policy actors to implement change and switch paths. 
These conjunctural forces are defined as unpredictable and rapidly changing ‘fleeting 
comings together of a number of diverse elements into a new, single combination’.^ * In 
France, the departure fi’om existing paths of hospital management policy induced by the 
introduction of the global budget was the result of such conjunctural factors - the presence 
of certain individuals and the economic difiSculties of the Left, facilitated by the hierarchy 
and centralisation of the French state.
However, Wilsford provides no explanation of how to predict the timing and 
actuality of changing conjunctures. By definition, they are unpredictable and brief 
windows of opportunity. Neither does he provide any extended discussion of why policy­
makers might react differently to certain conjunctural factors and invoke change. Indeed, 
Wilsford tends to divorce individuals fi’om any responsibility for managing events and 
manipulating preferences in order to create the necessary conditions for change. He 
suggests that policy-makers should recognise that patience is a virtue and, having prepared 
the ground for policy change, should wait for the new conjuncture that allows policy to 
overcome the existing barriers to change. Similarly, he accepts that fortuna is involved in 
the arrival of circumstance conducive to policy change.^
These difficulties raise the awkward relationship of how new institutionalist- 
inspired accounts of policy change can cope with its elevation of rules, routines and
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procedures. Their focus upon acknowledged patterns of behaviour emphasizes the 
continuity of policies and structures and points to incremental change as the norm. 
External pressures will be mediated by ‘organisational dynamics that imprints their own 
image upon the outcom e.T hese accounts suggest that episodes of policy change are 
infrequent, with change path-dependent and limited, unless the result of rare moments of 
historical crisis and creative destruction.®^
More importantly, Wilsford misconceives the resources at the disposal of the 
medical profession to combat the tactical advantages enjoyed by the French state. He 
argues that the organisational weaknesses of the medical profession, fragmentation and 
poor mobilisation ‘cut across the generic imperatives embedded within the profession, 
such as technical expertise, which establishes the doctor as the key figure in the hierarchy 
of service providers.’®^ Yet, the medical profession gains its influence through its control 
of expertise and information at the grassroots where decision-making is implementational. 
The frilure of the move towards departments within public hospitals in 1984 exemplifies 
this street-level autonomy of hospital doctors and undermines the conception of a ‘strong’ 
French state. Indeed, it is arguable that the alleged organisational weakness of hospital 
doctor trade unions actually hinders the capacity of the state to manage the 
implementation of policy, because it rids it of a credible interlocutor. Very differing 
conclusions can be drawn from Wilsford’s observations. Suleiman concludes that the 
‘strong’ centralised administrative structures of the French executive facilitate group 
capture of the state,®* Pierson argues that institutions can produce different impacts upon 
policy-making when government priorities shift from expansion to retrenchment.®® Kuhn 
argues that, in the broadcasting sector, the French state was never monolithic, but that the 
‘result was less an impotent than a confused state.’®®
Overall, new institutionalist accounts provide valuable insights into how 
institutional actors take decisions and the development paths of public policies. They 
provide a foundation for explaining both policy continuities and the persistence of distinct 
patterns o f decision-making within states. However, ultimately, the French state tradition 
and institutions, as highlighted by Wilsford, do not determine behaviour and policy 
outcomes. They structure the actions of agents and outcomes through determining the 
constraints and opportunities of the rules of the game.®^  New institutionalist approaches
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assume that incremental change is the norm. The difiBculty here is that radical change or 
policy innovation tends to be associated with the dislocation of structures, when existing 
rules no longer apply. Indeed, it is a recognition of the very inappropriateness of existing 
rules and norms in public health systems which lay behind the upheavals within health 
policy networks.
Meso-corporatism
Meso-corporatists argue that the advanced capitalist state increasingly attributes 
monopoly representation to functional or producer groups in exchange for their co­
operation in the formulation and implementation of public policies. Policy-making is, 
therefore, characterised as a closed process of mutually dependent bargaining, with its 
outcomes implemented through the channel of interest group leaderships who police their 
rank-and-file membership.^* This acceptance of mutual dependency leads to a 
concentration upon the bargaining process between state managers and the leaders of peak 
organisations, especially the umbrella organisations of labour and capital. Thus, in contrast 
to ‘strong’ state approaches, meso-corporatist accounts recognise that producer groups 
place marked constraints upon the actions of state managers.
Such closed decision-making and mutual dependence between the state and 
producer groups was at the heart of the post-war compromise between the state and the 
medical profession in health care.®^  However, work on interest groups in France has 
tended to deny the existence of fully-fledged liberal corporatist systems of interest 
intermediation. Rather than the monopoly, hierarchically-ordered groups necessary for 
liberal corporatism, pressure groups in France have traditionally been seen as relatively 
weak and ideologically fi^gmented.^® Yet, empirical work in this vein has not found refuge 
solely within a pluralist conception of state-interest group relations. Instead, it has pointed 
both to the interventionism of the French state in shaping the group universe and to the 
existence of more than one form of interest intermediation in France, invoking multiple 
models of state-interest group relations which include variants of liberal corporatism.^^ 
Even those who adopt a pluralist approach, such as Wilson, stress the state-led nature of 
pluralism within France.^ As Hall points out, the French state subsidises between half and 
three quarters o f the budgets of many interest groups, and each year it seconds
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approximately four thousand public employees to work with interest groups/^
In his study of the changing relations between agricultural trade unions and the 
state, Keeler identified a pronounced degree of corporatist decision-making. The state 
eases policy implementation by exploiting the capacity of agricultural trade unions to 
police their members. He points to the existence of sectoral corporatism within France 
whereby the degree to which the state and interest groups develop corporatist ties varies 
from policy sub-system to policy sub-system.^^ Similarly, Jobert and Muller argue that 
sectoral corporatism and professional regulation of social activities is a fimdamental 
element of French public services. They distinguish two models of sectoral corporatism: 
social and technical. The technical model involves the takeover of a policy sub-system’s 
management by a technostructure or elite civil service corps. In contrast, the social model 
delegates control to professionals who negotiate with a technostructure or administrative 
hierarchy with little prestige.’^
In the French health policy sub-system, Jobert and Muller recognise the apparent 
weakness of the sectoral corporatist approach because of the fragmentation amongst the 
medical professions’ representative organisations.^^ Like Wilsford, they acknowledge that 
interest group fragmentation is compounded by low membership and the inability of 
professional elites to discipline the rank-and-file. These organisational weaknesses enable 
medical elites to mobilise defensively against external threats to the profession’s self­
regulation and expertise, but leave them unable to take charge of the regulation of the 
health care system as expected within coiporatist bargaining structures.^ Unlike Wilsford, 
however, Jobert and Muller conclude that the strength of the medical profession lies not 
in its organisational resources, but in its cultural authority over other policy actors and 
wider French society. It provided the dominant référentiel, the commanding policy 
discourse in health policy-making. As Dunleavy argues, such ideological corporatism, 
founded upon a dominant professional ‘view of the world’, integrates policy networks, 
guides policy and lessens the perception among decision-makers of a need to regulate 
professions - so that policy largely becomes what professionals in the field do.^ *
Meso-corporatist accounts are primarily static and unable to explain the emergence 
of rival groups within health policy networks. The fundamental assumption of mutual 
dependence implies that policy change will be incremental and adaptive. In fact, the
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bargaining process between the state and interest groups partly depends upon whether the 
process can remain non-conflictual, closed and insulated from external actors. Cawson 
further minimises conflict between dominant partners and rival groups by arguing that 
vertical fonctional divisions within society mean that all actors in one sector will be linked 
by shared functional interests.^^ In health care systems, a ‘vertical’ grouping of health 
service employees can be expected to have a common interest in maintaining expenditure 
and expanding services. Equally, references to the ideological dominance of professionals 
accept the policy dynamic of professional trends, but they hamper a meso-corporatist 
explanation of emerging challenges to medical predominance. Why does not the shared 
professional ‘view of the world’ strangle the emergence of opposing viewpoints? And, 
such accounts would need to explain and accept the declining cultural authority of hospital 
doctors.
In their study of general practice in Britain, Klein and Day confirm the diflSculties 
that meso-corporatist accounts experience when explaining policy change in public health 
care systems.*® They argue that the evolution of policy towards general practice in the 
NHS should be seen as periods of distributional conflicts punctuated by constitutional 
conflicts, when the structure and processes of the health care system are called into 
question. However, th ^  conclude that it is only distributional conflicts which are marked 
by meso-corporatist patterns of decision-making. Constitutional conflicts cannot be 
explained by reference to the assumptions of the corporatist model. Yet, it is these periods 
of innovation that are pivotal to the understanding of the evolution of public health care 
systems.
In conclusion, meso-corporatist approaches recognise both the mutual dependence 
that exists between the state and hospital doctors, and the closed decision-making 
processes installed by the state-profession compromise in public health care systems. 
However, the assumption of closed and essentially incremental decision-making precludes 
meso-corporatist accounts from drawing satisfactory conclusions about the emergence of 
rival lobbies within health care systems. As with new institutionalist accounts, the 
transforming ‘constitutional’ crises, necessary to our understanding of the emergence of 
groups, lie outside its explanatory grip.
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Policy Networks
Policy network accounts argue that policy-making takes place within relatively closed 
networks of government departments, interest groups and professional bodies, and stress 
the disaggregation of policy-making and the fragmentation of the state.*  ^Networks vary 
across policy sub-systems with no consistent policy style or pattern of interest 
intermediation. Even within policy sub-systems such as health, the constellation of actors 
varies across the fields of services and between service and resource issues.^ Marsh and 
Rhodes identify two primary meso-level policy networks which emphasise structural 
relationships between organisations at the sectoral level rather than relations between 
individuals. ‘Policy communities’ are characterised by stability, frequent consultation 
between members, restricted memberships, high levels of consensus and a balance of 
power among members. ‘Issue networks’ are atomistic, lack stability, have a large 
fluctuating membership with limited interdependence, and have an unequal spread of 
resources between members.*^
Marsh and Rhodes argue that policy networks are brought together through 
resource dependency, with their boundaries determined by breaks in the resource 
structure, as identified by the ‘centre’ or produced by external pressures.*'  ^Networks 
subsequently emerge in policy sub-systems such as health, where governments are 
dependent upon professionals for information and expertise and where decision-making 
is ultimately biased towards implementation.*^ The unsatisfactory quality of coercion as 
a regulatory tool in such instances where the state depends upon groups for resources 
obliges governments to exploit the tools of exchange and shared norms and values. 
However, policy networks are also integrated through shared expertise or common belief 
systems. Hass points to epistemic communities, unified by common expertise and sharing 
normative and causal beliefs and common policy solutions.*® Sabatier identifies advocacy 
coalitions in which groups and organisations share common basic values and belief 
systems, and operate with the same causal assumptions, problem perceptions and 
preferred policies.*^
In the case of France, there is little specific policy literature on policy networks 
although Jouve draws parallels between the work of Marsh and Rhodes and that of 
Crozier, Freidberg and Jobert and Mueller which underlines the formulation of public
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policies within stable networks marked by common values and frequent interactions.** 
Culpepper argues that the dynamics of French agricultural policy-making are best 
encapsulated by competitive policy collaboration whereby multiple independent groups 
operate in a privileged policy community marked by muted competition.*^ Equally, 
Hayward, in his study of economic and industrial policy-making, points to the existence 
of a semi-pluralistic elistist policy community which brings together business, public and 
private bankers and politico-administrative leaders.^ Indeed, Cawson, Holmes and 
Stevens stress the disaggregation of the French state and the existence of sectoral policy 
networks in telecommunications and consumer electronics.^^
In general, French public policy studies have focused upon political networks 
between individuals which act as mediating and co-ordinating mechanisms within a rather 
closed politico-administrative system.^ In doing so, they have pursued a state-centred 
elitist analysis with the long-term cohesion and stability of networks produced by the 
ubiquitous presence of the elite civil service corps and their common training and 
socialisation processes/^ For instance, Josselin stresses the dominance of state actors in 
financial policy networks in France.®'* However, the stability of such networks is 
increasingly questioned by destabilising effects, such as: the rupture of local networks built 
upon relationships between prefects and notables; the displacement of decision-making 
centres caused by the increasing interventions of Brussels in ‘national’ policy-making; and 
growing external constraints such as economic pressures.®  ^ Schmidt argues that in the 
sphere of industrial policy, the heroic policy of the French state has dedined, as the state 
itself has sowed the seeds of the previous system’s downfall through deregulation and 
privatisation.®'^  Similarly, John and Cole suggests the convergence of patterns of decision­
making between countries as the requirement of cooperation and coordination in the face 
of similar social and economic pressures leads to the creation of networks which bypass 
established institutional arrangements.®^
Within the policy network literature, the evolution of health policy sub-systems is 
portrayed as the demise of a professional policy community which subordinated political 
and managerial influences as well as the needs of clients to the values and interests of 
dominant medical professionals.®* In the French public health care system, Jobert has 
charted how the challenges of the Finance Ministry and the Social Security funds during
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the formulation of French Plans threatened the privileged relationship of elite regional 
hospital doctors and the public hospital lobby, the Fédération Hospitalière de France, 
with the Health Ministry.^ In the British NHS, Wistow and Smith argue that new groups 
infiltrated the closed health policy community as it moved to a much ‘looser’ network, 
coming under attack from government and hospital managers in the 1980s and early 
1990s.^°° However, such explanations of health policy change are hampered by the 
inherent bias towards stability within professional policy networks which are the most 
resistant to change of all networks. Such networks arise to reduce uncertainty and to 
facilitate the management of difficult tasks by imposing routine. By definition, they are 
static and closed, insulated from other actors and the external environment.
Policy network theory has primarily sought to explain change within policy 
networks by reference to a list of exogenous or network-environment pressures which 
produce instability within established policy networks. These pressures are deemed to 
emanate from four broad sources of change within the wider environment: 
economic/market, ideological, knowledge/technology and institutional.^®  ^These factors 
are not mutually exclusive, operating at times in tandem, although most case studies 
acknowledge the significance of economic change. Wistow, in his study of change in 
British health policy networks, points to both economic pressures upon health care 
funding and the ideological challenges to medical predominance posed by the Thatcher 
governments.*®  ^ This argument is echoed by Jackson whose comparative study of the 
German and British coal industries concludes that the source of instability was primarily 
economic, but that the ideological platform of the Thatcher governments explains the 
heightened degree of change witnessed in Britain.*®*
The primacy of exogenous explanations runs the risk of reducing policy network 
theory to a ‘simple environmental stimulus-policy network response model’ which tells 
us little of the either the timing, nature or process of policy network change.*®^  As John 
and Cole argue, networks in such explanations do not provoke change; instead, external 
changes in the environment affect the resources of actors in networks.*®  ^However, 
endogenous pressures cannot be entirely divorced from explanations of policy network 
change. Change in policy networks can be the result of a shifting balance of resources 
within the governing coalition of the policy network in question. Equally, policy networks
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mediate the extent and direction of change, particularly in their capacity to minimise 
external pressures, although it does not follow that policy networks will necessarily act 
as a brake on change/^^ Indeed, Dohler argues that the structures of networks lend 
themselves to different policy paths. Hassenteufel, and Thatcher, go as far as to argue 
that although policy networks cannot be made accountable for changes in the 
environment, they can determine the direction of policy change. Such observations, 
Hassenteufel argues, can be married to a new institutionalist approach with the rules and 
practices of policy networks structuring the direction of policy change. However, as 
Atkinson and Coleman claim, the recognition that networks may channel the direction of 
policy change has remained a neglected topic in policy network theory.
The recognition of endogenous change does not challenge the importance of 
exogenous pressures upon policy networks. Rather, it adds a supplementary set of 
endogenous variables to already existing explanations and maintains a troublesome 
dichotomy between external and internal change. Smith draws up a comprehensive list of 
both exogenous and endogenous variables which threaten the stability of policy networks. 
It ranges from changes in external relations, new problems* despotic power, and economic 
and social change through to challenges between rival networks and emergent challenges 
within policy communities themselves.^" For good measure, Rhodes and Marsh stress that 
we should not forget that chance and opportunism play a part as do political crises in 
explaining policy network change."^
The compilation of such all-encompassing lists raises different problems. It fails 
to conceptualise the relationship between exogenous and endogenous change. Challenges 
between actors in policy networks are more often than not the product of wider changes 
in the environment. New problems, which have to be recognised by actors within 
networks, emerge because of broad social, economic and ideological change. More 
significantly, any list of variables remains exhaustive only for as long as it takes new case 
studies to isolate additional key variables (see for example the now common reference to 
the impact of European Union institutions as a catalyst for policy network change). Such 
an approach substitutes ‘empirical breadth’ for ‘theoretical depth’, adding to our 
understanding of the context of change rather than the actual process of change."^
Dowding argues that policy network accounts of policy change lack a theory of
2 0
power, and he casts doubt on the explanatory significance of policy networks/ '^* For him, 
networks are merely labels with no existence outside the resources at the disposal of 
actors within the policy process; they reflect the wider distribution of power within 
society. However, whilst Dowding consequently calls for the use of micro-level theories 
to explain policy network change. Smith demonstrates how ‘traditional’ state theories or 
macro-theories might be applied to meso-level policy networks. Neither of these views
are disputed by Marsh who calls for the marrying of policy networks with both macro- 
and m icro-theories.A s Marsh argues, structures such as networks cannot be solely 
reduced to the preferences of actors. And, whilst there is a need to understand the 
relations of power within networks, there is also an need to understand the wider nature 
of relations between state and civil society. However, Mills and Saward argue that 
applications of macro-theories have resulted in the unsatisfactory argument that policy 
networks are a multi-theoretic field.^ *^
The debate raised by Dowding illustrates the weakness of policy network theory 
which, as Marsh and Smith point out, is its failure to conceptualise the interactions 
between structures and agents."^ They argue that Dowding misguidedly reduces 
structures to the preferences and actions o f agents. Indeed, individualist approaches to 
networks share Dowding's mistrust of the influence of structures. However, they conclude 
that Knoke and Lauman and Marsh and Rhodes over-emphasise the role of structures. In 
fact, Marsh and Smith view policy networks as structures within which agents operate: 
‘Agents are, in a sense, “bearers” of those positions, but they interpret, deconstruct and 
reconstruct these structu res...T hus, the relationships within policy networks are both 
structural and interpersonal. As John and Cole point out, networks can be ‘dependent in 
the sense that social and political factors affect the shape of the network [and] 
independent because the process of networking affects policy.
Overall, policy network accounts isolate the resource dependency that brings 
actors together within the policy process. They recognise the fi'agmentation of the state 
and the distinct nature of the configuration of networks across sectors. Indeed, the nature 
of the policy network will affect policy outcomes. However, policy communities are, by 
definition, closed and biased towards stability. They manage routine decision-making. So, 
they cannot explain change within policy subsystems adequately, and analysts fall back
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upon change in the environment of policy networks, failing to conceptualise the relations 
between structures and agents.
In conclusion, all the accounts examined so far capture certain elements of the 
process of policy change in health care systems. Neo-mandst approaches isolate the 
macro-economic pressures for policy change. Structural elitism recognises the competition 
between rival elites. New institutionalist explanations identify the institutional 
configurations, routines and norms which influence the direction of policy change. Meso- 
corporatist explanations stress the mutual dependency between the state and the medical 
profession and the closed decision-making at the heart of the state-profession 
compromise. Likewise, policy network accounts, which allow for the fi*agmentation and 
disaggregation of the state, recognise the resource dependency that ties the state to the 
medical profession. Indeed, policy networks as political structures constrain and 
encourage certain decisions and thereby contribute to explanations of policy outcomes.
These competing strengths suggest that explanations of health policy should draw 
on différent theories to construct a composite explanation.^^ This multitheoretic approach 
argues that individual theories are hierarchically ordered, operating at either the macro-, 
meso- or micro-level. Macro-theories such as neo-marxism offer ‘a higher level of 
generality’'^  within which to fit the less comprehensive micro-theories. However, such 
composite explanations have their own limitations, deriving often fi*om the combination 
of theories with contradictory assumptions. Whilst such limitations may be avoidable, 
Saunders argues that the distinction between macro- and micro-levels is unsustainable and 
that these distinctions have a tendency to reduce the micro-theory to the macro-theory.'^ 
Harrison, Hunter and Pollitt thus rely extensively upon neo-marxism at the macro-level 
as an explanation of policy change, vdiich tends to over-rides the contribution of structural 
interest theory to their composite explanation.'^
In fact, existing accounts all fail to deal adequately with the process of policy 
change, failing to allow for both open or closed decision-making arenas and a coherent 
dynamic of policy formulation and implementation. Structural elitism, new 
institutionalism, meso-corporatism and policy network explanations demonstrate an 
inherent bias towards routine and stability, conceptualising a relatively closed policy-
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making process which nonetheless relies upon external social and economic pressures to 
explain policy change. In contrast, neo-marxist explanations, whilst taking full account of 
the structural pressures for change within capitalist systems, deem the formulation and 
nature of policy responses to be unproblematic. The interactions between structures and 
agents is poorly conceptualised by both policy network and neo-marxist accounts. One 
particular objective of this thesis is to investigate how best to conceptualise both the 
intermediating mechanisms of policy formulation, largely ignored by neo-mandsts and, the 
dynamic of public policies, underplayed by network analysis. To do so, it examines the 
role of politicians in managing policy networks. Most accounts fail to conceptualise the 
interventions of politicians in policy-making, either reducing political actors to automatons 
or, placing them in straitjacket of resource dependency and the cultural norms and 
routines of institutions.
1.2 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING HEALTH POLICY
CHANGE
The significance of interventions by politicians and their capacity to pursue goals which 
are not simply reflective of the interests of social groups or classes has been widely 
recognised .T his section builds upon the assumption that the strategic choices of 
politicians will help to shape the environment rather than adapt to it.^ ^^  It assumes that the 
emergence of hospital directors, although partly due to changes within the group itself, 
is best explained by the top-down interventions of politicians in the policy process. The 
first part examines the entry of ‘new’ groups into policy networks fi*om the individual 
group perspective. The second introduces a fi*amework o f possible paths open to 
politicians in the management of policy networks.
Change front the individual groupes perspective
The often-affirmed closed boundaries of policy networks and communities militate against 
the entry of new actors into the decision-making process (see above). The membership 
of policy networks depends upon the product of the resources and bargaining strategies 
employed by actors within the decision-making process. Within professional policy 
networks such as health, claims to authoritative information and technical expertise can
23
be expected to provide initially both legitimacy and access to the inner core of policy­
makers. Groups deficient in these areas or with little social or outcome power will be 
excluded.
However, strategies and resources evolve as actors respond to changing 
circumstances and events. An individual group seeking to gain entry into a policy network 
from which it has previously been excluded may make some headway because of its 
bargaining strategies, but its progress will depend much more on increasing the resources 
at its disposal. Progress here can result fi"om either a revaluation of existing resources or 
an addition to the stock of resources at the disposal of the group. Groups activate latent 
resources they already possess, or develop new resources. But, in addition, both 
revaluations or additions to the stock of group resources can themselves be the product 
of either a top-down process where group actors are in some way selected for influence 
by higher-level decision-makers, or the product of a bottom-up process where group 
leaders or members are in some way self-started, creating their own success.
Taking into account the origin and nature of resource change, we can point to four 
broad explanations of the entry of new actors in policy networks (see Table 1.1). First, the 
resources at the disposal of a group can take on increased utility or salience for other 
actors. This can be result of changes in the environment which mean that dominant actors 
need resources at the disposal of a previously excluded group. Second, groups may be 
advantaged whereby they benefit through the actions of another actor. For example, 
Dutch welfare professionals took on a more prominent role within policy-making not 
because of thdr fimdamental challenge to the then corporatist modes of decision-making, 
but as ‘a result of other choices that unintentionally made professionals more 
im portant.Third, the costs of collective mobilisation can decline, thus enabling group 
leaders or members to exploit previously untapped resources. Finally, groups may seek 
to develop new resources themselves, which can be subsequently employed to advance 
their aims or interests.
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To explore these distinctions in more detail, I begin with top-down influences. 
Politicians devote substantial time and effort to organising and reorganising policy arenas 
to support the formation and implementation of policies. Politicians will often intervene 
in the management of policy networks because policy networks privilege certain policy 
outcomes, shying roles and behaviour, specifying acceptable issues and defining rules of 
the game.^ They are able to do so because governments possess legitimacy and greater 
opportunities for conditional and unconditional incentives than other actors within policy 
networks: ‘at the end of the day, the material power and legitimacy of elected government 
can ride roughshod over any policy community.'"^ Rhodes argues that it would be 
misguided to under-estimate the asymmetric nature of the resources within policy 
communities and thereby devalue the capacity of governments to manipulate policy 
communities.^^^
Policy network theorists have characterized the arrival in government of politicians 
with distinctive ideologies or policy initiatives as the ‘grit’ in the routine business of the 
network’s internal ac to rs.R hodes attributes to government the capacity to manage 
access to policy networks, decide the rules of the game within policy networks and 
determine the scope and timing of consultation. Smith contends that Presidents and 
Prime ministers can employ their despotic power to ‘force new issues onto the agenda, 
[...] take decisions themselves, [..] give access to different groups, or [...] change the 
institution which is responsible for making a decision .Indeed, politicians can create a 
new group whilst seeking to erode or compensate its rivals. However, politicians can also 
manipulate the strategies and preferences of existing interest groups to foster bottom-up
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changes in the balance of influence between professional groups. So, politicians can 
manipulate the strategies and preferences of interest groups, alter the definition of issues 
and information flows, tampering with tensions and the balance of resources between 
groups, and thereby facilitate or impede collective action. Specific policies also create 
incentives by generating ‘spoils’ that help group leaderships to overcome collection action 
problems.
Involvement within a policy network, even a consensual policy community, does 
not mean that core executives will necessarily develop policies in harmony with the 
interests of the wider membership of the network. Thompson argues that the attacks by 
Thatcher governments on welfere professionals and the Thatcherite reforms of the welfare 
state illustrate that ‘core executive actors (especially ministers) can and will develop 
interests independent of those responsible for policy implementation. The formulation 
of the ‘internal market’ within the NHS and the 1987 NHS Policy Review were carried 
out by a small team of ministers with minimal external contributions firom the existing 
professional policy communities in the NHS.‘ *^ Similarly, the Thatcher government 
excluded the water boards, the pivotal actors in the existing policy network, fi*om a period 
of internal government decision-making during the privatisation of the water industry. 
Indeed, the French President and Prime minister excluded agricultural trade unions and 
high-ranking ofl&dals in the Agriculture Ministry fi’om decision-making during the 1991- 
1993 GATT negotiations.^^ Ministers can thus often choose between working alone or 
with policy communities. However, policy network theory has generally underplayed 
the importance of traditional variables such as political leadership and partisan choice.
The interventions of top politicians will be fundamental to explanations of policy 
network change. But this proposition says little about the nature or timing of their 
interventions, except to raise the prospect of some more all-encompassing lists of the 
possible actions politicians could take. The next section develops a firamework to examine 
the interventions and paths open to instrumental politicians in a specific situation where 
they are faced with a decline in the quality of outcomes produced by existing networks.
The limits of exit and voice: politicians and network restructuring
As long as the ‘routine business’ of policy networks produces an acceptable quality of
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outcomes, we can assume that rational politicians will have little or no reason to intervene 
in how the networks are run. But, some form of intervention will be triggered if politicians 
perceive a ‘crisis’ in terms of the declining quality of outcomes produced by a policy 
network. When the quality of outcomes is falling or decreasingly acceptable, politicians 
will confront costs measured primarily in terms of actual or potential lost support both 
from voters and client groups. Once the costs of these dysfunctional policies are deemed 
too high to bear, the core executive will intervene as long as it has a solution in prospect 
to the drop in the quality of outcomes. With no acceptable solution, it can decide to do 
nothing.
Declines in the quality of outcomes, as perceived by politicians, can occur for a 
multitude of reasons. The discovery of new solutions to problems previously accepted as 
non-issues or as faits accomplis often induces the perception of declining quality and 
occasion interventions. Equally, issues can be cognitively reconstructed through changing 
‘word formulas’ and symbolic constructions which produce new approaches. Lastly, 
qualitatively new problems can simply emerge. ‘Crises’ tend to be conceived as the results 
of unforeseeable or contingent events, limited in time, and outside the boundaries of the 
policy network. However, crises can be quasi-permanent, produced by the inherent 
tensions of the wider economic and political system. Within health policy sub-systems, 
many authors have argued that government is engaged in perpetual crisis management as 
it seeks to balance the legitimacy of expanding care and the constraints of economic 
management.
Hirshmann identified ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ as the two primary mechanisms which 
actors can use to redress short-term declines in quality.Through ‘exit’, actors escape 
from dysfunctional outcomes or declining quality by choosing an alternative product or 
organisation. Losing clients or members may subsequently lead the organisation involved 
to redress declining standards or dysfunctional policies. Through ‘voice’, actors express 
their dissatisfaction with the product or organisation. They remain as consumers of the 
product or members of the organisation in the expectation that complaints will force 
management to change its practices. The choice of either exit or voice is determined by 
the availability of alternatives, channels of influence, and the extent of ‘loyalty’ to the 
organisation. Loyalty, the degree of attachment to an organisation, will delay the use of
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exit and increase the likelihood of recourse to voice. Actors strongly influenced by loyalty 
stay with the organisation and remain silent about their dissatisfaction. However, voice 
is also likely to be used both in the earlier stages of quality decline as an alternative to exit, 
and at later stages in combination with exit - those who depart protesting may have more 
impact in accomplishing organisational change than those who exit without voicing the 
reasons why. Actors can exit an organisation in more than one way: transferring to a rival 
group, taking up a completely different issue, or switching out of collective action 
altogether.
Voice options are often the most significant channels of influence within the 
political domain. In the management of policy networks, voice equates to initiatives 
designed to change the culture of policy networks or to encourage actors to voluntarily 
alter their behaviour. People may try to influence the nature of the interaction processes 
between actors through the ‘selective activation’ of actors, the mobilisation of resources, 
the exploitation of the rules governing the network and communication strategies aimed 
at changing the perceptions of actors. In the British NHS, the voice function can be seen 
as being used with the whole series of management initiatives beginning with the 
Cogwheel reforms. In France, we can point to government publicity and information 
campaigns seeking to reduce rising drugs bills through encouraging changing patterns of 
prescriptions. However, most voice options have a weakness, because they accept the 
structure of the network as given. And, for voice to be effective, it often must be 
accompanied by the realistic threat of exit or sanction. If government actors have no 
alternative source of infonnation and expertise or provision in health care, and cannot 
realistically back out of thdr current responsibilities for public health, doctors may not feel 
that threats to exit the sector or cutback fimding are realistic, and so may not change their 
behaviour.
Exit is open to political actors either by withdrawing state intervention and support 
for service delivery, or by abandoning the established policy network. In public health care 
system, the withdrawal of services could be promoted over time through the development 
of the private sector care, simultaneously running down public services and providing 
incentives for clients to exit the public health care service. However, this exit option is 
only politically tenable for those political parties whose supporters do not demonstrate any
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significant degree of allegiance to public hospitals - usually because they either have, or 
could develop, a satisfactory private sector alternative for themselves. Even so, the costs 
of such a long-term withdrawal are bound to be high, with politicians enduring long-term 
unrest in the health policy network and risking electoral dissatisfaction Ifrom worried 
voters.
Second, whatever the alleged degree of resource dependency between government 
and groups, politicians can simply by-pass established policy communities. There is no 
obstacle to the use of internalised decision-making as long as the government is ready to 
incur the costs of new patterns of policy-making. However, these excursions outside the 
realm of policy networks can usually only be short-term or temporary. Governments can 
rarely maintain the level of sustained political intervention necessary to secure long-terms 
changes in a field where implementation rests with professional decision. Short-term or 
intense interventions to redress an unacceptable decline in the quality of existing outcomes 
are feasible, but politicians will normally be obliged to return thereafter to periods of 
routine or acceptable containment within networks. Indeed, political actors’ interventions 
will also be deflected over time by institutional actors as they reassert pre-existing norms 
and practices, and exploit the resource dependency between groups and governments.
With these constraints on the successful deployment of voice and exit options, 
neither route offers political actors mechanisms which are guaranteed capable of 
redressing the falling quality of outcomes of policy networks. Such constraints lead 
politicians to manage networks through the paths of network restructuring. These paths 
lie in between voice and exit. Unlike voice or game management strategies, they do not 
accept the structure of the network as given. Instead, network restructuring techniques 
seek to influence the distribution of resources, rules of the game and the norms, values and 
perceptions within the network in favour of government objectives. Unlike exit, they 
do not provide for government to disengage fi'om the provision of services, nor do they 
try and internalise policy-making in the core executive or central government. The two 
key reshaping choices are between expansion or consolidation. Consolidation reduces the 
number of actors in the network and closes the boundaries of the network to external 
actors. Expansion involves either the introduction of new groups, or the opening of 
barriers to other policy sub-systems, in order to dilute opposition to policies or to create
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new coalitional possibilities and dynamics.
When placed alongside exit and voice, expansion and consolidation provide a 
framework within which to discuss how politicians can (try to) reconfigure policy 
networks. Seven network restructuring paths are open to politicians when policy networks 
enter into crisis (see Figure 1.1), all of them top-down strategies. First, they can expand 
the membership of the policy network, perhaps by pushing a policy community into 
something more like an issue network. Second, politicians can reduce the membership of 
the policy network, moving towards a policy community set-up by privileging one 
dominant group. Third, politicians can seek to alter the balance between competing 
advocacy coalitions, where they are present. Fourth, governments can enter into 
corporatist arrangements with key actors in the policy network, creating a two-tier policy 
network with a core of key actors and a periphery of weaker actors.^’® Fifth, politicians 
dissatisfied with a quality decline can develop a rival policy network to invade the areas 
of conqjetence devolved previously to the policy community in question. Sixth, politicians 
can maintain the structure of an existing network, but progressively introduce top-down 
controls to increase ‘stress’ in the system, or remove certain aspects of the existing 
network’s respon^ilities. Finally, politicians can introduce new institutional mechanisms 
such as quasi-markets to guide implementation structures and decision-making process. 
Following any of these paths will redistribute resources between interest groups and 
fedlitate new entrants or exclusions from the decision-making policy process. They will 
also encourage bottom-up changes within professional organisations in response.
Recognising that these paths give politicians an active role in designing policy 
subsystems, does not necessarily mean that they can force through controversial policies. 
Faced with long-term decline in outcomes’ quality, politicians will often move from path 
to path as they seek to redress their problems. Policy innovation will often be a process 
of experimentation, of trial and error, as politicians interpret policy feedback and respond 
to past choices.Equally, top politicians’ interventions will stimulate new strategies by 
individual groups which rebound on the original top-down strategies.
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Figure 1.1: Politicians and Top-Down Strategies of Network Restructuring
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Summarizing this discussion, I argue first, that politicians will intervene actively 
in the management of policy networks, and that their interventions will be pivotal in any 
understanding of policy network change. Second, change is most likely to take place when 
there is a crisis within the policy network produced by declining quality of outcomes, or 
a dislocation in the existing structures of policy networks. Third, when politicians 
intervene, they will characteristically do so using a series of short-term moves fi'om one 
of seven options, often with a trial and error approach. Fourth, politicians’ actions are 
always constrained in some way. Long-term policy developments will take place as top- 
down strategies impact upon individual group strategies, but will often depend on 
efiecting changes in the relevant interest group universe. Which of the paths outlined here 
are followed by top politicians in government will depend upon a number of variables, not 
least the institutional structure of the policy subsystem in discussion.
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1.3 THE ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
This study focuses upon the emergence of hospital directors as a new and influential actor 
in French health policy debates. The first half of the analysis adopts an individual-group 
perspective. It begins with a detailed analysis of the bottom-up changes inside the corps 
of hospital directors and its major trade union, the SNCH. Chapter Two begins this 
approach by outlining the organisational map of policy-making in French hospital 
management, specifying the relevant policy network and its cleavages and potential 
alliances. Chapter Three analyses the anatomy of the hospital director corps  ^ its 
integration and expansion within the national school of public health, the tlcole Nationale 
de la Santé Publique (ENSP). It also looks at the entry of ENSP graduates into the 
SNCH. Chapter Four analyses the collective mobilisation and professional development 
of hospital directors within the SNCH.
The second half of the study examines the process of hospital management reform 
in the 1980s, and the involvement of hospital directors in successive policy initiatives. It 
looks in particular at how hospital directors within SNCH sought to influence decision- 
making as government reconfigured the health policy sub-system. Chapter Five analyses 
the positions adopted by the SNCH leadership on the reform of hospital financing, looking 
at the introduction of the global budget. Chapter Six examines the hospital directors’ 
evolving positions on the push for internal organisational reform in public hospitals, with 
the failed attempt to introduce medical departments. Finally, Chapter Seven examines how 
hospital directors lined up on the issue of planning and macro-control of public hospital 
development, focusing on the 1991 Hospital Law.
The case studies cover both distinct functional tasks and a timescale of more than 
ten years, allowing full analysis of the policy network’s complex dynamics. The trials of 
the global budget accompanied initial moves towards cost containment in 1976. The 
introduction of global budgets in 1983 ran parallel to the push for departments which went 
hand in hand with financial reform and the changing statute of hospital doctors. The 
reorganisation of hospital wards into departments was reversed in 1987. The issue of 
internal organisational reform declined in salience, and became overshadowed by that of 
hospital planning with the formulation of the 1991 Hospital Law. The development of
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diagnosis-related groups by the Health Ministry, the Programme de Médicalisation des 
Systèmes dinformation (PMSI), took place throughout the period of the case studies (see 
above). However, its formal introduction was only concluded in 1996 and its development 
was more or less confined to the Health Ministry and selected trials through the 1980s.
The conclusion of the thesis returns to the firamework for analysing health policy 
change developed above. It examines how the progressive professionalisation of hospital 
directors, and the active management of health policy networks by top politicians, worked 
in tandem with each other to produce a complex but undeniably important process of 
change in French health policy-making.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ORGANISATION OF PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN FRANCE
The compromise between the French state and the medical profession which provided the 
foundations for the expansion of the public health care system was pieced together over 
more than 25 years. Legislation in 1941 and 1943 provided a framework for the internal 
organisation of public hospitals which was subsequently cemented by the 1958 Debré 
ordinances. They paved the way for the full-time entry of hospital doctors into regional 
teaching hospitals.  ^This negotiated compromise blurred responsibility for the management 
o f the health care system between the French state, the Social Security funds and the 
medical profession.^ The ‘strong’ French state thus emerged somewhat weakened from 
its negotiated settlement with the hospital doctors.
This chapter begms by examining the system of managing the public hospital 
service which developed from this pact, and the second section analyses the administrative 
hierarchy of national government ministries. The third section looks at how public 
hospitals are organised as professional bureaucracies. The final section focuses on the 
corps of hospital directors, and how they fit into the hospital management policy sub­
system as a whole.
2.1 THE OVERALL PATTERN OF HOSPITAL SERVICES
The French health care service is based on a national health insurance scheme whose key 
elements are health sickness funds, financed primarily by employee-employer payroll 
contributions, which partially reimburse the medical costs incurred by patients.^ The 
founding decisions to set up the service were permeated by the organisational principles 
of ‘liberal’ medicine which enshrined the right of the patient to choose her doctor, 
privileged direct fee-for-service payment of doctors, and allowed for the free negotiation 
of fees between doctors and patients.* Over time, the foundations of these organisational 
principles were eroded by the state’s increasing intervention in running the health care
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service. However, the fee-for-service insurance foundations of the French health care 
service placed it in marked contrast to Britain’s nationalised NHS providing services free- 
at-the-point-of-delivery and funded by central taxation.^
With the expansion of the Social Security funds and the concurrent institution of 
third-party financing in October 1945, the general social insurance scheme (the Régime 
général) progressively extended its coverage to workers in business and industry.® 
However, initial plans for a single social insurance scheme for all workers floundered 
when pre-existing occupation-based schemes (such as those for the self-employed and 
farmers) refused to integrate into a single general scheme. The 1967 Social Security 
reforms then split the general social insurance scheme into three separate branches: health, 
pensions and 6mily allowances.^ This division gave birth to the health sickness fund, the 
Caisse nationale de Vassurance maladie des travailleurs salariés (CNAMTS). 
Approximately 80 percent of the population is covered by this one health sickness fund, 
the CNAMTS.* Yet, despite the predominance of the CNAMTS, over 30 insurance 
schemes continue to provide health care insurance under the auspices of the Social 
Security funds.^
The October 1945 ordinances enshrined the principle of management by the 
insured in the system of French social insurance, delegating the regulation of the health 
sickness funds to representatives of trade union and business federations. Indeed, the 1967 
reforms made the governing bodies of the funds responsible for balancing the budgets of 
thdr respective branches, endowing the funds with the formal capacity to fix the level of 
health sickness contributions. However, the trade union and business representatives on 
the national administrative council of the CNAMTS never exploited its formal managerial 
controls over public hospital spending. Nor did they manage the use or level of resources 
at its disposal through setting contributions or the rates paid to doctors.These rights 
remained the prerogatives of government as it usurped the functions of the CNAMTS in 
a ‘Yalta’ of the health care system which saw government gain control over public 
hospitals and the CNAMTS take control of private clinics and ambulatory care." Public 
hospitals were managed at the departmental level by the departmental health boards, while 
private clinics were managed at regional level by the regional offices of the health sickness 
funds. The French state, more attuned to a Beveridge model of wel&re delivery, competed
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with the Bismarckian social insurance of the Social Security funds, with the CNAMTS 
acting more as a ‘relay’ for the initiatives of the state.
The absence of the third party financier from the system (that is, the health 
sickness funds) was matched by open-ended financing, embodied in a clinical task-oriented 
system of public hospital payment. The prix de journée, a standard patient-day rate for the 
various medical specialisms within hospitals, did not allocate a finite sum of resources to 
public hospitals. Instead, it determined a unit of payment to balance the hospital budget, 
calculated as it was through the retrospective division of the total amount of spending for 
the previous year by the number of days spent by patients in the hospital." Deficits at the 
end of the financial year were simply carried over into the following year and perpetuated 
in the budgetary process, although hospitals could alter the patient-day rate and gain 
supplementary budgets in the course of the financial year." This arrangement was an 
inflationary mechanism: the more days spent by the patient in hospital, the larger the 
hospital's income:
‘You even saw documents, very clumsy memos from certain hospital 
directors telling the doctors that: “Given the budgetary difficulties of the 
hospital, you are invited to keep patients longer than necessary. Signed the 
director”.’"
In any case, any reduction in the number of patient bed days over the course of the 
financial year penalised hospitals rather than rewarding them for increased efficiency. 
However, this capacity to massage the length of patient stays devolved control over 
financial aggregates to the hospitals themselves. Its inclusive nature even allowed the 
cross-subsidisation of medical costs by hotel costs.
In fact, there were no developed mechanisms for resource allocation or top-down 
control of hospital development. The 1970 Hospital Law introduced the Health Map, 
dividing France into 284 health sectors and setting national quotas for the maximum 
provision of hospital services in each sector. However, in practice, it operated more as a 
means of identifying deficiencies in the provision of hospital services than as a means of 
redistributing existing hospital services from one area to another." The Ministry of Health 
lacked adequate information on local needs and operational policy tools to enforce any 
system of quotas. The number of hospital beds in the public sector actually increased by 
over 61,000 between 1972 and 1978."
Equally, general practitioners and specialists in the ambulatory care sector or
45
departmental health boards did not act as gatekeepers for hospital care. The purchasing 
fimction remained firmly in the hands of the individual patient who exercised the right to 
fi-eely choose not only her doctor, but also her hospital or private clinic. Such consumer 
sovereignty meant that patients could literally shop around for the best care available in 
either the public or private sector. The health sickness funds picked up the bill for 
treatment. Private medical insurance was held by one-third of the population in 1960, but 
this proportion rose to over two-thirds of individuals by 1980, and 80 percent at the end 
of the 1980s, and obligingly covered any shortfalls in public provision.^* Such ‘voting with 
your feet’ was dependent on a conjunction of factors, not least the necessary time, 
motivation and ability to gather information before entering hospital. Yet, hospitals which 
ignored the demands or perceived demands of clients did so at the risk of losing patients.
This consumer sovereignty provided the foundations of a competitive market 
between public hospitals and private clinics. However, it was an imperfect market with 
both inequalities within the public sector and, limited competition between hospitals and 
private clinics in certain sectors and specialisms. First, the French public hospital service 
counts in its ranks a diversity of institutions fi*om local hospitals to the regional teaching 
hospitals (see Table 2.1). However, it is bisected by the cleavage separating the 29 
regional hospitals^® firom general hospitals: ‘the French health care system could be 
considered to be a galaxy whose central point is the regional teaching hospital.T hese 
regional teaching hospitals were the product of the 1958 Debré ordinances which merged 
regional and teaching hospitals with medical schools to establish Centres Hospitalo- 
Universitaires (CHU). They spearheaded public hospital development, combining the 
roles of teaching and research with their status as designated centres for technically- 
advanced medicine. In 1987, these 29 hospitals accounted for approximately 40 percent 
of public hospital spending, or 26 percent of all public and private hospital spending 
(against 30 percent of public-private spending for all other public hospitals).^ Three 
hospital groups, the Hospices civils de Lyon (HCL), the Assistance publique de Marseille 
(APM) and iloQ Assistance publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (AP-HP) sat at the summit of the 
public hospital service. The AP-HP alone accounted for over ten percent of hospital beds 
in France and 12.5 percent of public hospital spending.^
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Table 2.1: The French Public Hospital Service^^
PUBLIC HOSPITALS
Type No Beds Average Beds
Regional Hospitals 29 105,490 3,640
General Hospitals and Hospitals 493 241,230 489
Local Hospitals 316 50,050 158
Medium and Long-Stay Centres 123 22,240 181
Specialised Psychiatric Hospitals 99 65,500 661
Others 9 830 92
TOTAL 1069 485,340 454
Second, in the private sector, private-for-profit clinics compete alongside non- 
profit-making institutions and clinics participating ‘within’ the public sector, providing in 
total 204,900 hospitals beds or approximately one-third of all beds in France (35 percent 
of spending on hospital care).^* However, only ten to fifteen private clinics compete on 
equal terms with regional hospitals. The average multidisciplinary clinic has approximately 
only 150 to 180 beds. Chains of private clinics such as Alphamed and Médifutur did not 
emerge until the 1980s, but, even then, the 64 clinics within these chains accounted for 
only 5,800 beds.^ Yet, the specialisation of private clinics means that they compete on 
equal terms with public hospitals in certain sectors and specialisms. For example, 
approximately 25 percent of treatment in private-for-profit clinics is day-surgery, 
compared to only 2.5 percent in public hospitals (mostly in the psychiatric sector).^^ In the 
general specialism of surgery, and the general category of medium-stay beds, private 
clinics have more beds than public hospitals.^* Similarly, private clinics are virtually absent 
jftom the long-stay sector, but account for approximately half of births and surgeiy.^
So what emerged fi^om the state-profession compromise in France was a market 
for health care services characterised by an established private sector, and marked by its 
singular absence of gatekeepers and fi*agmented lines of responsibility.^® The consumer 
sovereignty inherent in the market, coupled with established private clinics and medical
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insurance, produced a ‘safety exit’ for clients if governments sought to close off hospital 
spending. Bolstered by the open-ended patient-day rate, which reinforced a medical task- 
oriented model of service delivery, a ‘hospital management cold war’^  ^developed between 
the state and health sickness funds, ‘two worlds which bait[ed] each other all the time.’^  ^
This pattern produced irresponsible management, with contributions to the health sickness 
funds set to meet deficits rather than to place any overall constraints on spending^ :^ ‘as if 
the fimds were put in a bag which you kept dipping into as long as there's money in it.’^^
2.2 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES
The Health Ministry was originally a junior ministry within the established hierarchy of the
French central administration. Successive governments integrated Health into the
fi-amework of a wider ministry of Social Affairs, combining the dossier with that of
managing the social security fimds. This lack of autonomy sprang firom the fact that Health
had not been armexed by one of the elite administrative grands corps, and consequently
lacked an institutionalised lobby to defend its administrative territory. One civil service
corps captured the health and social affairs sectors, ih.Q Inspection Générale des Affaires
Sociales (IGAS). Auditors of social policies and institutions, they did not defend the
interests of the sector, export ideas or promote dossiers in the manner of a grands corps
such as the Inspecteurs des Finances}^ So Health remained
‘a quite weak ministry from the point of view of its human potential, its 
competence. There are relatively few people, few in regulatory roles and 
qualitatively quite weak. It is not a ministry which is very highly rated 
when leaving ENA [National School of Administration]. People don't 
make their careers here for long, the best leave.
In 1986, for example, the low bonus schemes and lack of career ‘outlets’ attracted only
five candidates for the 13 posts in health and social affairs offered to graduates ffom the
national civil service school, the École Nationale d!Administration (ENA).^^ However,
this absence of a grands corps in health cannot be divorced fi'om the fact that regulation
of the sector was effectively devolved to the medical profession. The legitimate grands
corps was outside the NCnistry.
Three central administrative divisions dealt directly with health care dossiers: the
Direction de la Pharmacie et du Médicament (DPM), the Direction Générale de la Santé
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(DGS), and the Direction des Hôpitaux (DH). The Barre government merged the DOS 
and the DH in 1979, but this experiment lasted for only 18 months and was ended by the 
Mauroy government in 1981. The DH, the largest of the three administrative divisions, 
controlled all hospital management dossiers, except for the education and training of 
hospital doctors which it co-managed with the Education Ministiy. Approximately 250 
staff worked in its 27 offices, the largest of which were the offices of construction- 
equipment and personnel.^* Its treatment of hospital dossiers rarely brought it into contact 
with the DPM, but it had more contact with the DGS which monopolised public health 
dossiers and all that was not hospital management. These contacts revolved around the 
dossiers of new technologies, psychiatry, and care of the elderly. Conflicts, if any, 
emerged because of the DH support for hospital care and the DGS support for public 
health-orientated policies. Rnally, the care of the elderly, and that of the disabled, involved 
the Direction de l'Action Sociale (DAS), one of the administrative divisions within the 
Social Affairs Ministiy. Relations between the DH and the DAS were rarely conflictual/^ 
Partly due to its weak status, the Health Ministry faced difficulties in promoting 
its dossiers at interministerial level and was unable to prevent the intervention of external 
ministries in the regulation of its dossiers.^ For instance, over six other ministries, 
including the ministries of the Interior, the Civil Service, Education and Finance, 
participated in interministerial discussions at Matignon during the formulation of the 1991 
Hospital Law (see Chapter Seven). The leading participants from outside the ministry 
were the ‘accountants’, the Direction du Budget (DB) in the Finance Ministry and the 
Direction de la Sécurité Sociale (DSS) in the Social Affairs Ministry. The DSS exercised 
administrative ‘control’ over the Social Security funds, although the Finance Ministry 
exercised greater control over dealings between the funds and government. From its 
creation in 1945, the DSS was marked by a legal administrative practice which meant that 
it was preoccupied with the definition of the right of the insured and duties of the funds. 
This administrative tradition meant that ‘lawyers’ from the Council of State headed the 
DSS. However, under the Barre government (1976-1981), the DSS developed a 
predominantly financial orientation, concerned with the need to balance the accounts of 
the Social Security funds. This evolution was marked by the nomination at the head of the 
DSS of budgetary and financial administrators from the Cour des Comptes, the court of
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accounts. It brought the DSS into conflict with the division of hospitals, the DH, as 
hospital spending accounts for approximately half of the spending undertaken by the 
Social Security funds.
Together with the Direction de Prévision (DP), the Direction de Budget (DB) 
shared the broad public spending orientation of the DSS, and represented the primary 
interministerial adversary for the DH. In many ways, the DSS and the DB operated in 
tandem, as the DSS pre-empted the positions of the DB ffom within the narrow circle of 
health and social administrative divisions. The DB was omnipresent, with the DH obliged 
to seek its approval on all dossiers even those without direct budgetary implications.'*  ^
Since the ministries of Health and Social Affairs had no ‘home’ grands corps, their 
inability to fend off external interventions enabled the DB to invade health policy issue 
areas:
‘It (the DB) is more powerful in terms of quality than the social 
administration and well, that introduces [...] a certain imbalance in the way 
of dealing with problems.
However, the DB could cloak its interventions in health policy-making, if necessary, in
two legitimate concerns. First, it conducted direct budgetary negotiations with the Paris
hospitals’ organization, the Assistance Publique, because of its distinct management
structures. Although these talks provided the Finance Ministiy with a Parisian-influenced
view of the problems of hospital management (see Chapter Seven). Second, the DB
straddled both the national and local levels of public hospitals, for it had under its
hierarchical control the corps of comptables, public accountants who managed the funds
of public institutions (see below). This civil service corps existed as a result of the
traditional separation within French public services between those who decided the
objectives of expenditure (in this case, hospital directors) and those who authorised it (in
this case, comptables).
The weakness of the health ministry was mirrored at the local level by its external
services. The Directions Départementales des Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales (DDASS),
the external services of the Health Ministry at the level of the French departments,
exercised a wide-ranging administrative control over public hospitals in each area. These
Departmental Boards of Health and Social Affairs were created in 1964 by the merger of
the Boards of Population, Health, Social Assistance and Tarification. They formally set
50
the budgets of public hospitals and supervised the financial management and policy 
decisions of public hospitals. They were complemented, at the regional level, by the 
Directions Régionales des Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales (DRASS) which were created 
in 1977 fi'om the merger of the regional boards of social affairs with the regional boards 
of social security (the government bodies supervising the management of the funds). They 
operated as centres of policy analysis and forecasting concerned with planning and 
statistical or epidemiological studies.'^^
Although both were external services of the Health Ministry, the regional DRASS 
had no hierarchical authority over the departmental DDASS. The two boards were 
formally headed, not by an official directly responsible to the Health Ministry or the DH, 
but by the departmental Prefect in the case of the DDASS and the regional Prefect in the 
case of the DRASS. Prefects owed their allegiance to the Interior Ministry, although they 
were only nominal heads of local health boards. However, despite their distinct roles, 
there was a nascent conflict between the two health boards, locked in a dispute over their 
respective attributions and functions. The Rocard government's MIMOSAS^ project, 
involving the management consultants, Arthur Andersen, sought to decide the optimal 
division of labour between the DDASS and the DRASS. Later on, a September 1991 
government decree instituted trials of the transfer of the function of administrative control 
of public hospitals to regional health boards (in Auvergne, Haute-Normandie and the 
Midi-Pyrénées).
In fact, the 1983 decentralisation reforms transferred approximately three-quarters
of the personnel and the social policy responsibilities of the departmental health boards,
the DDASS, to the elected assembly of the department, the Conseil Général. Given the
obligations of cost containment, public hospitals remained within the auspices of the
DDASS However, the stripping of their attributions cannot be divorced ffom:
‘reasons relating certainly in part to their institutional weakness. In fact, 
their political weight was absolutely not comparable to that of the 
departmental divisions of equipment, agriculture and indeed, education.
Indeed, the DDASS were relatively under-staffed with as few as three inspectors in one
DDASS to cover 112 institutions.'^ This under-staffing and the accompanying lack of
resources meant that the DDASS did not lead a voluntarist hospital policy at the
departmental level. Most DDASS units formally applied the directives fi'om the DH, whilst
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granting common budgetary increases to all public hospitals.
Equally, the external services of the Health Ministiy were locked in a ‘phoney war’ 
with the local offices of the health sickness fimds (see above).The CNAMTS was far 
from a monolithic structure, composed as it was of one national, 16 regional and 129 
primary offices. Regional offices exercised no authority over primary offices. Whilst they 
dealt with negotiations with private sector hospitals and scrutinised the budget of public 
hospitals, the primary offices were in daily contact with public hospitals because they 
assumed the practical role of transferring budgets to public hospitals. Regional directors 
were consequently engaged in territorial battles with the directors of the primary offices.^* 
In addition, three aggregate groups of policy actors operated throughout the various 
structures of the funds: the trade union and business representatives who sat on the 
Administrative Boards of each office; the bureaucrats or officials who administered the 
funds; and the médecins-contrôleurs, doctors who provided an ‘in-house’ medical 
expertise.
The health insurance funds were formally managed by the administrative boards; 
the principle of management by the insured being embodied in the 1945 legislation (see 
above). Following the 1967 social security reforms, the administrative boards came under 
the influence of an alliance between the anti-communist trade union federation Force 
Ouvrière (FO) and the French business federation, the Confédération Nationale du 
Patronat Français (CNPF). This alliance was forged after the 1967 reforms introduced 
parity of representation for unions and business on the administrative boards, replacing 
the election of union representatives with a system of government-determined quotas 
which artificially reduced the weigjit of the previously dominant communist Confédération 
Générale du Travail (CGT). However, the alliance later survived the return to elections 
and the ending of parity of representation in 1983 under the Socialist government. Indeed, 
in alliance with the CNPF, FO held the presidency of the national administrative board of 
the CNAMTS firom 1967. In addition, it took the presidency of nine of the 16 regional 
offices and 79 of the 129 primary offices.^^
However, over time, the administrative directors o f the CNAMTS gained their 
own formal management attributions in conflict with the initial principle of management 
by the insured. As early as May 1960, responsibility for the daily management of the funds
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began to be transferred, as directors took control of personnel management issues.^ ® Trade 
union and business delegates thus found their responsibilities ‘hollowed out’ from within 
the CNAMTS by the rise of administrative directors, and from outside the CNAMTS by 
the state intervention in the management of the health sickness funds. This dual erosion 
of its role reduced ‘the council of administration to a simple registration room for acts and 
debates of limited s c o p e .T h e  CNAMTS bureaucracy was headed at the national level 
by a director appointed by the government. Directors of the regional and primary offices 
were appointed by the relevant administrative boards, but they had to be chosen from a 
national register established by the Social Affairs Ministry. Roughly 80 percent of 
directors on this register have passed through the national centre for advanced studies in 
social security, the Centre National d’Études Supérietires de Séciirité Sociale (CNESS) - 
although, given the nature of the nomination process, membership of FO was also 
considered to be an advantage.
Working alongside the CNAMTS bureaucracy and the administrative boards were 
approximately 2,500 médecins-contrôleurs. These ‘in-house’ doctors were the 
counterparts of the médecins inspecteurs de la santé, the public health officials who 
worked for the DRASS and DDASS. However, whilst the médecins-inspecteurs were 
typically concerned with co-ordinating public health programmes or promoting measures 
to improve hospital hygiene, the médecins-contrôleurs were preoccupied with the 
budgetary implications of hospital treatment. Their role evolved from indiviudal 
examinations of selected patients dossiers (in order to ascertain the legitimacy of claims 
to reimbursement) to the analysis of the actual treatment decisions taken by hospital 
doctors. In 1984, th^r gained the right to examine the running of medical services within 
public hospitals, implementing a series of coupes transversales, statistical photographs of 
the treatment within a hospital ward on a given day. However, the médecins-contrôleurs 
did not impose corrective measures on hospital doctors. They subordinated such 
interventions to the ultimate aim of expanding the function and professional status of the 
profession.^ Since 1967, they have organised in their own formal hierarchy parallel to that 
of regional and primary offices, and pursued their own professional strategy divorced from 
other policy actors both within and outside the CNAMTS: ‘the gang from the 
CNAM[TS].... they don't leave the health sickness funds, it's a regiment.
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Thus, health policy administration in France was fragmented and weak with limited 
resources and personnel in its external services (in marked contrast to the ‘strong state’ 
conception of French policy-making). With the Health Ministry ranking low in the 
hierarchy of central ministries, the DH was unable to insulate its dossiers from the 
interventions of other ministries and in particular, the DB Its weak external services were 
unable to pursue an interventionist managerial policy in their dealings with public 
hospitals. Indeed, the DH did not possess the necessary information to calculate the actual 
delivery costs of hospital services. Despite progressive controls on bureaucracy of the 
CNAMTS, the health sickness funds retained control over its internal management and 
the development of its own statistical and analytical services - limiting the role of the DSS 
which was squeezed between the CNAMTS and the predominance of the DB. However, 
even the health sickness funds, fragmented and shorn of their responsibilities in public 
hospital management, provided information on the evolution of costs which was always 
months behind and based not on actual costs, but on the reimbursement of patient 
treatment. Such weakness emanated in part from the absence of a grand corps which 
defended its territory and prerogatives within central government. In health, the effective 
equivalent of ike grands corps was external to the administration. Hospital doctors were 
entrenched in the operating core of public hospitals.
2.3 PUBLIC HOSPITALS AS PROFESSIONAL BUREAUCRACIES
Combining the social justice of reactionary Catholicism with the corporatism of fascism, 
the Vichy government established the principle of a national public hospital service open 
to all and laid down a framework for the internal organisation of public hospitals.^  ^
However, it was another twenty years before the implementation of the 1958 Debré 
ordinances generalised full-time salaried status for hospital doctors within the newly 
merged regional and teaching hospitals. This section analyses the organisational structure 
of French public hospitals which emerged from the compromise between the state and the 
medical profession,”  employing the ^ ^ tzberg  typology of organisations in which public 
hospitals are categorized as ‘professional bureaucracies’.
Mintzberg isolates five components common to all organisations (see Figure 2.1).^*
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At their base sits the operating core which performs operational tasks needed to produce 
goods and services. It is connected by the middle-line hierarchy which represents the chain 
of middle-line managers stretching up to the strategic apex. The strategic apex determines 
how the organisation serves its mission and, in the public sector, ensures that it meets the 
needs of its external funders or controllers. The technostructure consists of many different 
kinds of control analysts who work towards the standardisation of tasks, improvement of 
technologies or containment of costs. Finally, the support staff provide discrete sets of 
services ancillary to the organisation’s central purpose - such as the canteen, the laundry 
or public relations units in the case of hospitals.
Mintzberg classifies public hospitals as professional bureaucracies because their 
organisational arrangements typically place a high value on professional expertise. Control 
of the delivery of services is extensively devolved to key members of the operating core - 
in this case, the medical profession. Co-ordination derives from the training and 
professional norms adhered to by professionals and produced outside the organisation by 
self-governing professional associations and networks. Within professional bureaucracies, 
the technostructure and middle-line management play relatively minor roles, and even the 
strategic apex will often be very small. Alongside the operating core, the most developed 
part of professional bureaucracies are the support staffs, but they are very tightly managed 
and subordinated to the dominant professional group’s priorities.
In French public hospitals, the dominance of the operating core was enshrined in 
the 1941 legislation and its accompanying 1943 decrees. This legislation installed services 
as the fundamental unit of medical organisation within public hospitals. Each service was 
the approximate equivalent of a hospital ward in the NHS. It centred on a medical 
specialism and was managed by a head doctor, a chef de service, who was appointed for 
life, and assumed full-responsibility for the delivery of medical care. Junior doctors, 
medical assistants and nursing staff worked under the supervision of head doctors for any 
tasks involved in the administering of treatment to patients. Indeed, in the spirit of 
professional bureaucracy, junior doctors were informally co-opted onto medical teams by 
senior doctors. Thus, the state recognised the collective autonomy of the medical 
profession, with chefs de service benefiting from: ‘all the independence necessary for the 
exercising of his art, notably in the choice and execution of treatments and, more
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generally, for all that which concerns medical acts .With the boundaries of clinical 
freedom thus drawn, chefs de service were free from managerial supervision to decide 
resource allocation, the nature of service delivery and technical development. The right 
to treat private patients, enshrined in the 1958 settlement, ensured that doctors could 
determine their own mix of work.^°
Figure 2.1: The Professional Bureaucracy
U m Staff
Hie Five Components of Organisations
The Professional Bureaucraqr
MCK a  Kfinlzberg. (1983X Siracturei in Hves: Designing Effective Organisations, Eaglewood CBffe, HI: 
entice-Hdl,Rgl-2,HglO-t 56
Inside hospitals, there was little in the way of a developed middle-line of
professional administrators. The hospital medical commission, the commission médicale
consultative, renamed the commission médicale de l'établissement in 1987, provided, in
principle, an arena for consultation between hospital doctors on the distribution of
resources and the medical policy pursued within the hospital. However, its composition
was unrepresentative and reinforced the professional hierarchy by allocating the majority
of seats to head doctors. In practice, hospital medical commissions operated more as a
rubber-stamp for choices taken in more informal discussions and limited themselves to
questions of promotion.^^ Chairs of the commissions avoided systematic intervention in
the daily running of wards, acting more as an occasional ‘troubleshooter’ dealing with
problems surrounding, for example, new projects or the boundaries between existing
services. In fact, public hospitals operated as a collection of autonomous fiefdoms, each
developing their own parallel structures:
‘hospital activity appears then more like the juxtaposition of the activities 
o f decision-making centres only having in common the use of certain 
resources than a co-ordinated and coherent [response] to the objective 
needs of health care.’^
Eleven different working schedules were identified in one service in a Strasbourg hospital
in 1982. The same enquiry claimed that the management at Lille regional hospital did not
know either the distribution of personnel throughout the institution or the level of
absenteeism® Such firagmentation was accentuated by the moves to create more services
as a means of overcoming the promotion bottleneck that life-long appointments of head
doctors created.^
The absence of a tradition of medical information programmes squashed the 
development of a technostructure within public hospitals. Hospital doctors kept their own 
records using their own classifications.® It was not until the 1980s that younger doctors, 
particularly in high-spending specialities, espoused a pro-managerial discourse, 
increasingly following management training and economics of health care programmes. 
The hospital training organisation, AFMHA®, organised 64 management training courses 
for 2600 hospital doctors in 1991 - an increase firom a few hundred doctors in 1987.® 
However, these fi-agmented initiatives did not signal the emergence of a medical 
‘technostructure’. A grassroots coalition of doctors united around a pro-managerial
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discourse did not emerge within public hospitals, despite moves towards the
implementation of diagnosis-related-groups and medical information departments in the
1980s (see Chapter Five). One nascent grouping was the head doctors of the Département
d'information Médicale (DIM), hospital departments aiming to collect and analyse
information on health care and patient treatment within hospitals, who became prominent
after an August 1989 circular foreseeing their creation. But, by the early 1990s, they had
failed to overcome their collective action difficulties, remaining an ineffectual national
lobby. Indeed, although over 90 percent of hospitals created or planned to create DIMs,
their effectiveness was curtailed by the lack of computerisation of medical services
(averaging only 25 percent of hospitals).^*
The strategic apex which progressively emerged was that of a tandem composed
of the mayor and hospital director. Mayors were the chairs of the conseils
d'administration, the Board of Trustees of public hospitals, which remained legally
attached to local government. Hospital directors were the civil servants, formally
appointed by the Minister of Health, who sat at the head of the administrative hierarchy
within public hospitals. The relationship between the two was an uneasy alliance or
cohabitation. The development of hospital directors as a corps of French civil servants
was at the expense of the Board of Trustees which gradually lost its responsibility for
general management of public hospitals to the newly-recognised hospital directors. The
corps came into formal existence with the legislation of 1941 and 1943 which recognised
the posts of hospital directors and endowed them with a formal job description.® Hospital
directors in hospitals with over 200 beds received their own formal attributions (such as
appointing non-medical staff), but the corps remained administrative secretaries and
bursars dominated by the Mayor:
‘the corps of hospital directors was in fact only a strict executive of 
collegiate decisions. It was the equivalent today of Mayors' general 
secretaries who are the implementors for the deliberative power which is 
the municipal council.’^ ®
The 1958 Debré ordinances subsequently transferred the formal nomination of hospital
directors fi'om the local Prefect to the Minister of Health. In addition, directors in
hospitals with over 200 beds were made responsible for signing external contracts and
further empowered to ratify spending, albeit on the basis of a budget established by the
Board of Trustees. However, it was the 1970 Hospital Law which transferred
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responsibility for general management of hospitals to the directors, who obtained the legal
foundation for their own formal authority.^ It attributed hospital directors with the right
to regulate all issues outside the limits of a series of formal attributions, not least the
voting of the budget, held by the Board of Trustees. So, although the Board maintained
its series of formal attributions not least the voting of the budget, its influence in the
running of hospitals declined:
‘What is the use of a Board of Trustees except to rubber-stamp it's true, 
all the documents that go before them. The budget?....It goes through, it 
goes through...’^
However, Mayors could not be divorced from the management of what is often 
the largest employer in a town; electoral considerations dictate intervention.’  ^First, local 
politidans appropriated from the Social Security funds the role of defenders of the general 
interest. Clients were represented on the Board of Trustees by delegates of the Social 
Security fimds and local politicians. Of these two groups of actors, it was local politicians, 
led by the Mayor, who most successfully exploited the opportunity to pose as defenders 
of the general interest. Social Security delegates were hampered by the sectional identity 
of trade unions and business organisations.’* Second, the opinion of mayors was pivotal 
in the appointment of hospital directors (see Chapter Three). This role and their oft- 
quoted legitimacy and national stature ensured that a director was bound to her mayor in 
such a way that their future depended on gaining, and maintaining, the confidence of the 
Mayor. If there was a disagreement on hospital policy, it was the director who departed 
not the Mayor. The ‘sacking’ in 1991 of Christian Dutreil from the head of the Hospices 
civils de Lyon after disagreements with the Mayor, Michel Noir, over his plans for the 
renovation of the hospital group demonstrated the directors’ dependence on the continued 
confidence of their Mayors.’^  However, the ties between hospital directors and mayors are 
not necessarily interpreted as a constant constraint on the actions of the director. At times, 
the organisational ties with mayors are one of the primary resources at the disposal of 
hospital directors (see below).
Support staff (ranging from technicians through to cleaners, cooks, receptionists 
and administrative staff) composed the largest category of personnel within public 
hospitals, with non-medical personnel including administrative stafi  ^ accounting for 
640,000 employees of the 740,000 employed in public hospital system in 1991. ‘Caring’
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occupations formed the largest single category of these personnel (444, 000) with nurses 
accounting for over 140,000 posts (67 percent of the nursing occupation as a whole). The 
majority of nurses, approximately 85 percent of whom were women, were ward nurses 
rather than operating theatre nurses or the senior echelons of the profession.^ Although 
defined, like directors, as support staff to the medical profession, they were firmly 
anchored within the operating core. Nurses were para-professional, not associated with 
the running of services, and doctors organised the delivery of care in line with their own 
professional requirements.^* The 1991 Hospital Law was partly concerned with creating 
a nursing voice within public hospitals. The office of nursing care in public hospitals, the 
service de soins infirmiers, was the Rocard government's response to the previous 
exclusion fi'om influence (see Chapter Seven).
French public hospitals thus conformed closely to Mintzberg’s professional 
bureaucracy lype, with a predominant professional operating core, an embryonic middle- 
line, and a strategic apex headed by mayors keen to protect their electoral interests. 
Management and medical hierarchies developed as two parallel arenas which avoided 
excursions beyond the narrow confines of their respective boundaries of influence.^ 
Hospital directors functioned more as support staff minimising the difficulties of 
professionals rather than challenging the boundaries of clinical autonomy of head 
doctors.*® Hospitals functioned as fiagmented collection of medical fiefdoms.
2.4 INTEREST GROUPS, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AND
ALLIANCES
This section examines the constellation of interest groups and professional associations 
which emerged within the health policy sub-system at a national level, focusing on the 
corps of hospital directors and their coalition strategies with other actors in the networks. 
Auxiliary staff are not considered, because their representative organisations exercised 
little influence within policy-making on hospital management, confining their actions to 
the narrow interests of pay and conditions.
The French medical profession is fiagmented. At the end of the 1980s, there were 
25,250 full-time public hospital doctors, to which must be added some 5,000 part-time 
doctors and more than 30,000 attachés (who mostly work less than five three-and-a-half
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hour shifts per week).*  ^The elite of the profession were the mandarins, the hospitalo 
imiverstaires who combined the duties of university medical professors with those of head 
doctors in regional teaching hospitals. Their dual status marked them out from the mono- 
appartenants in regional hospitals who exercised only medical duties. However, the 
prestige attached to medical practice in regional hospitals divorced both hospitalo- 
universitaires and mono-appartenants from all doctors working in general hospitals. 
Cross-cutting these horizontal cleavages were the vertical cleavages of specialisms and 
‘administration’ which isolated heads doctors and divided the profession into its multiple 
disciplinary sub-groups. Indeed, over time, increasing specialisation^ and the different 
statutory conditions and responsibilities attributed to hospital doctors produced a loose 
collection of competing elites, marked by their ‘deep divisions, not only political, but also 
between specialisms, between chapels, between clienteles; it's a bit tribal, it's a bit 
feudal.’^
There has long existed a mosaic of trade unions which defend the narrow interests 
associated with such different statutory or disciplinary sub-groups. Each grade or 
speciality had its own trade union, if not several, because political divisions and cleavages 
between doctors in general and regional hospitals often led to the creation of several trade 
unions within one discipline. By the early 1980s, over 50 hospital doctor trade unions 
were classified as ‘active’ lobbies at the national level.*  ^Many of these unions were bom 
as part of a defensive reaction to the hospital management reforms engaged by the 
Mauroy government in 1982. In feet, trade union membership among hospital doctors was 
low; estimated at only ten percent, once allowance was made for the fact that doctors 
often joined more than one trade union (one according to their discipline, another 
according to their grade or political persuasion).*  ^Such low rates of mobilisation, coupled 
with the narrowness of their individual interest bases, meant that no individual trade union 
could legitimately claim to represent the interests of hospital doctors:
‘all these people say that they are representative, but they represent very little....
They are big mouths, that's They represent 500 doctors in the best of cases...
if that ...if that.’*®
However, despite these conflicts of internal organisation and ideological divisions, by the
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late 1980s, two umbrella organisations had emerged:
- the managerialist Intersynidcat National des Médecins Hospitaliers (INMH) 
which brought together 14 unions from regional and general hospitals, but whose 
members, not part of the medical elite, tended not to exercise the dual 
responsibilities of teaching and medical responsibilities ;
- and, the larger, looser and more reactionary Coordination Syndicale des 
Médecins, Biologistes et Pharmaciens des Hôpitaux Publics, which brought 
together 13 unions representing 70 percent o f doctors elected to national 
commissions.*’
Hospital doctor trade unions were not entrenched within the organisational
stmcture of public hospitals. The collective voice of doctors within public hospitals was
the hospital medical commission (see above). The chairs of the hospital medical
commissions were grouped nationally in two consultative bodies, the Conférences des
Présidents des Commissions Médicales d!Ètahlissement, one for regional teaching
hospitals and one for general hospitals. These two national consultative bodies were joined
by a third, the Conférence des Doyens which groups together the deans of the medical
faculties. These three consultative bodies, not the trade unions, provided an aggregate
medical discourse for government, although, ever respectful of the hierarchy within the
medical profession, the consultative body for general hospitals did not exercise the
authority o f its regional teaching hospital counterpart. Claiming to be divorced from the
political struggles of thdr colleagues within trade unions, they acted as 'sounding boards’,
providing ‘technical’ advice for the government concerning hospital reforms and the
difficulties faced by hospitals.** As Edmond Hervé, Junior Minister for Health in the
Mauroy and Fabius governments between 1983 and 1986 explains:
‘In the spring of 1984, we counted 60 trade unions representing hospital 
doctors, thus, fragmentation. This said, what I have just said must be 
corrected because [...] there are also very strong representative 
organisations and, in the case of the regional teaching hospitals, you have 
a power [..] which was called at the time, the Conférence des Présidents 
de CMC y today, the Conférence des Présidents des CME and that was a 
real power and the other was the Conférence des Doyens.'*^ ^
Indeed, these bodies progressively upstaged the Ordre des Médecins, the professional
regulatory body which was founded under the Vichy government and of which all doctors
are members. Its work concerns primarily ethical and disciplinary matters and it remains
on the fringes of most policy debates, its authority contested within the ranks of the
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medical profession.^ However, like the trade unions, these national medical commissions
were not structured so as to discipline rank-and-file hospital doctors or to participate in
top-down management measures. They refused to act as global regulators of the public
hospital system.^  ^ The hospital doctor elite used its influence to promote individual
dossiers, such as ensuring that the ‘right’ candidate was appointed to posts in their wards
and facilitating demands for medical equipment. At best, they acted as a negative anti-
reform lobby for the medical profession.
However, to focus on the representative organisations of the corps of hospital
doctors is to by-pass the influence of mandarins, who exploited the access to politicians
created by common social and personal networks. It is not a banal statement to say that
every politician has a personal doctor. Indeed, senior officials in the Health Nfinistry were
convinced that the family doctor of Laurent Fabius, Prime minister (1984-1986), had an
important influence on the policy decisions of the PS government at the time of the
departmentalisation reform:”
‘It's this world. They [politicians] get themselves treated by them, and that 
counts enormously - you can do nothing about it, but it's like that. First, 
they have them [doctors] in their family and then, they get treated by 
them.’”
Each mandarin had his or her contacts in ministerial divisions and political parties. Some
even had direct access to the ministerial cabinet, the Prime minister's ofiSce at Matignon
and that of the President at the Elysée.”  The corps of hospital doctors was organised
‘a little like the show business environment, that is to say that there are 
stars, stars who, because of their own notoriety, intervene directly not only 
to ministers, but also constantly to the Prime minister or the President of 
the Republic [...]. The well-known doctors intervene directly, short-circuit 
everybody and, then, it comes down like a torrent firom above’.”
All political parties established formal ties with the medical profession and 
hospital personnel. Hospital doctors constituted a significant lobby within Parliament 
itself with 41 doctors in the National Assembly and over 46 in the Senate in 1991.”  
Multiple channels existed between hospital doctors and the right-wing gaullist 
Rassemblement pour La République (RPR). Informal channels bom of individual 
connections were supplemented by both RPR missions-santé (party associations in each 
department uniting doctors, nurses and dentists), and its Action Ouvrière et Professionnel 
(party sections, organised on the basis of occupation and profession).”  Similarly, the Parti
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Socialiste (PS) developed its own workplace party sections, groupes d'entreprises, within
public hospitals, although these were strongest in Paris where they were dominated by
nurses and care assistants.^ The predominant health policy lobby within the PS before its
arrival in office in 1981 was the ‘external’ Santé et Socialisme association, dominated by
card-carrying hospital doctors.
However, the medical profession generally supported right-wing parties. No party
had the ties with the medical profession enjoyed by the RPR: of the 50 doctors elected to
the National Assembly in 1986,22 were members of the RPR, over a third more than the
various parties grouped together in the centre right giscardian Union pour la Démocratie
Française (UDF), and almost three times the number in the PS. Indeed, the PS, more
likely to be labelled the ‘party of teachers’, could only muster 8 of the 50 doctors in the
National Assembly.”  At elections in the 1980s, approximately 40 percent of doctors voted
for the RPR, with only approximately 27 percent voting for parties on the Left
‘Doctors’ trade unions are right wing [..] it's a right wing arena [...] 
therefore the problem for the PS and the left is rather to woo the medical 
unions and the hospital environment to make them understand that we are 
quite reasonable interlocutors.’ ®^^
The politicisation of health policy networks was accentuated by the capacity of 
mayors to straddle local and national political arenas. Mayors of large towns were national 
figures, and party leaders traditionally used local strongholds as a springboard for national 
office (for example, Mauroy in Lille, Chirac in Paris and Chaban-Delmas in Bordeaux). 
Indeed, the practice of cumul des mandats (combining more than one political office at 
a time) meant that the chairs of boards of trustees more often than not also held a seat in 
the National Assembly.^® Such multiple office-holding had two primary influences on the 
patterns of interactions within health policy networks. First, given the electoral 
considerations attached to management of public hospitals, mayors operated as an 
entrenched institutional veto group against radical reform within the legislative process. 
Successive governments repeatedly raised and subsequently dropped plans to remove the 
presidency of hospital boards of trustees firom mayors. Second, in areas of daily 
management, mayors with sufficient political weight could help other actors to short- 
circuit the administrative hierarchy:
‘Each time that I asked him for an appointment with the minister’s
64
directeur du cabinet or with anyone, his network of contacts was such 
that he got it for me. We’d go and sort out our problems directly with the 
minister.’
In fact, the Fédération Hospitalière de France (FHF), cemented this relationship by 
bringing directors and politicians on the boards of trusteees of public hospitals together 
in a cross-party lobby in defence of public hospitals. Created in 1924, the FHF was imbued 
with a public service ethos, considering itself to be ‘the guardian of the temple of public 
service.Officially recognised, it was present in such diverse consultative forums as the 
national planning commission, the Commissariat général du Plan, the higher council for 
mutual insurances, the Conseil Supérieur de la Mutualité and the consultative body for 
public hospitals, the Conseil Supérieur des Hôpitaux. Indeed, it included within its 
national executive at the end of the 1980s high-ranking politicians from all political parties 
(except the PCF) - for example, former prime ministers such as Pierre Messmer, and 
former as well as future health and social affairs ministers as Jacques Barrot and Claude 
Evin.
The ‘privileged’ access o f the mandarins to political elites was, therefore, partly
countered by hospital directors, who could exploit the working relationship with ‘their’
mayor, upon whom their career closely depended. Similarly, directors were able to draw
upon the organisational resources derived from a pivotal role within local political and
economic networks:
‘When I was director at Lorient, I was the key-man of the Loiient local 
networks, that is to say that I knew all the entrepreneurs, the fishing ports, 
the chambers of commerce, industry, all the politicians, all the 
journalists.
However, unlike doctors, only one hospital director was elected to the National Assembly
between 1981 and 1991.^°  ^ In addition, the FHF was traditionally viewed as an
organisation associated with Force Ouvrière (FO); the minority trade union within the
corps of hospital directors. Within the FO federation, a tacit agreement left the
management of public hospitals to its directors' union and the FHF:
‘There was a division within the trade union FO itself whereby FO was 
contented to keep [the health sickness funds] the CNAMTS to doctors 
and ambulatory care and delegate to hospital directors its influence in 
hospitals.’ ®^*
In fact, hospital directors designated the CNAMTS to be little more than a passive
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‘banker’ for public hospitals, despite its over-riding funding of hospital investment
programmes and FO's persistent defence of patients’ rights. And, for the CNAMTS,
hospital directors remained tied to the alliance of ‘spenders’ which it sought to oversee
in its limited management of health policy networks. These functional roles weakened the
likelihood of any alliance between organisations within the corps of hospital directors and
those within the CNAMTS. In practice, hospital directors decried the legitimacy of the
CNAMTS, labelling it as a private organisation and fearing that the expansion of its role
would create a second administrative control of public hospitals alongside that of
departmental health boards:
‘The Social Security funds, a private organisation, must only be 
considered as a collector of funds, a redistributor of incomes. It must not 
in any circumstances set itself up as a dk facto overseer of public 
hospitals.’"^
Yet, whilst the corps remained wedded to the legitimacy of government to 
intervene in the management of public hospitals, it had few alliances with the actors in the 
fiugmented public administration. The most frequent interlocutor of hospital directors in 
the central administration was the Direction des Hôpitaux (DH). Hospital directors 
occupied posts in the DH, but the ability of the corps to capture this administrative 
division was weakened by the statute of the corps. Apart from the post of Director of 
Hospitals, the terms and conditions of the corps only permitted hospital directors to hold 
posts in the central administration as technical advisors in, for example, the cabinets of 
ministers or the Director of Hospitals. Consequently, the corps did not benefit from an 
established lobby at the level of the ministry - whereas in the case of the grands corps 
(such as the Bridges and Highways) such lobbies served to protect the interests of their 
members."^
The defence of these interests, in the case of hospital directors, was hampered 
paradoxically by the absence of a grand corps within health and social affairs, which 
apparently left hospital directors with no ‘in-house’ competition, but facilitated the 
Finance Ministry’s Direction du Budgets ‘invasion’ of the national policy arena due to the 
absence of a bulwark against their territorial expansion. The Inspecteurs des Finances 
within the DB classified hospital directors as members of a local cost-maximising cartel; 
a judgement Wiich justified, in its eyes, centralised control of public hospital development.
6 6
In fact, hospital directors were not part of a hierarchical line-order bureaucracy. Formally 
appointed by the Minister of Health, directors managed public hospitals which were 
legally attached to the commune and whose board of trustees was presided over by the 
local Mayor. They were consequently neither central nor local agents, but ‘hybrids’ who 
were able to draw their legitimacy from both central and local administrations. Indeed, 
they exploited this dual source of legitimacy to proclaim their independence from external 
control:
‘Operating as a hinge [between centre and local], he [the hospital director] 
can play on one or the other ... where he gets his autonomy. When he 
spoke to the Board of Trustees and to their presidents [the mayor], he was 
then representing the ministry. Since he is appointed by the minister, he 
could thus bring out changes in regulations or directives. But in relation 
to the tutelle [the DDASS], representing the State, he could exploit his 
political responsibility, since he had to manage a local institution.
In addition, an alliance between hospital directors and the DB was hindered by the 
belief held by the Inspecteurs des Finances that the corps o f hospital directors was ‘not 
up to the level of the stakes, the financial stakes, the stakes in terms of management 
diflSculties, the stakes in terms of relations with the medical l o b b y .T h i s  impression was 
coloured by the fact that the Inspecteurs viewed public hospitals as a possible area of 
future expansion for their own corps. To this end, leading personalities within the 
‘financial’ corps such as Jean Choussat, former Director of Hospitals and General Director 
of the Assistance Publique in Paris, advocated the opening of the posts of general 
directors of regional hospitals to the grands corps. Hospital directors closed external 
access to these posts by negotiating a requirement for a minimum of five-year experience 
as a hospital director before nomination as the head of a regional hospital - except that this 
requirement did not apply for the posts of General Director at Paris, Lyon and Marseille 
(see Chapter Three).
The competition for posts between the two corps was further complicated by the 
dependency of the comptables, the local treasurers who authorised local public spending, 
upon the Finance Ministiy. Any expansion of the attributions of directors, which 
weakened the traditional division in the civil service between those who decide the 
objectives of expenditure and those who authorise it, threatened the interests of the 
‘employees’ of the Finance Ministry. Indeed, the extension of managerial freedom fitted
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poorly with the administrative culture of the corps of comptables - which questioned 
managerial autonomy, seeing it as contradicting the control of hospital spending."'* Such 
policy stances were relayed nationally by the DB and cut into negotiations between 
Inspecteurs and hospital directors.
At the local level, the 1500 Inspectors of Health and Social Affairs who staffed the 
regional and departmental health boards, the DDASS and the DRASS, were a junior 
corps of civil servants. They were neither a serious rival nor a possible ally for hospital 
directors in the national policy-making process for two reasons. First, although trained at 
the same institution as hospital directors, the Inspectors followed a shorter training 
programme (two years) and their initial level of recruitment was lower (minimum of two 
years Anther education). So, ‘a candidate who is a bit ambitious and a little capable has 
more tendency to choose the hospital director route than the other (that of an 
Inspector).’"^ In 1990, there were not a sufficient number of suitable candidates to fill the 
places offered on the training course for student Inspectors. Second, the Inspectors failed 
to mobilise around a common programme of occupational mobility, creating their own 
professional association as late as 1991."^ However, whilst its aim was to achieve 
improvements in thdr statutory and working conditions, the Inspectors had not attached 
improvements in their statute to global reform of hospital management. As a corps^  they 
still had to formulate a specific platform of hospital management reforms; their model for 
reform of their statute was that of hospital directors.
In fact, the corps of hospital directors was ‘caught’ between the medical 
profession and the corps of Inspecteurs des Finances. Hospital directors had not forged 
an alliance with the DB and the Inspecteurs des Finances. Although they presented 
themselves as the ‘natural’ allies of central administrators, their conception of such an 
alliance hampered its coming into being. They looked for an alliance which increased their 
professional independence, in the sense that they sought to be empowered by central 
administrators to determine public hospital development. Such an alliance was precluded 
by the low esteem in which the DB held hospital directors and their wXti-corps rivalry 
between the hospital directors and the Inspecteurs des Finances.
In addition, despite divergent conceptions of their concrete forms, the widespread 
allegiance of hospital doctors to clinical fi’eedom and self-regulation provided insufficient
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common ground to unite hospital doctors against the interference of administrators and 
other external actors in the domain of medical practice. Consequently, hospital directors 
were brought into conflict with hospital doctors over the ‘frontiers of control’”  ^that exist 
between the administration and the medical profession: ‘If certain directors want to eat 
doctor, it's also true ... that certain hospital doctor trade unions want to eat director.’*^* 
This clash of interests over the internal organisation of public hospitals dictated that there 
could be no open and formal alliances between the leaderships of their respective trade 
unions. In fact, if hospital directors were to extend their control over the budgetary and 
planning process, they had to seek to integrate doctors into the administrative hierarchy 
within public hospitals. Hospital doctors could not be left to manage freely ‘their’ wards: 
‘responsibility carmot be shared within the hospital.
Against this background, nurses provided hospital directors with a possible 
stepping-stone into the medical environment. They worked directly in the heart of the 
medical operating core. Nursing cadres who espoused managerial functions were behind 
the construction of an autonomous identity within the nursing profession. However, 
nurses, like the medical profession, remained internally fragmented, with over 100 
associations and trade unions which were far from representative of the occupation as a 
whole (with only approximately 6 per cent of nurses belonging to the main trade union 
federations). The strikes by nurses in October 1988 were led by a spontaneous 
grassroots organisation of activists in opposition to the alleged inadequacies of the trade 
union leadership.*^* This grassroots coordination voiced demands for improved pay and 
conditions rather than the demands for organisational change which could have provided 
a bridge between directors and nurses: ‘they stopped at the idea of doing their job 
“well”.’*^  In fact, the administration enjoyed low levels of legitimacy among the massed 
ranks of the nursing occupation. Hospital directors were held responsible by nurses for 
a system of unresponsive bureaucracy which was overly preoccupied with budgetary 
questions: *^
‘a system which they hate. From this fact, if the struggles of other actors
still possess a certain legitimacy, the director can very easily be the object
of a pure rejection.’*^'*
Even nursing managers were themselves rejected by their fellow nurses who, in an effort
to distinguish their own contribution to the hospital workplace, stressed the global needs
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of the patient, psychological, social as well as physical, and the importance of ‘human 
contact’ with the patient^^: %  therefore, it is possible to talk of a nursing logic, it appears 
to be defined at the opposite end of what could be an administrative logic.
This rejection of hospital directors by nurses, coupled with the subordination of 
nursing personnel within medical services, undermined any possible bridge between the 
administrative and medical territories. However, hospital doctors and directors were not 
two hermetically-sealed groups. Interpersonal contacts established through the hospital 
workplace forged informal personal networks.Indeed, the unidimensional juxtaposition 
of the interests of hospital directors and doctors fails to portray the tacit alliances that 
existed between the professional operating core and the strategic apex. Hospital directors 
shared the interests of the medical profession in maintaining the managerial autonomy of 
public hospitals. For hospital doctors, a ‘strong’ director was a necessary first line of 
defence against the encroachments of central administrators in their hospital’s 
management. In addition, both groups sought to maximise the technical development of 
medical services within their hospitals in order to compete with the services provided by 
other hospitals, both public and private. As such, when faced with external constraints: 
‘a collective reaction occurs. Leading actors, who are often considered to have relatively 
opposed interests, [move] to an increasingly de facto convergence.’^^*
Thus, there was a changing pattern of interest configuration depending upon the 
nature o f the issue under consideration. The issue of managerial autonomy and the 
imposition of external controls upon the development of public hospitals mobilised the 
corps of hospital directors against the health sickness funds, the CNAMTS, and the 
central administrative divisions of the Direction des Hôpitaux (DH), the Direction de la 
Sécurité Sociale (DSS) and the Direction du Budget (DB). However, it also united 
hospital directors with the massed ranks of hospital doctors who joined in a defence of 
managerial autonomy of public hospitals often supported by local politicians and the 
nursing profession. By contrast, issues surrounding the internal organisation of public 
hospitals brought hospital directors into conflict with the medical profession and nurses. 
Yet, the hostility of the corps of Inspecteurs des Finances to the expansion of the corps 
of hospital directors, coupled with the control exercised over resource allocation by the 
medical profession, did not guarantee hospital directors the support of the DH, the DSS
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or the DB. Indeed, the legitimacy of the medical profession led government to encourage 
doctors to adopt a managerialist discourse, rather than to promote the interests of hospital 
directors within public hospitals.
These cleavages cross-cut the traditional axis of centre-periphery and 
administrative-professional divisions within health care systems. The configuration of 
interests in the health policy sub-system left hospital directors without any fixed alliances 
or partnerships. Alliances with the medical profession were hampered by the weakness of 
the representative organisations of hospital doctors and the conflicting interests of 
organisational reform. As for the nursing occupation, directors suffered from a distinct 
lack of legitimacy. Within the administrative hierarchy, directors had formed no alliance 
with the DB, had a competing corps in the Inspecteurs des Finances, possessed limited 
footholds in the DH, but faced only a junior corps within departmental health boards. 
However, directors remain wedded to the public sector with no consistent relationship 
with the health sickness funds. And, public hospital directors relied on trying to exploit 
their privileged relationship with local politicians, albeit in competition with other groups, 
not least from the medical profession.
CONCLUSIONS
The structure of the health policy sub-system which emerged from the state-profession 
compromise in France was marked by weak centralisation. Whilst the patient-day rate 
gave control over budgets to public hospitals, the organisation of public hospitals as 
professional bureaucracies decentralised control over the delivery of services to doctors. 
In addition, the weakness of the Health Ministry and its external services, blighted by its 
weak statistical support and inability to ward off the DB, precluded its strategic 
intervention at the subnational level. On the contrary, it encouraged across-the-board 
regulatory measures behind centralising budgetary controls. However, the politicisation 
of health policy networks, imderpinned by multiple office-holding mayors, short-circuited 
such standard administrative hierarchies.
Weak centralisation was buttressed by a form of governance which privileged the 
market over planning and removed responsibility and its concurrent risk from any single
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actor. The consumer sovereignty inherent in the French health care system reinforced
competition between public hospitals and private clinics. In certain areas, private clinics
competed on an equal footing with the public sector, although the level of competition
varied with types of treatment. In addition, it discouraged medical professionals from
acting as gatekeepers (in the mould of general practitioners in the NHS). Neither the
medical profession, the health sickness frmds nor the state had clear responsibilities:
‘The CNAMTS finances health care expenditures without exercising 
management controls on what is provided; the central government, 
through the Ministry of Health, exercises a titular control over all public 
hospital spending, even though it finances only a small fraction of total 
health expenditure; physicians determine the mix and quantity of resources 
used even though they share no financial responsibility, either in hospitals 
or in private practice.
Hospital doctors, entrenched in the operating core of public hospitals thereby installing 
a high degree of vertical dependency within the policy sub-system, were not prepared, or 
able, to enter into any corporatist arrangement with the Health Ministry. The social 
partners within the CNAMTS, particularly the FO, were more concerned with protecting 
the rights of patients to access care than to manage the rising health care budgets. Equally, 
the bosses’ movement, the Confédération Nationale du Patronat Français (CNPF), 
although an advocate of cost containment, was weakened by its internal contradictions 
(see Chapter One). This impotence left the state to occupy the regulatory space created 
by the absence of the medical profession or social partners.
Nor were the boundaries of the health policy sub-system closed. The absence of 
a health and social af&irs grands corps and the low relative standing of health and social 
afifairs ministries could not prevent the ‘invasion’ of the policy sub-system by other 
ministries - in particular, the DB and the Inspection des Finances. The constellation of 
actors within the policy sub-system was fragmented, with divided hospital doctor trade 
unions and entrenched groups within the health sickness funds, political parties and the 
administration. However, although fragmented, hospital doctors in regional teaching 
hospitals, entrenched within the privileged conférence, worked until the mid-1970s in 
alliance with the FHF and the DH in a dominant pro-hospital spending coalition.'^® This 
coalition was backed by local mayors with one eye on their electoral fortunes, as well as 
by the health sickness funds who financed much of the hospital investment programmes. 
Nurses, hospital personnel and, for that matter, the CNAMTS were, nevertheless,
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divorced from decision-making arenas.
Hospital directors occupied a ‘buffer zone’ between a pro-spending lobby of 
hospital doctors, the FHF, the DH, nurses and personnel on the one hand, and the anti­
spending DB on the other, albeit progressively more in tune with the initially ambiguous 
health sickness funds and the DSS.^ ^  ^This location offered the leadership of the corps a 
dual strategy because, depending upon the issues and its tactical ambitions, the hospital 
directors could switch alliances from one camp to the other. First, hospital directors could 
present themselves as the defenders of the local autonomy of public hospitals. This 
strategy cultivated support from hospital doctors and nurses and local mayors. It divorced 
hospital directors from its supporters within the departmental and regional health boards, 
the DDASS and the DRASS and the DH Alternatively, they could present themselves as 
the sole actors capable of delivering cost containment and improved management within 
public hospitals. This strategy cultivated an alliance with the DH and the Health and 
Finance Ministries at the expense of the local support of hospital doctors and nurses.
However, inherent in this juggling of strategies was the weak identification of the 
corps with either camp. Conflict over organisational boundaries within public hospitals 
weakened the foundations of alliances between hospital directors and doctors and nurses. 
Likewise, both its ‘hybrid’ statute and competition with the DB lessened the stability of 
the corp^ ties with a coalition of ‘financiers’. So hospital directors retreated to their 
privileged relations with local mayors and strategic positions within local political 
networks. Attaching oneself to a ‘good’ Mayor complete with a national profile was an 
astute career move for an ambitious hospital director. I now turn to the professionalisation 
of the corps of hospital directors and the emergence of the ENSP generation.
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CHAPTER THREE
HOSPITAL DmECTORS: THE ENSP GENERATION
The post-war professionalisation of hospital directors was a collective attempt by the 
members of a specialised and differentiated occupation to achieve self-regulation in both 
their organisation and working practices. Amongst other groups the degree of success in 
such endeavours has been associated with the acquisition of a series of traits - notably a 
developed body of expertise, reputation for altruistic service, demonstration of an 
extensive training and establishment of a professional code of conduct. These traits are 
said to characterise ‘core’ professions, such as doctors and lawyers.* However, there is 
little in these traits that is inherent to professions or professional tasks. Professional self­
regulation, maiked by collegiate control over recruitment and conduct, and autonomy in 
the workplace, is often underwritten by the state and is the product of an evolving 
bai^gaining process between a profession (seeking official sanction for its autonomy) and 
a government (seeking collaboration in the provision of services).^ In this view, traits are 
no more than the tools used by professionals to justify their self-regulation externally; a 
form of social closure to ward off competition and restrict access to the profession and 
thereby maintain its market superiority. And a profession is a ‘state-backed monopolistic 
supplier o f a valued service.’^
This chapter examines the professionalisation of French hospital directors. This 
emergence of a new actor in health policy networks is best summarised as the assertion 
o f an organisational profession within the pathway set down by French civil service 
structures. First, hospital directors are not one of the ‘core’ professions, but are dependent 
on state patronage: their emergence has been generated by the expansion of the apparatus 
of the state. They are also a techno-bureaucratic occupational group, or an 
‘organisational’ profession.* Larson identifies two categories of organisational 
professionals which are differentiated by their use of expertise and the presence or absence 
of a client orientation.^ Some organisational professions (such as school superintendents 
whose roles are generated by the concentration of administrative and managerial functions
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of the state), exploit the general ideology of professionalism not to assert independent 
professional status, but to justify their technobureaucratic power. Other aspiring 
occupations such as social workers, whose roles are also generated by the increasing 
functions and attributions of the state, nonetheless employ their claims to expertise to 
acquire countervailing power within the large organisations within which they work. 
Hospital directors clearly belong with the first group of organisational professionals who 
borrow from the ideology of professionalism to assert the legitimacy of their 
technobureaucratic functions.
Second, as one of the approximately 1800 functionally distinct corps  ^which make 
up the French civil service, hospital directors borrowed fi’om the ideology of the grands 
corps at the summit of the service. They exploited and moulded their actions upon the 
rules and norms of the corps structures imposed by the French state at the turn of the 
1960s. Each corps monopolises a specific task or set of tasks, with all its members 
enjoying the same terms and conditions of service.^ However, the seven grands corp^ at 
the summit o f the French civil service possess claims to a monopoly of expertise as well 
as possessing a degree of self-management with their own councils managing internal 
afl&irs.They are characterised by their historical origins, their small membership with limits 
on annual entries, their interministerial controls, and their mobility and ability to traverse 
public and private sectors under the practice of pantouflage^ Their expertise rests in part 
upon a certain generalism qualifying them for leadership posts and allowing them to define 
a conception of national interests and to manipulate multiple discourses.^^
The corps structure induces a balkanisation of the civil service, symbolised by 
competition and rivalry for territorial control of services and functions.Fuelling this 
balkanisation are the distinct identities which are attributed to corps along with an esprit 
de corps which ‘is first the awareness of belonging to a specific group; it is next to have 
a sense of solidarity with this group; it is finally the tendency to adhere to the objectives 
that it pursues, to identify with it.’^^  Corpsards are part of the same elite with common 
values and identities enforced by success at national concours, and training at a common 
institution where personal networks which tie individuals together are forged. Indeed, 
Thoenig^ showed how members of the Bridges and Highways corps, who shared common 
training, entrance examinations, and ‘language’ and traditions, demonstrated group
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cohesion and a certain ‘homogeneity’. In a study of industrial policy, Schmidt alludes to 
corpsards as a ‘small club of like-minded, arrogant, but competent individuals.’ '^* ‘Like- 
minded because like-trained’*^  the corps allegiance brings individuals together beyond the 
ties of substantive policy interests, political allegiances and recruitment from a narrow 
social and educational base.
Allegiance to the corps can claim to reduce the difficulty of collective action 
because ‘belonging to the corps takes on almost metaphysical connotations. It is the 
integration into a continuum which transcends the individual, integrates him into a chain 
which gives understanding to his actions.’*^  The corpsards' common backgrounds and 
corps identity helps substitute corps interest for the motivational diversity common in 
other groups. In addition, the grands corps have created an ethical code which governs 
the behaviour of individuals without any direct pressure upon individuals. However, this 
latter variable sits uneasily alongside both the individual strategies open to civil servants 
(such as promotion through ministerial cabinets) and the internal conflicts within corps. 
The homogeneity of the corps is questionable. As with other professions, they are not 
immune to ideological difrerences or internal factions, although they may be perceived 
externally as a coherent whole. Also, the pervasive culture of the state, and the general 
interest behind which the elite civil service ply their trade, does not diminish territorial 
clashes between corps. Functional roles are pre-eminent.*^
This chapter shows how the French civil service model imposed a certain dynamic 
upon the emergence of the corps, acting as a trigger to the formation of a group identity 
for hospital directors. It examines the management of the young corps from the beginning 
of the 1960s through to the imposition of cost containment in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
This period saw the emergence of a generation of hospital directors trained in the national 
school o f public health, the École Nationale de la Santé Publique (ENSP), as French 
governments both expanded the occupational group and progressively aligned its 
administrative organisation with that of other civil service corps. These decisions 
produced their own logic of development which affected the trade union membership 
within the corps, particularly the SNCH, the sole occupation-based trade union for 
hospital directors. As the SNCH swung progressively towards the development of a health 
policy platform in the late 1970s, the first generation of graduates from the expanded
82
training programme created by the government at the ENSP arrived in the corps.
The first section of the chapter examines hospital directors as an occupational 
group and how the institution of the ENSP structured the corps in 1991. The second plots 
the emergence of ENSP graduates fi*om the beginning of the 1960s, and changes in the 
corps* training, mobilisation and development. The third section of the chapter discusses 
the changing balance of support for different trade unions as ENSP graduates integrated 
the corps. The final section examines the group identity and motivations of those 
graduates who entered the SNCH.
3.1 THE ANATOMY OF A CORPS
Public hospital directors formed collectively in 1991 one of the category A ‘management 
and conception’ corp^^ of the French public hospital civil service. They exercised a virtual 
monopoly over all public hospital management posts. All but three hospital management 
posts were automatically reserved for members of the corps. Of the remaining three posts, 
hospital directors had ‘captured’ those as general director at the Hospices Civils de Lyon 
and the Assistance Publique de Marseille. Only the general director at the Assistance 
Publique - Hôpitaux de Paris remained outside the control of the corps. This position has 
been a ‘private hunting ground of Énarques [graduates of the elite civil service school, the 
École Nationale d'Administration (ENA)].’ ®^ Its single omission in their monopoly 
removed approximately ten percent of the capacity of public hospitals fi’om the control of 
the hospital directors’ C07775 (see Chapter Two).
As a category ‘A’ corps, public hospital directors were part of the leading 27 
percent of French civil servants recruited at graduate level or above.^° However, the corps 
did not have either the history, self-management, the monopoly of expertise or cultural 
authority attached to the grands corps such as the Inspection des Finances (see Chapter 
Two). First, its entrants came not firom ENA and the Ecole Polytechnique. Instead they 
were trained at the less reputed ENSP, ‘a school for second lieutenants.’^  ^Many entrants 
there also sat the ENA entrance examination, with the ENSP relegated to a ‘safe-bet.’ Nor 
had members of the hospital directors corps developed the generalist reputation which had 
allowed the grands corps to spread their influence beyond their allotted realm of technical
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expertise. The hospital directors did not straddle public and private sectors, and 
pantouflage (transferring to the private sector) remained uncommon despite the 
appearance of organised chains of private clinics.
However, the corps did exercise a degree of self-management, at least in terms of 
promotion through the posts within the corps. This influence was exercised through the 
corps  ^ trade union representatives on the commissions paritaires, the representative 
commissions which, along with the commissions de classement, co-manage the corps* 
relations with government. Most importantly, the commissions de classement assessed the 
appointments of individual hospital directors to vacant posts. The commissions were 
composed of trade union delegates, with mayoral and ministerial representation. In the 
case of the appointment of head directors, the commissions and the local Mayor listed 
candidates in order of preference. The formal decision remained with the Minister of 
Health, but the appointment normally resulted from the negotiations between the Mayor, 
trade unions and the Ministiy. This trade union contribution provided union leaderships 
with the opportunity to offer their members the selective benefit of trade union support 
for their individual promotion dossiers (see below). In 1991, approximately 75 percent of 
hospital directors^ were trade unionists (roughly four times the national average estimated 
at 15 to 20 percent).^ However, the concentration of trade union support was such that 
the SNCH commanded majority support, consistently winning a majority of seats on the 
commissions paritaires from as early as 1972. This dominance placed the control of 
representation on the consultative standing committees in the hands of the SNCH. Two 
conférences for hospital directors shadowed those of hospital doctors, one for directors 
of regional hospitals and one for general hospitals. As well as the seats of hospital 
directors on the formal consultative bodies, the Conseil Supérieor des Hôpitaux and the 
Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Hospitalière, these conférences were held within the 
network of the SNCH.
The corps totalled over 4,100 hospital directors '^*, a membership on a par with the 
3600 members of Bridges and Highways, but significantly more than the 227 members of 
the financial inspectorate, the Inspection des Finances?  ^These directors were divided 
administratively into four separate classes, ordered hierarchically from First to Fourth (the 
Fourth and Fifth classes having merged in 1985). The largest class was the Fourth and
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lowest class (see Table 3.1) which included approximately one third of all hospital 
directors. The four classes, for those directors en plein exercice as head directors of 
public hospitals, were determined according to an assessment of the activity of the hospital 
(its treatment of acute illnesses, emergency services and out-patients etc). As a rule-of- 
thumb, this meant that Fourth Class hospital directors could expect to manage hospitals 
with up to 200 beds. Third Class directors ran hospitals with up to 400 beds, while 
Second Class directors controlled hospitals with up to 1000 beds. First Class directors 
headed hospitals with over 1000 beds. At the pinnacle of the corps were the 29 posts as 
general directors of the regional hospitals and the Hospices Civils de Lyon and the 
Assistance Publique de Marseille (see Figure 3.1). These posts stood above the posts as 
head directors, assistant general directors, directors of central services, assistant directors 
and attachés in the rest o f the corps.
Table 3.1: The make-up of hospital directors in 199126









Aspiring hospital directors largely entered the corps as student directors in either 
the Fourth or Third Class. Entry was by way of two sets of national competitive 
examinations, known as concours, which were open to both members of the public and 
existing civil servants (see below). Promotion then came after both six years in a class and 
satisfactory assessments by the DDASS, the departmental health boards. One quarter of 
hospital directors entering the corps were expected to reach the First Class following the 
upgrading of the corps in 1988.^ However, promotion to the 29 posts as general directors 
was open only to directors with a minimum of four years professional experience in the 
First Class. This supplementary requirement was negotiated by the corps as a safeguard
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against access to these posts by other civil servants.
The concours to the Third Class offered two paths for candidates: the interne open 
to civil servants from other corp^^ and the externe open to the general public. ^The 
majority of candidates were selected from the externe which accounted for 65 percent of 
the annual ENSP intake, with the remaining 35 percent coming from the ranks of existing 
civil servants competing at the interne. The externe was dominated by graduate students 
from the seven political science institutes, the Instituts d’Ètudes Politiques (lEPs). These 
Sciences Po students represented approximately one quarter of candidates who entered 
the examination. They were outnumbered by candidates with qualifications in law who 
represented roughly half of the candidates to the examination. However, they accounted 
for two-thirds of successful candidates (see Figure 3.1). Two Institutes alone, those at 
Paris and Bordeaux, provided respectively 22 percent and 14 percent of successful 
candidates between 1986 and 1991.^
This dominance of Sciences Po graduates contrasted with the profile of candidates 
at the interm (see Table 3.2). First, as might be expected, candidates at the interne were 
older: an average of 33 years old against 24.5 years old for the externe. Second, they 
generally had lower academic qualifications. More than half of the successful candidates 
at the interne did not possess the university degree level education which was necessary 
to sit the externe. Finally, candidates at the interne came from diverse occupational 
backgrounds, ranging from inspectors of health and social afifairs through to teachers and 
post ofiBce inspectors. However, two occupations, adjoints des cadres, the administrative 
support staff within hospitals, and nurses regularly provided one third of candidates (on 
average, 23 percent and 15 percent of successful candidates respectively).^'
Table 3.2: The number of successful candidates at the intem ^^
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Successful candidates 29 33 26 14 28 28 35
With a degree or above 16 11 12 5 11 10 15
Nurses 6 5 3 2 2 7 5
Adjoints des cadres 5 10 7 2 4 9 8
8 6
Figure 3.1: The dominance of Sciences Po graduates at the externe
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In short, the corps of hospital directors had all the traits of a petit grand corps. It 
monopolised some of the highest paid jobs in the French civil service, but not the top post 
in the field, the head of UtiQ Assistance Publique in Paris. It was a Category ‘A’ corps with 
an above average level of unionisation, but although its trade unions influenced 
appointments, it lacked the self-management and standing which characterised the grands 
corps. Even the dominance of Sciences Po graduates deserved qualification. Paris, the 
most prestigious of the seven Institutes prepared candidates for ENA, and their top 
students took positions there. Although Paris graduates dominated the entry into the 
hospital directors corps, this option was often their second choice. Too often the corps* 
influence was reduced by internal shortcomings, of which a key problem was the cleavage 
between the Third and Fourth Classes.
A corps within a corps
The primary cleavage within the corps was that which separated Fourth Class hospital 
directors fi*om the top three classes. Few hospital directors ftom the Fourth Class gained 
entry into the first three classes despite meeting the criteria for promotion to a higher 
class. In 1989,43 percent of Fourth Class directors met the conditions for promotion to 
the Third Class.^  ^In 1991, 80 percent of directors in the Fourth Class had more than the 
six years seniority required for promotion to a higher class.^ "* However, on average, only 
40 Fourth Class directors a year entered new posts within the Third Class.^  ^Consequently, 
in 1991, only 13 percent of hospital directors in the first three classes originated from the 
Fourth Class (see Table 3.3). Only 10 of these directors had climbed from the Fourth to 
the First Class. The m^ority had progressed no further than the Third Class.^  ^Indeed, the 
Fourth Class only belatedly joined the ‘category A’ corps of the civil service in 1988.^’ 
This absence of integration stemmed from the different selection and training 
programmes which governed the entry of student directors into the Fourth and Third 
Classes. The entry requirements and training of Fourth Class directors were lower than 
their Third Class counterparts. Members of the public who wished to enter the Third Class 
entrance examination required a minimum of three years further education after the 
baccalaureate (the equivalent to ‘A’ Levels) as opposed to two years for Fourth Class 
student directors. These differential entry requirements were reflected in the length of
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training which lasted 12 months for Fourth Class student directors and 27 months for 
Third Class student directors.
Table 3.3: The number of directors originating from the Fourth Class^^





The training of hospital directors for the Third and Fourth Classes took place in
different geographical locations, although in principle the training of hospital directors was
monopolised by the ENSP at Rennes. The ENSP opened its doors to directors in the first
three classes in 1958, however, the School only took on responsibility for the training of
Fourth Class directors in 1986. And even fi'om 1986, the integration of Fourth Class
student directors into the ENSP remained incomplete: for four of their five months in the
classroom. Fourth Class student directors were taught at the Institut International
SuperiéiiT de Formation des Cadres de la Santé de Lyon, managed by the Hospices Civils
de Lyon and supervised by the ENSP. Consequently, in 1991, only 16 percent of Fourth
Class hospital directors had graduated firom the ENSP and this was fi’om the training
course taking place for the most part at Lyon and not at Rennes.^^
In practice, therefore, the Fourth class was a corps within a corps. Fourth Class
hospital directors required lower entry qualifications than Third Class directors, undertook
shorter training programmes and tended not to progress beyond the Second and Third
Classes. Indeed, Third Class directors invoked their higher qualifications and lengthier
training to oppose the promotion into the Third Class of Fourth Class directors whose
‘quite normal interests in promotion come up against, (...) even if it is not 
always openly said, (...) the corps interests of the Third Class directors.
And there, there is an area of conflict, it's obvious. (...)... fi’om time to 
time, there are things that are said that are not too pleasant.’^
These differing entrance requirements and training distanced the Fourth Class and
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provided the foundations of a distinct collective identity for the top three classes. Over 
two thirds (68 percent) of directors in the first three classes, with a high of 74 percent in 
the Second Class, were graduates of the ENSP (See Table 3.5).^  ^This common ENSP 
experience crosscut any cleavages bom of function and responsibility: ‘the homogeneity 
of the corps of directors is true, especially fi’om the Third to the First Class, because we 
all have this common training.
The ENSP identity
The ENSP began life in October 1945 as a government training department within the 
Institut National d'Hygiène in Paris. It opened its doors to public hospital directors in 
1958; the same year that government increased the powers of hospital directors and 
transferred the formal nomination of hospital directors firom the local Prefect to the 
Minister of Health (see Chapter Two). However, it was not until the early 1960s that the 
strong School-Co^5 bond was established. In 1960, the School took responsibility for the 
first national competitive entrance examination and training programme for hospital 
directors, and thereby gained its monopoly over the training of future hospital directors. 
Two years later, it moved to its own premises in Rennes, reinforcing the institutional and 
physical ties between the school and its graduates without which ‘the idea of the corps 
would be diluted, the dynamic School-Profession would disappear. The teaching [...] 
would no longer have a common physical base: a place, a school, specialised teachings.’*^  
The ENSP identity did not override competing allegiances fi’om directors within 
the first three classes. The professional identity of the corps, as well as its external 
reputation, exploited the influence and responsibilities of head directors as managers of 
public hospitals. The representative organisations of the corps operated as a lobby for 
head directors. The whole package of reforms that developed in the 1980s not only 
focused upon the responsibilities of head directors, but equated head directors to heads 
of enterprise sitting at the top of the strategic apex of public hospitals (see Chapter Four). 
When asked in a 1991 internal SNCH survey to prioritise their personal career ambitions, 
hospital directors placed the desire to be recognised as a ‘true head of enterprise’ in 
second place behind the financial or other recognition of the ‘hands-on’ experience of 
hospital directors.^
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However, the majority of hospital directors worked not en plein exercice as head
directors, but as part of the wider management teams which developed in public hospitals
after the June 1969 hospital management decree/^ Only 37 percent of posts were en plein
exercice as head directors, although there were significant differences between classes (see
Table 3.4). Paradoxically, the proportion of head directors was largest in the lowest class
where, given the size of the institutions managed by Fourth Class directors, the number
of posts as head directors reached 69 percent of posts in the class. However, throughout
the corps head directors distinguished their interests firom those of assistant directors:
‘When one defends the profession of hospital director, you often feel quite 
strongly the split between the head directors and the non-head directors 
that is to say that the head directors (...) consider that they have very 
important responsibilities and that they have worries that perhaps some of 
their colleagues haven't got. And they demand, because of this, specific 
advantages that their colleagues don't have... and quite rightly too!'*
Table 3.4; Posts as head directors (1991)/^






Second, the working environments of hospital directors in the smaller local and
general hospitals had few common points of reference with the tasks of hospital directors
working in regional hospitals or, for that matter, in the three hospital groups of the
Hospices Civils de Lyon  ^ the Assistance Publique de Marseille and the Assistance
Publique - Hôpitaux de Paris:
‘Already the tasks and the responsibilities [...] are different, that is to say, 
that it is a lot more fragmented: the larger the structure, less one has the 
feeling of participating in the final decision or in the life of the 
institution.’^ *
The centralised management structures of regional hospitals and the larger hospital groups 
such as ûiQ Assistance Publique spawned competing conceptions of the role of directors
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within the corps. Directors working within general hospitals in the provinces tended to
claim that centralised management structures such as the Assistance Publique reduced the
function of directors to that of ‘letter-boxes’^^  implementing directives from above or to
that of specialist ‘orderer of string.’ ®^ And hospital directors working within Paris
hospitals constituted a relatively closed sub-group within the corps: ‘the people who work
there, do thdr whole career there.This insulation changed somewhat in the early 1990s
when the Assistance Publique sought to ‘import’ hospital directors from outside its
centralised structures to act as catalysts for a more entrepreneurial management culture
within its hospitals.^^
Within the first three classes, the ENSP created a multi-dimensional School-Co/pj
dynamic which facilitated the forging of common professional networks. At its lowest
common denominator, the School-Co/pj dynamic manifested itself as no more than the
common experiences of teachers, classrooms and corridors. However, the ENSP
monopoly over training gave an important institutional and physical focus for hospital
directors. Success at the competitive entrance examination, the concours furnished a
common reference for all directors; reinforced as it was by the selection of a nucleus of
individuals with common backgrounds and educational standards.^^ In fact, graduation
from the ENSP and success at its competitive entrance examination defined the
parameters of group membership and came over time to symbolise common interests and
values: ‘you have been to a Grande École [ENSP], therefore, you have come out of this
Grande École, therefore, you have a sense of belonging which federates energies, which
attenuates differences.’^^
This experience provided hospital directors with a parallel process of recognising
common interests which reinforced that derived from the shared occupational status of
hospital director. Graduation from the ENSP automatically labelled hospital directors and
communicated similarity and a common nucleus of values and attitudes:
‘We have all gone through the same training, we have all had the same 
discourse at the School about who we were, and what we should be in the 
profession.
The ENSP tag consequently enabled other hospital directors to short-cut information 
constraints and automatically fellow categorise directors. This process continued into their 
professional life because hospital directors identified themselves by the year of their ENSP
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graduation or the names of the ‘personalities’ within the corps with whom they had 
graduated.
Of course, there remained differences between ENSP graduates. The ENSP
experience did not produce shared outlooks which erased the influence of other opinion-
forming variables such as family and social backgrounds. The School trained six other
occupations alongside hospital directors and was marked by a culture closer to the
conceptions of public health than to those of hospital management. Indeed, the history of
the School was punctuated by a series of conflicts between the school's administrators and
hospital directors who believed that:
‘The School is not, in terms of the quality of training, at the required level 
of the ambitions that it should have. And, precisely because it is not this 
privileged place of reflection, of doctrinal construction, in relation to the 
occupation of director, it is more at the back of our evolutions than in the 
avant-garde of them.’*®
Few hospital directors returned to the ENSP to teach and directors had no places by right
on the Administrative Board of the School. Yet, the School furnished individual directors 
with the group identity with which to recognise their common subjective interests with 
others organised in the corpsP Its manner of doing so was the consequence of the gradual 
imposition of the corps-hzstà organisation upon the function of hospital directors in 
France. However, the emergence of ENSP graduates within the corps did not occur over­
night. The next section looks at the rise of ENSP graduates within the corps from the 
beginning of the 1960s, focusing on the top three classes.
3.2 TRAINING, MOBILISATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE C0/IP5
There was no immediate influx of ENSP graduates into the corps nor any overnight coup 
which seized its commanding heights. The training programmes introduced in 1960 lasted 
only one year, but the numbers of student directors accepted on these programmes were 
not sufficient to alter significantly the composition of the corps. Only 138 hospital 
directors graduated from the ENSP training programme in the first decade of its existence. 
Indeed, until 1969, the average number of student directors accepted on the programmes 
was only 20 a year; the lowest being 15 and the highest being 23.** In addition, these
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ENSP graduates were only beginning to work their way through the ranks of the 
occupation, particularly since hospital directors were obliged to spend a minimum of six 
years in each class before entering the next. They were in no position to mount a dramatic 
push for the leadership of the corps.
The formalisation of the corps continued under successive French governments 
with the expansion of the ENSP training programme and the affirmation of the 
administrative hierarchy within public hospitals. In 1965, recognising the under­
management of public hospitals, the Health Commission of the Fifth Plan put forward 
proposals to expand recruitment to the ENSP programme/^ These proposals were in 
keeping with the late 1960s expansion of the civil service as a means of reversing the 
general post-war declines in recruitment.^ Indeed, in July 1968, the government 
introduced a common fund financed by public hospitals for the teaching and payment of 
trainee directors.^^ More significantly, June 1969 circulars introduced the interne and 
externe entry paths to the ENSP as well as the assistcmat training programme for hospital 
directors. The assistcmat extended the training period of student hospital directors to three 
years, adding two years as trainee directors in public hospitals to the one year spent in the 
classroom at Reimes.®
At a stroke, the government increased the prestige of the corps within the universe 
of the civil service - for prestige tends to be based not only upon the entry requirements 
o f the corps, but also upon the length of training undergone by its new recruits. In 
addition, the June circulars authorised the creation of management teams within public 
hospitals. At the same time, the circulars both improved promotion prospects for hospital 
directors and cemented the boundaries of the corps by reducing the number of civil 
servants transferring directly into the higher posts of the corps through the Tour 
Extérieur. These measures laid the ground for the 1970 Hospital Law which formally 
transferred responsibility for general management of public hospitals fi*om boards of 
trustees to hospital directors (see Chapter Two).
In 1972, the Health Commission of the French Plan, maintaining its calls for the 
expansion of the ENSP programme, sought a general increase in the prestige of the corps 
and advocated an opening of the concours to economists.® And following the switch to 
the assistcmat, the number o f student directors entering the ENSP increased. From
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graduations of 20, the annual intake increased over seven-fold with a series of graduations 
of over 100 student directors between 1974 and 1981 (with a peak of 148 in 1978).^ The 
first three classes of hospital directors more than doubled in size between 1972 and 1985, 
rising fi-om 1152 directors in 1972 to 2347 directors in 1985 (see Figure 3.2).^  ^Yet, of 
the 1796 ENSP graduates in the first three classes of hospital directors in 1991, 1698 
graduated fi’om the assistanat programme.^ More importantly, between 1974 and 1981, 
graduates formed the bulk of these new entrants into the corps. Recruitment onto the 
training programme was itself declining from the mid-1980s as governments cut the 
number of students entering the ENSP to on average 40 a year (the same level as the early 
1970s). The assistanat itself was replaced in 1987 by a twenty seven month training 
programme based on that followed by students at ENA; another attempt to increase its 
prestige.^^
The rise of these graduates with common ENSP origins progressively 
homogenised the corps (see Table 3.5). By 1991, there remained less than one percent of 
directors in the first three classes who entered the corps under the 1943 statutes (see
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Chapter Two). Few directors had been promoted either from the Fourth Class (13 
percent) or, from the ranks of chefs de bureaux, the administrative staff below hospital 
directors within public hospitals (less than 5 percent). In addition, the number of hospital 
directors originating from the Tour Extérieur represented no more than 6.5 percent of the 
first three classes. The proportion rose to 20 percent in the First Class, although it fell to 
less than one percent in the Third Class (from 1969, integration into the corps of hospital 
directors from other civü service corps was limited to the First and Second Classes). 
Nevertheless, in the First and Second Classes, the number of hospital directors from the 
Tour Extérieur declined, from 21 percent in 1980 t o l l  percent in 1991. Over the same 
period, the share of ENSP graduates in the First and Second Classes rose from 18 percent 
to 69 percent.®*
Table 3.5: The number of hospital directors in the first three classes by their method








1943 Statutes 11 8 4 23
ENSP (post 1960 courses) 72 21 5 98
ENSP (post 1969 courses) 152 730 816 16
Tour Extérieur 78 84 9 171
Promotion from Fourth Class 10 74 269 353
Promotion direct into Third Class 7 36 72 115
Diverse (N.Afiica, 1969 integration) 56 73 45 174
Total 386 1,026 1,220 2,632
Between 1972 and 1991 both the First and Second Classes increased as a 
proportion of the corps, with the First Class almost doubling in size (see Table 3.6 and 
Figure 3.3).^ Over the same period, the Third and Fourth Classes both declined, with the 
Fourth and Fifth classes increasing by only 185 hospital directors between 1972 and 1978. 
However, given the necessity to spend a minimum of six years in each class before 
entering the next, hospital directors originating from the assistanat programme did not
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arrive en masse in the First Class until after 1985. In 1985, ENSP graduates represented
58 percent of First to Third Class directors (24 percent in the First Class, 46 percent in
the Second and 68 percent in the Third).Only five of the assistanat graduates had
achieved First Class status by 1985, but 42 of the pre-1969 graduates had achieved First
Class status.^  ^The large-scale new waves of graduates who entered the corps in the mid-
1970s did not reach the First Class until over a decade later -152 had done so by 1991.^
Indeed, ‘the School must have taken 20 years to produce a homogeneous body of
managers amongst which the best took power almost everywhere.’”  Many ENSP
directors owed their promotion to the top classes of the corps to the general upgrading
of the corps in 1988; one hospital director out of two in the First and Second Classes had
less than three years seniority in 1991.”
However, the entry of the 1974-1981 assistanat generation into the corps enabled
ENSP graduates to use ‘the arrival in mass of these young graduates in health to
overthrow, to effectively take, let's say, all the sectors in hospitals.’”  The early ENSP
graduates possessed different qualities fi*om those hospital directors already in post. The
previously weak selection procedures had produced a disparate recruitment into the corps^
with appointments depending upon ‘the fortune of their past history and the institutional
history of the hospital.’”  In contrast, ENSP graduates all had a higher level of formal
education than existing members of the corps, with the national recruitment examinations
bringing into the corps a nucleus of university and Sciences Po graduates fi*om the pool
of graduates preparing examinations for ENA and other civil service corps. In 1966,
university graduates accounted for the first time for over 50 percent of the annual intake
of the ENSP. In addition, fi*om 1968, the intake began increasingly to comprise graduates
of public administration and economics (5 out of 15 with university degrees in 1968, 11
out of 37 in 1970).”  Although the intake remained dominated by law graduates (27 out
of 39 graduates in 1971), there was thus an influx of graduates with:
‘a different basic training, people who had already been through further 
education, who had done Sciences Po, who had prepared the entrance 
exam for ENA, who had a higher education diploma.’”
97
Table 3.6: The number of hospital directors in each class, 1972-1991^^
1972 1978 1985 1988 1991
First class 100 151 194 252 386
Second class 401 548 663 739 1026
Third class 651 978 1490 1513 1220
Fourth class 576 603 967 1503 1474
Fifth class 256 414 565 - -
Total 1,984 2,694 3,879 4,007 4,106
Notes: The Fourth and Fifth Classes merged in 1985.











upon entry into the corps, the first ENSP graduates began to organise as a distinct
group of hospital directors with its own codes and conventions. Graduation firom the
ENSP and not simply the occupational status of hospital director, came to define group
membership and the perception of common interests (see above). This divorced them firom
existing members of the corps and, in doing so, created an impetus towards change,
towards the assertion of their own codes and conventions:
‘One put in the same saucepan [the ENSP], a community of people who 
integrated through the reality of professional corps, therefore, (...) the 
necessity to distinguish themselves from those who preceded them, to find 
working rules which were common to the corps and to lead a truly 
autonomous corps with its own internal rules, its culture and its methods 
of identification.
Such a perception of shared interests was evident as the early ENSP graduates took up 
posts in public hospitals. They faced competition for such posts firom both non-ENSP 
hospital directors already in post and the corps of chefs de bureaux, the middle-ranking 
clerical staff within public hospitals. Chefs de bureaux had colonised hospital 
administrations with the aim of gaining access to management posts through internal 
promotion. It was not uncommon for head directors (often themselves ex-chefs de 
bureaux) to work directly with the chefs de bureaux and by-pass the ENSP directors 
within thdr management teams.*  ^In this competition for posts, the recognition of ENSP 
group membership and common interests motivated decisions to appoint a candidate to 
vacant posts:
‘A director fi’om the ENSP who found himself opposite candidates of 
whom certain were graduates of the ENSP, (...), he would favour, 
independently of the quality of the individual and of the quality of the 
training, he would favour those graduates, that is defibnite.’*^
However, this recognition of a group identity was not based upon acceptance of 
a shared doctrine or programme of reforms emanating firom their training at the ENSP. 
At best, the graduates who left the School did so with a code of practice and belief in 
management, with the common core values of a nascent advocacy coalition, but with few 
defined policy options. The ENSP remained wedded to a legalistic approach to 
management: ‘we had lessons on the regulations, how to read the regulations, how to 
apply the regulations, and what form to fill in to give your assessments.’*^  The firm policy 
commitments and management orientations to promote the interests of the corps had to
99
be pieced together outside the School in the representative organisations of hospital 
directors.
Overall, therefore, the rise of ENSP assistcmat graduates progressively
homogenised the corps, especially following the influx of ENSP graduates into the corps
between 1974 and 1981. It was the arrival of this generation that allowed ENSP graduates
to become the predominant group within the corps, although the rules governing
promotion between classes precluded an overnight shift in the control of the corps'
commanding heights. This generation, brought into the corps through the national
recruitment examinations, was characterised by its nucleus of university graduates with
legal and public administration backgrounds. This elevated the social and educational
standing of the corps.
Tt was with the training programme of the ENSP (that) the profession or 
the fiinction of hospital director became well-regarded - obtained (...) in 
any case, respect from doctors on the one hand, and local politicians on 
the other hand.’*"*
Most importantly, through the socialisation of its training programme, the ENSP created 
a group identity based on the twin pillars of the occupation of hospital director and 
graduation from the ENSP. This group identity created a dynamic for change within the 
corps and its representative organisations. In the next section, I analyse the changing 
fortunes of hospital director trade unions in the 1970s and 1980s, and in particular, the 
entry of ENSP graduates into the SNCH.
3.3 UNIONISATION, THE SNCH AND THE CORPS* EXPANSION
The early ENSP graduates entered the corps when Force Ouvrière (FO) was ceasing to 
be the main union for hospital directors.*  ^FO formed in 1948 when anti-communist trade 
unionists broke away from the then dominant Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) 
amidst growing criticisms of French Communist Party influence within the CGT. The 
reformist FO subsequently replaced the CGT as the major hospital director trade union, 
drawing its support from hospitals in Paris, Lyon, Marseille, and North Afnca, and from 
the psychiatric sector.*^
However, by the end of the 1960s, FO was engaged in a (losing) struggle for pre- 
eminance amongst hospital directors with a new force, the SNCH, a small and specialist
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union which aimed only to organize hospital directors. By 1966, at the elections to the 
commissions paritaires, an SNCH-led Liste d'Union won 62 percent of the vote.*  ^The 
SNCH formed in 1947 when hospital directors in three regions {Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and 
Seine-et-Mame) themselves broke away from the CGT.** They did so in opposition to the 
decision of the CGT in December 1946 to integrate hospital directors into the same trade 
union branches as hospital personnel. This decision watered down the directors’ specific 
identity, placing them in the same branches as the staff they were expected to manage: 
‘We could not decently be represented, trade union wise, by staff under our orders and 
whom we appoint, whereas they would not tolerate, quite rightly, to be represented by 
us.’*’ Refused permission by the CGT to continue to organise specific hospital director 
trade union branches, the directors formed the minority SNCH and sought to join the 
CGT as an independent trade union within the CGT confederation. When this request was 
denied, the SNCH directors broke away from the CGT altogether. Following the creation 
of FO, the CGT anyway lost its influence within the corps of hospital directors.
Unlike the CGT, both the SNCH and FO espoused a stance of political neutrality 
which prohibited formal links with any political parties. However, while FO and the CGT 
were general trade union federations, the SNCH adopted an occupation-specific trade 
unionism, stressing the distinct occupational problems facing hospital directors and 
refiising to aflSliate to wider trade union movements. The SNCH argued that directors and 
administrators simply faced difficulties which could not be aggregated together with those 
of other hospital personnel and occupations. In contrast, FO maintained distinct hospital 
director trade union branches, but integrated them into the wider FO trade union 
confederation. It perceived the problems facing hospital directors as not distinctive, and 
capable of being handled within the policy framework defined by the confederation’s 
national leadership with the interests of multiple occupations in mind.
From the outset, therefore, the competition between FO and the SNCH revolved 
around their rival conceptions of the position of hospital directors within the workforce. 
FO repeatedly condemned the SNCH for its occupation-based trade unionism. The FO 
leadership argued that FO’s integration into a wider trade union movement meant that it 
was able to define a long-term global hospital policy whereas the occupation-based trade 
unionism of the SNCH was without:
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‘any support, neither technical nor moral. Inevitably, it is cut off from the 
totality of workers: it lives cut off from the rest of the world with all that 
this conception of trade unionism has that is disturbing and erroneous.*^ 
SNCH’s single occupation approach also differed from that of the socialist Confédération
Française et Démocratique du Travail and the Catholic Confédération Française des
Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC). Like FO and the CGT, these two minor trade unions
integrated hospital directors into a wider trade union confederation. So the structure of
trade union competition presented ENSP graduates with two distinct identities when
deciding which trade union to support: the politically neutral and occupation-based SNCH
or the integrative stance of the dominant FO confederation (plus the minority variants
offered by the CGT, CFDT and CFTC), which all espoused varying partisan positions.
The entry of ENSP assistanat graduates into the corps did not alter the emerging
predominance of the SNCH at elections to the commissions paritaires. Despite its twin
principles of non-affiliation and political neutrality, in 1972 the SNCH joined in the liste
d'entente, an anti-FO electoral alliance with the CGT, the CFDT, and the CFTC This
electoral alliance prolonged its electoral strategy at the end of the 1960s.^  ^Its joint list
won 58 percent of the votes cast and took seven of the twelve seats on the commissions.^^
FO, with 42 percent of the vote remained the largest single trade union, but its dominance
in the commissions paritaires was weakened. Indeed, FO argued that the SNCH
represented only 41 percent of the vote, with the other 17 percent attributable to its
partners in the liste d'entente
However, the decline of FO continued as ENSP graduates, particularly the post-
1974 graduations of over 100, entered the first three classes. FO lost five percent of votes
cast between 1972-1981 (see Table 3.7). Between 1972 and 1981, the SNCH confirmed
its dominance at the expense of FO, and with the demise of the CFDT as an influence
among hospital directors. At the elections in 1975, the broad anti-FO coalition
disaggregated as the former partners presented two separate lists for the elections to the
commissions paritaires. The SNCH presented a joint list with the minor CFTC which won
55 percent of the votes cast, commanding seven of the twelve seats on the commissions
paritaires. At the subsequent elections of 1978 and 1981, the SNCH share of the vote,
still in alliance with the CFTC, rose to 59 percent in 1978 and 60 percent in 1981.
Although FO’s vote remained relatively stable in 1975, its support fell to 37 percent in
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1981. The support of the CFDT virtually disappeared as it failed to present a list at the 
elections to the commissions paritaires in 1978 and gained less than two percent of the 
votes cast in 1981. As for the CGT, it obtained less than two percent of the vote in 1978 
and fell to less than one percent in 1981.
Table 3.7: Trade union support at elections to the commissions paritaires from 1972 
to 1991^^
Percent: 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1991
Turnout 94.7 94.3 82.5 89.5 83.2 78.8 79.6
SNCH vote 57.7* 54.6 58.9 59.7 62.5 62.8 59.1
FO vote 42.3 40.9 39.5 37.3 31.6 29.4 25.2
CFDT vote • 4.5* « 1.7 4.9 6.8 15.6
CGT vote - - 1.6 1.3 0.9 1.0 -
Notes:* Li 1972, there was a joint SNCH/CEDT/CFTC/CGT list hi 1975, there was a joint CFDT/CGT list
The decline in FO’s vote share accelerated in the 1980s, dropping over 12 
percentage points to reach 25 percent in 1991, with sharper declines in support occurring 
at the 1984 and 1991 elections. In contrast, SNCH support reached 62 percent in 1984 
and 63 percent in 1987, although it fell back to 59 percent in 1991. This consolidation of 
SNCH support was achieved not only by its own performance, but also by the re- 
emergence of the CFDT at the expense of FO. The CFDT reversed its decline in the 1970s 
to progressively climb to 16 percent of votes in 1991. These trends meant that by 1991 
the closest challenger to the SNCH at elections to the commissions paritaires was over 
30 percent behind the dominant trade union.
However, only a minority of ENSP graduates joined the SNCH in the 1970s. By 
1980, out of the 1163 ENSP graduates in the corps, only 388 (33 per cent) had joined the 
trade union.®^  This relative poor recruitment can be partly explained by the continued 
predominance of FO membership among the graduates of the concours interne. Promoted 
from within the ranks of the civil service, they often brought pre-established FO loyalties 
to the corps.^  However, in its 1980 internal report on recruitment and membership, the 
SNCH leadership admitted that the expansion of the corps and the ENSP graduations in
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the 1970s should have had ‘a greater repercussion on the membership of the hospital 
director category. There was nothing of the sort and perhaps it is necessary to find out the 
reasons why.’^  ^Indeed, set against the results obtained at elections to the commission 
paritaires, it became apparent that ENSP graduates were voting for the SNCH, but not 
taking the final steps to join the trade union. In 1978, whilst its membership accounted for 
43 percent of the corps of hospital directors, the SNCH won almost 60 percent of votes 
at the elections for the commissions paritaires.^ * The difference between those voting for 
the SNCH and those actually joining the trade union suggests some important questions. 
Why did not the corps identity of the corpsards obviate large-scale collective action 
difficulties ? And why did the minority of directors who mobilised within the SNCH do 
so against the majority behaviour of their colleagues? The next section shows that the 
minority of ENSP graduates who entered the SNCH possessed distinct motivations firom 
those who remained outside the trade union.
3.4 THE ENSP GROUP IDENTITY
Group joining is commonly seen as determined by the extent of selective incentives which
are only available to individuals who become group members.^ In the case of trade
unions, these private benefits encourage individuals to join trade unions by both
minimising the net costs of membership, and reducing people’s willingness to fi*ee-ride on
the backs of other group members. In the case of ENSP graduates entering the corps in
the 1970s, trade union leaderships made use of the private benefits that came through their
defence of individuals and support for individuals’ promotion dossiers on the commissions
paritaires and commissions de classements, which came into operation in 1971 (see
Chapter Two).^°° Trade unions leaderships were never slow to advertise these benefits.
Even at the end of the 1960s, FO representatives made ENSP graduates fully aware of the
alleged career advantages that would accrue to its members:
‘When I was at the School in 1968, it was FO which dominated and they 
let it be known that if you took out a FO membership card, things would 
go better for you.’ ®^^
Trade union leaderships repeatedly defended their influence over the appointments 
of hospital directors. When Michèle Barzach, Junior Minister of Health in the 1986-1988
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Chirac government, appointed ‘her’ candidate at Montpellier against the wishes of the 
Mayor, the SNCH publicly decried the ministerial intervention in the appointment of a 
director/®^ Their defence revealed the unstable influence of trade unions, but it also 
publicised the possible benefits of SNCH trade union membership in ‘normal’ 
circumstances. Indeed, overtime, trade unions leaderships have delivered throughout the 
corps their message of selective benefits which has become widely accepted as motivation 
for membership:
‘Except for the rare people who truly join for reasons concerning trade 
union philosophy, the majority join, in feet, simply because when you need 
the trade unions in the commissions paritaires, it is practical [to be a trade 
union member]. ’
Most studies of the behaviour of elite civil servants fall back upon the selective 
benefits provided to the leaders of the corps through their management of individuals' 
careers. A common pattern is that of the maestro at the head of the corps who exercises 
control over the prospects of junior corpsards - for example, Chalandon at the head of the 
Mines. Collective action is made more likely because the corps advances the interests of 
individuals, which individual corps members cannot do on their own. Colonisation and 
maintenance of territorial gains moulds common and individual interests together. Even 
so, as Kessler argues, the balancing of individual and collective interests ‘is sometimes a 
matter of acrobatics.’ ®^*
Amongst the cohort of the ENSP assistanat graduates, the mechanism of the 
commissions paritaires should have produced an inherent bias towards membership of the 
dominant trade union, the SNCH. Rational individuals, who were motivated by the 
prospect of support for their promotion dossiers, could have been expected to maximise 
these private benefits by joining the trade union capable of delivering the most votes in 
their favour. A rational choice account would predict that the dominant trade union will 
have remained so, with a ‘snowball’ drive toward membership once it was widely 
expected to rise to a predominant or a quasi-predominant position. Finally, as the trade 
union became dominant, the benefits derived fi*om membership could have been expected 
to become increasingly haphazard as more candidates fi-om the same trade union 
competed for its endorsement in the fight to gain posts. This change might be expected 
to promote greater involvement within the trade union, as individual members try to
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secure the support of the trade union leadership. However, for some individuals, the same
change might have caused them to drop out of trade union participation, or to join a
minority trade union with more chance of securing support on the commissions paritaires,
albeit minority support.
The SNCH’s failure to mobilise ENSP graduates implies either that the majority
of graduates who voted for the union but did not join it, acted irrationally; or, that the
direct benefits to be gained fi*om SNCH dominance on the commissions paritaires were
minimal and that those ENSP graduates who joined the SNCH were maximising other
benefits. Not wanting to label some 70 percent of ENSP graduates up to 1980 as
irrational, I argue in fevour of the latter assumption which finds support in the sequence
of events in the 1970s. Some hospital directors in the SNCH criticised the lack of
influence of trade union delegates on the commissions paritaires:
T f you think of the role of the trade union representatives on the 
commissions paritaires, where, for example, the grading of the directors 
is concerned, their role is reduced to nothing... The delegates on the 
commissions paritaires have absolutely no power to modify anything.*'®^
At its 1980 Grenoble conference, the SNCH bemoaned its lack of influence on the
dedsions taken in the commissions paritaires. It complained that the excessive influence
of the Mayor in appointments meant that too often the choice of head director for vacant
posts did not coincide with the professional standing of the candidate.^ ®® Indeed, it was
in response to this criticism that Jacques Barrot, then overarching Minister of Health and
Social Security, instructed the DH to allow hospital director trade unions to list their
candidates in order of preference. As a result, it was only in the 1980s that the selective
benefits inherent in the mechanisms of the commissions paritaires became fully visible and
formally open to trade union leaderships.
Downgrading our estimate of the private benefits delivered by trade union
leaderships feils to explain why certain individuals did join the SNCH. The solution to this
puzzle revolves around the concept of the group identity which was provided by the
ENSP. Generally, people begin calculating the respective costs and benefits that
membership of an interest group entails, and deciding whether or not to join the group,
only after they have recognised that the group in question actually promotes their
interests.^ ®* The maximisation of private benefits is the final stage of a process of group
mobilisation. Individuals first situate themselves in relation to other individuals,
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determining that the interest group’s constituency exists, that they are members of that
constituency and that the interest group defends their interests. It is the management of
this process which is crudal in the choice of individuals to support one particular interest
group. It seems plausible to assume that the ENSP identity and common background
facilitatated the entry of their graduates into the representative organisations of the corps.
It seems reasonable to suppose that ENSP graduates who joined the SNCH, opted for the
SNCH over other trade unions because they recognised themselves in the constituency
defended by that trade union.
The constituency embraced by the SNCH was clearly that of public hospital
directors. It adopted the dual organisational principles of an occupation-based trade
unionism and political neutrality. These principles hinged upon the belief that hospital
directors, like lower-ranking hospital administrators, faced occupational challenges which
could not be bracketed together with those of other hospital personnel or, for that matter,
with any other occupation. Although it opened its ranks to other hospital administrative
staf^ it remained none the less ‘the’ hospital director trade union, both in terms of their
numerical weight within the SNCH (over half of its membership) and their control of its
decision-making bodies. Hospital directors monopolised the presidency of the trade union
and overwhelmingly dominated its national executive committee, the Bureau National
(BN). From 1976 onwards, only one of the BN 12 members was not a hospital director.
This stance, more than votes on the commissions paritaires, explains the decision
of those ENSP graduates who entered the trade union. They joined the SNCH because
their ENSP-co/775 identity dictated that they recognised themselves within the SNCH
constituency. It did so by laying down conditions of group membership which the internal
structure and constituency of FO could not meet. First, as part of a wider trade union
confederation, FO could not satisfy the focus of these ENSP graduates upon the
occupation of hospital director:
‘As a director, I think that there is, nevertheless, one difference between 
these two trade unions. It is that there is one which is, above all, a general 
trade union and the other is a corps trade union.*'®’
The SNCH was the only hospital director trade union which was capable of supporting
the professionalisation of hospital directors. The institutional constraints of belonging to
a wider confederation meant that FO could not develop such a project:
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‘quite simply, because it belongs to the FO confederation. This means that 
in joining FO, you support the policies of the confederation, and as for any 
far reaching discussions, you are prevented from having them between 
directors.
Indeed, these distinct appeals were reinforced by the nature of the competition between 
FO and the SNCH which revolved around their distinct structures and constituencies.
Second, as the traditionally dominant trade union within the corps of hospital 
directors, FO was more clearly associated with pre-ENSP hospital directors than the 
SNCH. Its links with this constituency hampered its acceptance by ENSP graduates who 
saw themselves as members o f a new constituency which was defined by generation and 
graduation from the ENSP. Even for one of its former general secretaries, the 
attractiveness of the FO for potential members suffered because it was perceived by ENSP 
graduates as ‘the trade union for grandfathers.’”  ^The results of a 1991 survey of Third 
and Fourth class directors maintained that FO was typified by strictly controlled 
conservative policies.”  ^The SNCH was able to distance itself from any association with 
such a constituency: ‘It is definite that the SNCH incarnated a certain modernist 
character.’” ^
The motivation of group identities within the corps is supported by the decline and
subsequent re-emeigence of the CFDT. Early ENSP graduates in the 1970s often entered
the corps with a legacy of support for the CFDT, because as university students they had
joined the CFDT whose support in universities rose after the protests of May 1968. Part
of the anti-FO coalition in 1972, CFDT directors attacked the conservative FO discourse,
endowing it with ‘the image of a trade union living in the past, fifty years behind.’”*
However, moves in the CFDT leadership towards autogestion, self-management in the
workplace, led the confederation to merge its managerial branches with employee
branches in the workplace. In March 1974, the CFDT put an end to its distinct hospital
director trade union branches (the same decision as that taken by the CGT in 1947) and
hastened its decline at elections to the commissions p a r ita ir e s The CFDT’s
organisational reform and attempted reconfiguration of its identity set, caused directors
to leave for the SNCH:
‘Even for people- who were a priori more attracted to the CFDT, 
[membership] became very difficult because we found ourselves (...) 
alongside the personnel who we were, outside trade union meetings, called 
upon to manage .... It was very difficult, which meant that there was a
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important drop in CFDT members, and most of them joined the SNCH.’“ ®
The CFDT only recovered after 1986 when it re-established its hospital director branches
following internal lobbying by directors such as Gérard Sacco, Director of Studies at the
ENSP. Their pressure led to the creation in 1986 of a union of health and social managers,
the Union Fédérale des Cadres Santé-Sociaux, which was afiSliated to the CFDT.
Returning to its traditional identity set within the hospital director constituency, the
CFDT’s revival was aided by the SNCH’s ties with government and CFDT’s appeal to
assistant directors through decentralised management responsibilities. The new CFDT
organization took votes fi’om both FO and the SNCH (see Table 3.7).
However, in the 1970s, the corps identity outlined above was not determinant in
directing all ENSP graduates to join the SNCH, even though it was the trade union most
identified with the constituency of hospital directors. Since the benefits of SNCH support
on the commissions paritaires were not decisively obvious, another motivation for
entering the SNCH was the maximisation of the benefits inherent in the recognition of
group identity. Those ENSP graduates who did enter the SNCH seem to have been
those graduates who had the most distinct hospital manager corps identity: ‘Me, when I
joined the SNCH, it was because it was a trade union of hospital d irec to rs .T h ey  ‘felt
better in a trade union of managers.
More importantly, this cohort of ENSP graduates possessed a higher level of
formal education than existing members of the SNCH with a corps-onexAtà outlook to
match. For them graduation firom the ENSP (and not simply the occupational status of
hospital director) defined their group membership and the perception of common interests.
This allegiance was particularly true for those ENSP graduates who entered the SNCH,
who had a distinct identity different fi'om the SNCH’s existing membership. This internal
difference created an impetus towards change, towards the assertion of their own codes
and conventions within the trade union:
‘There was never a rejection of those who had not been to the School 
[ENSP]. But, in fact, it was those who had gone to the School who 




The gradual imposition of the co/775-based organisation upon hospital directors triggered 
the development of an ENSP cadre of directors who wanted to become more hke the 
grands corps. These graduates did not just sweep into the commanding posts of the corps. 
But, over time their entry into the ranks of hospital directors homogenised the corps, 
particularly with the influx of ENSP graduates fi’om the 1974 to 1981 assistanat. The 
institution of an ENSP training programme with a national concours for entry into the first 
three classes nurtured a corps identity and attracted Sciences Po graduates, giving hospital 
directors many of the traits attached to civil service corps. The presence of Sciences Po 
graduates, particularly firom Paris, elevated the corps ' standing and brought it more into 
line with the middle- and higher-ranking civil service. (Graduates fi'om the Institutes which 
were created as ‘feeder institutions’ for the higher civil service peopled all elite 
competitive entry examinations:^^ between 1945 and 1994, approximately half of students 
at ENA passed through the Paris Institute of Political Science).
The ENSP structures and corps identity played a significant role in the 
mobilisation of hospital directors. First, the corps identity eased the formation of a group 
identity for hospital directors, particularly the acceptance of subjective interests and the 
existence of a defined identity set. The School acted as physical and institutional focus for 
hospital directors, providing common allegiances, personal networks and producing the 
primary cleavage with Fourth Class directors. Second, in the case of those ENSP 
graduates who entered the SNCH, the ENSP identity appears to have been the catalyst 
for collective action, rather than any great material benefits of group membership. The 
competition over identities structured most trade union conflict. Individual directors 
seemed to have most wanted to develop their group identity by joining SNCH during the 
entry o f the most corps-où&nttà. graduates in the mid-1970s. In addition, the ENSP 
identity of these graduates clashed with that of existing hospital directors, creating an 
impetus towards change both within the corps and the SNCH. However, the maximisation 
of group identity was very much tied to a particular generation of hospital directors. From 
the 1980s, the selective benefits of the commissions paritaires became fully operational.
The expansion of the corps cannot be dissociated firom the attempts of central
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government to improve the management of public hospitals. Successive French 
governments triggered the progressive imposition of the administrative organisation 
common to civil service corps. Once the ENSP took sole responsibility in 1960 for the 
hospital director training programme, a ‘School-Co/p^’^  ^dynamic was put in place. It in 
turn brought with it both the Sciences Po graduates and esprit de corps (drawn from 
success at a specialist national concours and passage through a co/775-based school) 
which were common throughout the elite French civil se rv ice .T h e  significance of 
government intervention, therefore, lies not so much in the imposition of a co?pj-solution 
to hospital management, but in the timing of its expansion of the corps. This expansion 
was not a direct product of any shift to cost containment in the 1970s. It was the product 
of a package of measures designed to strengthen the line-management function in public 
hospitals, not least the 1970 Hospital Law and repeated Health Planning Commissions 
which recognised the need to expand the numbers entering the corps in the 1960s.
The dilemma for the French state was that it set up a corps of managers to 
strengthen the line-management function in public hospitals. Yet, it sparked off a series 
of events that laid the foundations of a rival lobby or influence constraining central 
government intervention and control. The institution of national examinations 
homogenised the entry of university graduates into the corps. The ENSP forged a 
collective group identity which embraced the grands corps model of the French civil 
service. These changes triggered the formation of an occupational group whose upward 
social mobility gave them increased autonomy from their nominal ‘masters’ in central 
government. However, at first, the ENSP did not provide hospital directors with any more 
than the grands corps model of professional mobility. The concrete platform of hospital 
management reforms was to be developed in the trade unions and professional 
associations of the corps, especially in the SNCH.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PROFESSIONAL ORGANISATION: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE SNCH
The organisational dynamics of the SNCH in the early 1970s were firmly tied to the 
established practices of a trade union negotiating pay and conditions for its membership. 
However, these established practices were progressively undermined in the late 1970s by 
assistanat graduates who employed the SNCH as a vehicle for their collective social 
mobility, and progressively integrated its established practices into the organisational 
dynamics of a lobby and learned society. This transition hinged upon increasing the ties 
between hospital management reform, improved pay and conditions and the 
professionalisation of the corps. ENSP graduates entering into the leadership of the 
SNCH juggled three oiganisational dynamics: a professional dynamic, dedicated to raising 
the knowledge base of the corps and acquiring the traits of ‘core’ professions; a lobby 
dynamic, seeking to deliver legislative change; and a trade union dynamic, aiming to 
improve pay and conditions for the SNCH membership.^
This chapter analyses the changes in the leadership of the trade union, detailing 
how assistanat graduates fused multiple organisational dynamics into one competitive 
strategy fi’om the beginnings of cost containment in 1976 through to the rewriting of 
hospital legislation in 1991. This transition imposed a significant change in the accepted 
practices of the SNCH, marking it out as the main vehicle for the professionalisation of 
the corps of hospital directors - a task more ofl:en attributed to learned societies, lobbies 
and certifying organisations. It was marked by changing goals and pressures on the SNCH 
leadership as the dififerent organisational dynamics waxed and waned for distinct periods 
(see Table 4.1). The opening section examines the SNCH’s first steps towards the 
development of a package of health policy reforms where the trade union dynamic entered 
into crisis. The second plots the takeover of SNCH leadership roles by ENSP graduates 
in the early 1980s, which triggered the union’s shift towards becoming a powerful health 
policy lobby. The third analyses the emergence of the discourse of hospital planning which 
cemented the SNCH’s new lobby role and moved it towards a professionalisation strategy.
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The final section plots the emergence of hôpital-entreprise in the late 1980s, which 
translated into a concrete policy programme the aspirations of the ENSP graduates to 
upgrade their occupation.
Table 4.1: The Changing Organisational Dynamics of the SNCH, 1976-1991
Period Main Organisational Dynamic
1976-1979 Lobby orientation contests established trade union orientation
1980-1982 Lobby orientation allies with emerging professional orientation
1983-1986 Lobby and professional orientations reinforced under compromise 
merger with trade union orientation
1987-1991 Professional orientation comes to tiie'forefiont of SNCH strategy
4.1 FROM TRADE UNION TO HEALTH POLICY LOBBY
The SNCH leadership went into its annual trade union conference at Strasbourg in April 
1976 under pressure to redefine its practice of collective bargaining. Its established pattern 
of consensual ‘behind closed doors’ negotiations with the Health Ministry had failed to 
deliver sufficient improvements in pay and conditions to satisfy the growing demands of 
its rank-and-file membership. Claude-Guy Charlotte, the trade union's president, voiced 
concerns that the model of trade unionism adopted by the SNCH was at a crossroads, if 
not at the end of its life span, informing delegates that ‘it is absolutely crucial that we find 
another path along which to centre our demands.’^
In the months leading up to Strasbourg, the SNCH toyed with a strategy of overt 
confirontation in its negotiations with the Health Ministry. Twelve months earlier at La 
Baule, delegates had voted for strike action for the first time in the union’s history.^ As 
a result, on 17 October 1975, the SNCH held its first national day of action with 
approximately 1500 hospital directors demonstrating on the streets of Paris.^ However, 
this policy of overt confi*ontation clashed with the SNCH president's brand of 
‘responsible’ trade unionism and placed unsustainable demands upon the organisational 
resources at the union’s disposal. The national executive, the Bureau National (BN) did 
not initiate the radicalisation of the SNCH stance in negotiations with the Health Ministry,
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but was forced by the rank-and-file into overt confrontation:
‘The willingness to abandon a certain passive attitude - indeed, a fatalistic 
attitude - in favour of attacking stances, going as far as to take to the 
streets, proves that the times have changed and the BN can no longer 
today modify the speed of change except under threat of being accused of 
backtracking.’^
In an effort to minimise attacks on the leadership’s strategy of collective
bargaining, the Strasbourg conference debated the findings of an internal working group
which questioned the future of hospital directors as civil servants.^ Its report argued that
the inclusion of hospital directors within one of the general categories of French civil
servants hampered the corps in its pursuit of improved pay and conditions. It made it
difficult to award improved pay and conditions to hospital directors without attributing
them to all other civil servants. The report thus proposed that, whilst remaining civil
servants, hospital directors should seek to opt out of the general civil service categories
(as had hospital doctors). This change would not only divorce their pay demands firom
other civil servants, but also have the advantage of simultaneously increasing the prestige
of the corps. Much like Charlotte, the working group concluded that the SNCH had
exhausted all its possible means of action within the existing civil service structures:
‘Let’s recognise, that having tried everything in its midst and used all the 
means at our disposal, including striking, we have nothing more to expect 
from our status as civil servants. It has within itself its own constraints and 
condemns us to never bring out the originality of our functions without 
straightaway unleashing chain reactions right through the whole civil 
service.’^
However, the people outside the leadership calling for radical strike action 
explained the SNCH’s relative Mure as caused by its lack both of a developed lobby role 
and of a coherent doctrinal base upon which to found its demands and collective action. 
Jean-Paul Fischer, a leading spokesperson for this view, socialist member of the BN and 
ENSP graduate (1974-1976 assistanat), agreed with (if he did not lead) the demands for 
more radical action by the SNCH. He had been instrumental in the first ever strike of 
assistant directors which took place on 17 June 1975. At Strasbourg, he linked the union’s 
perceived lack of progress in furthering its demands not only to its consensus-led and 
‘behind closed doors’ pattern of negotiations, but also to its lack of a distinct
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programmatic base. For Fischer, the SNCH leadership could not continue ‘to veer from
left to right according to circumstances, events and [external] pressures.’* On the
contrary, if the SNCH was to defend adequately the interests of hospital directors, it was
obliged to anchor its demands within its own platform of health policy reforms and values.
He consequently moved from the conference floor at Strasbourg that the BN or,
conference delegates, establish an internal working party to study health policy issues -
the SNCH’s first step towards developing its own platform of health policy reforms.
The choice o f strategy open to the Charlotte leadership was increasingly that of
continued impotence, waiting for unlikely statutory change, or making moves towards the
SNCH becoming a health policy lobby. However, although the development of a lobby
orientation was fer from a closed option for the SNCH, there was little immediate public
support from the leadership or those close to Charlotte for the development of this
orientation. In the debate on general policy, Charlotte at first ignored Fischer's request.
Instead, he diose to raise the fear that the development o f a health policy platform ran the
risk of impinging upon the declared political neutrality of the SNCH and identifying it with
a particular political party:
‘Our SNCH includes a whole range of members who go from the extreme 
right to the extreme left and one of the essential principles of our 
organisation is to be perfectly apolitical.’®
However, Guy Vallet, a colleague of Fischer and a member of the same ENSP graduation,
subsequently returned the debate to the question of an internal health policy working
party. At the second time of asking, Charlotte conceded to their demand. The first meeting
of the BN after the conference put in place the health working group demanded by
Fischer.^®
This appeasement of Fischer and Vallet brought the development of a platform of 
health policy reforms onto the SNCH’s agenda, reflecting the alleged exhaustion of the 
SNCHs traditional model of collective bargaining. Charlotte publicly admitted the need 
for a new direction. However, Fischer and Vallet, both ENSP assistanat graduates, had 
a rival conception of the trade unionism to that of the Charlotte leadership. They coupled 
its role as trade union negotiating improved pay and conditions to that of learned society 
expanding the knowledge base of the corps and that of lobby delivering legislative change. 
For the moment, however, this challenge remained discreet, dependent upon frail
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interventions from the floor of conference.
In fact, the orientations of the SNCH continued to follow the preferences of its 
President and his close associates. The national executive, the BN, whose 12 members 
were elected at the annual conference," functioned as a presidential regime - with two- 
thirds of its members being no more than ‘extras’ on the sidelines of any decision­
making.^^ Legitimised both by the election from within its ranks of the president and 
empowered by the organisational constraints impeding wider consultation, the BN had 
usurped the sovereign policy-making role of the annual conference. The BN also by­
passed the union’s Conseil National (ON) of regional and departmental delegates, which 
met only a handfiil of times a year." This pattern of control meant that the SNCH 
functions rested chiefly upon the shoulders of the presidential ‘messiah’: ‘As it’s not a 
class-based trade union, it's not the COT [the French communist trade union 
confederation], it always works on [the back of] a providential man.’"  In this case, the 
president was Charlotte, elected in 1974. He was an ENSP graduate from 1964, but he 
was not part of the assistanat generation of hospital directors entering the corps in the 
1970s.
Discussions without decisions
Charlotte’s acquiescence to Fischer demands did not commit the BN to anything more 
than the setting up of one working party. Yet, following Strasbourg, the SNCH leadership 
actually constituted five working parties on health policy. The working parties reported 
back to the following conference at Pau in 1977 with their proposals for reforms in the 
areas of planning and financing of the health care system, the organisation and missions 
of public hospitals, and the future role of the Social Security funds in health care 
management. The constitution of these five working groups marked the beginning of a 
process of internal health policy debate within the SNCH. This process was enshrined by 
Charlotte before the 1977 Pau conference when he publicly came out in favour of the 
development of an SNCH health policy platform:
‘The time has come when it [SNCH] must owe its originality, in addition
to its character as a free and independent trade union of managers, [...] to
its doctrine in health policy.’"
Duly debated at Pau, the reports produced by the working groups subsequently provided
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the core argument of Objectifs Santé, the internal health policy document debated at the 
Rouen conference in 1978.^  ^Rouen was followed by the creation of a further SNCH 
working group which produced Vers me évaluation du système de santé, the health 
policy document debated at the Metz conference in 1979.^^
The rapid conversion of Charlotte to the Fischer philosophy went well beyond the 
initial proposals of Strasbourg. Fischer and his growing band of supporters continued to 
attack the conciliatory approach adopted by Charlotte, particularly as the Barre 
government began from 1976 to impose progressive top-down controls on hospital 
spending (see Chapter Five). Echoing the criticisms of some rank-and-file members at the 
M ure of the leadership to win improved pay and conditions, Fischer maintained that the 
SNCH needed to undertake radical strike action." However, in the short-term, Fischer 
and his colleagues posed no threat to the continued predominance of the Charlotte 
leadership. The initiative of Vallet and Fischer was not backed by the formal support of 
an organised faction within the SNCH. Fischer and his supporters remained an informal 
grouping operating through a lone representative within the BN.
Nevertheless, the Fischer thesis won support from the gradual development of a 
further informal school of thought within the SNCH, that of the ‘modernisers.’ The 
‘modernisers’ were primarily hospital directors who had graduated from the ENSP - such 
as Gérard Vincent, vice-president from 1976, Louis Rolland who entered the BN in 1978, 
Bernard Grandjean who entered the BN in 1979, and Alain Grenon who led the Metz 
working group. They came to support the shift towards the development of a health policy 
platform because of their common desire to modernise public hospital management 
through the introduction of private management techniques in public hospitals." Such 
calls for modernisation betrayed a common objective to enhance the standing of the corps, 
because the modernisation of management implied giving an expanded role to 
administrative hierarchies within hospitals. As with Fischer and his supporters, the 
modernisers backed the promotion of health policy debates within the SNCH because it 
promoted management reform, increased the profession’s standing and presented the 
SNCH with the opportunity to lead public debate on health care reform.
Both the ‘modernisers’ and Fischer were pushing at a half-open door as the 
government’s imposition of top-down controls on hospitals led Charlotte to accept the
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shift towards health policy debate as a necessary pre-requisite of the continued defence 
of the corps. Along with Jean Hue and others such as Alain Halbout (president of the 
SNCH from 1970 to 1974) Charlotte argued that it was impossible to ignore the threats 
of top-down spending controls on the fimction of hospital director and the environment 
of public hospitals. The SNCH had thus to react, to enter into the fray, not to launch a 
programme of managerial reform but to counter the cost containment agenda of the Barre 
government:
‘We talk now of widening the debate [...] we are orientating ourselves 
towards proper political-economic problems [...] I would say that, in fact, 
we have only reacted, that in these circumstances, the initiative comes 
from the Ministry.
So, for Charlotte, the health policy commitment was a defensive reaction to perceived 
external threats best characterised as an ‘externalist’ strategy which engaged the SNCH 
in the on-going public debate to defend the existing status and working conditions of 
hospital directors. There was no desire to transform the SNCH into a lobby for hospital 
management reform. Rather, the union confined debate to a defensive counterattack on 
the policies implemented by the Barre government. From the Pau conference onwards, it 
was this ‘externalist’ strategy led by Charlotte which dominated the SNCH; a strategy 
which welcomed health policy working groups, but took no concrete steps to formulate 
a programme of managerial reform.
Under Charlotte’s leadership, there was a status quo of discussions without 
decisions. A shift towards the development of health policy in order to defend the corps 
of hospital directors was endorsed, but the leadership did not actively create the 
conditions for it to take place. Indeed, the SNCH leadership retained its reservations about 
the possible politicisation of the SNCH if it was to engage in wider health policy debates 
outlined by Charlotte at Strasbourg. They were publicly shared by Jean Hue, one of the 
three vice-presidents of the SNCH from Strasbourg through to Metz, and Roger AUiaud, 
BN member at Strasbourg and Pau. At Pau, Hue attacked the prospect of specific policy 
commitments, arguing that it was a question of creating ‘not a doctrine, as one [i.e. 
opponents] too often demands without measuring the dangers that that represents, but 
[creating] guiding principles.
The BN took no action on the outcomes of debates at conference. It made no 
attempt to use these motions to define an SNCH official position or draw up a concrete
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policy document. First, the motions adopted were little more than diverse and somewhat
vague references to general principles concerning the structure and organisation of the
French health care system (see Table 4.2). Second, the BN did not accept that the
documents produced by the working groups were anything more than discussion
documents. As a result, the working party debates languished for the twelve months
between conferences:
‘These measures [conference reports] were never followed up. It remained 
at the level of conference speeches [...] Everyone expressed themselves, 
we were going to revolutionise the world, and then, at the end of the third 
day of the conference, it's over. Everyone goes home, and then, forgets 
what they heard for a year, what was said at conference.
Even this minimal continuity was broken when an entirely new working group was created
for Metz, a move which abruptly stalled the small progress towards policy formulation
with the production of reports for Pau followed by their integration into a single document
at Rouen.
Thus, by the end of the 1970s, there was a three-way split within the SNCH, 
although the boundaries between each school of thought were blurred because each had 
no formal organisational structures. The leading spokesmen of all schools of thought co­
habited within the leadership of the BN. Fischer and his supporters were united with 
Charlotte and the ‘externalists’ in condemning government policy, although they were 
split over which strategy the SNCH should pursue in defence of its interests and their 
support of a health policy doctrine. The Fischer group’s support for the development of 
a union health policy position lined them up with the ‘modernisers’ who were gaining in 
influence within the BN. Yet, the two groups remained divided over their respective 
attitudes towards the reform process engaged by the Barre government, with Fischer’s 
group emphasizing a lobby focus and politicisation as distinct from the professionalisation 
orientation of the modernisers. However, the ties between the modernisers and Fischer’s 
supporters were strengthened by the common ENSP background of Fischer, Vallet, 
Vincent and the majority of graduates who dominated the working parties at annual 
conferences.
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Table 4.2; SNCH Working Parties 1977-1979 - an array of diverse initiatives
Récognition of the relationship between tiie general health of a society, its economic system 
and its health care system. Development of preventative medicine with improved indicators 
of health status.
Call for improved co-ordination of health care services. Regional planning to provide 
ovCTarching^framewoAjwittin^dchhosgitals^rauIdhave^e^
General director and management team of regional hospitals should replace departmental 
health boards as the external tutelle of public hospitals. Corps of hospitals directors to 
expand its tasks to include the regulation of hospitals, forming a sin^e self-regulating 
adminKtiativejcwgswiAin_gublichosgitalS;_______^____________^______
Renewal of management practices within public hospitals, with wider use of
Parliament to decide the objectives of the health care system with reduced involvement for 
Social Security funds. Reform of hospital financing, but no endorsement of the global 
budget_____________________________________________________________
Hospital directors to gain authority over all hospital staff including doctors. Increased 
participation of all hospital staff within hospital management, with the introduction of 
devolved budgets. Doctors as tedmicians to be increasingty regulated wifii die introduction 
of medical audit
Indeed, the rise of the assistanat generation marked the beginning of a process of 
renewal within the composition of the formal decision-making bodies of the SNCH. In 
1976, ENSP graduates occupied approximately half of the seats in the BN. Graduates of 
the assistanat accounted for three of these posts. Their number subsequently rose to four 
in 1978 and six in 1980. Parallel to their progressive rise in the BN, ENSP graduates 
entered the national working groups that the SNCH established on an ad hoc basis to 
report on the chosen themes for debate at annual conferences. At Strasbourg in 1976, 
ENSP graduates, all from the assistanat programme, provided five out of eight hospital 
directors in the working group on the fixture of hospital directors in the civil service. At 
Pau in 1977, ENSP graduates provided 17 of the 30 hospital directors involved in health 
policy working groups, including 12 graduates of the assistanat.^  Their predominance 
was temporarily lost at the following conference in Rouen in 1978. However, at Metz in 
1979, they represented seven out of ten directors in the health policy working groups, 
including six graduates of the assistanat. However, the SNCH did not differentiate itself 
from its rival unions for some time, maintaining with FO and the COT an alliance against 
the measures undertaken by the Barre government (see Chapter Five).
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The ‘externalist’ strategy permitted the proliferation of working groups, but only 
as a reaction to the progressive top-down controls imposed on public hospitals. It 
produced a status quo of discussions without decisions. Yet, these changes within the 
SNCH also began the construction of a substantive knowledge base fuelled by its annual 
working groups. The trade union benefitted from the entry of ENSP graduates whose 
common identity helped to overcome the collective action difficulties inherent in such 
undertakings. The challenge to this status quo came once again from Fischer and his 
supporters of a rival conception of trade unionism. On this occasion, however, it was a 
formal challenge as Fischer led an internal faction against Charlotte at his re-election to 
the BN in 1980. The elections took place at the Grenoble conference in May 1980, hence 
the name of the Fischer-led Action, Grenoble 80. It provided the foundation for what was 
to be a key transition period in the SNCH’s development o f a series of health policy 
measures.
4.2 THE KEY TRANSITION PERIOD
The challenge of Grenoble 80 marked the beginning of the takeover of the SNCH by 
ENSP graduates. However, its campaign against Charlotte also tapped the rival 
constituendes to hospital directors within the SNCH. Its electoral list for the vacant seats 
on the BN paraded Fischer with Jacques-Yves Coz, a fellow hospital director. But, it also 
included both Jean-Claude Fréchou, a chef de bureau, and Jean-Paul Lemaire, a trainee 
director, and former outspoken critic of Charlotte on the SNCH’s National Commission 
for Hospital Administrative Personnel.^ However, the driving force behind the faction 
came from an ENSP network of graduates revolving around Vallet and Fischer, ‘the one 
who brought in [to Grenoble 80f\ the whole current of thought.’^  The backbone of this 
network was forged by personal contacts at the ENSP between the years of 1974 and 
1976: Fischer, Vallet, Ravelo de Tovar, Dandel, Hillariet, and Gaussens.^^ However, they 
were later joined by fellow hospital directors such as Coz and Roland Ollivier. Coz joined 
the cause of Fischer and Vallet at the 1979 Metz conference.^* Ollivier, who presented one 
of the additional reports at the Grenoble conference, was a member of the next graduation 
after Vallet and Fischer, that from 1977 to 1979.
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As if to meet the challenge of Fischer and his supporters at Grenoble, conference
debated the report of a working group on the internal organisation of the SNCH and its
future strategy in the 1980s.^ The findings were even presented by Vallet and another
supporter of Grenoble 80, Alice Rozié. The Grenoble 80 challenge perpetuated Fischer's
attacks on the alleged conciliatory approach of Charlotte to the increasing constraints
placed on hospital spending by the Barre government.^® Indeed, it presumed that such
conciliation had not only failed to deliver the necessary improvements in the working
conditions of trade union members, but had also led the SNCH, through its absence, to
endorse the introduction of cost containment measures, making it:
‘the only trade union which did not react to the [government] circulars 
blocking investments, limiting the growth of hospital technology. We thus 
gave our backing to the package of measures which really put in doubt 
hospital services. We should have been at the forefiront of the protests, but 
we were not there.
In fact, Grenoble 80 accused the Charlotte leadership of making sporadic and
ideologically inconsistent interventions in the quest for short-term gains:
‘The governing majority of the trade union has nothing to offer in way of 
a line o f action: it's not a question of embracing the twists and turns of 
current affairs without an analytical fi'amework.
To counter these deficiencies, Grenoble 80 proposed a twin-pronged remedy.
First, it advocated internal organisational reform to widen trade union democracy and
participation.^  ^These reforms would tackle what it saw as the weak accountability of the
BN, which not only informally co-opted individuals into its decision-making processes,
but also worked too often with no mandate or distribution of information to the grassroots
membership.^ Second, it argued that the SNCH had to act as ‘social mediators’ defending
the interests of its members in the arena of political parties through the promotion of
wider social transformations. This role, it argued, could only be achieved through the
development of a health policy platform which would enable the trade union to propose
reforms rather than suffer firom projects inspired by others.^^ Grenoble 80 was thus the
first organised grouping to go beyond the declarations of enlightened individuals and
formally promote the development of a health policy doctrine by the SNCH:
‘the first to say that if the SNCH did not have a doctrine, that if we did not 
propose a project, we would not be ... the SNCH was going to die a 
beautiful death.
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The polarisation between the Grenoble 80 leadership and the SNCH’s governing
majority was heightened by the fundamental political opposition between the two camps.
The leadership of Grenoble 80 was primarily composed of left-wing activists and
supporters of the Parti Socialiste, the PS. Its left-leaning health policy commitments
employed a socialising discourse advocating, for example, ‘the adaptation of man to his
environment and not simply the repairing of his productive force.M irroring the policy
shifts within the PS in opposition in the 1970s, it gave prominence to preventative
medicine, improved patient rights, decentralised planning and increased staff participation
in the running of hospitals to
‘make the hospital a more democratic hospital, a place of autonomy where 
decisions could be made in favour of the user up against a ^ t i s t  system 
which did not appear to take the interests of the hospital into account.’^ *
The PS-label which attached to Fischer and his colleagues amplified their criticisms of the
conciliatory stance of the Charlotte leadership to the Barre right-wing government. It
further divorced Grenoble 80 firom the governing majority behind Charlotte which was
dominated by a right-wing and to a lesser extent, centrist bloc of support. Ironically,
Charlotte, although not a card-carrying member, was a known socialist supporter who
firom 1977 to 1981 sat as a local councillor within the PS group on the Pau town
council.^^
The challenge to Charlotte ended with Fischer losing his place on the BN. And 
Grenoble 80 with 29 per cent of the vote was nonetheless shut out by the majority system 
of elections, securing no representatives in the election of vacant seats on the national 
executive. The list headed by Charlotte won 61 per cent support, with three ‘independent’ 
candidates getting the remaining seven percent of votes cast.^ Charlotte won a personal 
vote of confidence, gaining the highest number of votes of any candidate as his list took 
all four vacant seats on the BN. Fischer only managed to come sixth, beaten into fifth 
place by his colleague, Coz. This demise of Fischer relegated Grenoble 80 to the ranks 
of opposing minority within the trade union; the launch of a formal opposition to 
Charlotte having brought out in the open the polarisation between the competing factions.
However, support for the aims of Grenoble 80 came fi*om a group of hospital 
directors gathered around the vice-president and leading ‘moderniser’, \rincent. For the 
rising generation of ENSP graduates, Vincent was very much ‘the identikit profile of the
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ideal hospital director.’'*^ Upon graduation from the ENSP, he entered the Assistance
Publique de Paris where, in 1977, at the age of 28, he was appointed head director of
Hôtel-Dieu, one of the oldest and most symbolically important hospitals in France/^ At
the end of the 1970s, he mobilised within Paris an informal health policy think-tank which
was encouraged by the internal debate over strategic planning within the Assistance
Publique. The common bond running through its membership was that of generation.
Those hospital directors alongside Vincent, such as Christian Anastasy, Patrice
Barberousse and Christian Paire, were all aged roughly between 27 and 35 years old and
graduates of the assistanat programme. Indeed, Vincent was ‘through his age and his
charisma, [...] the animator, in effect, of a group, you could say, which was of young
Parisian intellectuals.’^
The Vincent network had no formal organisation or policy commitments in the
mould QÎGrenoble 80. At best, it drew upon the organisational culture of the Assistance
Publique and demonstrated a more pronounced openness than other directors to the
integration of doctors into multidisdplinaiy management teams.*  ^It retained a marked ad
hoc character when compared to the collective ranks of Grenoble 80:
‘The team of Gérard \%icent was more a team of men, you could say of 
quite brilliant individuals, but who were all promoters of individual 
projects. Whereas I think that Grenoble 80, (with, however, the 
phenomena of charisma as well, in particular, Jean-Paul Fischer who was 
an important character at the time,) was, even so, in my opinion, [...] more 
a team effort, that is to say, that somewhere, it had a collective discipline 
of reflection.’^
However, emerging from their socialisation within the corps was the collective ambition
to professionalise the corps through the assertion of the autonomy of hospital directors
as fully-fledged managers:
‘If we chose this occupation, it was not by chance. We wanted to work in 
the dvil service, but we did not want to be civil servants [...]. In fact, we 
wanted to be managers.’^ ’
The means to this common goal was perceived to be the transformation of the SNCH
from a traditional trade union defending pay and conditions into the champion of
managerial reform:
‘At that time, what struck me was more the lobby aspect of the SNCH: we 
wanted to make it a lobby. And I believe that we were aware that lobbying 
needed the constitution, the creation, the affirmation of a collective 
discourse.’ *^
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These organisational principles, inspired by the modernising discourse of Vincent, 
lent themselves to an alliance with Grenoble 80. Held together by their common critique 
of the ‘externalist’ leadership, both groups argued that the development of a platform of 
health policy reforms would increase the SNCH’s unity, improve its credibility in the eyes 
of other actors and encourage managerial change within public hospitals/^ More 
inq)ortantly, the alliance was facilitated by the effet de génération which bound together 
the leading members of Grenoble 80 and the Vincent group. They were all ENSP 
graduates imbued with the same ENSP identity.
In fact, whilst failing to defeat Charlotte, the challenge of Grenoble 80 ended the 
cohabitation of informal schools of thought within the BN. It formalised the fuzzy 
boundaries between rival schools, publicly designating the alliance between ENSP 
graduates in Vincent’s group and Grenoble 80 as the governing majority elect in the 
SNCH. However, the alliance between Vincent and Grenoble 80 had to be cemented and 
depended upon Vincent’s fiirther rise within the BN. Indeed, rather than the challenge of 
Grenoble 80, it was the emergence of Vincent within the governing majority which posed 
the more serious threat to Charlotte’s continued leadership.
After Grenoble, \lncent mobilised increasing support. Christian Paire, one of his 
lieutenants, entered the BN on the back of the presidential majority at Grenoble. 
‘Modernisers’ in the national executive such as Rolland and Grandjean equally threw their 
support behind the leader of the Paris modernisers. The polarisation between the Charlotte 
and Grenoble 80 factions cast Mncent as a bridgebuilder between the rival camps. Unlike 
Charlotte, he alone could mobilise the support of both the leading cliques of Grenoble 80 
and the Charlotte leadership. Indeed, \^cen t, as vice-president, had one foot in the 
Charlotte camp as it was. However, his reputation within the SNCH as a ‘moderniser’ also 
gave him links to Grenoble 80. Equally, his embracing of pragmatic and centrist positions 
within the BN made him acceptable to the Charlotte camp: ‘Vincent very quickly gave the 
impression of someone who was serious, obviously competent and moderate [...] He, thus, 
avoided all excesses.Progressively, therefore, Charlotte’s hold over the presidency 
waned as Vincent, already vice-president, was increasingly accepted within the BN as his 
natural successor ‘He was institutionally more than a Number Two, he was almost a Co- 
President.’^^
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Charlotte’s position as the incumbent president became untenable as delegates at 
Monaco in 1981 voted to introduce proportional representation for elections to the BN. 
Charlotte reinforced his hold over the SNCH at Grenoble partly because of the vagaries 
of the electoral system which shut Grenoble 80 out of the BN despite its substantial 
minority vote. After Grenoble, the demands of this oflBcial opposition persisted. The 
dedsion at Monaco to introduce proportional representation paved the way for Grenoble 
80 candidates to continue their attacks from within the BN. It reinforced the impression 
that Charlotte was no longer in control of the changing agenda both within and outside 
the trade union. Having given ground on this issue at the conference, and then been 
progressively sidelined within the BN, he formally resigned from the presidency of the 
SNCH. At Macon, the BN elected Vincent as President, who was also the chosen 
successor of Charlotte. At the same conference, Coz became the first director to enter the 
BN on the Grenoble 80 ticket.
Thus, by 1982, the key transition of the SNCH to a health policy lobby had been 
cemented by the ENSP graduates of the assistanat programme. The first step in this 
transition was the challenge of Grenoble 80, launched as it was by a generation of ENSP 
assistanat graduates. However, it was its alliance with Vincent and the Paris modernisers, 
also facilitated by their common ENSP origins, which was the catalyst for change. The 
lobbyist orientation of Fischer was allied to the professional orientation of the modernisers 
who sought the increasing autonomy of the corps. From these foundations, the SNCH was 
able to enter into the fray of health policy debates, distinguishing itself from its rivals by 
adopting a progressive stance on hospital management reform. However, the SNCH 
leadership had still to settle the demands of the rank-and-file for improved pay and 
working conditions. The collective action difficulties emerging from these traditional trade 
union demands had to be minimised by integrating them into the professionalisation 
strategy of the modernisers.
131
4.3 MODERNISATION AS CENTRAL PLANNING
With the election of Vincent, a clique of a dozen ENSP assistanat graduates seized
control of the leadership of the SNCH. The backbone of the group was formed by the
leading members of the Paris modernisers and Grenoble 80 as Vincent took his circle of
directors into an informal alliance with the former opponents of Charlotte. Symbolically,
Grenoble 80 continued to abstain at conference when it came to voting the annual report
of the president. However, Vincent integrated Coz fully into the workings of the BN.
Indeed, as Vincent progressively cemented the alliance, his own circle of supporters
accused him of being too accommodating of Grenoble 8&s positions:
‘The president is elected by the majority and is governing with the 
minority. There is something here that seems to me to be a bit 
contradictory.’^ ^
However, the SNCH’s organisational reliance upon an homme providentiel, rapidly biased 
decision-making towards the views of the newly-elected president and his team of 
confidantes. At Macon, Vincent broke with the indecision of the ‘externalist’ strategy and 
swung the SNCH’s support behind the global budget and the introduction of departments 
in public hospitals; the twin pillars of the health policy formulated by the Mauroy 
government (see Chapter Five and Chapter Six).
This break with the ‘externalist’ strategy imposed new constraints upon the 
Vincent leadership. The new leadership group sought to tie the SNCH into a wider 
modernising coalition within the health policy arena and to transform their trade union into 
a health policy lobby. Yet, the administrative divisions within the relevant ministries were 
captured by énarques (graduates of the elite National School of Administration) and the 
rival corps of Inpsectenrs des Finances. As far as the Vincent leadership was concerned, 
this situation dictated both the expansion of the SNCH’s media profile, particularly within 
the specialised medical press, and the co-ordination of networks of contacts with political 
parties.^^ Consequently, from Macon onwards, the SNCH leadership matched its 
endorsement of health policy reform with a call to its members to exploit both their pivotal 
positions within local political and economic networks and their organisational contacts 
with mayors:
‘Not only to “make them alive to” [our policies], but to make their 
mandate dependent upon our support so we can obtain a good statute. We
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must be strong and, therefore, it suits us to be in league with one of the 
institutional and political powers of the country.
Leading trade unionists undertook a series of local and fragmented initiatives
which ranged from the organisation of regional conferences to the invitation of local
politicians to dine with the SNCH president and national delegates.^^ Coz and Vallet were
members of the PS. Likewise, Edouard Couty, ENSP graduate, although not a leading
militant of the SNCH, was active in the PS Health Commissions. Jean-Xavier Trazzini and
Christian Anastasy, a hospital director close to Vincent, were members of the RPR
Indeed, Anastasy was part of a small group of hospital directors who,
‘were very friendly with one another [and] decided to share themselves out 
into the different political parties [...] Well I [Anastasy] said “Well, you, 
you go into the PS... You, especially given your beliefs, you go in the 
UDF. And you, where do you want to go?”’^ *
The end result was that hospital directors started from the mid-1980s to participate in the
health commissions of all mainstream political parties; ‘There was a certain number of
hospital directors who found themselves within political parties, in the health commissions
of these political parties with the will to get their ideas accepted.’’’
Within the narrow clique surrounding Vincent, the task of engineering a favourable
climate of opinion towards hospital directors was alloted to Dominique Paillé who \%cent
delegated ‘to create openings within political parties.’^  Paillé was not an elected member
of the BN, but was appointed in 1981 as the first full-time national delegate of the SNCH
after the repeated procrastinations of conferences at the end of the 1970s.®^  A graduate
of both the Paris Institute of Political Studies and the ENSP, he was widely seen within
the trade union as a ‘political animal,’ with little experience of management in public
hospitals.®  ^ He brought with him to the SNCH informal contacts with the Christian
democratic. Centre des Démocrats Sociaux (CDS). Like Vincent, he was identified with
the pragmatic centre. Supported by Vincent, he duly exploited the contacts of leading
directors who were either well-established or on the fringes of political parties. The two
men forged a ‘modernist’ tandem at the head of the SNCH whose close working
relationship progressively undercut the influence of the BN on the strategy of the trade
union:
‘During the time that Paillé was the full-time national officer, I believe that 
you could say that almost half of the public discourse of the SNCH was
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done by Paillé. ,63
Despite these advances, the SNCH continued to lack its own formal programme
of objectives and management reforms. Beyond the endorsement of the global budget and
departments at Macon, annual conferences hesitated to grant official union-backing to
hospital management policy reforms, as they had under Charlotte.^ However, in
preparation for the 1986 legislative election campaign, Vincent moved the SNCH towards
the formulation of its own manifesto of hospital management reform.®* The manifesto,
known as the 200 Propositions, was published in June 1985 and constituted the first
formal programme of health care reform voiced by the SNCH.®® Its formulation engaged
a process of consultation to incorporate the views of a committee of experts and regional
branches; views which for the most part had already emerged within the working groups
at conferences. Nevertheless, the manifesto ultimately bore the imprint of Vincent and
Paillé, who argued that the need to synthesize a large number of proposals meant that
responsibility should be legitimately concentrated in the hands of the President and the
national delegate® :^
‘These propositions were done in a very simple way and that was that 
Dominique Paillé, [and] Gérard Vincent called people up [...] like me, for 
example, and people decided and provided their contribution 
individu^y.’®*
In fact, the 200 Propositions bore witness to the ascendancy behind Vincent of the 
managerial culture of the Assistance Publique (see Table 4.3).®® In keeping with the 
centralised structures he had experienced throughout his career, the manifesto called for 
increased managerial autonomy of hospitals, but maintained an overarching framework 
of top-down regional planning to regulate the development of services in both the public 
and private sectors. After consultation, regional health boards would formulate 
development plans within which the medium term plans of public hospitals were obliged 
to fit. Individual contracts agreeing service developments and guaranteeing the necessary 
finance would then be signed between hospitals and health boards. However, hospitals 
would have increased managerial freedom to reach their contractual objectives, albeit 
within the framework of the global budget. Control of hospitals by health boards would 
move from being a priori to becoming an a posteriori evaluation.^® Hospital directors
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would have complete freedom to move funds across budgets and to place funds on the 
financial markets. In addition, the internal organisation of hospitals would move towards 
increased déconcentration and participation of staff within management, with the 
introduction of human resource management and incentive schemes. Multiple cost centres 
would be set up, with each centre signing contracts with the management within the 
framework of the hospital’s general policy.^^
Table 4.3: The 200 Propositions - Modernisation As Central Planning
Regional health boards to finmnlate decentralised regional plans. Hospitals define own medium-term 
plans setting out medical objectives and fiitnre development plans.
Regional health boards approve hospital plans against the background of regional plan; approval 
_^mgWb]rhos]^W^althJboard_conbucjk^|ddi^u^mkWJGnanciaI^acWng&ri^^
Move to a posteriori evaluation. The departmental health boards, the DDASS, to ensure no more 
Ûian coherence decisions taken wiA medium term plans and q)prove the budget. Hospitals firee to 
^%t_objecfivesjofc^back_as^e^fit^dwiAmjmi^^^^obalbudget^_______________
Directors free to move frmds within hospital budgets widi access to the financial market for loans 
and the placement of funds.____________________________________________________
Introduction of human resource management and incentive schemes. Internal contracts between 
cost centres and hospital management___________________________________________
These moves towards the development of the SNCH as a health policy lobby 
satisfied one of the primary objectives of the Grenoble 80 manifesto. However, the union 
did not break entirely with the strategy of collective bargaining endorsed by Charlotte. 
Like his predecessor, Vincent sou^t to exploit the legitimacy gained for the SNCH from 
its ‘sensible’ actions and its development o f‘insider’ networks. Indeed, his strategy rested 
upon his capacity to convince government that the union’s leadership could gaurantee its 
members’ discipline. He refused to condone strike action which not only jeopardised his 
strategy but also placed untenable demands upon the organisational resources of the 
SNCH:
‘We do not have the right to behave like rank-and-file trade unionists. Our 
trade union is strong because it has come of age and it knows not to go 
beyond certain limits.’^
However, the discipline required for the modernist strategy could only survive if the
Vincent leadership delivered the pecuniary rewards desired by the rank-and-file. At the
annual conference at Angers in 1984, Grenoble 80 was quick to renew its calls for strike
action, although it did no more than refuse to vote the president's annual report.^ The
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conversion to the modernising strategy affected primarily the leadership group
surrounding Vincent. Rank-and-file members remained more concerned with pay and
conditions, producing a schizophrenic trade union with
‘its modernist leadership labouriously seeking to provoke the birth of a 
new race o f ‘hospital manager’, but dragging behind itself a rank-and-file 
which is not always in its own image.
In the short-term, Vincent bargained that support for hospital management reform
would deliver improved pay and conditions for hospital directors. In the long-term, he
wagered that the modernisation of public hospital management would reinforce the line-
management function and the ‘strategic apex’ within public hospitals. So Vincent tied the
SNCH to a discourse which integrated the demands for improved pay and conditions with
managerial change within public hospitals:
‘To conceive of the role of hospital director, but in a renovated hospital, 
and to never dissodate this fi~om the individual stature of hospital directors 
themselves... I believe that Vincent was a visionary for that.... He knew 
how to provoke in his entourage and in the profession an understanding 
that... ‘We keep that which is good for me but what is also good for the 
hospital.’ I believe that that was truly an innovative discourse and a 
cultural revolution.’”
The increasing financial constraints placed upon public hospitals helped the
Vincent leadership accomplish its task of redefining accepted ‘best practice’ within the
corps. The imposition of the global budget in 1983 put an end to the pump-primer that
was the patient-day rate and reinforced the top-down financial controls on public
hospitals. This changing environment sparked a grassroots cultural revolution within the
corps as the ‘director-builder’ aiming to expand the number of beds in her hospital gave
way to the ‘director-manager’ searching for eflficency gains.”  The director-manager
elevated the language of private sector management, obliged by financial constraints
‘to invest in programmes for better management, for the better use of 
resources [...] and that’s how we [hospital directors] were led to take 
decisions as managers and no longer like administrators...decisions as 
managers which have effectively certain similarities with decisions in firms, 
directors of firms.’”
The popularisation of private management techniques spread through the corps by means 
as diverse as participation in training programmes and managerial conferences, daily 
contacts with private sector suppliers, professional journals such as Gestions
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hospitalières, and SNCH documents. Voq Association des Anciens Élèves de l'ENSP held
its own conference days.^* ‘Pathfinders’ such as Louis Omnès at Lorient publicised
management improvements within their own hospitals, spreading them through the diverse
professional networks of the corps. Trazzini and Paillé formed the Association pour le
développement des innovations hospitalières?^ Other directors attended courses only to
then popularise the themes through interpersonal networks:
‘I, like a lot of others, followed, for example, training courses of the type 
^^rojet d?entrepris^\ And I think that these courses aroused among die 
majority of us an obvious interest and as we meet up even so quite alot 
in the profession, we keep ourselves more or less up to date with the 
actions that each other are carrying out in their establishments. And, 
finally,... there was a mutual enrichment of each others' diverse 
experiences.’*®
At the forefi"ont of much of this evolution in ‘best practice’ were those directors who were 
sent by the Health Ministiy on the advanced managerial courses at the prestigious business 
school, the tjcole des Hautes Études Commerciales (see Chapter Five).*'
Thus, by end of 1985, the SNCH had assembled many of the attributes associated 
with lobbies and learned societies. Once elected, Vincent renounced the ‘externalist’ 
strategy of Charlotte and tied improved working conditions for hospital directors to the 
reform of public hospital management itself. Working with Paillé, he led the development 
of a distinct platform of policy commitments, endorsing the global budget and the 
introduction of departments. These commitments went hand in hand with the creation of 
SNCH networks within traditional political parties. The reformist discourse propagated 
through these networics was characterised by a belief in planning as the means of achieving 
increased managerial discretion for hospital directors. The 200 Propositions which 
proposed a system of regional planning reflected the dominance within the Vincent 
leadership of the managerial culture of Assistance Publique. However, \%cent did not 
discard the responsible trade unionism advocated by Charlotte which placed increasing 
pressures on his Macon strategy. Rank-and-file discipline remained contingent on the 
Vincent strategy reaping the promised rewards of improved pay and conditions. More 
importantly, rival market-led conceptions of the function of hospital directors came to 
challenge the planning vision advocated by Vincent. These conceptions, fuelled by 
grassroots changes in ‘best practice’, emerged in the late 1980s under the banner of 
hôpital-entreprise.
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4.4 QUASI-MARKETS AND HÔPITAL-ENTREPRISE
Hôpital-entreprise was inextricably bound up with the advancement of the statutory
interests of the corps. In its most rudimentary expression, it encapsulated no more than
the introduction of private management techniques into public hospitals. In a sense it
broke with the progressive public administration of the past to borrow from the ‘new
public management’ discourse, which argued that the public sector could be managed
using methods employed in the private sector.*  ^However, its likening of public hospitals
to private enterprises and its recognition of the risks and organisational culture of the
private sector also provided a vehicle for the collective aspirations of hospital directors
to professionalise the corps. Once again, it borrowed from the new public management
agenda which aigued for the increased discretion of managers at the grassroots. Like their
counterparts in private enterprise, directors were to be free to manage, with the
assumption that this would lead to greater efficiency and control of resources. Indeed,
Vincent and Paillé aigued that if public hospitals were enterprises, albeit particular forms
of enterprises, then as in private sector firms management was crucial to their success.^
Hospital directors were not administrators, but managers who should be paid accordingly:
‘Because a business is the opposite of an administration, it is necessary 
that the director of a firm does not have the status of a civil servant, that 
he is paid as a salaried manager of a firm.’*^
The espousal of hôpital-entreprise by the SNCH leadership exploited the 
evolution towards private sector ideologies within political parties. The slogan was raised 
without substance from conference to conference in the 1970s and early 1980s as a 
leitmotif for modernisation.*^ However, in the mid-1980s, its new public management 
connotations mirrored the entrepreneurial discourse voiced across the political spectrum 
from the PS through to the RPR. Following the 1983 economic policy reversal of the 
Mauroy government, the PS government reconciled itself with the private sector and the 
values of free enterprise and the market.*^ Equally, at the 1986 legislative elections, the 
gauUist RPR with its interventionist traditions endorsed a free market economic platform 
inspired by the policies of Thatcher and Reagan.*  ^Its manifesto for hospital management 
reform embraced the language of hôpital-entreprise, advocating increased managerial
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responsibilities for directors.**
Within the SNCH, hôpital-entreprise was primarily popularised by an emerging 
right-wing tendency orbiting around the RPR directors, Alain Grenon and Jean-Xavier 
Trazzini. These two directors came from the clique of directors surrounding the Vincent 
leadership. Grenon hailed from the ‘modernising’ wing of the SNCH. Trazzini even stood 
on the Vincent list for election to the BN in 1985. However, in 1986, Grenon led his own 
list against Vincent at elections to the BN at the annual conference at Bordeaux. Its 
programme called for a recognition of the entrepreneurial nature of hospital directors’ 
tasks. And exploiting the resentment felt at the influence exerted upon Vincent by leaders 
of Grenoble 80, it alleged that the Vincent leadership was too compliant in its dealings 
with the socialist governments of Mauroy and Fabius (the mirror image of Grenoble 80's 
previous attacks on Charlotte).*® At the elections, the Grenon list won approximately 21 
percent of votes cast, while Grenoble 80 achieved 26 percent. The pro-Vincent list won 
43 percent of votes and two of the four seats being contested to ensure its majority on the 
BN.®° However, from Bordeaux onwards the Vincent leadership was outflanked on its left 
and its right, and although Grenon did not possess the necessary status of being one of the 
union leaders, Vincent did face a competing project of hospital management reform.®^  
Following this first right-wing challenge, the Vincent leadership dedicated its 1987 
Lyon conference to an evaluation of the concept oîhôpital-entreprise. In the run-up to 
conference, Trazzini led an internal working group in the formulation of the principal 
conference report, ''Hôpital-entreprise, mythe ou réalité?'P  In parallel, from the end of 
1986 and through the first half of 1987, he worked with Grenon and Michel Le Guennec, 
a member of FO, but fellow RPR supporter, on a manifesto for hospital management 
reform commissioned in November 1986 by Michèle Barzach, the gaullist Junior Minister 
for Health in the Chirac government.®  ^Barzach asked the three RPR directors to produce 
a series of draft managerial reforms to ease the straitjacket of the global budget. The 
ensuing government report, known commonly as the Trazzini report, was published in 
June 1987, after the SNCH’s armual conference in May.®"* Consequently, throughout late 
1986 and 1987, although far from a threat to \%icent on the BN, the emerging ‘RPR 
wing’ o f the SNCH dominated debates over professional practice; the SNCH rode with 
the tide of the changing political environment and the demands of Barzach.
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However, the Trazzini-inspired reports were not entirely divorced from the oflBcial 
policy stance of the SNCH. The skeleton of the 200 Propositions resurfaced in both the 
Lyon conference document and the Trazzini report (see Table 4.4). Running through the 
different programmes was the common framework of decentralised planning, 
contractualisation and increased ‘zones of freedom’ for directors. Indeed, the Trazzini 
report recognised the need to lay down safeguards about the dangers of total deregulation 
of public hospitals. It accepted the demands of public service, common staflBng policies 
and funding constraints which worked against the adoption of either the statute of private 
companies or the aim of profit maximisation. However, whereas the 200 Propositions 
made great store of its decentralised but somewhat top-down system of planning, the 
Trazzini report devoted more time to the benefits of less administrative control over public 
hospitals.^
Table 4.4: The Trazzini Report - A step on from the 200 Propositions
Zones of Aeedom for public hospitals, with moves towards a posteriori monitoring and evaluation
Contractualisation of objectives, with strategic targets between hospitals and health authorities in a 
negotiated projet d'entreprise. Hospitals free to reach agreed targets as seen fit.
A bottom-up budgetary process, with armual contracts defining objectives between persoimel and 
management.________________________________________________________________
Equali^ of treatmait for hospitals and private clinics, with more collaboration between hospitals and
Loosening of financial management enabling directors to place funds and have fi:ee access to the 
financial markets.__________________________________________________
Encouragement of improved methods of human resource management
In fact, the managerial culture or view of the world which accompanied the two 
sets of reports was markedly different, \fincent exploited the concept of hôpital-entreprise 
very much as a modernising slogan for a package of managerial reforms formulated in past 
conferences in the 1970s and early 1980s. In keeping with his renowned pragmatism, he 
justified his use of hôpital-entreprise because it created an echo in the media.^ He did no 
more than pay lip-service to the concept of hôpital-entreprise, leaving it to Paillé to adopt 
an overt ‘entrepreneurial’ discourse.^ Socialised within the centralised management of the
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Assistance Publique, Vincent had ‘absolutely no comprehension of the entrepreneurial
dimension of public hospitals. For him, the hospital hadn't got a strong identity, hadn't got
an autonomous strategy.’^  From the conference platform at Lyon, he recognised hospital
directors as chefs d'entreprise, but was quick to rebuff the liberalisation of the market for
health care services:
‘This theme is &shionable and allows certain [individuals], notably outside 
the hospital profession to think that by managing hospitals like enterprises 
[they] will finally solve, as if by miracle, the haunting problem of the Social 
Security deficit. [...] Hospital managers in the SNCH are not dreamers 
who would think that hospitals are enterprises, that it is necessary to 
abolish the tutelle [the DDASS] and let them do what they want - the 
fantasy of a few reckless individuals who confuse fireedom and 
irresponsibility liberalism and corporatism. Because they live through the 
money of the French, the public hospital must lay down in fi'ont of the 
principles and schemes defined by those who govern.’®^
In contrast, the Lyon conference report advocated the heightening of managerial
fi-eedom and competition between hospitals to usher in a market for new activities which
would ‘reward the better, let’s say, health [projects]’.'®® For the zealots, public hospitals
would compete openly in the marketplace under the stewardship of hospital directors who
as the ‘true bosses’ would stand or fall by the success of their strategies in the market:
‘push[ing] the system right to the end of its logic that is to say that the 
hospital effectively no longer has a budget, [. . .] if private clinics are better 
they should take the share of the market, it's up to hospitals to be good.’'®'
This rupture with civil service culture demanded an end to the principle of seniority and
the introduction of strict performance evaluation and sanctions for failure to reach
objectives (as with all managing directors in the private sector).'®  ^Of course, hospital
directors would receive improved pay and working conditions in exchange for this
increased risk.
The emergence of hôpital-entreprise highlighted the cleavage within the SNCH 
leadership between ‘statists’ who placed hospitals within a top-down planning system and 
‘autonomists’ who stressed the fi’eedom of hospitals within a competitive market for 
health care services. Members of Grenoble 80 such as Vallet tended to voice their 
disapproval of the underlying values of the concept of hôpital-entreprise. However, the 
cleavage crosscut the left-right axis within the SNCH; not all members of Grenoble 80 
voiced disapproval (see below). It reflected more accurately the distinct managerial
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cultures separating directors within the Assistance Publique and larger organisational 
structures from those in the provinces (see Chapter Three). Directors outside the large 
teaching hospitals demonstrated more support for the autonomist line than those who 
worked inside centralised managerial hierarchies. Indeed, statists, typified by Vincent, 
replicated the centralised planning prevalent within regional teaching hospitals and the 
three hospital groups in Paris, Lyon and Marseille.
This maturing division within the leadership did not threaten the Macon strategy. 
Vincent's hold over the SNCH somewhat masked the cleavage between statists and 
autonomists. His espousal of modernisation and pragmatic use of the language of hôpital- 
entreprise was sufficient to offset challenges to his leadership. Indeed, the formal Grenon 
challenge b%an to falter even after Bordeaux. However, 'N^cent’s refusal to endorse the 
hôpital-entreprise programme weakened the claims to professionalisation which were at 
the heart of the modernising discourse. Hôpital-entreprise ensured the autonomy of 
hospital directors and pushed the corps to throw off the shackles of state regulation. 
Vincent, who endorsed a renovation of hospital management through regional planning, 
began to defend the trade union and lobby orientations of the SNCH against those who 
elevated the professional dynamic of the SNCH Yet, challenges to his leadership persisted 
as the SNCH failed to deliver improvements in the working conditions of hospital 
directors.
Challenges to the Vincent majority
The change of government in 1986 with the RPR-UDF coalition replacing the PS brought 
little immediate reward for the corps of hospital directors. Indeed, Vincent was obliged 
to hold a special conference in Paris on 10 March 1987 to discuss the union’s tactics, 
faced with the continued failure of the Chirac government to grant improvements in the 
statute of hospital directors.^® This conference sent a message to the Chirac government, 
but also reflected the discontent of grassroots activists. In the aftermath of the March 
conference, the Vincent coalition fragmented as Christian Paire, one of the stalwarts of 
the ‘modernisers’ and vice-president of the SNCH, created with Flourent, Van 
Costenoble and Barberousse, an opposing tendency. Agir et Rénover}^ Its threat to 
\Tncent manifested itself in further demands for statutoiy advances and criticisms of the
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union’s internal running. Harping back to similar criticisms to those of Grenoble 80, Agir
et Rénover attacked the media-dominated strategy followed by the \^ c e n t leadership as
well as the centralisation of control within the SNCH and the lack of representation for
its different occupations. This said, it did not contest the moves under \%icent towards
SNCH involvement in health policy debate:
‘We would like to underline again how much we appreciate the evolution 
of the SNCH over the last five years, notably under the drive of its 
president, in terms of the major debates relating to public hospitals and 
across the media.
However, it proposed that the SNCH should return to its policy of political neutrality, 
adopt more assertive traditional forms of action, not excluding strikes, and undertake ‘less 
political behaviour and more trade union behaviour. Agir et Rénover raised the spectre 
of the traditional trade union function which the lobby/profession orientation of the 
Vincent leadership had sublimated.
At elections to the BN in Lyon in 1987, Agir et Rénover presented its own list of 
candidates, winning a single seat on the BN with 18 percent of votes cast.^°  ^However, it 
represented little threat to the Vincent presidency as the ailing Grenoble 80 assured the 
BN of its total loyalty to \^ c e n t in June 1987.^ °* Indeed, support for Vincent within the 
SNCH was contingent upon his success in the statutory negotiations with the Chirac 
government. Agir et Rénover were riding upon a wave of discontent with had relatively 
weak foundations within the trade union. Both opposing tendencies. Agir et Rénover and 
Grenoble 80 tried to tap cross-occupation support in their attacks on the Vincent 
leadership, placing non-directors in key positions in their electoral lists.
However, once the Chirac government delivered the promised statutory 
improvements to directors in spring 1988, the Vincent leadership reinforced its hold over 
the SNCH (see Chapter Six). The Reims 1988 conference was at times no more than a 
self-congratulatory celebration of the gains made by Vincent for hospital directors. The 
Vincent list won an overwhelming majority at the elections to the national executive, 
winning all the vacant seats on the BN.^‘® This shift sparked off an internal 
resettlement/renegotiation of the existing cleavages within the SNCH. The clean slate of 
the Vincent majority meant that Grenoble 80 lost the voice of Coz on the BN, winning 
only 17 percent of the vote: having scored its lowest vote ever at elections to the BN, the 
tendency entered into terminal decline. Shortly afterwards in March 1989, Vallet and Coz
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publicly wound up Grenoble 80, citing the adoption by the Vincent leadership of most of 
the Grenoble 80 platform as the reason for its demise."^ Grenon's autonomist challenge 
also petered out at Reims in the absence of any independent candidates to the BN. Indeed, 
after Reims, Trazzini left the BN to concentrate upon his work in the Conférence des 
Directeurs des Hôpitaux Généraux
Against the background of these events in the spring of 1989, the ruling group of 
hospital directors surrounding Vincent refashioned the settlement which underpinned his 
leadership of the trade union. First, the leadership of the defunct Grenoble 80 was 
formally integrated into the union’s governing majority of the SNCH - a change publicly 
cemented by the constitution of ‘joint’ lists for the elections to the BN at the annual 
conference in Orleans in 1989. Under the banner o f ‘With the President’, Coz, led the 
majority Vincent list with the oflBcial support of Vallet, Grandjean and Rolland. Second, 
the emerging fissure between statists and autonomists within the SNCH was welded 
together at a special seminar at Corbiers in February 1989, which involved the BN and a 
few invited guests including Coz. It thrashed out the formula of hospitals as public health 
enterprises, enterprises publique de santé which gained cross-union support."^ The Eight 
Point SNCH Charter defined at Corbiers stated as its fourth aim that ‘the SNCH wants 
to promote the Hospital as an effective enterprise which responds to the health and social 
needs of its clientele.’"^
However, less than two months after Corbiers, as the SNCH prepared its Orleans 
conference, Vincent left the presidency of the trade union. On 19 April 1989, Claude Évin, 
Minister of Solidarity, Health and Social Protection in the Rocard government, appointed 
Vincent to the post of Directeur des Hôpitaux. Vincent was the first hospital director ever 
to accede to this post. IBs departure, when it was generally believed that he was to move 
to the Saint-Antoine hospital in Paris, came one week after the launch of the rewriting of 
the 1970 Hospital Law by the Rocard government (see Chapter Seven). It immediately 
broke the Vincent-Paillé tandem which had defined the strategy of the trade union since 
the 1982 Macon conference. With Vincent gone. Paillé, although remaining in the BN, 
subsequently resigned as national delegate to work as general secretary for the centrist 
parliamentary group, the Union du Centre (UDC). Rolland then became interim president 
until the election by the BN of a new president at the Orleans conference.
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In the run-up to Orléans, Rolland failed to assert his claims to the presidency.
Despite his tenure of the interim presidency, the BN elected Coz over Rolland in what
Coz himself described as a ‘big surprise... a clap of thunder.A lthough he was outside
the BN at the time of Vincent's departure, the former stalwart of Grenoble 80 emerged
as a compromise candidate, who was acceptable to the members of both the former
Vincent majority and its opponents such as Paire. His leadership of the Vincent list
returned him to the BN in time for the election of president. In addition, he could call
upon the support of Paire“ * whose criticisms of the Vincent leadership matched those
previously voiced by Grenoble 80. Both factions decried the absence of internal
organisational reform and called for firmer action, particularly in favour of non-hospital
directors within the SNCH.^'^
Vincent’s departure did not reverse the strategy pursued by the SNCH since
Macon. As expected, Coz continued to push for hospital management reorganisation as
a vehicle for improved pay and conditions for hospital directors. In response to the Évin
initiative, the SNCH formed an internal working party to formulate its reply to the
legislative proposals of the Rocard government. Composed of roughly ten individuals, it
was led by another stalwart of Grenoble 80, Ollivier. However, as work progressed, the
working party revealed the new core of decision-makers orbiting around Coz; ‘Very, very
quickly, it was reduced to three or four people, people like Rolland Ollivier, Christian
Paire, Michel Pallot [who replaced Paillé as national d e leg a te ].W ith  Coz and Paire
sharing common criticisms of the Vmcent leadership, Ollivier proved to be closest within
the ranks of eX'^ Grenoble 80 stalwarts to the positions endorsed by Paire. Indeed, he
progressively endorsed moves towards an autonomist managerial line:
‘For the first time, a path was open which implied that the mission of 
public service could very easily be achieved with private sector methods.
I admit that people like me, as well as others noticed that. There was an 
important conceptual turning point.
In fact, Coz, working outside the Assistance Publique and large regional hospitals was
typical of those directors who, like Trazzini (in the RPR), were more or less seduced by
the autonomist line. Grenoble 80 had always endorsed a programme ‘more aimed at the
idea of autonomy, of responsibility.’^^ However, his transition as president, although
remaining identified with the Left, was facilitated by the general swing towards
modernisation and the withdrawal of the state in national politics.
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Assured within the presidency, the leadership alliance under Coz, progressively
exposed its autonomist credentials, borrowing from the discourse of hôpital-entreprise.
If little else, it offered Coz the opportunity to distinguish his tenure from that Vincent and
assert his fledgling presidency. However, this emergence of the autonomists was marked
by the acceptance of the legal framework of an Établissement Public Industriel et
Commercial (EPIC) to govern the managerial attributions of public hospitals. Frequent
conference debates in the 1970s had rejected the concept of EPIC because of its
commercial connotations.However, inspired by the EPIC framework granted to
France-Télécom in 1990, a transition towards EPIC status was accepted by the Coz
leadership because it would lessen the external managerial controls on public hospitals.
For Coz, it was central to the status of the corps of hospital directors that directors be
granted managerial autonomy:
‘Let everyone understand that your social status will and will only be what 
is the degree of freedom of the hospital in relation to its present status of 
a hospital-administration.’^^
EPIC status permitted diverse co-operation with the private sector and freed up the
management of hospital personnel, because all but the directors and public accountants
lost their civil service standing and gained that o f the private sector. However, more
importantly, the SNCH attached itself to a legal framework which carried a significant
message: hospitals were equated to commercial and industrial public organisations such
as France-Télécom. It brought the professional orientation of the SNCH to the fore,
privileging the increased managerial autonomy of hospital directors and aligning them to
entrepreneurial leaders of the strategic apex of public hospitals.
Thus, in the early 1990s, with the departure of \%cent, the policies of the SNCH
moved closer to the spirit of hôpital-entreprise as the autonomist line within the trade
union cemented a new consensus. The emergence of hôpital-entreprise was driven by the
r i^ t of the SNCH although autonomists eventually mobilised behind Coz, the Grenoble
80 stalwart. Indeed, with the election of Coz, the opposition to Charlotte and the centrist
leadership of the SNCH took control of the trade union. Coz allied with Paire and Ollivier
and, although on the Left, ended the statist orientation pursued by Vincent. However,
Vincent’s departure did not threaten the pursuit of the Macon strategy. The strategy had
borne its fiuits at Reims. The evolution within the SNCH from trade union to lobby and
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to learned society was accepted within the union’s elite and survived the departure of its 
main advocate. Vincent handed over to one of his generation.
CONCLUSIONS
The internal development of the SNCH was driven by the urge of ENSP graduates to 
piece together a professionalising discourse at the head of the trade union. That the SNCH 
was the main vehicle chosen by ENSP graduates to carry their collective aspirations 
demanded in itself an unlikely redefinition of its established practices. Despite its group 
identity, the union was tied to the delivery of pecuniary benefits for its membership which 
included not simply hospital directors, but also general hospital administrative personnel. 
Trade unions, fi'aught with the collective mobilisation difficulties surrounding the delivery 
of pecuniary benefits, sit uneasily with the organisational dynamic of professions. 
Professions, whilst not ignoring material benefits, elevate the definition and creation of 
expertise, originating knowledge and making technological improvements. These traits 
justify their autonomy and self-regulation in the workplace.
However, the discourse of ENSP graduates promoted organisational change 
within the SNCH as a means of delivering pecuniary benefits for the rank-and-file 
membership. It advocated the development of the SNCH as a health policy lobby whilst 
tethering the fiiture status of the corps to hospital management reform. Indeed, Vincent 
and Coz both maintained to conference that pecuniary benefits would accompany the 
continued evolution of hospital directors at the forefi’ont of the strategic apex of public 
hospitals. They coupled the organisational dynamics of trade unions to that of learned 
society, expanding the knowledge base of the corps and that of lobby delivering legislative 
change. However, this approach did not fully resolve the tensions between the relatively 
autonomous leadership, focused on the presidential ‘messiah’ somewhat above the rank- 
and-file. The merger of organisational dynamics sidestepped the demands of rank-and-file 
in the short-term, but ultimately the Vincent strategy depended upon the delivery of 
improved wages and conditions. This imposed a constraint upon the leadership, since the 
BN was obliged to refuse calls for strike action not only because of the resources 
demanded by such action, but also because strikes undermined the professional orientation
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sought by ENSP graduates.
The catalyst for a challenge to existing practices within the SNCH was the failure 
of the collective bargaining endorsed by the Charlotte leadership. However, the ensuing 
shift, sparked by Fischer and his coUegaues, towards health policy debate at SNCH 
conferences was neutralised by the ‘externalists’ who minimised the moves towards health 
policy debate to nothing more than a necessary response to the imposition of top-down 
controls on hospital financing. The key transition was the emergence of both Grenoble 80 
around Fischer and the ‘modernisers’ around Vincent who were driven by their own 
agendas: a rival model of trade unionism and the promotion of the corps. Vincent, acting 
as a bridgebuilder between the Charlotte leadership and the supporters of Fischer, 
subsequently brought the two camps together under a modernising strategy at Macon. The 
alliance was 6cilitated by the common presence of a generation of ENSP graduates within 
Grenoble 80 and the modernising clan surrounding \Hncent in Paris. As Thoenig illustrates 
in the case of Bridges and IBghways, change passed through a generation of ‘young 
t u r c s . Indeed, when Vincent left the presidency of the SNCH in April 1990, the torch 
simply passed on to a fellow assistanat graduate, Coz. \^ th  the appointment of Coz, a 
long standing supporter of Grenoble 80, the changes in the leadership of the SNCH came 
full circle: the original opposition to the centrist leadership of Charlotte took control of 
the SNCH.
The integration of Coz into the Vincent camp reflected the ENSP background of 
the dozen or so directors orienting around Vincent and Paillé, the national delegate. 
However, \%icent’s discourse, which interpreted the modernisation of hospital 
management within an overarching fi:amework of regional planning, was challenged by the 
hôpital-entreprise and market orientation endorsed by Coz. Indeed, in the 1980s, the 
primary cleavage within the SNCH was that between statists and autonomists. This 
cleavage progressively became entwined with the professional dynamics within the trade 
union. Hôpital-entreprise was the vehicle for the professionalisation of the corps, since 
it implied the autonomy of hospital directors and state withdrawal fi*om the management 
of public hospitals. This elevation of the professional dynamic was confirmed rather 
ironically when \%icent, the moderniser more in tune with the professionalisation of the 
corps, left the SNCH and Coz, in contrast more tied to the clan of lobbyists in Grenoble
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80, took over the presidency.
Finally, the transition within the SNCH to health policy lobby increased the 
resources at the disposal of its leadership. First, it upgraded the substantive knowledge 
at the disposal of the corps. The working groups within conference produced an array of 
diverse measures, first formalised in the 200 Propositions. Although in no way exercising 
a monopoly over such knowledge, the SNCH stole a march over the Fédération 
Hospitalière de France and Force Oumère which converted rather belatedly to the 
positions endorsed by the SNCH. Second, the establishment of a national delegate in the 
form of Paillé transformed the lobbying capacity of the SNCH. This lobbying was 
supported by the entry of directors into the networks and working groups of political 
parties; a movement orchestrated by Paillé and \Tncent. Third, the linkage between the 
different organisational dynamics running through the SNCH lessened the collective 
mobilisation difiBculties facing its leadership. However, the internal changes within the 
SNCH cannot be divorced fi’om changes in the public sector and its environment. The cost 
containment of the 1980s produced a grassroots evolution of management and 
conceptions of ‘best practice’ within the corps which was exploited by the SNCH 
leadership. Indeed, the transitions within the SNCH mirrored the changing balance of the 
political parties and ideologies within the French political system. The emergence of the 
left-leaning Grenoble SO and the adoption by Vincent of a planned solution to hospital 
management corresponded with the rise of the French Socialists. The transition towards 
hôpital-entreprise, driven intially by right-wing directors, shadowed both the warming of 
the French Socialists towards the private sector and the arrival in office of a Gaullist- 
Giscardian government committed to the market. The next part of the thesis examines 
how these evolutions within the SNCH interacted with successive French governments 
and enabled it to gain both pecuniary benefits and influence within the policy-making 
process.
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CHAPTER FIVE
REORGANISING HOSPITAL FINANCING: 
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE GLOBAL BUDGET
The system of hospital financing based on patient-day rates helped to sustain the state- 
medical profession compromise in France by devolving ultimate control of hospital 
spending to doctors. This allocation of roles aided and abetted hospital directors in the 
management of annual budgets, although the patient-day rate was only one of a range of 
accounting rules which bolstered local control of spending (see Chapter 2). However, 
faced by mounting financial pressures for cost containment in the 1970s, the Barre 
government began in earnest to claw back control of financial aggregates fi'om local actors 
fi"om 1976 onwards. This centralisation through top-down controls on financial aggregates 
led to the replacement of the patient-day rate system by the global budget in 1983, and 
forms the focus of attention here. At this point, I broaden out attention firom the previous 
narrow individual-group perspective to look at the SNCH’s interactions with other actors 
and government in the policy networks shaping hospital management policy.
The introduction of the global budget was the first managerial reform that 
Vincent’s modernist SNCH leadership openly supported as it strived to push the hospital 
directors’ union towards the role of health policy lobby. Its early support for the global 
budget Mgnalled the SNCH’s evolving strategy, reversing the union's previous opposition 
to financial reform. The change tied future improvements in the terms and conditions of 
hospital directors to hospital management reform. The opening section of the chapter 
examines the first moves to cost containment under the Barre government fi'om 1976 to 
1981. The second analyses the arrival of the Left in office in 1981 and its reversal of the 
controls on hospital spending. The third details the Mauroy government’s policy reversal 
in June 1982 and its return to top-down controls on financial aggregates. The final section 
provides an account of the formulation of the global budget under the Mauroy 
government in 1983.
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5.1 EARLY MOVES TO TOP-DOWN CONTROLS
By 1980, spending on hospital services, both public and private, reached over half of all 
health care spending in France. The motor behind this rise was spending on public 
hospitals which increased throughout the 1970s at a rate which outstripped spending on 
both private clinics and ambulatory care (see Figure 5.1). The patient-day rate, with its in­
built capacity for hospitals to manipulate funding by massaging the length of patient stays, 
largely explains this growth (see Chapter One). By 1980, public hospital spending 
accounted for over 40 per cent of total health spending (as opposed to 30 per cent in 
1970).' This rise in hospital spending occurred at the same time as the stagflation of the 
French economy, following the 1973 oil crisis, which placed increased pressure upon the 
funding of the health sickness funds, the CNAMTS. \^ th  each subsequent decline in 
economic growth and rise in unemployment, the CNAMTS received fewer contributions 
with which to finance the bill for its comprehensive insurance coverage, let alone match 
growth in demands fuelled by rising technological costs, demographic changes and 
inflation.^ From 1975 onwards, the French government began to experience its first 
serious financial difficulties with the CNAMTS. One participant recalled:
‘financial problems, we started to get them uniquely fi’om 1975 onwards...
I was occupied with all that, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975.1 saw the 
Hospital Law [in 1970] and its implementation problems and, then, we had 
no financial problems with the Social Security... The first time that we had 
them, serious ones, it was 1975.’^
In response to the failed refiationary programme undertaken by the Chirac 
government, Raymond Barre, a market liberal and faithful Prime Minister of the president 
Giscard dBstaing, swung fi’om September 1976 towards a monetarist economic policy. 
He aimed to control inflation, reduce the public spending and foreign account deficits and 
improve the monetary position of firms.* In line with the squeeze on public spending, the 
Barre government introduced from 1976 a series of top-down controls on hospital 
investment and development programmes (see Table 5.1).^ Simone Veil, Health Nfinister, 
argued that the control of spending would not be achieved through the reform of hospital 
financing, but rather through ‘the mastering of [health service] structures.’® This stance 
assumed that the absence of a finite demand for health care created the conditions for
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supply to produce its own demand. Controls on the health care infrastructure would thus 
ultimately quell rising costs within public health care systems. These controls reached their 
logical conclusion at the end of 1979 when the Barre government endowed the Health 
Minister with the right to close hospital wards even against the wishes of public hospitals.^
Figure 5.1: The rise of public hospital spending 1970-1980
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Table 5.1: Top-down controls on investment and development 1977-1979*
August 1977: Prefects forbiddeu to grant hospitals permission for any projects which would increase the 
number of beds. Limits subsequently placed on increases in hospital personnel (not to go beyond 1.5 
percent of the existing total).______________________________________________________
March 1978: The proportion of hospital investment programmes able to be financed by recourse to 
external loans limited to 60 percent of the total outlay. In practical terms, this meant that projects had 
either to be eidier self-financing or supported by government subsidies._______________________
September 1979: Hospitals obliged to include within investments programmes the measures which 
would enable them to finance any increased costs through efficiency savings. Approval for projects over 
10 billion French Francs transferred firom the Prefect to the Health Ministry. Increases in hospital 
personnel ended._____________________________________________________ __________
December 1979: Health Minister could unilaterally close hospital beds and wards if requests to do so 
were ignored______________________________ _
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However, controls on the supply of hospital services were undermined by the 
declining length of patient-stays, driven by improved medical technology, which permitted 
a greater throughput of patients in existing beds.^ Indeed, whilst controls on the supply 
of hospital services were prioritized. Veil also announced, in May 1975, the launch of 
trials of the global budget and a more sophisicated variation of the patient-day rate, the 
prix de journée éclaté (see Table 5.2).^ ® The Finance Ministry delayed the start of the 
trials because it considered that the two proposed reforms did not provide a sufficiently 
radical alternative to the patient-day rate." The reform was initially announced for 
October 1976, but it was not until May 1977 that the Barre government eventually 
announced the development of simulations of the two replacements for the patient-day 
rate before their introduction in selected hospitals in 1978.^  ^ The practical trials began in 
January 1978 and were scheduled to last for two years." Six hospitals were to participate 
in the trials with three hospitals testing the global budget and three hospitals testing the 
prix de journée éclaté}^
Table 5.2: Alternative funding mechanisms
Prix de journée éclaté
Broke the patient-day rate down into its varions components (a patient-day rate for hotel costs 
according to Qpes of hospitalisation and for diSerent types of medical specialisms or discipline, and
a charge for expensive prostheses")._______ _____  ____________________________
Global budget
Ended individual billing of patients. Annual budget in twelve monthty instalments determined through 
internal negotiations with medical services._______ __________________________________
Introducing the trials. Veil argued that the replacement for the patient-day rate 
should provide government with more information about the true nature of costs, breaking 
the patient-day rate into its various components (in keeping with the 1970 Hospital 
Law).^  ^However, by the time the trials began, the priorities of the Barre government were 
no longer the clarification of hospital costs, but rather the termination of the inflationary 
nature of the patient-day rate. Even before the lessons of the trials had been learnt, the
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government was quick to push for the introduction of the global budget. Only twelve 
months into the trials, on 31 January 1979, the Council of Ministers endorsed the 
introduction of the global budget with plans to put the global budget legislation though 
the National Assembly in the following autumn session. The Prime Minister Raymond 
Barre announced his support for the global budget in early 1978.^^
The case in fevour of the changeover was twofold. First, the implementation costs 
of the prix de journée éclaté were higher than those of the global budget. It necessitated 
a high-level investment in analytical accounting, increasing the burden on management 
teams particularly in smaller hospitals without adequate computer systems. In contrast, 
the global budget was somewhat of a known quantity which had passed its trials 
throughout the French administration and was known to have been introduced 
successfully in Quebec: 'Eveiyone knew that a budget, it works, I mean there was no need 
for a great deal of though t.S econd , the global budget offered the possibility of 
controlling hospital spending whereas the prix de journée éclaté was fiill of loopholes. In 
the first year of the trials of the prix de journée éclaté, the Antoine-Beclère hospital spent 
more than it would have done if its budget had been calculated using the old system of the 
patient-day rate.^’
Yet, despite this support for the global budget, the trials were extended for an 
indeterminate period at the end of December 1979.^ ® The Barre government was 
hampered by divisions within its parliamentary majority. It had no desire to mobilise 
opporition by the implementation of unpopular hospital management reforms during the 
run-up to the 1981 presidential elections, particularly as doctors had already opposed the 
government’s reorganisation of ambulatory care.^  ^Indeed, the December 1979 legislation 
which enabled the Health Minister to unilaterally close hospitals beds was never applied. 
Such conflict-avoidance motivated the Barre government’s acceptance of a second version 
of the prix de journée éclaté as five hospitals began further trials in January 1981 (see 
below).“  The global budget trials were simultaneously extended to four additional 
hospitals (one hospital already having been added in January 1980) including regional 
hospitals which were not previously involved in these trials.^
However, the Barre government did move towards a practical globalisation of 
hospital budgets. The top-down control of investments was progressively supported by
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matching controls on the mechanism of the patient-day rate. In 1975, the Chirac 
government introduced a national guideline on the desired increases in the patient-day 
rate, the taux directeur (TD). In 1977, the Barre government created the National 
Interministerial Commission for the Rationalisation of Hospital Management. These 
measures still did not signal any significant controls on the patient-day rate. In 1978, the 
Interministerial Commission awarded half of the supplementary budgets requested. 
However, from September 1979, the base calculations for the patient-day rate were 
significantly altered (see Table 5.3). Progressively, the percentage increases in spending 
determined by national guidelines no longer applied to the patient-day rate, but to total 
hospital spending for the previous financial year.^ '* These measures were ‘of a purely 
budgetary nature, brutal, so as to limit the infernal game of the patient-day rate.’^  ^ In 
practice, such top-down measures as with the shift towards statutory increases in the mass 
of budgets rather than the patient-day rate, gave the Barre government the global budget 
in all but name.
,26Table 5.3: Steps towards the globalisation of hospital budgets, 1979-1980
September 1979: Increases in patient-day rate no longer calculated according to actual spending for the 
previous financial year, but according to the prospective budgets drawn up at the beginning of the year. 
Deficits no longer carried over into the following financial year. Supplementary budgets withdrawn. 
The TD transformed into statutoiy ceiling rather than a guideline. Increases above national guidelines 
required the approval of the Minister.________________________________________________
October 1980: the increases in total spending had to be aligned on the predicted increases in the gross 
domestic product for die forthcoming year.____________________________________________
In fact, the progressive implementation of the global budget did not fit within the 
timetable imposed upon the Barre government by the 1981 presidential elections. The 
President, Giscard dBstaing, appointed Jean Farge as Junior Minister for Social Security 
in July 1979 and gave him a free hand to balance the books of the CNAMTS in the 
remaining twenty months before the 1981 presidential elections. Farge and his team saw 
their task as so urgent that they had to impose top-down controls on hospital budgets 
rather than move towards the global budget. Top-down controls on the patient-day rate 
gave the prospect of immediate results, whilst the global budget only offered the prospect 
of cuts in the future.^  ^Indeed, despite previous announcements, there was no proponent
1 6 0
of the immediate implementation of the reform within the Barre government: ‘It's
necessary to understand quite clearly that as long as we remained within the period of
trials, nobody could care less.’^ ® Rather, the measures taken by the Barre government
shifted aggregate budgetary decisions upwards from local health boards to Farge and his
team who demonstrated allegedly more resistance to budgetary increases than local actors:
‘Choussat [the Director of Hospitals] arrived with the budgets of the 
largest hospitals in France... And I [Farge] would say: “Listen, there it's 
less 10 percent, there it's less 15 percent and if they make a fuss, they 
make a fuss and that's that.”’ ^
Nevertheless, hospital budgets spiralled above the accepted constraints of the national
guidelines encompassed in the taux directeurs (TD): 17.2 percent for a TD of 9.8 in 1979
and 17.5 percent for a TD of 11.8 percent in 1980.^°
The SNCH in opposition
Under the externalist strategy pursued by Charlotte, the SNCH remained in limbo, 
declaring its opposition to all the possible changes - the global budget, the prix de journée 
éclaté and the patient-day rate. The working groups at conference acknowledged the 
inflationary nature of the patient-day rate, but shied away from endorsing the global 
budget. At Pau, the hospital finance working group condemned the implementation of the 
global budget in Quebec, which it saw as having reduced the managerial freedom of 
hospital directors.^  ^At Metz, it accepted the principle of the global budget, but raised the 
twin fears that its implementation would not apply to private clinics and that it would be 
exploited by government to produce a centralised administrative process, setting hospital 
budgets according to the funding capacities of the Social Security funds.^^
However, the minority of hospital directors involved in trials did voice their 
support for the global budget. These hospital directors latched on to the increased 
managerial responsibilities for directors as they negotiated objectives and internal budgets 
with doctors. Marc Buisson, involved in the trials at StGennain-en-Laye, argued at 
Rouen in 1978 that the introduction of devolved budgets increased participation within 
the management process and eased dialogue with doctors through their involvement in 
budgetary negotiations.^^ At his hospital, the size of the global budget allocation rested 
upon the outcome of bottom-up negotiations led by directors with individual services. 
More importantly, Vincent, himself involved in the trials at Hôtel-Dieu, argued that
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administrative simplifications and improvements in the cash-flow of hospitals would derive 
fi'om the monthly payments and the end to individual billing which accompanied the global 
budgetV incen t and his Assistance Publique modernisers had embraced the global 
budget, although the role of director was to allocate between services a top-down budget 
set externally. However, this support for the global budget was never an organised 
opposition to the SNCH’s official stance. As long as the trials persisted, Vincent shied 
away from publicly identifying himself with the reform. He offered a series of non­
committal statements both at Rouen and Metz endorsing concerns over the increased 
involvement of the Social Security funds in the management of public hospitals and the 
use that government might eventually make of the global budget.^^
In fact, the dominance of the externalist leadership radicalised the stance of the 
SNCH towards the Barre government as the union made increasing forays into the health 
policy arena to defend the corps of public hospital directors. At Rouen, the SNCH 
condemned (with only three abstentions) both the global budget and the prix de journée 
éclaté?  ^Members of the Bureau National interpreted the global budget as a tool to reduce 
hospital spending whilst blaming hospital directors for budgetary cutbacks: ‘a trap that has 
been set for us... To want to enclose us in these structures [the global budget] is to make 
us carry the can.’^  ^The leadership even intensified its attacks on the Barre government at 
the Metz conference in 1979 where SNCH delegates ‘that some would have easily 
imagined to be more “moderate” and preoccupied with advancing their claims for 
improved pay and conditions said all the ill that they think of government policy.’^ * In his 
opening speech to conference, Charlotte called on delegates to reject the global budget 
and, attacking the moves towards cost containment, declared that the SNCH refused ‘to 
be the accomplices of a undertaking to demolish the public hospital service.
Following Metz, the SNCH joined with Force Ouvière and the Confédération 
Générale du Travail (CGT) to castigate in particular both the bill enabling the unilateral 
closure of hospital beds and the introduction of the global budget. Joint trade union 
meetings were organised under the banner of a Tour de France of grassroots consultation 
with hospital directors."^ ® The trade unions derided claims that public hospitals were the 
‘gravediggers’ responsible for the rising debt of the Social Security funds. They attacked 
the global budget as a reversal of the long-established policy of hospital modernisation
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which threatened to place hospitals within an arbitrary straitjacket of budgetary controls
calculated not on the basis of need, but according to the budgetary deficit of the Social
Security funds. The change would unnecessarily complicate hospital management (a
reference to the negotiation of budgets by each service). Appealing to their ‘natural’
supporters, they argued that the reform threatened the safety of patients, favoured private
clinics who would continue with the patient-day rate and impinged upon the rights of
hospital boards of trustees - or, in other words, local Mayors.^^
However, opposition to the global budget was more pertinently driven by the
leadership of \hQ Fédération Hospitalière de France (FHF). It reluctantly recognised the
inflationaiy nature of the patient-day rate, but argued that its maintenance was a necessary
‘safeguard for the financial autonomy of hospitals’ as were adjustments to budgets during
the financial year.^  ^ It lobbied in favour of a simplified version of the prix de journée
éclaté which provided a standard patient-day rate by medical discipline, but reduced
earlier complications by providing no detailed breakdown of costs except for expensive
prosthesis and hotel costs.^  ^The FHF exploited its ties with politicians, but it was further
able to make use of its ties with the Direction des Hôpitaux (DH) to hinder any concrete
validation of the global budget within the health commissions of the National Plan.^
Indeed, the DH was ‘very much in the hands of the FHF’^  ^and, in alliance with the FHF,
it manoeuvred the health planning commission to call for the globalisation of hospital
spending, but only when conditions were right. As a result of such rearguard lobbying, the
trials of the second prix de journée éclaté began in the spring of 1980.^
Equally, the FHF neutralised the moves by the technical services of the CNAMTS
to increase their involvement in hospital budgeting. Led by Patrice Legrand, a graduate
of ENA, the national school of administration, the CNAMTS technical services believed
the prix de journée éclaté to be unworkable and supported the global budget as a
superior, but flawed alternative destined to fireeze the existing distribution of resources
between hospitals.*  ^However, the FHF made use of its connections with FO (the head of
Social Affairs within the CNAMTS was a hospital director, member of the FHF riding on
an FO ticket) to prevent any encroachment of the CNAMTS within hospital budgeting:
‘The FHF managed to get itself heard, and I want to say, widely. And, in 
the spirit of the FHF, the CNAMTS only had two functions: the first was 
to pay up for the patient-day rate an open till, and the second was to
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intervene as a complement to the state in the financing of infi'astructure’.'^ *
In fact, the FHF pushed on an open door because at the end of the 1970s, the philosophy
of the CNPF delegates in the health sickness funds readily accepted the defence of the
health ‘industry’ and its funding (see Chapter One).
However, as the Barre government imposed top-down controls on financial
aggregates, a coalition of civil servants primarily from the Inspection des Finances swept
into the health and social divisions of the central administration. Farge, the Junior Minister
appointed to resolve the funding crisis facing the Social Security funds, was himself an
Inspecteur des Finances with ten years experience at the head of the Division of Public
Accounts (DCP). He took with him to Social Affairs, Pierre Laturelle, fellow Inspecteur
des Finances and his former deputy at the DCP. Jean Choussat, another Inspecteur des
Finances firom the Direction du Budget (DB) took over at the head of the DH and the
general direction of health, the Direction Générale de la Santé which were fused for the
first time in their history (see Chapter Two). In addition, Jean Marmot, fi’om the Court of
Accounts became director of the Direction de la Sécurité Sociale (DSS) thereby ending
the monopoly of ‘lawyers’ fi'om the Council of State over the leadership of the DSS.
Finally, Dominique Coudreau, health policy advisor to Raymond Barre and also
Inspecteur des Finances, was appointed director of the CNAMTS in 1979. Within its
technical services, Legrand had already assembled a team of economists rather than the
traditional legal experts.
discard and Barre’s assembling of this group signalled a significant change in the
regulation of the health policy sub-system as the network of finance personnel increasingly
internalised decision-making over financial aggregates. Farge kept a close team of four
advisors, sharing a technical advisor on hospital affairs with the centrist Jacques Barrot,
who had replaced Veil at Social Affairs. The newly appointed people shared common
perceptions of the inadequacies of health care management and the necessary solutions
to rising health care spending. Farge said of Coudreau and the other ‘financiers’ that ‘as
we were fi'om the same ministry, we already had a certain communality of thinking.
Integral to these shared perceptions was the acceptance that hospital directors lacked the
requisite resources to enter into any strategic posts within central government. In the
words of Barre, ‘[we] didn’t have opposite us at that time, a corps of hospital directors
that have the maturity that they have now [in 1992].’ °^ At this time, access to the central
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administrative divisions was still barred to the corps and the ‘outsider’ SNCH.
Thus, in the initial stages of cost containment, there were neither any structural or 
organisational reforms nor promotion of hospital managers into the decision-making 
process. The coalition of ‘financiers’ assembled by Giscard and Barre did not push 
towards the implementation of the global budget. The imposition of top-down controls 
on financial aggregates and the appointment of Choussat weakened the established 
relationships with the FHF and internalised policy-making. The SNCH under the guidance 
of the externalists remained wedded to the alliance of anti-modemisers led by FO and the 
FHF which fought the introduction of the global budget. However, within the SNCH, 
hospital directors, particularly those involved in its trials, were ofifering their cautious 
support to the global budget. Vmcent was growing in influence within the national 
executive, HheBifreau National (BN) and the modernisation coalition of Grenoble 80 and 
the Paris modernisers was beginning to take shape. In fact, the victory of Nfitterrand at 
the 1981 presidential elections and the subsequent election of a PS government under the 
premiership of Pierre Mauroy in a Union of the Left with the communists, signalled a new 
stage in the formulation of the global budget; at a time when Vmcent was to take control 
of the SNCH.
5.2 THE PHASE OF SOCIALIST EXPANSION
After the 1981 elections, the negotiations between Mauroy and the communist PCF 
settled upon Health as one of four ministries to be awarded to communist ministers.^  ^On 
24 June 1981, Jack Ralite, PCF deputy and mayor of Aubervilliers, took office as Health 
Nfinister in the second Mauroy government, although he had previously expressed his 
personal preference for Culture.^ Ralite was joined at Social Affairs by Nicole Questiaux, 
supporter of the leftwing CERES faction within the PS, who was appointed as Minister 
for National Solidarity. However, unlike his immediate predecessors, Ralite was a full 
minister and Questiaux was unable to exercise any hierarchical authority over his actions.
Ralite packed his cabinet with the ‘principal actors of the health care commission 
of the PCF.’^^  He appointed five communist advisors including the former PCF deputy, 
Gilbert Millet, who acted as a quasi-spokesperson for the PCF health commission within
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his c a b in e t.However, Mauroy took the opportunity to remove the DH from PCF
influence, ending the joint tenure of Choussat in November 1981. In a compromise
agreement, the communist candidate. Professor Guy Roux, was attributed the DOS whilst
a known socialist, Jean de Kervasdoué, was imposed at the head of the DH.^  ^Kervasdoué,
who worked previously within the Planning Office of the Assistance Publique as well as
the Centre de Recherche en Gestion de VEcole Polytechnique  ^was a former advisor to
Mauroy as well as a member of the socialist health policy lobby. Santé et Socialisme. His
forced appointment instilled from the outset a deep-seated cleavage within the Health
Ministry between Kervasdoué, the DH and the Ralite cabinet.
The Mauroy government embarked upon an economic programme best defined
as ‘redistributive Keynesianism'/^ This macro-economic dash for growth relaxed the top-
down financial controls imposed upon public hospitals under Barre. At Health and Social
Affairs, Ralite and Questiaux repeatedly upped the spending commitments of the Mauroy
government as they engaged in a game of ministerial oneupmanship:
‘It's her who said that she would not be the Minister of Health Accounts 
... She almost added more on top of what we [the Ralite cabinet] could 
have demanded. If there was a competition with Ralite it was in this 
domain: ‘I'm going to do more.... She perhaps had the mission to brake 
the spending by Ralite, but she didn't do it’.^ *
In the first few months of the Mauroy government, Ralite trumpeted not only the
suspension of the National Commission for the Rationalisation of Hospital Management,
but also the repeal of five circulars and the December 1979 law which accounted for much
of the fiamework of top-down controls imposed under Barre. He tied his colours firmly
to the mast of expansion on 22 July 1981, reinstating supplementary budgets and
proclaiming the creation of 2000 personnel posts in hospitals, 1500 further posts as
doctors and 1000 new posts in psychiatric hospitals.^°
In September, Ralite set out on a tour of health care institutions throughout
France to prepare the Chartre de la Santé, the health charter which was to embody the
overarching health care philosophy of the Mauroy govemment.^^ The global budget was
not discarded. It remained one of three interdependent managerial reforms which, along
with the introduction of departments in public hospitals and a single statute for hospital
doctors, were signalled by Mitterrand in his ten campaign measures dedicated to health.^^
However, the justification for the implementation of the global budget lay no longer in its
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capacity to constrain rising spending, but in its concurrent modernisation of hospital 
management. Underlining the new found relaxation of controls, Ralite gave advance 
warning in October 1981 of a ‘major reform of management and hospital billing ’ referring 
to a global financial envelope which could be updated during the course of the financial 
year.“
However, the introduction of the global budget was pushed down the political 
agenda by the Mauroy government. Initial moves towards more formal consultation 
continued in October after the end of Halite’s personal tour with a series of four Round 
Table discussions between Ralite, Questiaux and hospital trade unions and associations. 
The Round Tables kicked off on 24 November 1981 and ended on 25 March 1982.^ The 
November Round Table led to the creation of two working parties for hospital reform 
which met twice in early January 1982 and were managed by the cabinets and the DH (see 
Chapter Six).®^  However, through the end of 1981 to the spring of 1982, the Ralite 
cabinet was preoccupied with the publication of the Health Charter. The report on the 
trials of the global budget remained unpublished and the Mauroy government had still to 
make an overt commitment to the exact nature of the global budget reform. The Health 
Charter, finally discussed at the Council of Ministers on 12 May 1982, was a vague 
statement which was more concerned with general principles than concrete policy 
proposals. Although it committed the Mauroy government to the replacement of the 
patient-day rate, it made no mention of the global budget.^
In practice, the global budget was struck ftom the agenda as Ralite and his cabinet 
threw established relations with hospital doctors into crisis over Ralite’s moves to abolish 
private pay beds in public hospitals, negotiate a single set of terms and conditions for 
hospital doctors and widen the entry qualifications for specialists.^^ Such measures 
undermined the state-profession compromise, particularly the proposal to rid public 
hospitals of private pay beds. For many hospital doctors this measure broke the ‘moral 
contract’ established by the 1958 ordinances.^ More importantly, the panoply of measures 
eroded the divisions hampering the collective mobilisation of hospital doctors, and thus 
prompted umbrella demonstrations.®  ^From the end of March through to mid-April 1982, 
public hospitals were hit by strikes, with demonstrating doctors at one stage even 
storming Ralite's office.^ ®
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The Ralite ministry acted as a catalyst for the creation and mobilisation of hospital 
doctor unions outside the established avenues of the consultative conférences for regional 
and general hospitals. The most vehement opponent to the Ralite ministry, Solidariié 
Médicale, only formed in November 1981 as a common front for health care professionals 
to defend liberal practice against the impending incursions.^^ Its overriding aim was to do 
no more than create disorder in public hospitals. The union attended the first consultation 
meeting on private sector reform in November 1981 only to boycott the rest.^ Launched 
by Bernard Debré, grandson of Michel Debré, the organization was progressively 
dominated by the guallist RPR mandarins, particularly Debré and Canlorbe.”  Indeed, the 
RPR oflBcially gave its support to the defence of private sector rights which it designated 
as an ‘apolitical’ struggle.’^
However, the policies adopted by Ralite only provide a partial explanation for the 
breakdown of relations between the Mauroy government and hospital doctors. His agenda 
reflected the propositions voiced by Mitterrand who stood by his PCF minister, although 
the President was concerned over the speed of Ralite's proposed abolition of private 
sector rights.^  ^The abolition o f private pay beds had been considered by the Court of 
Accounts and Barrot under Giscard (although ultimately discarded). However, Ralite who 
already suffered from his communist party afSliation broke the rules of the game 
regulating consultations between the mandarins and the government. First, his communist 
affiliations were like a ‘red flag to a bull’, tapping into the right-wing hostility of the 
medical leadership and revealing the paucity of the Left's ties with hospital doctors^^: ‘I 
am not saying that [opposition] was only political but a little nevertheless. It is obvious ... 
Do not forget that we had at first a communist minister.’^  Second, in his first meeting 
with hospital doctor trade unions, Ralite invited non-medical trade unions, most notably 
the communist COT, to the negotiating table. This change broke with tradition and the 
acknowledged place of the medical profession. Convinced of the futility of consultation, 
several unions left the last Round Table in protest at Ralite's methods.’* The near-total 
breakdown in the state-medical profession relationship created an opening for the SNCH 
to acquire influence, which had relatively little to do with the global budget, which lay 
forgotten in the ministry as the wider battles unfolded.
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The SNCH and VincenVs arrival
In the first expansionist months of the Mauroy government, the leadership of the SNCH 
did little to end its externalist strategy or to depart from the stances endorsed by its rivals. 
Although at its 1981 Monaco conference, it reasserted its opposition to the private pay 
beds within public hospitals, it maintained its opposition to the global budget.Indeed, 
like the FHF and FO, it opposed the August 1981 circulars on trade union rights in public 
hospitals.*® These measures played to the clientelistic relationship between Ralite and the 
CGT, proffering improved rights and conditions of representation upon trade unions in 
public hospitals, much to the annoyance of directors. At the ‘mass’ consultation meetings 
held by Ralite, dedicated as they were to rhetoric rather than specific policy proposals, the 
SNCH was no more than a face within the crowd of over 50 hospital doctor trade 
unions.*^
However, in the spring of 1982, Vincent and his modernising coalition in alliance
with Grenoble 80 took over the leadership of the SNCH (see Chapter 4). No longer
president-elect, Vincent put an end to his diplomatic non-committal utterrances at
conference and adopted promotion of the global budget as the core policy to guide his
actions throughout his presidency. Despite its relegation down the policy agenda of the
Mauroy government, he regarded the implementation of global budgets as inevitable,
calculating that rising hospital expenditure and shorter patient stays would produce
politically untenable increases in the patient-day rate.*  ^He consequently argued that the
global budget was a means of actually staving oflf severe clampdowns on hospital
spending, contrary to popular opinion.*  ^More importantly, in the short-term, he bargained
that an endorsement of the global budget would set the SNCH apart fi’om the FO and the
FHF and alert the Mauroy government to its newly-established modernising discourse:
‘My argument was the following. In any event, we will not escape ... the 
global budget, and it’s either one or the other. Either we are its promoters 
and we come out of the reform with an increased reputation or, we oppose 
[the reforms] and we will be considered to be reactionaries who have no 
sense of the general interest’.*'^
Vincent’s modernising thesis was buttressed by the fact that hospital directors involved
in the trials argued that the global budget fostered new managerial methods, decentralised
budgets, medical information and computing systems (see above).*  ^Whether bottom-up
or top-down in its implementation, the global budget appeared to assert the authority of
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hospital directors, reinforcing the line-management and the strategic apex within public 
hospitals.
Opposition to the Vincent thesis within the union’s national executive, the BN,
was mute. Charlotte and his supporters were quickly sidelined by the clique of ENSP
directors surrounding Vincent. Louis Rolland, who led what little organised opposition
there was to the global budget, could only count upon the support of one other member
of the BN, Jean-Louis Romanens. Their opposition was subsequently undermined by both
their repeated insistence that the patient-day rate had no inflationary tendencies, and their
inability to agree upon an alternative to the global budget. Whilst Romanens opposed the
global budget regardless of the conditions governing its implementation, Rolland directed
his attacks not at the principle of the global budget per se, but at the fears surrounding its
implementation. He claimed that the global budget trials were falsely managed by the
Health Ministry so that directors such as Vincent and his team worked within an
artificially flexible global budget which would not be generalised throughout France:
‘The government did all it could so it went well. If they [Vincent and his 
team] had a variation in the level of their activity, immediately, this 
variation was taken into consideration and the global envelope was 
readjusted.’*®
In practice, however, the government, according to Rolland, would discard bottom-up 
negotiated budgets in favour of an externally-imposed top-down global budget.
However, \%cent neutralised this opposition at conference by ensuring Rolland’s 
appointment as reporter at Macon on the conditions for the successful implementation of 
the global budget. Underpinning Rolland's attacks on the global budget was an acceptance 
that it could be perfected if certain conditions were attached to its implementation. With 
Bernard Grandjean, Rolland drew up a list of eight conditions for the successful 
implementation of the global budget.*^ The two primary conditions were bottom-up 
budgetary negotiations and the possibility to update the budget during the financial year 
according to changes in the level of hospital activity and the wider economic situation, 
particularly changes in inflation. These concessions, voiced at earlier conferences, made 
the global budget palatable to its opponents, but maintained the SNCH’s public signal of 
support for the global budget, which the FHF and the FO had not sent.
The choice of conference as the forum for the endorsement of the global budget 
further brushed aside debate within the BN and gave more legitimacy and increased media
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attention to the reversal of the SNCH policy. Directors involved within the trials, as well
as the Vincent group, had already professed their support for the financial reform.
However, the personal engagement of Vincent, allied with the compromise report of
Rolland and Grandjean and the lack of counter proposals, swung conference behind the
SNCH endorsing the global budget:
‘The membership as a whole would certainly not have followed it [global 
budget], but the people who were at the conference, I would say that, in 
the crowd of the conference and with the w e i^  of the president [Vincent] 
and then, his election, it went through. Gérard took a position for it’.** 
Conference voted in favour of the global budget as presented by Rolland with only one
abstention, that of Romanens.*’
Following Macon, the SNCH leadership duly sought a meeting in June 1982
between a delegation led by Vincent and Ralite to push home the change in leadership and
strategy of the trade union. However, Ralite’s appointment negated any possible
opportunities for the SNCH to exploit the contacts, despite the informal contacts between
Grenoble 80 and Santé et Socialisme whose members were expected to capture the
Ministry. There was no SNCH lobby within the diverse networks of the PCF. The trade
union’s informal channels of influence bom o f‘personal fliendships’ with ministers which
it had enq>loyed in the past amply did not exist now.’® Georges Merhle, the only hospital
director within Ralite's cabinet was on its flinges, viewed suspiciously by his colleagues.
Merhle was a graduate of the ENSP and a rank-and-file member of the SNCH. However,
he owed his appointment to his work in the PS Health Commission which automatically
‘isolated’ him fi*om his colleagues within the cabinet who saw him as the ‘obligatory’
socialist keeping tabs on PCF management of public hospitals.’^
Nevertheless, Ralite greeted the SNCH’s support for the global budget favourably,
interpreting its shift towards the reform as an ‘important step-forward’.’  ^He assured the
SNCH that it would be involved in the formulation of any global budget reform (as it
would be for the hospital reform planned by Ralite for the 1983 spring session of
Parliament). For certain members of the BN, the meeting consequently symbolised an
acknowledgement by Ralite of the pivotal role to be played by the SNCH in the reform
of hospital financing:
‘At the first meeting with the Minister which took place [after Macon],
Gérard \%icent made known the position of the SNCH and straightaway
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the Ministry took in this information and considered it to be [of] 
fundamental [importance]'/^
For Rolland, the Mauroy government was simply waiting for the SNCH endorsement to
launch the global budget reorganisation.
Thus, the SNCH’s conversion to the global budget, coming after Vincent’s
election, appeared to members of the BN to have catapulted the trade union into the
networks surrounding decision-making. Forcing through the acceptance of the global
budget, Vincent led the SNCH to break ranks from rival organisations, particularly FO,
delivering a salient message of change to the Mauroy government at a time when it lacked
supports to deliver its policies within public hospitals. However, even at Macon, the
acceptance of the global budget by the rank-and-file floundered upon conditions which
the SNCH leadership would find difiBcult to impose upon any government. Vincent could
paper over the cracks at Macon simply because Ralite, buoyed by the expansionist policy
of the Mauroy government and pre-occupied by the unrest among hospital doctors, failed
to advance the global budget dossier.
However, as the Mauroy government mistakenly wagered on international
expansion granting France an export-led emergence from recession, pressure increasingly
came to bear on public spending in 1982.^  ^ The deteriorating macro-economic
performance of the French economy provided a catalyst for the reorientation of health
policy, symbolised by the removal of Questiaux. Calls were made by Mauroy, Jacques
Delors, the Finance Minister, and Laurent Fabius, the Budget Minister for the removal of
Questiaux who publicly announced that she would not play the role of ‘Nfinister of
Accounts’.^ Marmot at the DSS even complained directly to Mauroy about the behaviour
of his minister, pointing out that ‘it was useless to go and see Nicole Questiaux to talk to
her about hospitals, as if you would go and see Saint Peter in heaven to talk about
p o k e r . H e r  position became untenable after the Mauroy government agreed the June
1982 deflationary economic programme.^ On 29 June 1982, Mauroy wrote to Mitterrand
arguing that Questiaux ‘must go. It's urgent now.’^ * The next day, Pierre Bérégovoy,
Mitterrand's General Secretary at the Elysée, replaced Questiaux as Minister of Social
Affairs and National Solidarity.
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5.3 POLICY REVERSAL AND CUTBACK MANAGEMENT
The government reshuflQe made Bérégovoy one of the leading ministers within the Mauroy
government.”  Like Farge in 1979, his immediate agenda was dictated by the burgeoning
deficit of the Social Security funds. The swing towards economic austerity acknowledged
implicitly that private firms could no longer bear the weight of rising social security
contributions, privileging the control of rising costs rather than the ‘traditional’ response
of raising receipts to cover welfare deficits.*®® Indeed, Bérégovoy supported rigid public
spending guidelines for the Social Security funds, viewing cost containment as the sole
means of ensuring the survival of the welfare system.*®* His infamous announcement to
waiting journalists upon entering the Ministry of Social Affairs was that, unlike Questiaux,
he knew how to count. *®^
The appointment of Bérégovoy ushered in a new division of labour between
Health and Social Affairs. Bérégovoy first dispossessed Ralite of his remaining
responsibilities for the management of hospital spending and the global budget. He then
assembled a ministerial cabinet which was suited to the needs of financial management.
Grafted on to the remnants of Questiaux's cabinet were specialist financial management
experts such as Claude Rubiniwicz to improve cash-flows within public hospitals, Marie-
Laurence Pitois to work on pension funds and the economists Guy Worms and André
Gauron.*®  ^ As his directeur de cabinet, Bérégovoy appointed Jean-Charles Naouri,
another Inspecteur des Finances and author with Simon Nora of a well-known 1978
report on the financing of the Social Security funds. *®^ Naouri dominated the team
assembled behind Bérégovoy, with Marmot at the DSS readily accepting that intellectually
Naouri ‘was in Formula One.’*®^ In fact, his work with Bérégovoy gave birth to a new
strategic axis of decision-making within the Ministry of Social Affairs, as one
commentator noted:
‘Jean-Charles Naouri [was] the computer who allowed him [Bérégovoy] 
to put into practice what he had within his head. Rarely has a more perfect 
symbiosis between politician and technician given such efficient results’.*®^
Through the summer of 1982, Bérégovoy and Naouri formulated a time-honoured 
mix of income-generating measures and reduced levels of reimbursement to cap the
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Social Security budgetary deficit. The first concerted measures came with the 29 July 
1982 government circular and the Bérégovoy Social Security Plan on 30 September 
1 9 8 2  107 Tjigsg measures included a one percent social security contribution on individual 
incomes, modified social insurance contributions for the self-employed, a tax on tobacco 
and alcohol and pharmaceutical advertising, and reduced reimbursement for various 
treatments. Bérégovoy and Naouri targeted health care spending and, in particular, public 
hospital spending which continued to increase at a faster rate than spending on general 
practitioners or private clinics. The Plan abolished supplementary budgets, placed 
constraints on hospital funding and ordered the CNAMTS to claim back its advance 
payments fi'om public hospitals (advances paid in order to offset the delay between the 
billing of the Social Security funds and the payment of hospitals)(see Table 5.4). However, 
it provoked widespread opposition with its proposal to introduce a daily hotel charge for 
hospital patients. And opposition to the wider Bérégovoy Plan, let pass its significant 
announcement that the global budget would come into being fi'om 1984. This first formal 
announcement of a date for its introduction came less than two months after Bérégovoy’s 
arrival in ofiSce.
Table 5.4: Bérégovoy’s moves towards cost containment, July-September 1982109
Abolition of supplementary budgets for 1982.
Social Secnrity funds instructed to claim back part of die monthly advances given to hospitals
Daily patient indemnities after a period of fliree monüis were to be refused.
Introdiiction of a daily hospital charge, le forfait hospitalier.
Limits placed on increases in hospital staff.
Target of 14,5 per cent growth for hospital spending in 1983 (compared with 22 per cent in 
1982).____________________________ ____________________________________
Introduction of the global budget from 1 January 1984.
The swift endorsement of the global budget under Bérégovoy and Naouri was not 
matched by the DH report on its trials in public hospitals. Finally published in September 
1982, it gave the global budget a far fi'om complete endorsement. The authors, none of 
whom were hospital directors, argued that the trials revealed the limited returns of both 
variations of the prix de journée éclaté, stressing both their complexity (particularly of
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decisions surrounding their various components) and the necessary improvements in 
computer and statistical systems in public hospitals."^ However, they identified two 
primary obstacles to the introduction of the global budget/^^ First, the global budget 
developed for the trials was incomplete: it did not apply to all areas of hospital spending, 
omitting, in particular, the treatment of outpatients and long-stay patients. Second, its 
successful implementation required the reorganisation of the Social Security funds. The 
multiplicity of fimds and the individual reimbursement of patients necessitated, even under 
the global budget, the maintenance of a fictitious system of patient-day rates. Without it, 
the fimds would have no knowledge of the financial contribution of individual funds to the 
global budgets awarded to hospitals. Indeed, the funds risked losing knowledge of 
questions surrounding individual reimbursement; the data which generated their statistical 
system and the information exploited by their own médecms-contrôîems}^^
In fact, the report concluded that the reform of hospital financing was not as 
pressing as the need to introduce new managerial systems inside hospitals."^ It advocated 
the development of management by objectives, with hospital budgets resulting fi’om 
bottom-up negotiations between doctors and directors. In this process, doctors, enshrined 
as heads of cost centres, centres ds responsabilité, would set future objectives for patient 
care and receive budgets that would be directly assessed in relation to pre-determined 
objectives. Hospital budgets would then be discussed with departmental health boards, the 
DDASS, on the basis of the objectives decided within the hospital. The whole process 
would rest upon the shift towards the contractualisation of hospital management, both 
within public hospitals and between public hospitals and the DDASS.” ^
However, Naouri believed that the existing national guidelines of the faux 
directeur (TD) enabled public hospital spending to increase out of control, like ‘a ship 
without a captain drifting with the w i n d s . H e  argued that the TD was not a budget 
since it did not operate on the basis of any pre-set financial limits. Consequently, his 
agenda was to introduce basic budgetary procedures into the management o f the public 
hospitals system, which was to remain within its overall spending limits, but redeploy 
existing resources. It became the accepted discourse that the financial diflSculties facing 
public hospitals emanated not firom a lack of resources, but an inefficient distribution of 
resources within the public hospital service, with too many beds given over to psychiatry
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in particular. The global budget, within the framework defined by Naouri, would provide 
the necessary constraints on hospital spending thereby forcing hospitals to shake-out 
inefiSciencies within the service.
Naouri’s concerns were mirrored in two reports published by the Inspection des 
Finances and IGAS, the social affairs inspectorate, in July and August 1982 respectively. 
Both reports stressed the inadequacies of the budgetary process within public hospitals 
and the disparities that existed between hospitals.^^  ^They found that the ‘across the board’ 
application of the TD had frozen inequalities between hospitals, thereby artificially 
favouring medical services with a declining level of activity. More importantly, in a third 
of departments, public hospitals, not averse to ‘creative accounting’ measures, went 
beyond the increase in spending dictated by the TD.^ *^ Such were the inadequacies of 
accounting procedures and the reliance upon outdated information from the CNAMTS 
that at no time could the government be sure how much was being spent by public 
hospitals.
Against this background, Bérégovoy and Naouri obligingly triggered the 
introduction of the global budget; the final decision to do so remaining the prerogative of 
this strategic axis within Social Affairs. Matignon voiced its concerns about the political 
backlash that could follow the implementation of the global budget. Indeed, the 
presentation of the Bérégovoy Plan at the end of September 1982 coincided with the 
demonstration, led by Solidarité Médicale^ of 5000 liberal professionals defending their 
professions against the threat of bureaucratisation. However, Matignon neither 
supported the prix de journée éclaté nor opposed the global budget. More importantly, 
Kervasdoué at the head of the DH was the sole representative of the Health \finistry 
involved within policy negotiations at Social Affairs, and he was not opposed to the 
introduction of the global budget. He used the reports by the Inspection des Finances and 
IGAS to put the weight of grands corps behind the hospital reform agenda. However, 
he was far from an integral member of the team surrounding Bérégovoy. He had been 
presented with a fa it accompli over the return of the CNAMTS advances to public 
hospitals. Naouri excluded any other actors from influence on the final decision, stressing 
that the implementation of the global budget was approved ‘by ourselves.’*^ ' It remained 
to be seen whether the SNCH could overcome this exclusion.
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The SNCH neutralised
The Vincent leadership underwrote the lessons of the DH report on the trials of the global 
budget. In any case, the conclusions of the report supported the SNCH demands for 
managerial reform, as did those of the Inspection des Finances and IGAS. Like the DH 
report, the SNCH advocated a bottom-up budget that was freely negotiated between 
hospitals and local health boards, against the background of an established contract setting 
out the medical objectives of public hospitals.SNCH internal working groups had 
previously advocated decentralised management by objectives and a posteriori external 
assessments of public hospitals in relation to the attainment of its previously agreed 
contractual objectives; a philosophy which was to form the backbone of the 200 
Propositions (see Chapter Four).
Following the steps taken at Macon, the SNCH leadership continued to project 
the trade union as a "responsible’ manager of public funds. It publicly supported, in the 
interests of national solidarity, the wages freeze imposed by the June 1982 economic 
policy reversal of the Mauroy government.*^ Indeed, the Vincent-Paillé tandem exploited 
the crisis of relations between the medical profession and the Mauroy government to 
interpose hospital directors in the dispute as the agents of government ministers. In early 
July, the SNCH subsequently attacked hospital doctors, blaming the medically induced 
organisational fragmentation of public hospitals as the source of ever-expanding costs. 
Perpetuating its calls for the globalisation of hospital budgets, the Vincent leadership 
commented that: ‘If all doctors have not yet understood the notions of public service and 
general interest, directors have not given up the hope of getting them to understand, even 
if it will take a long time’.*^ ^
These public statements promoted the SNCH as an agent of central government 
within public hospitals, emphasising the hierarchical relations between the ministry and 
public hospitals. Nevertheless, the union progressively adopted an ambiguous discourse 
to government policy as the Bérégovoy Plans were announced in the summer of 1982. 
Despite acknowledging sacrifices in the name of national solidarity, Vincent argued that 
the September Social Security Plan wrongly asked public hospitals to take the blame for 
the budgetary deficit of the health sickness funds, the CNAMTS. In contrast, the SNCH 
leadership blamed the social reforms of the Mauroy government for already having
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imposed increased costs upon public hospitals without matching increases in funding. The 
union refused to countenance the imposition of cost containment measures upon public 
hospitals and the ending of supplementary budgets for 1982. It questioned the very 
parameters of the government's discourse, doubting the validity of the rises in hospital 
spending which were advanced by the CN A M TS.The  union position was that claims 
that public hospital spending accounted for approximately half of the budget of the 
CNAMTS could not justify budgetary controls on public hospitals without consultation: 
‘the budgetary restrictions imposed on hospitals cannot be presented as economic rigour, 
but as arbitrary measures because they are general, blind, and brutal.
In fact, the modernist leadership was progressively hampered by the conditions 
attached to the acceptance of the global budget at Macon. With the government’s decision 
to implement the global budget already taken, Vincent was publicly obliged to 
ackno^edge the conditions which the previous uncertainty surrounding the global budget 
had enabled him to relegate in earlier discussions. Indeed, in response to the Bérégovoy 
Plan, the SNCH leadership resurrected the Macon compromise. First, it armounced its 
fears that the global budget would be reduced to a top-down, across-the-board annual 
percentage increase, calculated upon predicted inflation rates and superimposed upon 
existing hospital budgets. Second, it demanded the inclusion of a mechanism which both 
enabled hospitals to re-negotiate their annual budgets after six months of the financial year 
and took account of rising prices and the changing objectives of public hospitals. Finally, 
to simplify administrative procedures, the union further argued that the global budget 
should end individual billing of patients and lead to the automatic coverage of all patients 
by the Social Security funds.'^*
This combative negotiating policy realigned the SNCH with the positions adopted 
by FO and the FHF. The modernist leadership was constrained by both the pressures 
emanating fi’om its rank-and-file members and by competition fiom its rivals. The SNCH 
leadership faced a tension between the promotion of its modernist discourse and the fears 
of a rank-and-file membership still attached to the ‘externalist’ strategy pursued by 
Charlotte (see Chapter Four). Neither could the SNCH in its battle with FO and the FHF 
allow its rivals to monopolise the ‘moral high ground’ as the sole defenders of public 
hospitals. The public service ethos permeated the corps and had to fiame the discourse
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of Vincent and the modernist leadership too. However, the SNCH’s support for the
introduction of the global budget did not falter. At this stage the Vincent leadership was
able to maintain an illusion that it could influence the formulation of the global budget,
thereby balancing support for the global budget with rank-and-file concerns and
competitive pressures.
However, the SNCH had no channels of influence to drive home its demands.
Ralite and his cabinet were isolated. Naouri and Bérégovoy had little regard for hospital
directors. Naouri stated that the SNCH and its Macon conference endorsement had no
influence on the decision to introduce the global budget (see Chapter 4 and 6).^ ^^  Indeed,
the SNCH was unable to cement anything other than a tacit alliance with Kervasdoué at
the DH. At best, the SNCH could call on the co/pj-based loyalties of four hospital
directors within the oflBces of the DH in 1982 and five in 1983.^ °^ Yet, more importantly,
Kervasdoué criticised the quality of public hospital management, generating shockwaves
in the corps of hospital directors, for which collectively he had little esteem: ‘He despied
it [the corpsY he beat us, he said everything to us.’^^  ^In 1982, Kervasdoué introduced
a five-week training programme in private sector management techniques, reserved
initially for general directors and then extending to the First Class, at the École des Hautes
Études Commerciales (HEC), choosing the widely-recognised business school over the
corps* own ENSP. This programme contributed to the grassroots change within the corps
as it redefined its best practice (see Chapter 4). Thus, although there was obvious
common ground between Kervasdoué and the SNCH, the trade union leadership and the
Director of Hospitals:
‘didn't have a easy dialogue, it wasn't simple... What has always struck me, 
personnally, is that we [SNCH] were in fundamental agreement with 
Kervasdoué on loads of things, loads, and that it seems to me that the 
contact never took’.^ ^^
Unlike the SNCH, the DH argued that the only form of global budget that would
guarantee the control of public spending was a top-down, pre-determined financial
envelope. This form of the global budget was tested at Hôtel-Dieu by Vincent, although
it was under the ‘special’ circumstances of the trials. In fact, Kervasdoué merely saw the
global budget as the first step towards the development within French public hospitals of
the system of Diagnosis-Related-Groups introduced in the United States; a system widely
rejected in its early stages by hospital directors.
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Consequently, the SNCH was far removed from the core decision-making process 
which was increasingly internalised in the government. The SNCH leadership was also 
struggling to advance its Macon strategy, given the constraints imposed upon its support 
for the global budget by the demands of the rank-and-file. However, the Bill had yet to 
pass through the National Assembly, an arena more suited to lobbying by the SNCH.
5.4 FORMULATING THE FINAL POLICY
The Bérégovoy Plan was put before the National Assembly in late October 1982, slotted 
by the Mauroy government within a series of measures relating to the management of the 
Social Security funds. The Bill mapped out the basic principles of the global budget. 
These principles, responding to the concerns of the DH report, enshrined lead social 
security funds to manage global budgets in each area, maintaining the patient-day rate for 
certain payments, and extended the rights of the CNAMTS to assess treatment within 
wards. However, most of the procedures governing the implementation of the global 
budget were left to be finalised in administrative decrees. Faced with such a skeleton 
global budget, opponents to the Bill in the National Assembly persisted in their attacks on 
the introduction of a hotel charge for hospital patients and taxes on tobacco and 
alcohol.^ ^^  The Social Affairs parliamentary committee did insist upon the opportunity to 
revise the global budget during the financial year, but only under the vague terms of an 
important and unforseen modification of economic conditions or medical activity. The 
rightwing majority in the Senate subsequently condemned the global budget as a 
mechanism that would lead to the rationing of health care.^ *^ However, designated a 
‘measure of urgency’, the skeleton global budget passed uneventfully through the National 
Assembly and the Senate, appearing in the Journal Officiel on 19 January 1983.
The writing of the decree in spring 1983 coincided with the appointment of 
Edmond Hervé, Health Minister in the first Mauroy government, who replaced Ralite as 
a Junior Minister for Health working under Bérégovoy (see Chapter 6). Like Ralite, Hervé 
and his cabinet were excluded from negotiations over the introduction of the global 
budget. The formulation of the decree was monopolised by a Social Affairs working 
group composed of Naouri and the Bérégovoy cabinet. Marmot from the DSS and
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Kervasdoué from the DH. This internalised policy-making even excluded the technical 
services of the CNAMTS led by Coudreau and the DB who placed its trust in Naouri and 
Bérégovoy. ‘It [the global budget] was done by Naouri, ... me [Kervasdoué], and 
Marmot. Fullstop. Three people.’ '^”*
These three dominant protagonists were divided over the extent to which they 
should associate bottom-up managerial changes with the implementation of the global 
b u d g e t . I n  keeping with the conclusions of the DH report, Kervasdoué stressed the 
necessity to introduce new managerial systems within public hospitals. He was opposed 
by Marmot who was keen to impose merely budgetary and accounting procedures. The 
head of the DSS argued that the introduction of cost centres and devolved budgetary 
negotiations within public hospitals over-estimated both the computer services at the 
disposal of hospital directors and their knowledge of the internal distribution of budgets. 
He promoted no counter proposals, but saw the propositions for managerial change as 
unrealistic, claiming that ‘in any case, this is not what happens in hospitals, we're going 
therefore to do a budget... well see [for the rest].’'^ ^
The deciding vote fell to Naouri who neither supported nor opposed the 
introduction of new managerial procedures. His primary concern was to impose a 
restrictive global budget which did not enable hospital spending to rise out of control. 
Once he ensured that the departmental budget was fixed and controlled by the central 
administration and that the conditions surrounding the revision of the global budget were 
set in the vaguest of terms, Naouri was not at all concerned to block the managerial 
reforms that Kervasdoué wanted. He considered their inclusion was a necessary means of 
camouflaging the draconian cost-containment measures within the global budget thereby 
making the reform more palatable for hospital directors who had to implement it: ‘I didn't 
believe in i t .... I didn't really believe in that type of thing, but it was put in, I didn't think 
that it was crucial.
A compromise which isolated Marmot was negotiated because Kervasdoué was 
prepared to accept the top-down approach of the global budget as a temporary measure 
before the introduction of Diagnosis-Related-Groups. He further saw the fixed nature of 
the departmental budget as a means of altering the disparities between hospitals and 
between regions. For Marmot, the outcome was, therefore, a global budget that, whilst
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adopting new managerial procedures, imposed a top-down budget upon public hospitals
in the knowledge that the managerial measures would not be borne out in practice:
‘The launch of the global budget necessitated a whole series of technical, 
administrative, accounting and computerisation measures which didn't 
exist. This being the case, they [Naouri and Kervasdoué] put in place a 
mechanism that could not exist, that only existed in their imagination.’ *^^
The decree was made public on 30 May 1983.^ *^  It put in place a top-down budget 
set by departmental Prefects by reference to an average increase in hospital budgets which 
was determined nationally by the government. In other words, the taux directeur was 
retained. Indeed, although budgets could be re-negotiated during the financial year, the 
terms of their renegotiation were no more defined than they were by the National 
Assembly. \^thin public hospitals, the decree confirmed the introduction of individual cost 
centres, centres de responsabilités (CRs), which were to correspond to existing services 
(or future departments) and be led by head doctors. Hospital directors were to devise 
statistical records of the activity of each CR in order to monitor its use of resources. Every 
semester these tables were to provide the basis for an analysis of gaps between results and 
provisions. Externally, social security funds would form local committees, known as 
Commission des 35 after the article of the decree, to monitor hospital spending. However, 
global budgets were not to cover all hospital spending. They excluded long-stay treatment, 
ambulance transport until 1987, and outpatient treatment indefinitely.
The decree signalled the introduction of the global budget in regional hospitals 
fi'om January 1984. The proposed general application of the global budget fi'om 1984 was 
therefore withdrawn. However, the timetable for implementation was far more extensive 
than that proposed by the September 1982 DH report which argued that the global budget 
was best introduced progressively in four regions in 1984, 9 regions in 1985 and 16 
regions in 1986. More importantly, an intervention by Mauroy dictated that the new 
system should not apply to private clinics. Against the background of further disputes with 
hospital doctors* the Prime Minister committed himself to this stance in an open letter on 
29 April 1983.^^
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The Mâcon conditions come home to roost
Until the draft decree was released for consultation at the end of May 1983, the BN 
devoted little time to discussing the global budget. With no opposition within the BN, 
Vincent and the SNCH leadership manoeuvred behind the Mâcon compromise, throwing 
their support behind the global budget whilst p a c in g  the rank-and-file with the conditions 
attached to its implementation. However, the utility of the Mâcon compromise for Vincent 
lessened as the formulation of the draft decree progressed in the spring of 1983: ‘I knew 
that I would have many days ahead criticising the government saying: “Global budget, yes, 
but not like you're proposing... you are not negotiating enough”. O n c e  the draft decree 
was made public, the Vincent leadership was obliged to choose between pacifying the 
rank-and-file or pursuing its modernist agenda.
In fact, Vincent and the SNCH leadership chose to reject the global budget and 
accept the now constraining Mâcon stipulations. The SNCH leadership continued its 
attempts to divorce itself fi'om the cost containment imposed by Bérégovoy. Vincent 
immediately alleged that the decree openly questioned the legitimate management expertise 
of hospital directors. The SNCH leadership questioned the failure of the Naouri-inspired 
global budget to cover all elements of hospital spending, and argued that this move would 
produce a false globalisation of budgets. Equally, it derided the maintenance of references 
to the patient-day rate, the failure to reduce the weight of administrative tasks and the 
absence of inducements for alternative treatments to hospitalisation. Finally, it alleged that 
the ^ obal budget threatened to ‘fi-eeze’ the existing uneven distribution of public hospital 
services, prompting \Hncent to argue that the decree introduced ‘a system that it [SNCH] 
judges to be, at the same time, truncated, reactionary and sacrificing, in the long-term, the 
public hospital service.
This sacrifice was to the interests of private clinics and the CNAMTS, the 
traditional twin evils of the corps. First, the Vincent leadership feared that patients would 
desert public hospitals for private clinics free from the financial constraints of the global 
budget. Second, they argued that, in the overriding concerns to balance the books of the 
CNAMTS, Bérégovoy and Naouri had elevated the CNAMTS to the role of ‘second 
tutelle'* for public hospitals. Indeed, the draft decree invited the CNAMTS to control 
hospital doctors at the level of each cost centre or centre de responsabilité, fuelling fears
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about its influence over medical practice within public hospitals.*^ ®
However, whatever its criticisms, the SNCH had little access to the triumvirate of 
decision-makers dictating the new policy’s progress. Like other hospital directors involved 
in the global budget trials, Vincent was a member of a DH working group created in 
January 1983 to consider the formulation of the global budget. Equally, with Paire and 
Yves Barrot, assistant director at Hôtel-Dieu and the union organiser within the Assistance 
Publique, Vincent met repeatedly with the Bérégovoy cabinet as part of the consultation 
process surrounding the global budget. However, Vincent himself acknowledges that the 
SNCH at this stage was ‘not truly on the inside.Relations with Kervasdoué were 
strained (see above) and Naouri and Bérégovoy had little esteem for the corps of hospital 
directors (see Chapter 4).
In addition, Bérégovoy’s decision to implement the global budget through 
administrative decree closed off the ‘privileged’ policy arena of the Vincent leadership. 
The decree did not return to the National Assembly for approval thereby removing from 
the SNCH its possible veto points via deputies, whose multiple office-holding through the 
cumul des mandats meant they often doubled as mayors (see Chapter Two). The decree 
route weakened the SNCH’s capacity to lobby for changes to the global budget: ‘We didn't 
hold the pen. We held the pen much more, in my opinion,... in laws rather than decrees 
at the time.’^  ^To try and steer the discussion surrounding the global budget back into the 
wider political arena^^  ^Vincent tied the SNCH rejection of the global budget to the alleged 
threat posed by the CNAMTS to the independence of local politicians on the boards of 
trustees within public hospitals. Indeed, the SNCH lobbied members of the National 
Assembly with a letter-writing campaign outlining the financial consequences of the global 
budget decree upon public hospitals.
At the same time, the SNCH jettisoned its confrontational discourse about the 
medical profession, opting instead for the supposed benefits of a ‘local actor’ coalition 
against the Bérégovoy-Naouri rationalization plans. In general, hospital doctor trade 
unions criticised the global budget as a ‘tourniquet’, e q u a t in g  it to no more than the 
previous system of national guidelines and mistrusting its devolution of the management 
of the fmanacial crisis to hospital doctors. The conférences for regional and general 
hospitals, concerned over the speed of the introduction of the global budget, were keen to
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make it clear in public that hospital doctors would not accept the task of rationing health 
care for the central administration/^^ However, the SNCH was unable to drag hospital 
doctors into the policy arena. Despite the rejection of the global budget, the introduction 
of cost centres, centres de responsabilités, run by doctors, was supported by the Vincent 
leadership. More importantly, hospital doctors were preoccupied with the introduction of 
departments, the development of the single statute and the ending of private pay beds. The 
global budget issue did cross over through the question of the boundaries of cost centres 
into the reorganisation of public hospitals. But, even though the contacts with Bérégovoy 
‘were good’:
‘We did not talk a great deal, unfortunately, not enough, about the global 
budget . .. We saw him [Bérégovoy] on two or three occasions, then at the 
time o f ... the strike of the internes... but, unfortunately, we didn't talk 
enough about the global budget’.^®®
In any case, hospital doctors felt that they lacked the reputational resources and expertise
to participate fully in the formulation of the global budget:
‘Financial techniques are so complicated ... we are absolutely not 
competent. And medical trade unions in France have never tried to act as 
a counterweight [to the financiers] because even if we had competent 
people, they would have told us “it is not your problem”.
Thus, despite its pretentions to use the global budget to signal its modernist 
discourse, the Vincent leadership fell back in line with the positions held by the FHF and 
FO. Indeed, FO and the FHF shared the SNCH’s principal reservations about the 
implementation of the ^ obal budget: its top-down determination and vague conditions for 
supplementary budgets, its elevation of the CNAMTS and its deficit, its maintenance of 
billing and, its non-application to private clinics. Essentially then, the SNCH returned to 
the externalist positions defined by Charlotte: for all its changing rhetoric, the union failed 
to influence the final formulation of the global budget. Bérégovoy and his cabinet made 
minor concessions, extending the global budget to include outpatients and long-stay care 
from 1985 and ambulance services fi’om October 1987. However, although the 30 May 
decree was rejected at the second meeting of the consultative Conseil Supérieur des 
Hôpitaux on 4 July 1983,^® sparse account was taken by Bérégovoy of the amendments 
it tabled. Within two weeks of the Conseil Supérieur des Hôpitaux finishing its 
examination of the global budget, the global budget decree was published in the Journal
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Officiel and had passed into the realm of law. It was little different from that presented on 
30 May 1983.^ ^^
CONCLUSIONS
The twists and turns in government thinking about global budgets partly account for the 
SNCH’s own contortions in responding to the idea. Farge had viewed the global budget 
not as a short-term, but as a long-term strategy for savings: he had simply tightened the 
spending limits imposed by the taitx directeur. But, by 1982, the idea of global budgets 
stood at the centre of a number of different conceptions of how to control the apparently 
inexorable growth of public hospitals costs - some emphasizing much shorter term fiscal 
imperatives to curb budget increases, and some focusing on fundamental management and 
accountability reforms inside hospitals. This ambivalence allowed the modernist Vincent 
leadership to edge the union towards accepting the principle of reform on global budget 
lines, and, then, sustain a distant supportive role during the legislative phase of its 
implementation. But, the union leadership took flight at the administrative implementation 
of the project, affronted by their exclusion from decision-making and the all-too-clear 
cutback intentions of the eventual solution, and conscious that they could not anyway hold 
their rank-and-file behind such an outcome. Faced by competition from rival unions, some 
of them better placed to attract the attention of policy-makers, the SNCH leadership saw 
insufficient basis for anything, but outright opposition to the decree, and were unmoved 
by the still symbolic concessions to managerial reform which it included.
The SNCH’s volte face on global budgets, switching from pioneering support to 
fierce denunciation, highlights the extraordinary difficulties of changing its conventional 
‘externalist’ strategy, and achieving the rebalancing of professional/managerial and trade 
union orientations upon which Vincent had set his policy. The modernists in the union 
leadership needed a stable commitment from government to expanding the hospital 
directors’ role before they could hope to persuade their membership to accept potentially 
disruptive reforms with an eye to the corps^  long-term future. But, in the crisis conditions 
of 1982-3, the government itself could not commit to any coherent strategy for rebuilding 
policy networks. Its immediate cutback imperatives were bound to predominate, but they
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were additionally reinforced by the scepticism of the trio of key policy-makers about the 
hospital directors’ capacity to implement meaningful changes.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE PUSH FOR ORGANISATIONAL REFORM: DEPARTMENTS WITHIN 
PUBLIC HOSPITALS AND THE POSITION OF HOSPITAL DIRECTORS
The introduction of departments aimed to redesign the operating core of public hospitals, 
whose structures previously enshrined clinical autonomy in medical services headed by 
head doctors appointed for life. The language of departments attacked the economic and 
professional inefficiencies induced by the fragmentation of hospitals into disparate services 
which channelled responsibilities to heads of services and complicated responsibility for 
the overall treatment of patients. Instead, departments would replace services with larger 
and more integrated structures, varying from wider coordination between services to the 
fusion of services within a common budgetary, medical and administrative hierarchy. 
Equally, they would increase participation in decision-making, offering opportunities for 
junior doctors experiencing a promotion bottleneck due to the expansion of the medical 
population and the life-long appointments and responsibilities of heads of services.^ Junior 
doctors had been obliged to create their own services to advance their career, heightening 
the organisational fragmentation of public hospitals.
The concept of departments undermined the fundamental bargains of the state- 
profession compromise in France, attacking both the entrenched positions of head doctors 
and the established boundaries between medical and administrative domains. It challenged 
medical self-regulation, abandoned the principle of beds as the primary organisational 
principle, and threw doubt on established positions. This chapter analyses the SNCH’s 
evolving strategy throughout the introduction of departments, which cannot be divorced 
from Vincent’s demands for improved pay and conditions for hospital directors. Indeed, 
the Macon strategy depended upon its capacity to deliver pecuniary benefits for the rank- 
and-file at the same time as it delivered managerial reform for the leadership. The first 
section examines the SNCH’s initial positions on the crisis in government-medical 
relations induced by Ralite's management of departments. The second investigates Hervé’s 
attempts to quell this evolving crisis and the SNCH’s refusal to engage in a public defence 
of departments. The third section examines the continued failure of the PS government
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to advance the implementation of departments in public hospitals and the rupture of its 
relations with the SNCH. The Vincent leadership’s strategy came to focus more and more 
on demands for improved pay and conditions for hospital directors. The final section 
analyses the return to office by the Right under Chirac and its reversion to medical 
services, at the same time as the SNCH reaped the statutory rewards of its Macon 
strategy.
6.1 THE LEFT GOVERNMENT* S CONFRONTATION 
WITH THE DOCTORS
The SNCH came out in support of departments at Macon at the same time as it endorsed 
the global budget.^ Within its newly-entrenched modernist leadership. Paire, Vincent's 
lieutenant, sponsored the reorganisation of public hospitals in fi'ont of conference, tapping 
the support of Grenoble 80 for such a move.^ The hospital doctor trade union subscribed 
to the off-quoted benefits of departments, such as increased participation, improved 
efficiency and patient care.^ It held services responsible for the fragmentation of public 
hospitals and condemned the monopoly leadership of heads of services as a barrier to the 
expression of demands by junior doctors.^ However, their conference held that moves to 
departments were acceptable only if their implementation was founded upon a pre- 
established consensus within hospitals, with no externally imposed change or alienation 
of hospital doctors. Throughout, the autonomy of hospitals was to be maintained, 
ensuring local discretion and warding off attacks on medical teams and their 
responsibilities.^
In the SNCH leadership, the endorsement of departments was overshadowed by 
\%icent's decision to use the global budget to launch his presidency. The SNCH was not 
the lead sponsor of departments, first mooted in 1967 and provided for in a vague 
legislative framework in May 1976.  ^In June 1980, the Barre government even went as 
far as to commission a report on the introduction of departments from Dr. Gallois, the 
designer of departments at Macon general hospital.* The FHF and most hospital doctor 
trade unions were in favour of some reform of services, with even the conservative 
Solidarité Médicale supporting ‘horizontal’ divisions in public hospitals.^ Within the PS, 
Sœité et Socialisme, whose ideology revolved around a strong attack on the medical elite
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in regional teaching hospitals, the mandarinat^  lobbied for departments, pushing the
reform onto the 110 Propositions of Mitterrand; a measure confirmed by Ralite both in
early October 1981 and the 1982 Health Charter.
After losing the Health Ministry to Ralite, members of Santé et Socialisme moved
into key positions within the DH and behind Questiaux (not least Kervasdoué at the DH
and Cohen-Solal at the Ministry of Social Affairs).” They profited from a division of
labour which saw Ralite front the introduction of departments, but leave the progress of
the dossier to be monitored by the DH as Ralite’s cabinet immersed itself in the Health
Charter. Underscoring the opposition between Ralite and Kervasdoué, Jacques Latrille,
Ralite's directeur du cabinet argues that the development of departments was the work
of members of Santé et Socialisme and the PS Health Commission within the DH:
‘This project, it was truly drawn up ... outside the cabinet. I was the only 
one [within the cabinet  ^ to go from time to time to seek information, to 
say things, but we let them get on with it’.*^
For the PS, departments shadowed its broader commitments to self-management in the
workplace through the dilution of the hierarchical authority of head doctors. Equally, like
the SNCH, it accepted the wider discourse of the ineflScient use of resources and
fragmented patient care produced by the organisation of over-specialised services.
However, despite the best intentions of Santé et Socialisme, the PS did not arrive in office
in 1981 with an established conception of what departments should be like.”
In fact, the widespread acceptance of departments in principle belied the absence
of an accepted model of departments. Organisational reform exposed the cleavages within
the established hospital community because it endangered established interests,
particularly within the medical profession. A number of secondary cleavages developed,
such as the role of the different units within departments, personnel participation,
appointment procedures and the voluntary acceptance or not of departmentalisation. But,
two principal cleavages essentially structured the configuration of interests. First, those
supporting wider co-ordination between services clashed with those wishing to introduce
new medical and administrative structures. Second, those supporting structural
reorganisation were divided into those supporting a ‘parliamentary’ department focused
on a departmental council, and those supporting a ‘presidential’ department revolving
around the managerial demands of a head doctor.”
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In early March 1982, the DH built upon the December 1981 consultation groups, 
by assembling a consultative commission to report on the development of departments 
within public hospitals/^ Led by Professor Hirsch, the commission involved 25 individuals, 
of whom approximately half were hospital doctors, including such luminaries as Professor 
Escat, president of the national conférence of chairs of hospital medical commissions in 
regional teaching hospitals. Its report concluded that to retain the hospital doctors’ 
allegiance for change, the government should set no strictly defined norms, thereby 
allowing public hospitals to remain ‘masters’ of the implementation process. Hirsch and 
his colleagues stressed the reticence in hospitals towards departments and the concurrent 
obligation to undertake a significant process of consultation and explanation of the 
reform.^* However, the working group did not agree with the super-head of department 
concept and instead advocated either an elected directorate of hospital doctors or a 
departmental council headed by no more than a medical coordinator.^® Nevertheless, as 
the Hirsch Commission began its deliberations, strikes against changes to the private 
sector rights and the terms and conditions of hospital doctors hit public hospitals. 
Departmentalisation was not divorced from these issues and became caught up in the 
wider strike movements (see Chapter 5). In September 1982, somewhat prematurely, 
hospital doctors began four days of strikes against departments and the introduction of 
a single statute for hospital doctors.
In fact, Ralite fanned the flames of medical opposition with the release of a draft 
decree on 27 October 1982 which ignored the findings of the Hirsch Commission.^^ 
Rather, Ralite drew inspiration from a 1982 report on hospital organisation (by Fuillet, 
Rebuftel and Escarguel) which proposed the participation of personnel in the management 
of services as a means of putting an end to the monopoly of control exercised by the 
medical profession and the administration.^^ Ralite’s proposals went against the Hirsch 
Commission views in several ways. First, his decree imposed a uniform model of 
departments which left little room for local discretion (see Table 6.1). Although Ralite had 
earlier intimated that trials would take place and that departments would be based upon 
the initiatives of local doctors,^ hospitals were expected to formulate plans for 
departmentalisation by October 1983. Second, Ralite opted for a presidential structure 
which concentrated responsibility for running a department in the hands of its head, rather
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than its ‘parliament’, the conseil de département. More importantly, Ralite broke two 
established rules of medical organisation, those of self-regulation and appointment through 
co-optation. The decree advocated that head doctors should be elected by an electoral 
college which gave three-quarters representation to doctors, but also involved non­
medical staff with 12.5 percent of the votes. Even heads of functional units which made 
up the department were to be designated by the departmental council, which involved 
non-medical personnel.
Table 6.1: The Shock Wave - The Draft Decree October 1982^ *^
Organisation Two-tier departments, with between 5 and 20 doctors divided into functional 
units.
Head of Departments Head of departments to be full-time doctors with minimum of five years 
tenure. The head of department allocates resources in department (with help 
of head nurse of his choice) and oversees the meeting of budgetary and 
medical targets, with all departments engaging in permanent evaluation. He 
presents an armual report to the chair of the hospital medical commission.
Functional Units Units headed by a doctor designated by the departmental council for four 
years. Ptesent heads of service would by right be heads of units. Size of Units 
decided by Board of Trustees upon proposal of Departmental Council and 
opinion of hospital medical commission.
Departmental Council The departmental council comprised of the head of department (chair by 
right), three full-time doctors, a representative of other doctors, 2 
representatives of non-medical staff. Departmental council designates heads 
of functional units.
Head Nurse Helps in management of department, responsible for nursing care; 
consultative voice in departmental council.
With the release of the draft decree, Ralite appeared to usurp the DH and its prior 
consultations with hospital doctors. Indeed, the mismanagement of the decree’s release 
reinforced the mobilisation of hospital doctors against Ralite, already hampered by his 
communist affiliation and the over-play of reforms (See Chapter 5). Professor Escat led 
the doctors’ claims of pseudo-consultation, arguing that Ralite did not wait for the 
publication of the ffirsch working group report in early November 1982.^  ^His charge was 
echoed by hospital doctor trade unions including Solidarité Médicale and the conférence 
for general hospitals.^^ In his defence, Ralite claimed that, on 28 October 1982, the 
cabinet met with the conférence and ran through all the details of the draft decree.^^
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However, the row spread to the Health Ministry, with the DH keen to avoid blame for the 
emerging debacle.^* With one misjudgment of the climate of government-medical 
profession relations, departments became an over-riding symbolic issue for hospital 
doctors, exploiting its connections with other reforms. Debré, leader of Solidarité 
Médicale, soon exploited the propaganda that cleaners were to elect head doctors.^^
Distracted by the introduction of the global budget, the SNCH did no more than 
keep a watchful eye on the progress of departmentalisation. The Ralite decree ignored the 
conditions which the union laid down at Macon. However, hospital doctors, in tacit 
alliance with the SNCH, were voicing concerns which matched those of Vincent and his 
BN. The SNCH had few channels of influence within the Ralite cabinet and the team 
surrounding Kervasdoué at the DH (see Chapter 5), and hospital directors were an 
insignificant minority within the Hirsch commission, with no leading SNCH activists on 
the commission. Throughout the summer of 1982, the SNCH attended consultation 
meetings, but was crowded out there by the massed ranks of hospital doctors. Thus, the 
Vincent leadership left hospital doctors to impose conditions on the government, and the 
union only made responsible noises on the sidelines as befits the nascent partners of the 
Mauroy government. The SNCH tacitly conceded that the medical profession must be lead 
negotiators on the departmental dossier.
By early February 1983, a revised decree dated 10 January 1983 was in circulation 
as Ralite attempted to backtrack on his October debacle.The revised decree went some 
way to answering the general demands of hospital doctors who sought the removal of 
non-medical participation in the election of heads of departments and delays to the January 
1984 deadline for implementation.^^ The decree created more areas of discretion in the 
implementation of departments, making no reference to either the implementation date of 
January 1984 nor the maximum and minimum number of doctors involved in one 
department. In addition, head doctors were to be elected for four years by the 
departmental council, which itself was elected according to distinct colleges thus ensuring 
that doctors on council remained elected by peers. Equally, doctors were ensured a 
majority in the council, thereby reducing the weight of non-medical stafif in the election 
of head doctors. But, in addition, Ralite did not fail to offer concessions to other hospital 
personnel. He made overtones to the hospital directors as he placed all departments under
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their authority and gave them the formal power to appoint head nurses on proposition of 
the council/^
However, the divisions between hospital doctors negated Ralite’s advances as he 
set about staving off the complaints of a profession divided between those who likened 
departments to the ‘soviétisation’ of hospitals and the ‘ideology’ of the mass extinction 
of intellectuals in Cambodia '^ ,^ through to those who saw it as the transformation of 
doctors into ‘little shivering civil servants’^  ^and on to those who accepted departments 
without compromise but contested their very organisation.^® The Left was not without its 
allies. One was the Intersyndicale Derenne, classified as close to the Mauroy government, 
created in November 1983 and led by the left-wing stalwart. Professor Derenne.^^ Yet, the 
most pro-departments stance came from the INMH or the Intersyndicale du 12 février 
led by Francis Peigné. Indeed, Ralite, speaking on 18 February 1983, mirrored the 
demands of the Peigné Intersyndicale.^* However, there was no way back for Ralite from 
the release of the draft decree in October 1982. Even the Economic and Social Council 
argued that it was not possible to undertake a rapid and generalised application of 
departments.^^ As strikes by doctors progressed, Ralite was finally moved on 24 March 
1983 fi'om Health to make way for Edmond Hervé, a PS stalwart, mayor of Rennes and 
Junior Minister for Health in the first Mauroy government before the June 1981 legislative 
elections. For the SNCH leadership, Hervé’s arrival presented new opportunities.
6.2 NEGOTIATIONS OF A COMPROMISE
The removal of Ralite ended the conflict between the DH and the cabinet, and gave the 
circle of Santé et Socialisme renewed influence over policy formulation. Although a junior 
minister, Hervé and his cabinet were left by Bérégovoy to manage the introduction of 
departments, with the support of the DH. However, Hervé did have to contend with 
sporadic interventions from both Mauroy and Mitterrand, although the introduction of 
departments was not a primary concern of the Mauroy government.'*® These interventions 
were provoked both by the Elysée’s and Matignon’s frustrations with Ralite’s activism 
and, by the need to placate hospital doctors who exploited their personal networks and 
reputational power (particularly at the Elysée) to usher in policy change.
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Strikes persisted throughout the spring with departments forming only one of the 
bones of contention between the Mauroy government and hospital doctors/^ However, 
Hervé unilaterally declared a six month ‘ceasefire’ from March to September 1983/^ He 
aimed to adopt a more consensual approach to negotiations than Ralite, ‘to negotiate, to 
convince rather than to constrain .O n  28 April 1983, Hervé and Kervasdoué met with 
the conférences with the hope of reviving consultation between hospital doctors and the 
government.'*  ^Underpinning these steps, Matignon and the Elysée intervened to accelerate 
the moves towards deflating the crisis. In an open letter, read at the Assisses Nationales 
de la Santé on 29 April 1983, Mauroy made propositions to ameliorate the situation, 
while Mitterrand took the initiative of appointing a team of well-reputed hospital doctors, 
ihQ Médiateurs, to unblock the growing confrontation with hospital doctors.^^
From the end of May 1983, Hervé undertook a series of conciliatory steps towards 
hospital doctors. He abandoned Ralite's January 1984 implementation deadline, reassured 
hospital doctors over medical representation within departments and tampered with the 
procedures surrounding the appointment and responsibilities of head doctors. His note 
d’orientation on 24 May suggested that heads of departments should be appointed by 
hospital directors after being proposed solely by doctors within the department, thereby 
responding to the concerns to maintain medical self-regulation. Equally, it proposed that 
departmental councils should be composed solely of doctors and nursing personnel. 
Finally, the conception of a super-mandarin was diluted as heads of department were to 
have organisational responsibilities, but no direct medical authority over other doctors '*^ 
In seeking to repair the collapse of relations under the stewardship of Ralite, Hervé 
quickly moved to isolate the conférences and elite hospital doctors who were initially 
reinstated by the Elysée and courted by the Junior Minister. Their opposition to 
departments, as they hid behind a technical apolitical discourse, obliged Hervé to seek or 
construct other partners '*^ The measures endorsed by Hervé at the end of May were 
designed to fi*agment opposition to departments by divorcing those unions on the fiinges 
of departments from those preaching total rejection. The pivotal interlocutors of the 
Ministry became people such as Peigné, Derenne and the leader of doctors in general 
hospitals, Gatelmand, at the head of the emerging hospital doctor trade union movement. 
Most importantly, Hervé started to elevate the concerns of moderate trade unions.
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particularly Peigné, above other interlocutors. Thus, the Junior Minister followed the path 
already briefly sketched out by Ralite.
However, the Mauroy government could not rest easy on departments because its 
other hospital reforms, particularly the single statute for doctors and the global budget, 
rested upon departmentalisation. After responding to the confused demands of the medical 
profession, Hervé tested the water on 18 August 1983 with the release of a Bill 
introducing departments and cleaning up a number of articles of the 1970 Hospital Law. 
(The renovation of hospital planning promised to the SNCH was quietly dropped). This 
Bill, published six days after the global budget decree, introduced departments as the basic 
unit of medical organisation within public hospitals. However, reflecting the uncertainty 
o f the medical reaction, it did no more than sketch out the basic parameters of future 
hospital departments, ‘a little like a return to the Fourth Republic: a very loose law, 
leaving all latitude to the Minister to take decisions by statutory m e a n s .Hervé employed 
the tactical advantage of administrative decrees to delay opposition to departments whilst 
obtaining the legitimacy derived from parliamentary approval. In contrast, Ralite had taken 
the opposite approach, unwisely beginning the moves towards departments with the 
release of a draft decree.
The SNCH and Article Two
With the appointment of Hervé, the SNCH leadership acquired ‘privileged’ channels of 
access to the Health Ministry: Coz knew the Junior Minister for Health and Louis Rolland 
was a personal ftiend from his days at University. Merhle, who remained in the cabinet, 
was brought back into the heart of policy discussions after his isolation under Ralite; as 
a member of the PS, he was no longer treated with suspicion.'*  ^However, throughout 
Hervé's protacted negotiations, the Vincent leadership did no more than maintain its 
conditional support for departments, calling for an extended implementation period in 
which to undertake trials and cultivate grassroots support for organisational change within 
hospitals. Typically, with the publication of the Bill, the union welcomed departments, 
but insisted that the final approval of local plans to introduce departments be left to 
hospital Boards of Trustees. Such conservative positions were coupled with whatever 
actions seemed necessary to ensure the legitimate place of directors within future
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departmental structures (see Table 6.2). Defending its managerial prerogatives, the SNCH 
was concerned that departments be placed within the wider framework of the global 
budget, the setting of medical objectives and improved participation within public 
hospitals. The union leadership had no wish to witness the replacement of fragmented 
heads of service with either ‘super-chefs’ endowed with electoral legitimacy at the head 
of reinforced medical strongholds with their own departmental budgets or, the creation 
of an uncoordinated régime d'assemblées characterised by departmental councils with 
extensive controls over budgetary and personnel management.
Table 6.2: The SNCH and its safeguards
Department No imposed model but departments à la carte
Departmental Heads To be no more than coordinators
Heads of UFs Hospital directors or Boards of Trustees to have roles in their 
appointment
Departmental Councils To have no extended powers which would lead to a régime 
d’assemblées'
Hospital directors To preside over the Departmental Commission which formulates 
reorganisation in hospitals
Staff Nurses To be appointed alongside each head of department by hospital 
directors
Over one third of the membership of the SNCH’s national executive, the BN, was 
against an endorsement of departments precisely because they felt that it was a no-win 
issue for hospital directors. Enthusiastic supporters of departments, like Paire and Coz, 
were relatively isolated. Within the corps, departments were widely considered to be 
neither a primary nor a legitimate concern of hospital directors. Even within the BN, 
directors were wary of stepping outside the traditional boundaries of hospital 
management: ‘as though.. we were going to touch something that would light the powder 
keg.’^  Although Vincent was a supporter of departments, he questioned the wisdom of 
the SNCH contesting medical opposition to organisational change within public hospitals. 
He was not prepared to enter into conflict with the medical profession when the outcome 
of the reform process was far from certain: ‘The beliefs of hospital doctors are not ready
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[for departments], we are not going to go to war against hospital doctors, we are not
going to tackle them head-on.’”
However, Vincent was prepared to engage in sporadic skirmishes with hospital
doctors in the hope of raising the morale of the rank-and-file. In discussions of the Hervé
Bill, he elevated into a cause célèbre Article Two which gave hospital directors formal
authority over all hospital personnel including hospital doctors. The precedent for such
a clause existed in the authority of the general director of the Assistance Publique,
although its inclusion within the Bill owed much to the lobbying of Vincent and the SNCH
leadership.”  As far back as 19 November 1982, at a meeting with Ralite's directeur du
cabinet, Vincent reportedly convinced the ministry that the decentralisation of managerial
responsibilities inherent within departmentalisation necessitated the confirmation of ‘a
single line of command within hospitals.This elevation of Article Two answered the
short-term failings of the Macon strategy. Although in the autumn of 1983 Vincent could
point to the beginning of negotiations to merge the Fourth and Fifth Classes,^* the absence
of direct pecuniary gains since Macon led Vincent to still believe that he:
‘needed something showy. In the absence of being able to give money to 
hospital directors, it was necessary that I showed them that they were 
becoming more important, that their power was increasing. ... It's all 
symbols, every profession needs its symbols’.”
Through the consultation surrounding the Bill, the SNCH repeated its standard
attacks on alleged incursions into the managerial fi-eedom of public hospitals by the
departmental health boards, the DDASS, and local prefects, denouncing any top-down
controls upon public hospitals under the guise o f ‘tidying up’ the 1970 Hospital Law.^
Both Vincent and the rest of the BN were aware that Article Two would have little
influence upon the day-to-day running of hospitals:
‘a single ‘boss’ in the hospital: it was very theoretical. I always said, even 
at the time, that those who have the powers will keep them and those who 
haven't got any ... will never have any’.^ ^
Article Two neither specifed in what areas of medical decision-making hospital directors
would ‘outrank’ hospital doctors nor answered the question of possible areas of
opposition between hospital directors and future heads of departments. However,
maximising the symbolic resonance of Article Two, the Vincent leadership demanded the
replacement in it of the words ‘authority over’ with a new phrase giving directors
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‘hierarchical power over’ hospital personnel.
The wrath of hospital doctors was duly unleashed upon the corps of hospital
directors as a broad medical coalition, ranging from Yves Rochet, the newly-appointed
chair of the conférence des présidents des CMCs des CHUs, through to Garbay, Derenne
and Peigné, attacked any extension of the authority of hospital directors.^^ This coalition
objected to the encroachment of Article Two into the sacrosanct boundaries of clinical
freedom which they alleged would devalue medical expertise and raise unnecessary ethical
questions.^ The Syndicat Garbay wrote to Mitterrand in an attempt to draw the Elysée
into the fray.®^  However, in reply, the Vincent leadership stressed that it was asking simply
for the generalisation across France of the formal authority exercised, with little
complaint, by the general director of the Assistance Publique.^ The union continued to
argue that no organisation, whether public or private, could function efficiently while
certain personnel remained outside the authority of its management. Upping the stakes in
an open letter to the Elysée, Vincent portrayed directors as defenders of the general
interest against the individualistic self-interest of the medical profession:
‘Such a measure [Article Two] would considerably aid hospital directors 
in the search for improved management. Hospital doctors still too often 
adopt, in fact, independent behaviour, respecting neither the objectives, 
the organisation nor the means of the institution’.^ ^
As the SNCH put it, the Mauroy government could not control public hospital spending
if hospital directors were not given the legal authority necessary to assert their
predominance over hospital doctors.
However, the Elysée and Matignon feared fuelling medical discontent by
maintaining Article Two within the Hervé Bill. And hospital doctors ensured its rejection
by the consultative body, the Conseil Supérieur des Hôpitaux, at the beginning of
September 1983.^ * Shortly after this meeting, hoping to quell medical discontent, Hervé
backtracked, declaring that the end of the clause was mistakenly deleted before its release
for consultation. The clause should have read that hospital directors exercised formal
authority over hospital doctors, but only outside the confines of clinical autonomy.^® This
ommission permitted Hervé to satisfy the socialist group within the National Assembly
which, on 10 October, refused to withdraw the clause, arguing that it was wrong to
‘quibble about this sentence and ask hospital directors at the same time to act like heads
of business leading team s.H ow ever, the Elysée and Matignon summoned Professor
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Raymond Villey, chairperson of the professional body, the Ordre des Médecins, to 
intervene. He came up with an agreement that later was put to the Senate and accepted. 
This agreement simply clarified that the authority of directors had no bearing on the 
medical issues surrounding the treatment of patients; it was ‘rubber-stamped’ by both 
Vincent and Peigné.
With the passing of the Bill through the National Assembly, Vincent was again 
happy to engage in timely contests with hospital doctors. He identified the SNCH once 
more as the willing agents of central government hampered by the outdated management 
systems of public administration. The compromise thrashed out with Peigné left Vincent 
able to declare to his members that ‘it was our thesis that won out, thanks to the support 
of the Minister of Health, the National Assembly and the Senate.H ow ever, the BN 
refused to engage in overt support for departments, preferring to remain on the sidelines 
until the final negotiations between Hervé and hospital doctors. This conditional 
acceptance of organisational reform betrayed the weakness of the Vincent leadership’s 
strategy. Its pragmatic endorsement of departments clashed with its willingness to do 
battle over the symbolic issue of the preserved domain of medical self-regulation. Yet, 
Article Two failed to placate the growing demands of the SNCH rank-and-file for 
pecuniary improvements.
Hervé jumps in the deep end
The cursory diversion towards Article Two did little to ease the implementation of 
departments. The January 1984 Law enshrined no more than the skeleton of departments, 
leaving the administrative decree still to be negotiated. Hervé released another draft 
decree for consultation on 1 March 1984, hoping finally to publish the decree at the end 
of June. The text confirmed the removal of the major stumbling block under Ralite which 
was the election of heads of departments by hospital personnel (see Table 6.3).^  ^
However, it returned to the presidential model of departments from which Hervé had 
recoiled in the spring of 1983. He now argued that heads of department had to be 
bolstered in order to counterbalance the influence of hospital directors. The new heads 
of departments were not only to nominate heads of functional units, but also to define 
medical objectives, allocate resources and contribute to budgetary discussions within
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hospitals.
Such inconsistencies brought immediate criticisms from hospital doctor trade 
unions who feared that the creation of super-mandarins would blur the individual 
responsibility of doctors and confer excessive control over departmental councils and 
functional units to head doctors.Derenne, one of the Left’s supporters, expressed his 
federation's preference for a parliamentary department, arguing that ‘the text of 01 March 
1984 left no solution to the head of department other than to be an autocrat... or a lazy 
king ’76 criticisms were matched by concerns over the length of the mandate for the 
heads of department and the election of councils by the use of the list system. Doctors 
argued that lists would introduce personnel trade unions into the privileged technical and 
professional domain of medical self-regulation. Hospital doctors demanded control of the 
implementation of departments, aiming to form the majority of the commissions de 
départementalisation which were to determine the re-organisation of hospitals at the 
grassroots.^
Table 6.3: Hervé's presidential departments
Heads of Departments to be full-time doctors, elected for four years. Power to nominate heads of 
functional units, to define medical objectives, to allocate resources. Participates in wider budgetaiy 
discussions within hospitals._______________________________________________________
Dq>artmental Conned, elected by electoral colleges with a majority of seats attributed to doctors, to advise 
heads of departments. Conned to have a purely consultative role.____________________________
Departments based upon functional units the size of existing services.
Departmental Commissions, with majority representation to doctors, to devise local plans to introduce 
departments.___________________________________________________________________
However, after further consultation,^* Hervé brokered a series of compromises 
which appeared to lay the foundations for an acceptable decree. The Ministry released a 
revised decree on 4 May, accompanied three days later by the first Guide de la 
Départementalisation?  ^The revised decree maintained the managerial responsibilities of 
future heads, but ensured that these were to be exercised ‘on the proposal’ of 
departmental councils, with the responsibilities of heads of fiinctional units fixed by decree 
rather than left to the discretion of heads of departments. This revision responded to the 
likes of Derenne and Peigné. Equally, though, to pacify the criticisms of existing heads of
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services, Hervé conceded that they could become heads of functional units for life. Finally, 
the members of the commissions de départementalisation were to be elected not 
appointed thereby warding off medical concerns over the composition of local 
commissions.*®
Thus, Hervé continued to downgrade the influence of the conférences whilst 
elevating left-wing and pro-departments supporters within the fragmented hospital doctor 
trade union movement. The backbone of this support were the federations led by Derenne 
and, more especially. Peigné, who both believed that there was finally a workable decree 
in place. *^ However, the support of Derenne fluctuated as he demanded the installation 
of a ‘parliamentary’ department once the decree neared its completion.*^ The INMH was 
racked by internal divisions which weakened Peigné, although he remained ‘a faithful ally 
right until the end, against winds and tides’.*^  Although the INMH made minor procedural 
criticisms of the decree, its internal fragmentation, particularly between doctors in regional 
and general hospitals, prevented it fi’om formulating an official position on the 
introduction of departments.*'  ^Indeed, its largest member, the Syndicat Garbay, walked 
out of consultations with Hervé in protest at departmentalisation.*^
Despite further rounds of consultation held by Hervé, the final version of his 
decree differed little fi’om that of early May.*  ^After passing relatively unscathed through 
the Conseil Svpérieur des Hôpitaux on 20 June, Hervé's decree arrived at the end of the 
month in the office of Mauroy for his final signature.*  ^Hervé appeared to have quelled the 
crisis cultivated by Ralite and at least advanced beyond the issue of the decree to the 
process of its implementation in public hospitals. He did so through concessions over 
medical appointments, but also by cultivating the demands of Peigné and his supporters.
The SNCH responds to its grassroots
Through the first half of 1984, the Vincent leadership did not deviate fi’om its cautious 
defence of departments and the prerogatives of the corps. In response to the March 
decree, it lobbied for minimal coordinating roles for heads of departments and asserted the 
position of the nursing manager within departments. Indeed, it claimed the ‘natural’ role 
for directors both in the'appointment of nursing managers and heads of functional units 
and, as chair of the departmental commissions designed to implement the organisational
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changes.** True to its cautious stance, the Vincent leadership couched these demands in 
terms of the defence of the autonomy of hospitals and even that of the medical hierarchy.*  ^
However, territorial clashes still erupted as hospital doctors contested the revision through 
departments of the division of labour between hospital directors and doctors.^ 
Unfortunately, these territorial clashes dragged the SNCH into a public row with Peigné 
and the INMH who rebuffed the demands of hospital directors to chair departmental 
commissions and exercise a nominal role in the appointment of the heads of functional 
units.^^
As with his opposition to Article Two, Peigné exploited his support of 
departments to bolster his negotiating stance, threatening to withdraw from consultation 
if Hervé bowed to the SNCH demands. Such conflicts revealed the SNCH’s weakness in 
the negotiations surrounding departments. Conceding to SNCH demands would have 
required Hervé to work against the interests of hospital doctor trade unions which he had 
assidiously elevated in negotiations, and this vdthout a concrete commitment to the 
implementation of departments by the SNCH More importantly, Hervé and his cabinet 
considered that the corps lacked legitimacy and ‘quite simply, they did not have the 
weight’.In stead , he wished to create a counterweight within hospitals to offset any 
administrative hierarchy. This view was supported by Bérégovoy who sought to 
modernise the training and expertise of hospital directors (see Chapter 4). Indeed, 
Bérégovoy wanted to create a general advisory board on hospital management, the 
Conseil Général des Hôpitaux (CGH), as a final resting place for those general directors 
whom he wanted to replace, pleading to Mitterrand that ‘it is impossible for me to move 
the directors of regional hospitals for lack of outlets.
The prospect of a CGH surfaced during negotiations to revise the corp^ terms and 
conditions as the Mauroy government undertook a general reform of the working 
conditions of the civil service.^ "^  The SNCH approved the development of the Conseil 
because it promised to increase both the reputational resources of the corps and to 
provide extra posts at its summit. However, meeting with Hervé and his cabinet on 7 
March 1984, one week after the release of the March draft decree on departments, 
Vincent and a SNCH delegation were quick to label Hervé’s proposals to enlarge the First 
and Second classes and to evaluate the head directors of the regional hospitals every five
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years as a mere ‘réformette’.^  ^Indeed, Vincent and his Macon strategy faced mounting 
pressures to deliver pecuniary gains, particularly from directors within the Third Class, 
whose careers were stalled by the bottleneck created by the expansion of the assistcmat 
and subsequent moves to cost containment. The skirmish provoked by Article Two could 
in the long-run do little to convince the rank-and-file of the utility of the Macon strategy. 
However, the Vincent leadership did derive some advantage from the fact that the merger 
of the Fourth and Fifth classes finally appeared to have negotiated the obstacles posed by 
the Finance Ministry.
In fact, the conclusion of the negotiations with Hervé was far from near. When 
meeting with Hervé, the Vincent delegation had no validated negotiating stance with 
which to counter the minister’s proposals. The BN delegated Coz and Paire to report on 
the measures required to prevent hospital directors being denied promotion opportunities. 
At a meeting at the end of March 1984, the union’s forum for regional and departmental 
delegates, the Conseil National, put back its discussion of the counter-proposals 
emanating from the BN until its meeting on 15 May at the annual conference at Angers 
(see Table 6.4).^ At the second meeting with Hervé on 28 March, the DH and Merhle set 
a timetable for future negotiations which loosely called for a third meeting of discussions 
before the summer, once a synthesis of government proposals had been sent to hospital 
director trade unions. However, the SNCH was still able to lead the way because its 
electoral partners, the CGT and the CFDT had similar proposals to the SNCH, and they 
united behind Vincent's call for a complete overhaul of the terms and conditions of 
hospital directors rather than any piecemeal measures. Meanwhile FO, happy to support 
Vincent’s calls for a revision of terms and conditions, had no definite project to put 
forward at the meeting.®^
Table 6.4; The Principal Themes Developed hy the BN98
Division of the corps into two classes with improved classification of existing posts. 
Maintenance of the existing appointment process.
Fine-tuning of access to ENSP and rules governing the entry of other civil servants into the 
corps.
Introduction of sabbatical leave for hospital directors.
Improved access to other corps, in particular, IGAS.
Creation of a General Inspection of Hospitals.
Improved conditions for assistant directors within the framework of friture reform of their 
training.______________________________________________________________
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However, the prospect of drawn out negotiations against the short-term failure of 
the Macon strategy led Grenoble 80 to rally behind calls for strike action at the 1984 
conference (see Chapter 4).^ Vincent acknowledged that hospital directors felt cheated 
over the global budget. From the rostrum he praised the hospital directors’ victory in 
the fight for Article Two of the 1984 Hospital Law. However, rank-and-file support for 
the Macon strategy was being undermined by the stringent controls imposed on hospital 
budgets by Bérégovoy - notably limited national guidelines for global budgets, tame 
directeurs, for 1984 and 1985 and constraints on investment in hospitals by the Social 
Security fimds in 1984. Bérégovoy vaunted his intention to use the stringent controls to 
force hospital directors to improve efficiency and management techniques, ushering in a 
budgetary policy based upon the redeployment of existing resources (see Chapter 4). In 
response to attacks on his budgetary policy, he merely concluded that directors were 
unhappy to have to undertake managerial tasks.
The breakdown of its relations with the Mauroy government loomed up because 
the SNCH, ‘a trade union which up until now had so associated itself with the building site 
of reforms since 1981,’ opposed the Bérégovoy-inspired budgetary policy.*®^  The Vincent 
leadership progressively entwined its management of departments with its negotiations for 
a revised statute for hospital directors. It concluded that hospital directors were not 
reaping the expected rewards fi'om their loyalty to reform policies, and now faced an 
uphill struggle to gain recognition fi'om Bérégovoy and Hervé. However, uncertainty soon 
reigned, because whilst the Hervé decree on departments remained in Mauroy's office 
waiting to be signed, Mitterrand replaced his Prime Minister with Laurent Fabius.
6.3 STOP-START IMPLEMENTATION
The ensuing government reshuffle brought to Social Affairs, Georgina Dufoix, a loyal 
Mitterrandist who combined her ministerial office with that of the role of spokesperson 
for the Fabius government. Her arrival threw doubt on the future of the Hervé decree. For 
whilst she supported departments, she immediately voiced concerns over the hostility of 
the medical profession to their introduction in public hospitals. Unfamiliar with the 
decree, she reviewed it over the summer, placing the introduction of departments on hold.
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However, her refusal to endorse the organisational reform persisted well into the autumn 
of 1984 as little emerged from the Ministry of Social Affairs. On 2 October, she confirmed 
to the SNCH that she was still in the process of reviewing the decree. Such hesitation 
sent a far from coded message to hospital doctors that the compromise assembled by 
Hervé was open for re-negotiation. By early December, rumours circulated predicting the 
demise of the reform altogether.
In fact, Dufoix revoked the autonomy granted to Hervé by Bérégovoy who 
retained his hold over budgetary policy as Finance Minister (no doubt, one of the 
motivations behind Dufoix’s intervention in departmentalisation). However, with doubt 
hanging over the future of departments, Hervé exploited his privileged access to 
Mitterrand on an official trip to Afiica to by-pass Dufoix’s hesitations. On the airplane, 
he convinced the President of the necessity to forge ahead with the introduction of 
departments:^®^
‘I knew that certain erroneous comments had been addressed to the 
President of the Republic... as it was a subject that I held close to my 
heart and which was for me very strongly symbolic,... I allowed myself to 
say what was the philosophy of departmentalisation, to explain’.
His intervention convinced the Elysée to override the minister’s hesitations and force the
publication of the decree. Thus, somewhat unexpectedly on 29 December 1984 the decree
surfaced in the Journal Officiel, in a form that was not dissimilar to that prepared in the
summer by Hervé (see Table 6.5). The belated publication of the decree left Dufoix with
little more than twelve months to manage the implementation of departments successfully
before the coming legislative elections in March 1986 returned the Right to office. The
first hurdle to negotiate was the election of local commissions to plan the reorganisation
of public hospitals. However, opponents of departments met the publication of the decree
with widespread hostility, resurrecting immediately the arguments voiced under Hervé and
Ralite. Nine hospital doctor trade unions created a cross-union coalition, CLASH, which
pledged itself to a policy of local obstructionism.^®* The Syndicat Autonome launched a
boycott of elections to local commissions to scuttle departments until the expected
electoral victory of the gaullist RPR which pledged to return to services.*®^
Trying to manage this hostility widened the cleavage between Health and Social
Affairs. With little of her reptuation invested in the policy, Dufoix was prepared to
appease the stringent opponents of departments within the medical community to ease
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their implementation. In contrast, Hervé believed that Dufoix should not risk losing what 
support existed for departments in a futile attempt to reach a compromise with those 
intent on scuttling their introduction altogether. He argued that the Fabius government 
was best to proceed with departmentalisation, relying upon the support of the INMH led 
by Peigné and, to a lesser extent, the inconsistent Derenne. The internal constraints 
surrounding Peigné fell away from September 1984 as three anti-department unions 
including the Sytrdicat Garbay left the INMH only to be followed by six further unions 
in November 1984."° However, despite his public appearances alongside Dufoix, the lines 
of communication between Hervé and Dufoix had deteriorated as had those between the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and the DH: ‘Hervé kept some contact, but he was nevertheless, 
a little on the sidelines.’"^
From the end of March 1985, Dufoix prepared the ground for a government 
retreat from the December 1984 decree. This flurry of conciliatory measures under the 
guise of flexibility sought to avoid a mass boycott of the elections to local departmental 
commissions."^ Dufoix extended deadlines for setting up commissions and formalising 
plans to introduce departments. Existing head of services were enticed with the suggestion 
that a department could possibly be no more than a single functional unit, thereby paving 
the way for existing serivces to continue."^ In fact, Dufoix announced that departments 
as portrayed in the December 1984 decree would not be obligatory, arguing that whilst 
anything was possible within the framework of the decree, the actual decree could 
eventually be ignored."^ Thus, disavowing Hervé completely, she finally announced that 
she was prepared to reduce departments to little more than the improved coordination of 
care and the ending of life appointments."^
These last-ditch compromises did not prevent the threatened boycott of elections 
to local commissions."^ However, the boycott only served to encourage Dufoix to 
increase her overtures to hospital doctors. On 10 May 1985, from the rostrum at the Caen 
conference of the SNCH, she declared that she would fundamentally remodel the 
December 1984 decree.*" At the end of May, she announced that the responsibilities of 
heads of department were to be watered down to that of coordinators, with the 
appointment of heads of functional units becoming the prerogative of Prefects rather than 
heads of department (see Table 6.5).*** The rewritten draft decree, made public on 4 June
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1985, instigated a catch-all strategy, tempting junior doctors with the creation of a third 
tier of responsibility, subdi\nsiom à vœation médicale, below departments and functional 
units. And to outmanoeuvre local obstructionism. Boards of Trustees were empowered 
to designate ad hoc committees to fulfil the roles of the commissions where they were 
absent. All deadlines structuring the implementation of departments were abandoned for 
a single final deadline of 28 December 1987.“^
Table 6.5; The search for a compromise - * Innovations* in the June 1985 Decree 120
Organisation December 1984 June 1985
Heads of 
Departments
Extensive powers; draws up medical 
objectives for department, nominates 
head of functional units.
Flexible powers which could be 




Nominated by head of department for 
four years with possible tacit 
reappointment. After 12 years must 
be formalfy reappointed by CMC, 
after proposal by doctors in 
departmental council.
Nominated by Prefect for four years 
with tacit reappointment after 
submission of acceptable progress 
report. After 12 years must be 




Proposes nomination of heads of 
functional units and medical 
objectives. Determines how heads of 
functional units associated to 
department.
Determines roles of heads of 
departments and relations between 
the two.
In fact, during early 1985, Dufoix entered into private negotiations with the
leadership of the conférence des présidents des CMC des CHUs, in particular, its chair.
Professor Rochet and vice-chair. Professor Pellerin. These informal negotiations
culminated in a private dinner party that Dufoix arranged for members of the conférence
in Paris at the end of April. Neither Hervé and his cabinet nor Kervasdoué at the DH,
sidelined by Dufoix, were invited to the dinner party. Indeed, Dufoix and her close
advisors worked alone and outside of the formal channels of negotiations:
‘Dufoix did what she did by herself [..] she was doing it herself [...] when 
we learnt that she was negotiating with people [Rochet and Pellerin] like 
that without talking to us about it... truly on her own, we were 
flabbergasted’.*^
Discussions at this dinner party sealed the final contours of the revised decree, with
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Dufoix accepting the demands imposed by Rochet:
‘We [Rochet] said, ... that there was a minimum and a maximum ... 
beyond which we cannot go. If you do that, then that should work ... they 
allowed us to believe that they would do it’.^^
The product of Dufobc's covert negotiations was to be put before the consultative 
Conseil Supérieur des Hôpitaux on the 26 June 1985. Her negotiations with Rochet and 
Pellerin appeared to have borne the necessary finit at the expense of the privileged access 
given to trade unions and in particular. Peigné. Many of the defining characteristics of 
departments were swept away as Dufoix retreated towards no more than the improved 
co-ordination of existing services. Indeed, her attempts to find a palatable reform for those 
most hostile to departments successfully alienated the support of junior doctors and left- 
wing trade unions. However, with each rejection of her policy, Dufoix became further tied 
to a s t r a ta  of appeasement which left her continually chasing the demands of the hostile 
mandarins led by Rochet and Pellerin
The SNCH withdrawals
The appointment of Dufoix signalled a temporary ceasefire in the developing hostilities 
between the PS government and hospital directors. Dufoix adopted a conciliatory stance 
towards the corps which stood in marked contrast to the dismissive announcements of 
Bérégovoy and Naouri. Bérégovoy’s announcement in June 1984 of the pending reform 
of the statute of the corps reinforced the constructive dialogue engendered by the 
appointment of a new Prime Minister. The Vincent leadership was quick to welcome 
Dufoix, recognising that, unlike her predecessors, she had ‘understood that you do not 
win a war with discouraged officers.However,  she appointed no hospital directors to 
her cabinet.
The stalemate over departments passed the SNCH by as its leadership became 
further obsessed by the demands of its protracted negotiations over the new statute for 
hospital directors. It was the demands of its statutory negotiations, rather than any 
positions on departments, which produced a series of tergiversations by the SNCH 
leadership in its dealings with Dufoix. In July 1984, provisional agreement for the merger 
of the Fourth and Fifth classes was reached within the Fabius government. These 
negotiations were primarily led by Hervé and hospital directors within his cabinet.
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François Grateau joined the cabinet from his post as assistant director at Lille regional 
hospital to replace Merhle who left to become general director of the Assistance Publique 
de Marseille. Merhle's departure ended SNCH representation in the cabinet. Grateau was 
a member of FO. On 1 August 1984, in a meeting with the SNCH, Grateau informed 
Vincent that he, like FO, saw little interest in the merger of the two lowest classes. 
However, ENSP membership apart, neither Merhle nor Grateau were utilized by the 
SNCH to promote the interests of the corps: ‘I [Vincent] had contacts with the Ministers, 
their directeurs de cabinet, with Matignon, but virtually never with my colleagues in the 
c a b i n e t Those hospital directors who entered the Ministry were not regarded with 
‘respect’ by colleagues: professional standing came through grassroots management of 
hospitals rather than through playing the ‘political cards’ of cabinet membership.
In fact, negotiations over the revision of the corps  ^ statute stalled in the autumn 
of 1984. By 12 September, the merger of the Fourth and Fifth classes had remained 
blocked in Hervé's office for six weeks, and the rival corps, the Inspection Générale des 
Affaires Sociales (IGAS), was lobbying forcefiilly against the creation of a Conseil 
Général des Hôpitaux (see below) . After its tribulations at Finance, the merger of the 
two lowest classes was further delayed at the Civil Service Ministry who rejected the 
decree on 16 November 1984.^ °^ In response, the SNCH, meeting on 20 November, 
mandated Vincent to make radical proposals for reform such as limited time contracts 
rather than proceeding with the ‘réformette’ proposed by the Fabius government or 
pursuing the threat of strike action. Indeed, Vincent refused to support the general civil 
service strike called on 25 October 1984 because the demands of the SNCH were not 
concerned solely with pay and conditions. However, the fusion of the Fourth and Fifth 
classes was not finally accepted by the Fabius government until the SNCH membership 
agreed, on 13 February 1985, to strike action by hospital directors. Matignon gave the 
go-ahead the following day, allowing Vincent to remove, albeit temporarily, the threat of 
strikes from the SNCH’s agenda.
However, the merger of the two lowest classes failed to address the career 
bottleneck facing the first three classes which was fuelling the pressure on Vincent and his 
Macon strategy. Exploiting the leeway for radical initiatives provided by the CN, the 
SNCH leadership endorsed la sortie du Titre IV, the removal of hospital directors from
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the general statutes governing the French civil service and the creation of their own 
specific statute. The shift towards this position was finalised at the meeting of the BN in 
mid-March 1985 where it received unanimous support. The leadership legitimised such 
a negotiating stance through references to the statute of hospital doctors and the singular 
role of hospital directors within the French civil service. Meeting on 22 March, the BN 
mandated Christian Paire in the next round of consultations to vote against the 
government réformette and declare that the SNCH sought for hospital directors to exit 
from the constraints of the general s t a tu t es . I n  particular, the SNCH objected to the 
proposed ending of both hospital director representation on the consultative body for 
hospital civil servants, the Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Publique  ^ and to the absence 
in the proposals of any guarantee of reciprocal access for hospital directors into other 
corps
Within the SNCH, support for the removal of directors from the general civil 
service statutes came from Rolland and lightwing directors such as Gusching, the union’s 
national delegate for hospital directors, as well as the leaders Trazzini and Grenon. 
However, although happy to resurrect arguments voiced at the 1976 Strasbourg 
conference, the SNCH leadership had little intention of leaving the Titre IV. Vincent, and 
Paire who led the negotiations for the SNCH, believed they could employ such a 
maximalist demand to advance the union’s arguments as it attempted to ‘perfect’ the 
existing government project.*^* It was a tactical move which positioned the SNCH as 
modernisers, divorcing the Vincent leadership from its trade union competitors and 
drawing criticisms from the FHF. In fact, the majority of the SNCH membership, led by 
the leadership of Grenoble 80, would not have accepted a move outside the Titre IV.
Vincent progressively began to trade SNCH support for departments for an 
improved statute. Dufoix's concessions during spring 1985 brought little from the SNCH 
which went ‘through the motions’ in its criticisms of the revision of the Hervé decree. At 
its May 1985 conference at Caen, the SNCH repeated its demands for the representation 
of all personnel in departmental councils, for grassroots discretion in the implementation 
of departments and for a role for directors within the appointment of the heads of 
functional units. However, Vincent threatened to withdraw entirely from the 
implementation of departments, berating the Fabius government for its failure to consider
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the interests of hospital directors. His speech was a qualitative change from the union’s 
previous non-commital stance and attacks on budgetary policy. In a letter to Dufoix, 
Vincent bemoaned the minor role of directors in the setting up of departments.*'^  ^At Caen 
the SNCH leadership formally opted-out of any constructive broker role facilitating the 
implementation of departments. In front of Dufoix, who arrived waving the decree 
finalising the merger of the Fourth and Fifth classes, Vincent recognised that that it was 
too late to ‘save’ departments and that hospital directors would not promote their 
introduction when successive PS governments had never recognised such a role for 
hospital directors:
‘Hospital directors can no longer, whatever the government decides, lead 
for the [public] good this reform rejected by a large part of the medical 
profession ... It is now too late to ask them to play the leading roles on a 
dossier from which they have been deliberately pushed aside from the 
beginning.’*'*^
Here, Vincent was following the lead of his rank-and-file membership. Within hospitals 
most directors hesitated to prepare for departments, which would complicate the 
introduction of the global budget - given the confusion about whether the future 
departments were automatically to be centres de responsabilités. In more than two-thirds 
of regional and teaching hospitals, the departmental commissions had never met.*'*^
At no stage within departmentalisation had the BN been prepared to risk a 
prolonged confrontation with hospital doctors, fearing that, with medical hostility to 
organisational change, little would come of departments. And the SNCH leadership was 
divided over Vincent's attempt to exploit support for departments as a bargaining resource 
within negotiations for a new statute. This debate was heightened as the BN discussed the 
stance to be taken when Dufoix's rewritten decree came before the Conseil Supérieur des 
Hôpitaux on 26 June 1985. There remained defenders of departments such as Vallet and 
even Trazzini who wanted the SNCH to support the decree so as to maintain the idea of 
the text. However, others wanted the SNCH to abstain, notably Grandjean, Paire, an 
original supporter of departments, and Paillé. Within the CN, individuals such as 
Romanens and Marie were keen to make the connection between the lack of returns for 
the SNCH from previous support for government reforms. Eventually, the compromise 
which emerged was for the SNCH to abstain if a global vote was taken, and to reject the 
article on appointment of heads of functional units if the vote was article by article.
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The SNCH leadership was intent on drawing attention to the dependency tying 
government to hospital directors. At Caen, Vincent flaunted the spumed grassroots 
influences of hospital directors, sending the message that to win back the confidence of 
the SNCH the Mauroy government had to unblock negotiations over statutory 
improvements. Indeed, the SNCH now lost interest completely in departments except as 
a tool for advancing its statutory gains. However, in searching for the acceptance of the 
conférence, Dufoix had signed a pact with known supporters of the RPR - Pellerin was 
one of a small policy group working in Paris for Chirac. However, the pact was 
inevitably unstable. Perhaps inevitably, the conférence reneged on its agreement with 
DufoK, provoking Fabius to withdraw the decree the night before it was to be discussed 
at the Conseil Supérieur des H ô p ita u x With the decree dropped, supporters of 
departments seized the opportunity to lobby Matignon and the Elysée against what they 
considered to be the abandoning of departments. Indeed, Peigné put personal pressure on 
the Elysée to relaunch departments. The Elysée responded with the appointment on 
September 1985 of Jean Terquem, one of the 1983 Médiateurs and a former advisor to 
Mitterrand. The introduction of departments was once again relaunched.
Flogging a dead horse: Terquem
Coming as it did after a summer of inactivity, the appointment of Terquem, who quickly 
acquired the title of ‘Mr. Départementalisation’, was little more than a last ditch attempt 
to accelerate the introduction of departments before the legislative elections of March 
1986. Given the approaching elections, Terquem did not engage in yet another round of 
consultations, preferring to make his proposals public by mid-September. '^*® He assembled 
a small team of advisors which relied upon Kervasdoué and Gilles Johannet, the former 
member of Santé et Socialisme from Dufoix's cabinet. He reinforced these ministerial 
collaborators with Peigné and Gatelmand, who although on the right wing supported 
departments because his members were mostly from general hospitals or mono- 
appartenants: ‘1 came to an agreement with Johannet and Kervasdoué. And, then in the 
evening, 1 met up with Peigné and Gatelmand. And, that was it.’*'*^
In fact, by September 1985, there was no ministerial leadership on the dossier. 
Both Dufoix and Hervé were not prepared to take responsibility for the decree:
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‘Hervé who, I consider to be an honest bloke, serious-minded, competent, 
was a strong supporter of departmentalisation, but he was a timid, 
scrupulous man, “I am only a Junior Minister”.... so much so that 
discussing with Hervé and ... his advisors, he said “Okay, okay, you’re 
right, very well, you have to go and see what they think of it at Dufoix's”.
Then, I went to see, well, she thought nothing, Dufoix and her advisors:
“well, very good, but what do they think of it at Fabius's!
Likewise the Elysée and Matignon, although keen to minimise opposition in the approach
to the 1986 legislative elections, left Terquem to formulate the decree, trusting his
judgement: ‘Nobody telephoned me to tell me that heads of service should retain the
majority [in the departmental council]... there is a c l imate. Indeed,  within the Fabius
government, there was a general recognition that the PS had missed the opportunity to
move towards departments within public hospitals. Terquem recognised himself that he
was on a ‘suicide mission.
The Terquem decree was released for consultation, before going to the Conseil
Supérieur des Hôpitaux on 27 September 1985. To ease its implementation, Dufoix
promised that there would be budgetary and personnel ‘rewards’ for hospitals
reorganising in departments. However, the decree was published in December 1985 just
three months before the legislative elections at which opinion polls strongly predicted a
victory for the Right. In short, the anti-department lobby within the medical community
had achieved their short-term goal of delaying implementation. Thus Terquem’s work
merely threw out a symbolic line to those who supported departments. However, after the
dominance of the conférence, the Fabius government returned to the likes of Peigné and
Santé et Socialisme to guide departments through in a period of strictly controlled
internalised policy-making.
The SNCH prepares for the RPR
Not part of the restrained team of advisors surrounding Terquem, the SNCH remained 
divorced from the formulation of the September 1985 decree. Terquem relied upon 
Kervasdoué to inform him about the climate of opinion within the corps: ‘Hospital 
directors discussed [departments] with Kervasdoué and when I discussed with 
Kervasdoué, ... he said “Take into account hospital directors”. W i t h i n  the Hervé 
cabinet, Pierre Rayroles, the ENSP graduate and leader of the SNCH 1983 working 
group at Roubaix, now tracked the work of Terquem, but remained divorced from the
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decision-making process. However, in anticipation of the Right’s return to office, the
Vincent leadership had already abandoned departments in the interests of assuring the
necessary statutory gains for the corps. At the Conseil Supérieur des Hôpitaux, it voted
against the Terquem decree, blocking the introduction of departments for the first time;
a decision motivated by the continued obstruction of the reform of the statute of hospital
directors rather than the Terquem decree: ‘There were fundamental reasons, but equally
there were tactical reasons.
Rayroles inherited fi’om Grateau the statutory negotiations with the corps, but here
his work foundered repeatedly upon the continued obstructionism of the DB coordinated
by Marie-Hélène Bérard, a member of the RPR, and ironically, a personal fiiend of
Vincent. Rayroles accused Bérard of deliberately obstructing the dossier for political
gains:’When she crushed me on my decree in 1986 ... Marie-Hélène told me “The statute
for hospital directors. I'll grant it in a year”.’^^  ^Rayroles’ failure to force through the
revised statute strained his relationship with the SNCH. As with other hospital directors
previously within the cabinet, the Vincent leadership failed to nurture its ties with
Rayroles who, despite his ENSP origins, defined himself as everything but a relay within
the Ministry for the SNCH leadership:
‘The profession held it against me,... not against the Minister, but against 
me. As I said, at the time, to a certain top official of the trade union 
[SNCH]: “By what mandate do you believe that I am ordered by you...
I am not here to serve you, I am sorry’” .
On 13 November 1985, the BN hardened its negotiating stance towards the Fabius 
government. Aware of the DB’s desire to stall negotiations, Vincent was prepared to bank 
upon the defeat of the Left and pursue a strategy designed to ‘entice’ the Right:’We felt 
that government was going to change; the only way to get something was to fiighten the 
R i g h t . F i r s t ,  Vincent organised a walkout of hospital directors whilst Dufoix was 
speaking at the Assises de l'Hospitalisation Publique in December 1985.^ *^ Second, on 
the initiative of Coz, in early December the SNCH bought a page in the national daily. Le 
Monde, to publicise the danger facing public hospitals under the headline of ‘French men 
and women, the SNCH is telling you: your public hospitals are in pe r i l . Spur red  on by 
its stalled statutory negotiations and the allegedly unrealistic increases in hospital budgets 
for 1986, the SNCH took a public swipe at PS management of public hospitals:
2 2 1
‘Annual budget increases are less than real inflation and medical progress 
is thus threatened; investments are still blocked; organisational reforms, 
clumsily imposed are putting the internal cohesion of hospitals in danger; 
finally, the petty bureaucratisation of hospital directors is the first step 
towards the nationalisation of our establishements*.
In fact, Vincent and Paillé concluded an informal understanding with Bernard Debré, who
was an advisor to the RPR leader Jacques Chirac, as well as being leader of Solidarité
M éd ica leThis agreement called for the SNCH to fail to promote departments in order
for the RPR to accept Article Two of the 1984 Hospital Law. Indeed, the RPR and the
UDF in an effort to win the support of hospital directors agreed that hospital directors
could leave the Titre IV
From January 1986, the SNCH withdrew from further confrontations with Dufoix
or Hervé. Vincent justified this withdrawal by both the need to preserve the union’s
neutrality during the electoral campaign, and the belief that the rank-and-file did not have
the necessary will to see the demands of the SNCH met.^ ^^  However, relations between
the SNCH and the Fabius government deteriorated. First, the government began to place
its supporters on the Conseil Général des Hôpitaux before the institution had been
formally agreed. Second, it threatened the autonomy of the corps^  undermining the hold
of Maurice Rochaix over his post as general director at the Hospices Civils de Lyon.
Finally, it refijsed to countenance the SNCH’s demands to improve the statutory revisions
offered to hospital directors. Thus, the SNCH simply dropped departments and waited
for the election of the RPR and UDF opposition. The statutory reform negotiated by
Rayroles was finally pushed through, but remained unacceptable to the SNCH. Indeed,
it was the first such statute published against the union’s wishes. As Paire recognised, the
SNCH had been absent from the discussions concerning the development of the Conseil
Général des H ôpitaux.However, as expected, the March 1986 legislative elections
returned a RPR-UDF majority to the National Assembly and Mitterrand appointed Chirac
as Prime Minister to lead the first government of cohabitation under the Fifth Republic.
6.4 THE CONSERVATIVES* REVERSAL OF THE REFORM
The Chirac government failed to appoint a Health Minister, leaving Philippe Séguin, as 
Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, to combine health with the management of the
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social security funds. However, lobbying by RPR mandarins soon forced Chirac to rectify 
what was portrayed as a mere oversight with the nomination of Michèle Barzach as Junior 
Minister for Health. The former RPR delegate for social affairs was not one of the 
Debré band of vocal mandarins who waved the flag of the RPR whilst in opposition. 
Instead, her professional background was as a gynaecologist:
‘It was at times, quite amusing because [...] people asked her what her
hospital titles were... You could hear a pin drop ... they could not imagine
that a Minister who was a doctor did not have hospital qualifications.’ ®^^
To compensate for such deficiencies, Barzach was shadowed within her cabinet by
Pellerin, the vice-president of the conférence and leading member of RPR health policy
working groups when in opposition.^®* His appointment reflected the decision by the
Chirac government to ignore its most vocal supporters in opposition, not least Debré and
the Syndicat Autonome. Indeed, Chirac bowed to the traditional avenue of medical
influence, that of the conférence.
In opposition, the Giscardian and GauUist parties pledged to reinstate private pay 
beds and return to services. However, they left unsaid whether the return to services 
implied a return to the pre-1981 organisation of public hospitals. As the newly-installed 
Chirac government began to formulate its hospital legislation. Séguin clashed with 
Barzach as he lobbied for the continued promotion of departments rather than a return to 
life-long appointments in services. ^ ®^ However, after sporadic early interventions. Séguin 
withdrew, leaving the formulation of the Bill to the Barzach cabinet. ‘For Séguin, the 
world of hospitalisation, hospital directors all that did not e x is t .H is  withdrawal left 
Pellerin facing little opposition. The vice-president of the conférence possessed a 
reputation and technical experience which Barzach and her technical directeur de cabinet, 
Guy Berger a ‘nobody’^^* fi*om the Court of Accounts could not possibly match: ‘Barzach 
did not know a great deal and I [Pellerin] was considered in the team as the one who knew 
all the problems the best.’^^  ^The DH under Kervasdoué was isolated because both his 
socialist loyalties and the conflict over his successor between Séguin and Barzach 
sidelined its influence. The post finally went to a compromise candidate, François 
Delafosse, an énarque and former advisor to Pompidou, who met the demand for a safe 
pair of hands, but had no experience of public hospital management. By the time of his 
arrival, the skeleton of the reform was already in place, and Delafosse did no more than
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attend one interministerial meeting chaired by Chirac on 30 October 1986 to confirm the 
Bill;
‘The day I took up my duties,... I asked one of my collaborators to give 
me the dossier of the reform, the bill, but he did not have it... They did not 
have the text in its entirety, that had been communicated from the 
cabine
Thus, the Chirac government swung behind the organisational reforms formulated 
by the conférence and endorsed by Pellerin within the cabinet. In line with the proposals 
of the Senate, these reforms recognised the necessity to repair the state-profession 
compromise through a return to private pay beds and services. However, they 
acknowledged the undesirability of a return to traditional services, accepting a balance 
between self-regulation and external evaluation. First, departments were reduced to 
voluntary associations, initiated by doctors and headed by a medical co-ordinator, but not 
having to conform to any common organisational model. Second, heads of services were 
no longer to benefit fi'om life-long appointments, but instead to be subject to five-year 
evaluations based on reports of achievements. If they so desired, heads of service could 
create pôles d'activités, functional units delegating responsibility over certain tasks within 
services to junior doctors. Third, the managerial accountability, albeit mild, behind the 
evaluation of heads of services was supported by the transformation of hospital medical 
commissions which were attributed reinforced roles in the choice and modalities of 
treatment. Finally, to ram home the changes in professional self-regulation, the use of 
private pay beds was to be monitored by specific commissions, the commissions d'activité 
libérale, in each department.
By November 1986, the Bill was ready to be forwarded to the National Assembly. 
It was adopted by the Conseil Supérieur des Hôpitaux although most articles were 
approved only by a narrow majority. Opposition focused upon the constraints on the right 
of doctors to treat private patients. Stripped of their substance, departments raised little 
opposition, apart fi'om Peigné and the INMH who were keen to see the Bill withdrawn. 
However, only minor changes were suggested to the Bill; the most significant of which 
was the removal of the reference to technical and economic evaluation fi'om the remit of 
the revised hospital medical commissions, because doctors refused to be caught up in the 
logic of the global budget. Its proposals mirrored the influence of the conférence and
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Pellerin who had assidiously courted Chirac whilst in opposition. Debré and his fellow 
mandarins, the more vociferous supporters of the Right, had been sidelined along with 
those like Peigné who had associated themselves with the move towards departments.*^  ^
However, with the Bill ready for the National Assembly, student strikes against university 
reform tied to industrial action in the public sector led Chirac to announce a pause in 
government action.*^ * Barzach pushed through the return of private pay beds, due to be 
phased out by socialist legislation at the end of 1986 and delayed the rest of her Bill.
The SNCH reaps its rewards
Like Dufoix, Barzach immediately courted the SNCH, writing to its 1986 Bordeaux 
conference in support of the reinforcement of the authority of hospital directors as heads 
of entreprise.*^’ Indeed, she espoused the discourse of hôpital-entreprise deliberately 
pushed to the fore by Vincent. However, there were no hospital directors within her 
cabinet, although Trazzini, Grenon and Le Guennec were invited by Barzach to suggest 
reforms to the global budget and public hospital line-management (see Chapter Four). The 
corps had to content itself with appointments removed from the formulation of the 
hospital law, notably Christian Anastasy, part of the Vincent network, as advisor to 
Delafosse at the DH. However, the ‘absence’ of a Directeur des Hôpitaux weakened the 
influence of the SNCH throughout the formulation of the Bill.
However, to all intents and purposes, the Vincent leadership had long since opted 
out of departments. Under Barzach, with departments devoid of any substance, it had 
even less incentive to rally for a stringent definition of departments than it had under the 
PS. It left any opposition against the relegation of departments to Peigné and the INMH. 
Indeed, supporting the general framework defined by Barzach, the SNCH leadership 
touted five-year evaluations of heads of services as one of its own earlier proposals.**® 
Instead, it made its fundamental bargaining issues the restoration of pay beds and the 
prerogatives attributed to revised hospital medical commissions. Meeting with Séguin, the 
SNCH, confirmed as early as 16 June 1986, its opposition to the private beds, which it 
saw as a poor response to the crisis of hospital doctor recruitment, a stance asserted by 
the union’s conferences at both Monaco and Bordeaux.*** Equally, it opposed the 
increased responsibilities attributed to hospital medical commissions which threatened the
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influence of Boards of Trustees and hospital directors. Indeed, the SNCH argued that no 
hôpital-entreprise could work with a plurality of decision-makers at its strategic apex.^ *^
This move away from departments belied the overriding concerns of the Vincent 
leadership to negotiate a revised statute as the elite consensus underpinning the Macon 
strategy fragmented (see Chapter 4). However, the SNCH leadership had to convince the 
Chirac government not to apply the socialists’ March 1986 settlement whose very legality 
it challenged. A delegation led by Vincent met with the Barzach cabinet on 10 April 1986 
to discuss its statutory reform, employing the meeting to criticise the statute promulgated 
by the PS, particularly its absence of equity. The SNCH demanded that directors leaving 
the ENSP be able to reach the top posts within the corps within 18 years, that the posts 
of general directors not be separated from posts in First Class, and that a Paris office of 
the ENSP and more radical reforms to training programmes be established. In addition, 
it considered the Conseil Général des Hôpitaux to be an ill-defined second rate IGAS 
used to provide for PS dignitaries such as Dr. Georges Benedetti or Jean Blocquaux (a 
former technical advisor to Dufoix).
The BN remained preoccupied with leaving the Titre IV. Support for such an 
eventuality continued to unite an eclectic coalition stretching from Paillé and Rolland, 
through to the reluctant Romanens (who saw it as a tool to improve the image of the 
SNCH externally), and Paire (who saw it as a means of protecting posts from other civil 
servants). However, opponents such as Vallet, the Grenoble 80 stalwart who feared 
exposing posts, raised concern that what began as a tactical move to enhance the 
bargaining power of the SNCH was developing into a fundamental principle of the union 
with little debate from the BN.^“  Progressively, the majority of the BN endorsed the move 
to remain faithful to the entrepreurial logic of public hospitals. In fact, regional delegates 
in the CN endorsed the exit of Titre IV  on 6 May 1986 with only three dissenting voices. 
It agreed to put forward a bill to senators and deputies proposing the withdrawal of 
directors from Titre TV.
However, Barzach admitted to the SNCH that she faced political difficulties in 
allowing hospital directors to leave the Titre I V . Preparing her retreat from promises 
made whilst in opposition, she tried to convince directors that leaving the Titre IV  was not 
as important as the specific pay and conditions devoted to directors within its general
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framework. Concerned about recent nominations to the Conseil Général, she also 
prepared to renege on its implementation.^^ In response, the SNCH lobbied heavily during 
September 1986 meeting with Chirac, Séguin and Barzach. Paire was particularly 
concerned to promote the Conseil Général into a quasi-general inspectorate modelled on 
the IGAS and Xhs grands c o r p s However, the IGAS and the FHF successfully lobbied 
Matignon to withdraw the issue from the Barzach Bill.^ ^^  In response, Matignon delayed 
its decision until the finalisation of discussions over the reform of the statute of hospital 
directors. To offset the possible loss of the Conseil Général, the SNCH demanded ten 
places for hospital directors in IGAS.^ ®^
As under the PS, the statute was held up in the corridors of Matignon and the 
Finance Ministry. This delay occurred despite the appointment of Bérard, Vincent’s fiiend 
from the DB, as social policy advisor to Chirac, although Bérard quickly formed an 
effective partnership with Barzach. When the SNCH was informed in mid-November 
that the Prime minister's office had agreed to change its statute, the 1986 student crisis 
and ‘pause’ decided by the Chirac government further hampered the issue. The ‘pause’ 
only served to increase the pressure upon Vincent, who had offered minor rewards to the 
rank-and-file, but appeared once more to be shut out of negotiations.
In fact, with spring 1987 approaching, the Vincent leadership was drawn into 
threats of strike action to advance its claims. On 10 March 1987 the SNCH held a congrès 
extraordinaire where the assembled delegates agreed to march from the National 
Assembly to the Health Ministry in defence of their statutory demands. The demonstration 
was to coincide with the parliamentary debate on the 1987 Hospital law.^ ^^  This threat of 
action appeared to relaunch negotiations with Barzach. The day after its Paris conference, 
Barzach informed the SNCH leadership of the proposed statutory decree for hospital 
directors and agreed to discuss the terms of other administrative categories. In return the 
SNCH leadership withdrew its strike action, claiming that it was difficult to organise, fell 
in the school holidays and would clash with the demonstration of medical students. This 
withdrawal permitted the Vincent leadership to maintain its stance of responsible trade 
unionism, but opened it to attacks by delegates at the 1987 Lyon conference.*^ However, 
most importantly for the Vincent leadership, negotiations were relaunched, with meetings 
held between the government and the SNCH throughout April. The final interministerial
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meeting on the statute was signalled to take place on 14 May.*^ *
The negotiations paralleled the parliamentary debate over the Barzach Bill. Its first 
reading took place on 28 April, with Debré leading the calls of RPR mandarins for the 
automatic reappointment of heads of services. The SNCH lobbyied for reduced 
attributions of responsibility for hospital medical commissions, and assurances that 
directors chaired local commissions on private pay beds.^°° Equally, it set out positions 
against the grouping of private clinics and for the application of the global budget in 
private clinics. However, the Vincent leadership had no intention of jeopardising its 
concurrent negotiations for improved pay and conditions. Areas of contention still 
remained between the SNCH and Barzach over the tour du ministre, the capacity of 
ministers to appoint from outside the corps, the maintenance of the Conseil Général, the 
reform of the ENSP and bonus payments for directors. However, the SNCH was ready 
to compromise and accept both the maintenance of tour extérieur in the First and Second 
classes and the evaluation of general directors every five years. This last position was in 
keeping with its culture of new public management and was no more than what the unions 
accepted for heads of service. As for exiting the Titre IV, the SNCH decided to accept the 
Barzach statute, but maintain its lobbying of the National Assembly for change.
The final arbitrage for the statute came at the end of July. The Macon strategy 
finally delivered as Bérard gave what she said she would: ‘They [the modernist leadership] 
pulled their iron out of the fire because... [the Chirac government] took great care of 
them, .... a new financially advantageous statute. They pocketed that.’^ °^  In return for 
accepting that general directors were nominated for renewable five year periods dependent 
upon their performance in post, the corps received an opening of its classification, 
improved pay and conditions, and changes to the ENSP training programme (see Table
6. 6).^ °^  Indeed, the Chirac government withdrew its claims to appoint individuals from 
outside the corps to the posts of general directors and threw in ten sabbatical leaves, 
known as congés spéciaux, for First class directors 55 years old or above. These 
sabbatical leaves increased the prestige of the corps and by-passed the problem of the 
Conseil Général des Hôpitaux by providing the corps with the ten end-of-career exits that 
it had expected from the Conseil Général.
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Table 6.6: Chirac’s Presents - the 1988 Statutory Gains
Fourth Class to join other classes in Categoiy A. Increased opening to one-third of Fourth Class to 
Third Class and improved career bonuses.
Reclassification of existing classes, with directors to move j&om Third to First Class in 12 years. 
Twenty five percent of directors rather than existing 13 percent to reach First Class from Third. 
First Class directors to move to Letter A payment scales (amongst top salaries in civil service). Ten 
general directors to move to Letter C.
General directors appointed for five-year renewable terms dependent on assessment of managerial 
performance.
ENSP training programme to be lengthened to 27 months (same as ENA).
Ten sabbatical leaves as in grands corps to be introduced.____________________________
With the publication of the statute in January 1988, Vincent publicly thanked 
Chirac and Barzach for pushing ahead with the reform against opposition.Such a 
successful end to negotiations quelled opposition to the strategy. However, although the 
SNCH reaped the pecuniary rewards of the Macon strategy, Vincent and the BN were 
aware of its constraints and there were fears that the union had reached the end of the 
road with the 1988 settlement on pay and working conditions.^®  ^Not only had the Macon 
strategy subordinated the demands of non-hospital directors within the SNCH, it had also 
failed to deliver the hospital management reforms necessary for the professionalisation of 
the corps.
CONCLUSIONS
The extended saga of a contested and ultimately failed endeavour at organizational 
reform, intertwined with the hospital directors’ much less contentious quest for greater 
state recognition, reveals a great deal about the complexities of policy-making in the 
French health care sector. The departmentalization battles most clearly revealed the 
strength in depth of the medical profession, and the extent of their points of access and 
pressure - ranging from the mobilization of defensive grassroots public protests and strikes 
(especially against Ralite’s attempted fcdt accompli) through to the direct access of senior 
doctors to Mitterand in the Elysée, and their ability to persuade the opposition to 
emasculate a move towards greater managerialism and efficiency gains which right wing 
politicians might have been expected to support. At times, the doctors’ opposition verged 
towards the ludicrous, notably in public statements which equated the introduction of
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departments to the mass extinction of intellectuals in Cambodia. But, the doctors* 
influence was so great that their professional reputation could survive both the lurch into 
strong forms of anti-government protests and the cleavages between the diehards wedded 
to services and life-long posts, through those who supported the principle but were never 
quite satisfied with the practical details of its application, to the minority of doctors who 
supported the reform and would countenance no compromise. At all stages the lead actors 
holding the dossier were strongly influenced by different shades of medical opinion.
By contrast, the hospital directors played a much less important role in the wings 
of the departmentalization controversy, and pursued throughout a much more sensistive, 
complex, tactical and carefully modulated policy line which spoke volumes for their own 
awareness of the comparative weakness of their position. The SNCH especially had to 
tread a fine line both because of its relatively weaker access to senior politicians, ministers, 
their cabinets and other policy-makers than the doctors, and because the modernizing 
leadership were bound by the careful compromises of the Macon conference resolutions 
into maintaining an internal balance of rank-and-file and leadership interests. That the long 
series of battles in which they were fairly tangentially involved should culminate in the 
SNCH’s acquiring significant new state concessions which greatly boosted the 
professionalization of hospital directors is only partly a tribute to the wisdom of their 
shifting line. The union leadership played a long game, throwing their weight conditionally 
behind departments at the start of the process, wdtholding further commitment later as the 
government seemed unlikely to face down the doctors’ resistance, and in the end going 
with the wdnd for rejecting the PS government’s later eflforts in time to establish a good 
relationship with the Chirac government. But, the renegotiation of the corps  ^ status 
proceeded on a separate, more routinized track, where the connections with 
departmentalization were never firmly established. And the Chirac government’s final 
concessions to hospital directors on professionalization reflected in part the cumulative 
experience of the Left’s partly successful and partly unsuccessful reforms - all of which 
tended to confirm the central government’s dependence on securing allies within the 
public hospitals system if they were to secure any changes at all in directions that they 
wanted.
The SNCH’s relatively conditional access to ministers and policy-makers during
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the departmentalization phase mattered less than it might have done under other 
circumstances, since the Left government’s initiatives were doomed from the outset to 
make little progress. Ralite was greeted with suspicion because of his Communist party 
aflBliation, and the manner of his initial launch of the departmentalization proposals. His 
subsequent inability to manage the rupture in relations with the doctors, left his successors 
fighting uphill, unable to attract the stronger support from bodies like the SNCH which 
might have acted as a bit of a counterweight to medical lobbying, and with progressively 
less clear visions of the changes they were anyway trying to achieve. In these 
circumstances, the SNCH’s tactical shifts could allow it to edge its interests ahead, despite 
its rather conditional access to influence, and the Vincent leadership’s inability to show 
much concrete progress on professionalization before the 1986 election. But, the fears of 
exhaustion of the Macon strategy already apparent under the new government reflected 
the SNCH’s clear need to ratchet up its influence another notch if it was to secure the 
expanded role in the hospital system which the hospital directors’ corps had set itself as 
a target.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
PLANNING SYSTEMS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF HOSPITALS:
THE 1991 HOSPITAL LAW
The global budget and the reorganisation of services failed to address satisfactorily the 
absence of mechanisms to regulate the allocation of resources in the French public hospital 
service. As implemented, the global budget was a blunt instrument which froze the 
existing distribution of resources between hospitals. It did little to shake out the surplus 
60,000 hospital beds commonly acknowledged to exist in the French public system; beds 
already targeted by the 1979 measures put in place by Veil (see Chapter Five). In 1991, 
the Rocard government introduced a renovated system of regional planning which sought 
to combine extended managerial freedoms for public hospitals with the top-down 
regulation of the delivery and allocation of resources within the public hospital service. 
This new legislation completely rewrote the 1970 Hospital Law, and so the Rocard 
government went one step further than previous governments which had simply rewritten 
selected articles or passages of existing legislation.
The renovation of the hospital planning system mirrored the policy discourse 
promoted by the SNCH earlier in the mid-1980s. The reforms accommodated both the 
regional planning of the 200 Propositions and the managerial freedom of hôpital- 
entreprise (see Chapter Four). Indeed, the formulation of the 1991 legislation brought to 
the fore a network of ENSP directors who invaded the key loci of decision-making at the 
various stages of the passage of the Bill through the processes of consultation, inter­
ministerial negotiations and parliamentary scrutiny. The opening section of the chapter 
examines how the SNCH was advantaged by the changing institutional configuration 
brought about by the presidential and legislative elections of the spring and summer of 
1988. The second part analyses the formulation of the law and the changing strategy of 
the SNCH as it lobbied the Rocard government. The third section examines the inter­
ministerial negotiations surrounding the 1991 legislation and how, this time, the corps of 
hospital directors managed to ward off the territorial aspirations of the Inspection des 
Finances. The final part of the chapter analyses the passage of the 1991 Law through a
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National Assembly with reinvigorated deliberative powers after the electoral consequences 
of the events of 1988.
7.1 RELAUNCHING THE REFORM PROCESS
At the 1988 national conference of the SNCH, Vincent acknowledged the impotence of 
the trade union in face of the cross-party consensus against further upheavals in the 
management of public hospitals.^ The Barzach legislation had patched up the state- 
profession compromise, restoring calm to the troubled waters of organisational reform 
under the French Socialists. Preaching stability in numerous policy areas, Bérégovoy, 
Mitterrand's spokesperson throughout the 1988 presidential campaign, insisted that the 
PS would not subject public hospitals to "legislative ping-pong" upon its return to office.  ^
However, the presidential strategy pursued by Nfitterrand to assure his second term in the 
Elysée did have important repercussions for the resources at the disposal of the SNCH. 
The union’s leadership was advantaged by a series of contingent events triggered by the 
ramifications of the strategy employed by Mitterrand for both PS support in the National 
Assembly and the composition of the Rocard government in 1988.
Mitterrand owed his re-election to his successful portrayal of himself as a neutral 
referee above political parties and sectional interests. To this end, he sponsored a strategy 
of ouverture which endorsed the entry into government of representatives of civil society 
and politicians fi'om outside the ranks of his ‘own’ party, the PS. This successful 
presidential strategy translated poorly in the right-wing National Assembly where it hinged 
upon enticing sufiBcient centrist deputies in the Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (CDS) 
away from the RPR-UDF opposition. Obliged to dissolve the National Assembly, 
Mitterrand then contributed to a confused PS campaign at the June legislative elections 
where, in any case, the bipolarisation of the majority run-off legislative elections tied the 
centrists to the Right. Mitterrand and his Prime minister failed to gain an absolute majority 
within the National Assembly.^
To maximise his fi’eedom of manoeuvre within the National Assembly, Mitterrand 
had appointed his fellow socialist and longstanding competitor, Michel Rocard, as his 
Prime minister. Rocard was the politician best identified with the strategy of ouverture.
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vaunting his own style of government, the méthode Rocard, which privileged consensus 
and consultation/ However, he was unable to drive a wedge between the CDS and the 
RPR-UDF opposition. Following intense negotiations, only centrist personalities joined 
the government, although the CDS created its own parliamentary group, the Union du 
Centre (UDC), as it publicly weakened its ties with the traditional Right.^ The UDC 
adopted a policy of constructive opposition to the Rocard government, predicated upon 
a case by case examination of its legislation. To compensate, the PS lowered the number 
of deputies required by a party to qualify as a formal parliamentary group; thereby 
ensuring the short-term favours of the weakened communists on the Left.
However, the Rocard government possessed an armoury of constitutional weapons 
to force its legislation through the National Assembly.® In particular. Article 49.3 
permitted governments to identify legislation as a matter of confidence, ensuring its 
passage through the National Assembly unless the opposition successfully mobilised a 
vote of no confidence against the government. This said, the strategies of cmverture and 
the publicly-professed méthode Rocard placed symbolic restraints on the use of such 
weapons. They obliged Rocard to construct ad hoc majorities with the communists or 
more particularly, the UDC, elevated by the underlying orientations of ouverture? This 
search for ad hoc majorities potentially reinforced the policy-making influence of the 
National Assembly to the benefit of the SNCH leadership which, frozen out of the central 
administration by competing grands corps, had purposely forged its own organisational 
networks within political parties. Indeed, Paillé had privileged access to the UDC, 
standing as the 'number two’ to a CDS candidate in 1988 and resigning fi'om his post as 
national delegate in November 1988 to work in the National Assembly for the UDC, 
although he remained vice-president of the union and member of its BN until 1991 .*
In fact, the access of the SNCH to ministers and cabinets was bolstered in the 
summer of 1988 by the appointment of Claude Evin as Minister of Solidarity, Health and 
Social Protection in the second Rocard government. Ouverture dictated that the Health 
Mnistry was initidly attributed to a representative of civil society, Pr. Léon 
Schwartzenberg. However, Schwartzenberg resigned within a week of taking ofiBce and, 
when Mitterrand vetoed as his replacement, Bernard Kouchner, founder of the medical 
charity. Médecins du Monde, the Health Ministry fell into the hands of Evin.^ Evin was
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one of Rocard's lieutenants within the PS and was firmly-entrenched within the 
organisational networks of the corps of hospital directors. He was one of the vice- 
presidents of the FHF, but more importantly, chair of the Saint-Nazaire general hospital 
managed by Coz with whom he had collaborated in the past.^ ® These ties were further 
strengthened by the appointment of the hospital director, Edouard Couty, to Evin's 
cabinet. Couty, a fellow rocardian, rose, like Merhle, within the ranks of the PS Health 
Commission in the mid-1980s (see Chapter Four). He held no post within the SNCH, but 
was an assistanat graduate fi*om the Vincent generation. Unlike his predecessors in 
cabinets^ Couty enjoyed a reputation throughout the corps as an innovator; his 
appointment was suggested by Coz." He was later joined within the cabinet by Gilbert 
Chodorge, an ENSP graduate, who transferred fi-om the DH to give support.
Thus, the 1988 legislative elections and subsequent appointments in the Rocard 
government upgraded the resources that the SNCH leadership could tap into. The SNCH 
harvested the fiuits o f its networking within political parties during the 1980s, and was 
advantaged by the interventions of actors who did not intentionally seek to advance the 
interests of the hospital director trade union. However, hospital management reform at 
first remained off the agenda of the incoming Rocard government. It emerged within the 
Evin cabinet over the autumn and winter of 1988 as a means to quell the short-term 
political difficulties facing the Minister of Solidarity, Health and Social Protection.
Short-term political constraints
On his arrival in office, Evin, as befits one of Rocard's lieutenants, put his faith in a series 
of pragmatic and incremental managerial initiatives. He intended, at most, to swing the 
pendulum back in favour o f departments, informing the Director of Hospitals that: ‘You 
mustn't rush things, you must consult fully, advance with small strokes, pragmatically. All 
these big reforms. No. You must do little concrete things.’"  Under his leadership, the 
Ministry began trials o f state-hospital contracts with the signing of a five-year develop­
ment contract with Lille regional hospital, in line with one of the 200 Propositions of the 
SNCH." In addition, in October 1988, Evin commissioned a series of reports on 
managerial reform within public hospitals. One such report was attributed to Peigné as the 
PS sought once more to elevate the INMH or, at least to quell its expectations of a return
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to departments. Initially imposed by Mitterrand, Peigné included in his team the former 
general secretary of the ENSP, Guy Collet, and his former collaborator, Gatelmand. '^* 
Evin inherited from the Chirac government a long-running conflict with nurses 
over the non-application of previously agreed improvements in their pay and working 
conditions. Delafosse, the Director of Hospitals, informed Evin in the first days of his 
ministry, of the pressing need to agree a settlement with nursing trade unions if he was to 
avoid strikes by nurses in the autumn. However, Evin ignored the advice of his Director 
of Hospitals, with the result that strikes broke out in the second half of October 1988, led 
by grassroots coordinations of nurses rather than established trade unions. From the 
beginning of 1989, these strikes triggered pay demands from hospital doctors and student 
doctors.Not to be outdone, in March 1989, Vincent deemed it necessary to berate Evin 
for ignoring the role of hospital directors within public hospitals, although he remained 
keen to stress that the SNCH was not in disagreement with the overarching policies 
pursued by the Nfinister.^*
Somewhat obligingly, Evin pledged to deal, in turn, with the difficulties facing all 
hospital personnel after reaching agreement with striking nurses.This pledge risked 
locking the Minister of Solidarity, Health and Social Protection into an endless round of 
negotiations and unwelcome media coverage from strikes and demonstrations. Within his 
cabinet, this looming threat encouraged support for a radical reform of the 1970 Hospital 
Law. The interventionists were led by Couty, Marcel Atlan, former advisor to Hervé, and 
Didier Tabuteau who was plucked by Evin from the Council of State. They argued that 
the complete rewriting of the 1970 Hospital Law could be a ‘political exit’, enabling Evin 
to go ‘beyond all these [pay demand] problems by undertaking a large reworking of the 
whole of the system with a big project, with a big law.’^ ® Accordingly, it would by-pass 
the spending constraints imposed by Matignon and draw the sting from pay demands as 
it interpreted unrest as the product of progressive failures to modernise hospital 
management. With this pressure from the interventionists, Evin moved progressively away 
from dissenting voices which preached caution, arguing that reform actually ran the risk 
of mobilising hospital staff against the Rocard government. Indeed, he came to endorse 
the stance of the interventionists, despite his faith in incremental initiatives and piecemeal 
change.
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However, with their battle won in their own ministry, the interventionists still had 
to overcome the caution voiced by other ministries. Notably, the Direction du Budget 
(DB) questioned the necessity of a full-blown hospital law, advocating instead piecemeal 
changes to existing legislation so as to maintain control over hospital spending. However, 
Evin's proposals underwrote the Prime Minister's own government-wide initiative to 
renovate the management of French public services.^^ As Rocard's lieutenant, Evin was 
able to count upon the support of Matignon to overcome resistance to reform, voiced as 
it was by the ministerial divisions of one of his rivals in the PS, Pierre Bérégovoy. The 
Rocard government could not contain the internal divisions within the PS which increased 
as the influence of Mitterrand waned.^ Bérégovoy was a supporter of the former Prime 
Minister, Laurent Fabius, who was a key rival of Rocard for control of the party. For 
once, health and social affairs possessed organisational resources to counteract the 
traditional predominance of the Finance ministry.
The Rocard government duly announced its reform of the management of public 
hospitals after a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 12 ^ r i l  1989.^ From the outset, 
Evin sought to make planning the backbone of the reform.^ His orientations envisaged 
the generalisation of hospital-govemment contracts» such as that signed with Lille regional 
hospital. These contracts would be negotiated in line with the strategic objectives of 
regional plans and would usher in moves to a posteriori tutelle or regulation of public 
hospitals, evaluating how far hospitals met the objectives stated within each contract. 
These proposals built upon a discourse of modernisation through planning which 
replicated regional planning and contractualisation in other policy sub-systems. But, it also 
acknowledged a plethora of past reports and initiatives, including the 1985 Étienne report 
commissioned by Bérégovoy and Dufoix, and the proposed reform withdrawn by Ralite 
in 1983. In addition, they mirrored proposals contained within the reports commissioned 
in October 1988, particularly those of Peigné and the IGAS inspectors, Silland and de 
Camas. Silland advocated moves to a posteriori controls on public hospitals with 
heightened managerial autonomy in the implementation of top-down financial and health 
objectives as laid down within r^onal plans covering both public and private hospitals.^^ 
Working in collaboration with Silland, the DH acknowledged the findings o f her report, 
but deemed that it ‘only furthered the outlines [of projects] begun over the last few
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years.However, Peigné (who had worked closely with Couty^*) handed Evin a progress 
report in early April 1989 and broke ranks to demand a set of improved pay and statutory 
conditions for hospital personnel. This recommendation misread Evin’s motivations for 
undertaking the reform in the first place.^^
The corps of hospital directors takes the DH
The SNCH was not divorced from this policy discourse of modernisation through
planning, despite its moves towards a more autonomist managerial stance. Its leadership
claimed a direct line of policy inheritance from the orientations defined by Evin to its own
earlier policy programme: ‘The 200 Propositions were formulated in the years around
1985. The legislator was inspired by them five or six years l a t e r . I n  fact, Coz took on
an advisory role at a series of informal ‘brainstorming’ dinners organised by Evin in March
1989: ‘We quite rapidly saw him play an unofiRcial role within the entourage of the
Minister without having an official post.’^  ^Coz sat alongside other hospital directors, in
particular, the cabinet members, Couty and Chodorge. Thus, the SNCH found itself in the
current of a policy stream to whose creation it had contributed as
‘several people who were saying the same thing at the same time, (...) 
because these were the ideas in the air which were circulating and which 
rose up like that. Well, it is true that certain [ideas] came out of the 
Étienne report, others (...) came out of the works of the SNCH (...). Other 
ideas (...) came out of the whole discourse that was bom at the time and 
[formalised] under the name of hôpital-entreprise’^ ^
More importantly, for the SNCH, the rewriting of the 1970 Hopsital Law signalled 
the end of Delafosse's tenure at the DH. Evin employed Delafosse as a dispensable front 
man in his disputes with nurses.^  ^ However, having won the case for reform, the 
interventionists within Evin's cabinet lobbied for his removal because he was identified 
with the Right. And, with no grassroots experience of public hospitals, he lacked the 
requisite managerial profile to front the reform process. '^* This reasoning was favourably 
received by Evin, who recognised that the appointment of a new Director of Hospitals 
presented him with the opportunity to mobilise support within public hospitals, to ‘bring 
together an alliance of modernisers’ - if not within the ranks of the medical profession, at 
least within the ranks of hospital personnel.^  ^ Like socialist ministers before him, Evin was 
plagued by the requirement of the PS to ‘soften up the medical trade unions and the
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hospital world to make it understand that we are quite reasonable interlocutors.’^ ^
The replacement of Delafosse paved the way for the corps of hospital directors to 
make further inroads into the administrative networks from which it had been previously 
excluded. SNCH personnel were already present within Evin’s coterie. He now turned 
once again to the corps to fill the vacant post of Director of Hospitals. The planning 
orientation of the forthcoming Bill mirrored the demands of the SNCH manifesto. Equally, 
the proposals generated increased responsibilities and strategic roles for hospital directors 
within public hospitals. Their successful implementation relied, in part, upon the co­
operation of hospital directors and the grassroots support that Evin required in public 
hospitals. On 19 April 1989, Gérard Vincent was officially appointed as Director of 
Hospitals: the first hospital director to hold the post.^  ^Given his previous criticisms of the 
Left, his nomination was not appreciated by the Elysée. However, Vincent was imposed 
by Evin who, once again, exploited his support within Matignon. Significantly, nursing 
managers within the SNCH dropped their strike plans on the same day that Vincent was 
appointed to the DH.^*
Thus, driven by the interventionists within his cabinet (not least Couty), Evin 
moved progressively towards the acceptance of hospital reform to ward off short-term 
political difficulties. Triggered by strikes of nurses, his response to these immediate 
constraints strengthened the resources at the disposal of the SNCH. So too did the 
management of the hung parliament resulting from the June 1988 legislative elections and 
events over the summer of 1988. The SNCH and the corps of hospital directors were 
projected into a coalition of modernisers leading the reform of hospital management. The 
trade union's previous dissemination of the orientations contained in the Evin April 
declaration facilitated Vincent’s nomination, an institutional foothold which gave the 
hospital directors’ union entry into the core of decision-makers.
7.2 BUILDING A CONSENSUS FOR REFORM
Through June and July 1989, the DH brought together eight working parties to flesh out 
the implementation of the Evin proposals.^® The members of these groups were drawn 
from public hospitals, departmental and regional health boards and administrative divisions
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within the central ministry. Each working party met on average four times over the 
summer. Their findings were supported by an additional report firom the Mengual group, 
named after its chairperson, which was invited to collaborate in the development of the 
proposals concerning both the reform of hospital planning and the renovation of the tutelle 
exercised over public hospitals. This working party was initially established by Evin under 
the impetus of the projet dadministration, the ministry's response to the government-wide 
initiative for reforming the civil service. It embodied the specific contribution of the 
departmental and regional health boards to the formulation of the Bill: seven of its eleven 
members were directors of DRASS or DDASS.^
Within the DH, Vincent brought together his own team of advisors to oversee the 
formulation of the hospital reform. This team was led by two hospital directors from the 
SNCH, Patrice Barberousse and the former regional organiser, Jean-Luc Chassaniol. 
Chassaniol, with the support of the DH, coordinated the contributions of the working 
parties, reducing the DOS and the DAS to minor supporting roles. However, in keeping 
with Rocardian principles, Evin put in place a pilot committee of practitioners to oversee 
the formulation of the law, which met with woridng groups in September. This committee 
was composed, in the first instance, of Silland, Couty who ‘resigned’ from the cabinet, 
and Peigné who was further integrated into the reform process to weaken the criticisms 
emanating from the INMH. They were later joined by Professor Nicolas, head of 
cardiology at Nantes, and, as the necessary representative of the nursing occupation, by 
Dominique Kerroux, general nurse at Brest and, a former president of the national 
associations of general nurses.^^
At the beginning of October 1989,^  ^the committee took on an acknowledged 
public role because it was officially endorsed by Evin as XhQ Mission d'information, de 
Concertation et de Proposition sur la Réforme hospitalière, commonly known as the 
Couty Commission. In its working practices, the Couty Commission, which was 
constructed as a vehicle for consultation, embodied the méthode R o c a rd It spent over 
seven months, punctuated by the publication of its report on 5 April 1990, interviewing 
150 individuals, visiting 25 establishments, and undertaking 12 regional forums beginning 
in late May 1990 in Lille and ending in Marseille in mid-June.^ This practice of regional 
forums was initiated during the Rocard government's reform of telecommunications. In
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preparation, the members of the Commission were all trained in public relations by 
Jacques Séguéla, who masterminded Mitterrand's presidential campaign in 1981/^ Silland, 
more accustomed to working behind closed doors, remained in Paris to address regional 
feedback as the forums progressed.^
However, after the reports and, with the working parties already in place, the 
Couty Commission was very much seen by Evin and his cabinet as paving the way for the 
hospital reform in local hospitals rather than inspiring its formulation. Indeed, Evin 
publicly aired the emerging legislative details of the Bill for the first time in early 
December 1989 in fi'ont of the assembled ranks of the Fédération Hospitalière de France 
(FHF). From the rostrum, he confirmed the renovation of regional planning, the removal 
of the a priori approval of health boards on all management decisions except budgetary 
issues, as well as increased participation for nurses in the management of hospitals, the 
creation of departments and changes to the management of personnel. More importantly, 
he announced a significant departure firom the general orientations presented in April 
because public hospitals were to be given a new statut, the fi-amework which defined their 
legal status and operations. To provide public hospitals with increased managerial 
flexibility including the possibility of cooperation with new partners, they were to lose 
their designation as public administrative institutions and instead become établissements 
publics de santé (EPS).*^
The emergence of the EPS firamework owed much to the tactical awareness of the 
Evin cabinet who believed it to be a valuable asset in the forthcoming round of inter- 
ministerial negotiations.^ The EPS fi-amework masked a whole series of measures behind 
the principle of whether or not to accept the evolution of the statute governing public 
hospitals. In doing so, it avoided repeated confi-ontations with the DB. Indeed, Evin 
legitimised the EPS fi-amework by having his speech to the FHF sanctioned by Matignon 
four days before the conference.^^ Despite the rejection by the Bérégovoy cabinet of the 
EPS firamework as a source of rigidity rather than flexibility, Evin won an important 
negotiating resource for the forthcoming round of interministerial negotiations. Once 
again, the utility of Evin’s ties to Rocard were heightened as Mitterrand's hold over the 
PS fell apart and rival factions fought for control o f the party.
In keeping with its mission statement, the Couty Commission mirrored Evin’s
247
proposals in favour of contractual regional planning and common accreditation 
mechanisms for public hospitals and private clinics (see Table 7.1 In its April 1990 
report, it supported the removal of controls from public hospitals, leaving them free to 
develop their own strategic responses to the changing needs of the local environment, 
within the confines of the goals identified by regional plans. Indeed, the report echoed 
previous statements that public hospitals would be obliged to formulate development 
s t r a t e g i e s , d'établissement^ in order to compete for service contracts in the areas 
of market expansion identified by regional planning commissions. In line with the declared 
programme of hospital closures and expansions, regional health boards would evaluate the 
development strategies of hospitals, entering into specific contracts with individual 
hospitals. In return, public hospitals would be freed from the extensive a priori controls 
exercised by DDASS on their management arrangements.^^ Inside hospitals, the 
Commission proposed the creation of new nursing structures, services infirmiers, to 
respond to the pressures for the participation of nurses in management. In addition, it 
sought to reinforce the tandem of hospital director and the chair of the hospital medical 
commission. This invigorated strategic apex would together devise the projet médical, the 
starting point for the projet d'établissementP  For Couty and his colleagues, the 
management of hospitals was to become more concerned with dynamic entrepreneurial 
responses to market change and competition to deliver services and local needs.
However, like Peigné’s earlier report, Couty and his colleagues identified the 
expectations of hospital personnel as highest in the areas of resource redistribution 
(stafiSng levels, budgets and investments), and the internal rigidity of hospital management 
(in particular, the weakness of internal communication and absence of responsibility).*^ 
Deciding the appropriate response to these expectations of funding and internal 
organisational change triggered disputes between the members of the Commission. In 
particular. Peigné was on the verge of leaving the Commission on several occasions.*^ He 
relayed the positions of the INMH which refused to discuss legislation before the Rocard 
government dealt satisfactorily with the pay and working conditions of hospital doctors 
and personnel.** Equally, his steadfast support of departments brought him into conflict 
with Nicolas and Couty. Peigné saw departments as the solution to the demands for 
increased participation. However, Nicolas and Couty, supported by the concerns of the
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DH working party to avoid repeating the upheavals o f 1984, believed that there were 
more important issues to deal with and that the Commission had to go beyond the 
fractious debate of the early 1980s .As a result. Peigné ‘little by little, [...] distanced 
himself from the mission.
Table 7.1: Couty report, regional planning for public hospitals and private clinics^ ^
Health Map, Health Organisation Schemes, and Annexes
Fonnnlated by regional consultative bodies, composed of local professionals and health representa- 
tives, and assisted by expert committees.____________________________________________
Health Map to set die optimum level of services and equipment for the region for five years 
Health Organisation Scheme to lay down the allocation and distribution of semces 
Annexe to indicate die creations and closures of beds and services necessary to achieve die targets of 
die health organisation schemes.____________________________________________________
Renovated system of accreditation
Common system of accreditations for public hospitals and private clinics no longer on first-come- 
first-served basis. Introduction of fixed accreditations with periodic evaluation and mmimnm rates of 
activi^ and technical support for die delivery of services._________________________________
Contractualisation
Development contracts to meet objectives of regional plans to be signed between the State and 
hospitals, after consultation with Social Security funds, and in association, if desired, with local 
audiorities
Public hospitals
Public hospitals to propose own projet d'établissement setting out for the next five years its general 
medical and development objectives and associated costings. These plans are based upon die projet 
médical which determines medical objectives in line with the health organisation scheme and 
integrates nursing objectives as defined by the service infirmier.
Freedom to Manage
Fewer decisions referred to departmental health boards, with moves to a posteriori regulation and 
shorts time delays for boards to respond. Justification for rejection of hospital plaimed decisions 
increasingly limited to dneats to budgetary equilibrium of hospitals.
Directors able to sign external contracts without reference to DDASS. Budgets onty controlled al level 
of minimal mass categories and no longer line by line. Reform of traditional division of responsibili­
ties between directors and comptables. Hospitals to be able to undertake commercial activities and 
cooperate widi public and private actors through the signing of grot*pements d ’intérêts publiques.
However, this cleavage between Peigné and his colleagues was offset by Silland's 
support of stringent top-down regional planning which isolated her from her professional
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colleagues who argued for flexible and indicative plans.^  ^Members of the Commission 
accepted that a top-down compulsory framework would ensure that planning targets 
would be met, but recognised difficulties in their application to private clinics and, for that 
matter, to public hospitals.^ The issue of including the private sector within regional plans 
gave ammunition to those in favour of indicative planning. However, as the DH working 
party pointed out in September 1989, an indicative framework would simply leave 
regional health boards at the mercy of the goodwill exercised by hospitals and clinics.®^  
In a compromise which relegated the concerns of Silland, the Couty report argued that 
health organisation plans were to incite change, orientating choices rather than imposing 
them, although hospital-state contracts were to be the privileged means of implementing 
change.Typically, the CNAMTS was to provide an annual report to regional planning 
committees in order to increase the awareness of their members about regional health 
costs.®^
In fact, these cleavages within the Commission mirrored clashes between the DH 
and the DSS; clashes which were fuelled by the institutional interests of the two 
administrative divisions (see Chapter Two). As well as conflicting views over the function 
of the Health Map, the DH consistently clashed with the DSS over the extent of the top- 
down controls to be imposed upon public hospitals by regional planning authorities. Its 
conception of hospital-state contracts as the product more or less of the sum of the 
grassroots development plans of public hospitals clashed with the DSS view which saw 
hospital-state contracts as the tools of the DRASS to implement the necessary 
reconversion of hospital beds. Indeed, the DH led by Vincent was in broad agreement with 
the planning system envisaged by the Couty Commission, with its criticisms directed at 
technical concerns of implementation rather than matters of principle.®  ^However, the 
DH’s acceptance of the necessity of top-down controls on hospital spending was 
tempered by Vincent's demand that planning contracts were supported by additional 
funding and that evaluation of results rather than controls on actions should serve as the 
key means of auditing the management of public hospitals. For instance, Vincent 
advocated annual reports on how hospitals were meeting the targets established in 
contracts.^
As Couty acknowledges, the DSS set out its store much like the DB: ‘We knew
250
that the arguments that they were developing were the arguments that we would hear later 
at interministerial meetings from the mouth of the Budget.’®^ As late as January 1990, the 
DSS argued (like the DB) that a full-blown hospital law was unnecessary or, at the very 
least, that the DH should undertake trials before any confirmation of reform. It questioned 
the feasibility of the planning system conceived by Evin and the Couty Commission, citing 
insufficient resources at the disposal of the DRASS, inadequate indicators and informa­
tion, and persistent doubts over its legal application to private clinics. Much like Silland, 
it wanted to exploit regional planning as the tools to force through the reallocation of 
existing services between hospitals. It attempted to introduce financial criteria into the 
physical planning devised by the Evin cabinet, with additional safeguards to ensure that 
the Health Map and reÿonal plans were determined in line with general medium-term 
economic objectives.^ Regional financial envelopes, based upon the spending of the 
health insurance funds in the region, would operate as overall spending limits.^ These 
regional financial constraints would determine the granting of authorisations to public 
hospitals, rather than regional medical needs. Hospital development programmes would 
have to include indicative financial costings which demonstrated how increased costs 
matched with the expected rise in spending by the health sickness funds.** Finally, it 
argued that the annexe attached to regional plans should establish the required creation 
and closure of beds and services, with the redeployment of hospital personnel managed 
regionally.*  ^Sanctions could then be imposed on hospitals which failed to meet minimal 
safety and technical standards.
In feet, the concerns of the DSS betrayed the inter-co/775 rivalry between the client 
groups of the DH and the DSS. Vincent and his team of fellow directors were concerned 
to protect the prerogatives of hospital directors, even though, within the DH, both medical 
professionals and hospital directors were divorced from the civil administrators issued 
from the ranks of ENA. Protecting its own, the DSS envisaged an interventionist state 
operating through the regional DRASS, despite its criticisms of the resources at the 
disposal of the DRASS. Whatever the alleged qualities of ENSP graduates, the DSS 
doubted that hospital directors could be trusted to control the inflationary spending 
tendencies of hospital doctors. The Mengual Group even raised its concerns about the 
extensive managerial freedom being granted to hospital directors;
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If the wind of enterprise must blow through hospital bureaucracy, it must 
not be transformed into an anarchic laissez-faire which would lead to a 
financial wastage from which it is not sure that the state would exit 
winning/^
Overall, throughout the negotiations at Solidarity, Health and Social Protection, 
the DH hoisted the DSS on its own petard, claiming that its financial planning could not 
work because of the incompatible funding mechanisms of private clinics and public 
hospitals. The government could not oblige private clinics to participate in financial 
planning. The DH’s trump card was the argument that, given the far fi-om stable support 
of the governing majority in the legislature, the announcement of financial planning would 
be badly received in the National Assembly (particularly as it would not apply to private 
clinics).^  ^ Throughout these discussions, the dominant axis of decision-making was 
provided by Silland and Couty and the DH. Hospital directors were at the core of this 
network of actors, through Vincent and his cabinet and the role of Couty, and also 
through Chodorge within the cabinet of Evin. The first draft of the bill was drawn up by 
Silland and a team from the DH^, and was circulating at the beginning of February, 
although the contribution of the Couty Commission was only complete at the end of July 
1 9 9 0  73 jjj as the work of the Couty commission progressed, Evin and the cabinet
came to dominate the formulation of the Bill. The limited supporting role of the 
Commission was badly accepted by the likes of Peigné because Couty, the lynchpin 
between Commission and cabinet, acted as a ‘brake’ on proposals considered to be too 
radical to be put forward.’* However, in the middle of February 1990, the cabine fs  hold 
over the formulation of the Bill intensified.lt rewrote the first draft of the Bill against the 
wishes of Silland who angrily withdrew her support.’  ^For Silland, the cabinet version of 
the Bill went against the philosophy of the Couty Commission which sought to reinforce 
the medical legitimacy of decision-making, thereby avoiding claims of economic 
rationing.’  ^More importantly, even for Silland, it over-centralised the planning process 
and introduced within it multiple sources of rigidity.”  Thus, at the crucial stage of the 
formulation of the Bill, Evin and his cabinet made decisions at the top.
252
The SNCH absent once again
With Vincent having departed to the DH, the union’s national executive, the Bureau 
National (BN), elected Coz to the presidency of the SNCH (see Chapter Four). The 
unexpected election of the former Grenoble 80 stalwart nonetheless ensured continuity 
in the SNCH’s leadership strategy. Coz supported the line pursued by Vincent since 
Macon. His election by the BN further blurred the boundaries between Evin, the DH and 
the SNCH. Coz operated as an informal policy advisor to Evin, and his election brought 
the SNCH firmly into the networks established by Evia^* Vincent was at the DH, Coz was 
president of the SNCH, Paillé had entered the UDC and Couty and Chodorge had entered 
the cabinet. Indeed, with Evin in attendance, the SNCH met at its annual conference at 
Orléans in May 1989 to discuss the theme of the projet Rétablissement and take pleasure 
in the adoption by the Rocard government of its manifesto of regional planning and 
contractualisation.^’ However, few hospital directors were involved within the June and 
July DH working parties, with only one leading personality of the corps (Omnès) in any 
of the working groups.*®
Following the April 1989 declaration by Evin, the SNCH established its own 
working party to draw up its public response to the rewriting of the 1970 Hospital Law. 
In principle, the working party, with its membership of ten, was a fairly open structure 
which aimed to mobilise contributions fi*om the regions to fuel its own internal debate. 
However, as work progressed, both the difiSculties in mobilising the regions and the 
pressures on members of the union working party meant that it became dominated by a 
core of decision-makers orbiting around Coz: "Very, very quickly, it was reduced to three 
or four people, people like Roland Ollivier, Christian Paire, Michel Pallet.’'*^  Like Coz, 
OUivier, the leader of the working party, was both a former member of Grenoble 80 and 
a supporter of the doctrine of hôpital-entreprise. In this instance, his relationship with Coz 
replaced the former tandem of Vincent and Paillé at the head of the SNCH.
The union working party presented its findings to the BN in late October 1989.*  ^
These findings were finalised when they were debated without incident by the BN and 
regional delegates in early December.*^ Within the working party, there was little 
disagreement over the proposals. Endorsing the new public management discourse of the 
‘right to manage’, its report conceived organisationally of hospital directors as the
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strategic apex of public hospitals. Indeed, the bulk of the proposals did not depart from 
policy platforms raised intermittently at previous conferences (See Table 7.2). In line with 
past commitments, the working party accepted the necessity of bottom-up regional plans, 
bolstered by development contracts between hospitals and local health boards, thereby 
paving the way for a posteriori evaluation and the removal of budgetary and personnel 
management controls. However, the SNCH sought the transformation of public hospitals 
into Etablissments Publics Industriels et Commercials (EPIC) or, at least, the right of 
hospitals to create commercial services or enter into common activities with public or 
private partners.^ This demand emerged from the new governing alliance of Coz, Ollivier 
and Paire which swung the SNCH towards the autonomist positions rejected by Vincent 
(see Chapter Four). The SNCH now argued that only with the legal character of EPICs 
could public hospitals possess the increased managerial freedom necessary to compete 
with private clinics. This freedom was not necessarily guaranteed by the vague EPS 
statute proposed by Evin.
Table 7.2: SNCH Proposals, The Right to Manage
Hospitals to become Établissement Public Économique et Commercial.
Free management of personnel, allowing local recruitment procedures, including incentive 
schemes, and ending controls on staflSng level.
Less control on frnanacial management and signing of external contracts, with regional 
Court of Accounts acting as external auditor. End to division between ordonnateur and 
comptable or at least, agence comptable.___________________________________
Assured role for regional committees in formulation of regional plans, widi guaranteed 
influence of regional councils. Regional plans to apph  ^to both public and private sectors.
Elevation of evaluation and monitoring procedures.
Facilitation of public-private partnerships and mergers of establishments.
However, with its discourse of regional planning and contractualisation accepted 
within the Evin ministry, the Coz leadership attacked the continued imbalance between 
hospital and private clinics and prioritised statutory changes to the representation of the 
corps. In addition, it advocated equal treatment by government of public hospitals and 
private clinics. In the short-term, this meant the modification of the global budget through
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the harmonisation of the funding of public and private hospitals. In the long-term, it 
demanded the introduction of the fee-for-service funding inherent within diagnosis-related 
groups, the PMSI programme. The union’s acceptance of PMSI came belatedly at 
Reims.Finally, the SNCH demanded the creation of a specific administrative consulta­
tive body within public hospitals, a collège des cadres}^ Like Vincent before him, Coz 
was unable to ignore the pressures for change emanating from the rank-and-file. These 
demands responded to grassroots members’ pressures not only for pecuniary benefits fi*om 
their leadership role in hospitals, but also for an end to the competitive advantage allotted 
to private clinics by their continued use of the patient-day rate. In the first week of 
September 1989, Coz met with Evin to plead for the harmonisation of the financial rules 
governing the public and private sectors, indicating that a situation existed where on the 
same pitch one team was playing rugby whilst the other played football.*  ^However, the 
application of the global budget to private clinics had been ruled out by Evin at the launch 
of the reform.**
In fact, the Coz leadership entered into a ‘phoney war’ with the DH and the Evin 
cabinet where its main concerns were improved pay and working conditions for the 
corps^ Its efforts to radicalise the legislation were nullified, despite its protestations, by 
the union’s association and general agreement with the formulation of the Bill. As early 
as September 1989, these concerns were evident as Coz offered to extend the perfor­
mance evaluation of general directors to all directors in exchange for improved pay and 
conditions and increased managerial freedom.^ The membership of the union was 
increasingly pushing for pay rewards because the gains by nurses diminished the relative 
scale of their own gains made in 1988, which in any case, focused upon the expansion of 
the first two classes of hospital directors. Coz demanded the extension of diverse bonuses 
for hospital directors, trading with the government over improvements, for example, to 
the bonuses of hospital directors in return for the ending their perk of buying low-cost 
provisions from public hospitals. Given his public ties to Evin and Vincent, Coz was 
obliged to deliver improved pay and conditions or risk being labelled the ‘puppet’ of the 
Evin ministry and the DH. However, at Dijon, Coz reminded SNCH delegates that 
whatever the demands for pecuniary gains, they could not be achieved without the 
organisational transformation of public hospitals (see Chapter Four).^^
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Within the Vincent cabinet, the SNCH had close links to Chassaniol who, along 
with Baiherousse, was recognised by the Coz leadership as a valuable connection to the 
DH.^^ The SNCH also met regularly with the cabinet and, like other unions, with the 
Couty Commission. However, as negotiations progressed, the SNCH leadership believed 
the ties with Evin and his ministry simply ‘eased their [members of the cabinet] 
listen ing .T he SNCH leadership enjoyed difficult relations with Vincent who did not 
espouse the autonomist stances pursued under Coz.^  ^ Vincent’s statist orientations were 
out of step with the liberalising thesis newly adopted by Coz. The DH now pursued a 
philosophy more in tune with the 200 Propositions and the managerial culture espoused 
by Mncent within the Assistance Publique de Paris. Indeed, \Tncent was quick to point 
out that he wanted ‘to give a greater freedom of action to hospitals without [..] the state 
abandoning all control. IVe never been lax and I never will be.’^ * For the corps of hospital 
directors, he had to some extent become the poacher turned gamekeeper.
As the demand for hospitals to be reclassified as EPICs demonstrated, the union’s 
differences with Evin were defined by the extent of managerial autonomy to be attributed 
to hospital directors. The SNCH dismissed the proposed mechanism of regional planning 
as rigid and top-down: the absence of democratic or bottom-up involvement contradicting 
the logic of the projet d'établissement. In addition, it condemned the limited possibility 
of co-operation for public hospitals, the ill-defined roles of actors and commissions within 
hospitals, and the absence of evaluation. Yet, in keeping with its ‘phoney war’ with Evin, 
the Coz leadership welcomed the principal orientations of the reform and settled upon 
cautious support for the rewriting of the 1970 Hospital Law. It relegated the findings of 
the Couty Commission as overly ‘prudent’ or a ‘lost opportunity’, ultimately positioning 
itself as a foil to the DH to cement its positions against the DSS within the ministry. 
Typically, Ollivier interpreted the Couty report as making progress, but not going far 
enough, although he recognised, for example, the advances in managerial freedom and 
the beginnings of a collège des cadres?^
It was left to the conférence of hospital directors from general hospitals to 
spearhead the discourse oîhôpital-entreprise. More than its regional hospital counterpart, 
this consultative body was under the control of ENSP entrepreneurs from the SNCH 
throughout the period of consultation by the Couty Commission. Indeed, Trazzini became
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its president in January 1988 (see Chapter Four) and assembled around himself fellow 
entrepreneurs, in particular, Philippe Domy. No longer constrained within the SNCH 
leadership, Trazzini swung the conférence towards the policies of hôpital-entreprise with 
little concern for the difficulties of elite-follower relations within the corps. The 
conférence thereby endorsed the modelling of the organisation of public hospitals upon 
private enterprises. It also advocated changing the statute of public hospitals to that of 
EPICs, allowing partnerships with private competitors, and transforming the internal 
personnel consultative body into a private sector style enterprise committee. The culture 
of contractualisation which permeated state-hospital development projects would 
necessitate the transformation of hospital director into heads of enterprise; the conférence 
aimed to make sure that directors had the tools to undertake such a transformation.^
However, there were few partners for the SNCH to call upon in its lobbying to 
radicalise the proposals of Evin. The reactionary federation of hospital doctor trade 
unions, the Coordination, marked the Bill with the tag of economic rationalisation, 
increased centralisation and missed opportunity. It rejected the top-down regulation of the 
Health Map with its weak consultative committees, as well as the weak autonomy of 
hospitals and the timid harmonisation of the public and private sectors, but targeted 
primarily the absence of a package of social measures tied to investment and improve­
ments in the pay and conditions of hospital personnel.^ This concern over social measures 
was also voiced by the INNBi, along with the retreat from the introduction of depart­
ments. Although Peigné had resigned from its presidency, because of his presence on the 
Couty Commission, the INMH was forced to tread a tight line between opposition and 
support for the Couty Commission.^ However, Peigné's successor, Stanislas Johannet, 
was unable to drag the rank-and-file into a modernist support for the Bill. Thus, hospital 
doctor trade unions retreated into statutory demands, much like the SNCH. Indeed, the 
consultative body for regional hospitals boycotted the forums held by the Couty 
Commission.^ ®®
After preliminary discussions, the SNCH deliberately banked on the parliamentary 
debate to advance its positions. The Coz leadership recognised that the Rocard 
government would seek to entice UDC deputies away from the opposition and believed 
itself to be in a position to exploit its privileged connections with Paillé. ^ ®^ However, Coz
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remained constrained by both the re-emergence of pecuniary demands on the agenda of 
the SNCH, and the absence of coalition partners. Nonetheless, the SNCH leadership now 
faced a different strategic position than with previous reforms. The boundaries between 
the SNCH and the administrative networks of the ministry were blurred and the SNCH 
leadership was to all intents and purposes publicly keen to recognise not only the origin 
of the Couty proposals, but also its basic agreement with them. Its discourse had in many 
ways been ‘stolen’. Yet, at the same time, the corps of hospital directors was boosted by 
Evin, not through the awarding of ‘insider’ status to the SNCH or corporatist style 
arrangements, but through the elevation of key individuals within the ENSP generation. 
This division between the SNCH and these individuals made it difficult for the SNCH 
leadership to advance its more recent demands.
7.3 BATTLES BETWEEN MINISTRIES AND CORPS
At the end of November 1989, the Finance Ministry criticised the absence of inter­
ministerial consultation by Evin and his cabinet}^ Preliminary meetings subsequently took 
place in January and June 1990 between the DH, the DSS and, the DB, the DP and the 
DCP from within the Finance and Budget Ministries.'®  ^However, the DH deliberately 
kept interministerial consultation to a minimum because it was wary that preliminary 
discussions might compromise the orientations of the law and reduce the DH’s margins 
for manoeuvre in future negotiations.'®* The first round of interministerial consultation 
only began in earnest in mid-July 1990, proceeding through August to end on 2 0  
September 1990.'®^
The negotiations were held at Matignon, chaired by members of Rocard's cabinet. 
They were attended, for the most part, by the leading members of the cabinet: Bruntière, 
Tabuteau, Couty, Chodorge and Atlan. Members of the DH, including Chassaniol and 
Vincent, participated intermittently. The Evin cabinet were joined in negotiation by 
advisors from the cabinets and administrative divisions of the Civil Service, Education and 
Interior ministries. However, the primary axis of negotiations was that between the Evin 
cabinet and the DH, and the cabinets of the Finance Ministry, its junior partner the 
Budget Ministry, and their administrative divisions, the DB and the DCP: ‘They had
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opinions on every article, including medical organisation which could appear quite 
surprising. That's what they were told at M a t ig n o n .Indeed, at the first meeting, the 
Rocard cabinet put in place an interministerial working party to iron out the differences 
between the rival conceptions of the DB, the DCP, the DH and the Evin cabinet
As it had done fi*om the outset, the DB first sought to block the progress of the 
Bill, requesting a series of trials before pushing ahead with legislation. These delaying 
tactics were quickly rebuffed by the Prime Minister's cabinet who made it clear that the 
government had reserved a place in its parliamentary timetable for the first reading of the 
Bill in December 1990.^ ®* With the timetable dictated by Matignon, the DB consequently 
retreated back to its criticisms of the regional planning system; echoing the concerns of 
the DSS, and to a certain extent those of Silland, and arguing for coercive rather than 
contractual mechanisms. It condemned the physical planning advocated by the Evin 
cabinet and the DH which it believed would be superseded by technical progress, plagued 
by political pressures and become unmanageable as it grew in sophistication. It further 
argued that the over-reliance on physical planning would not control spending, would pass 
smaller hospitals by, and would not prepare public hospitals to compete against their 
private counterparts. So like the DSS, the DB advocated that the dynamism and coercion 
needed to redistribute services could only be provided by financial planning constraints.
To force through the necessary closures of hospital wards and beds, the DB 
advocated the creation of independent regional authorities.^^® These regional structures, 
very much the reproduction of regional Assistance Publiques, would regroup the staff of 
existing health boards and be led by elite civil servants appointed by the Council of 
Ministers. Each regional structure would negotiate its annual budget directly with the DB, 
DSS and the DH. Through the distribution of budgets to hospitals, the region structure 
would subsequently determine the necessary closures, redevelopments and conversions 
within its area, in the process, monitoring budgets and managing staffing levels. The DB 
did not fail to emphasise that such a restructuring avoided the redefinition of the statute 
governing public hospitals, and delayed legislation through the necessity to undertake 
trials in two regions. More importantly, it gave the corps of Inspecteurs des Finances an 
opening into the management posts of the public hospital service - threatening at once 
hospital directors, heads of DDASS and DRASS, and Prefects deemed by the DB as too
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busy to coordinate new regional structures. Indeed, the DB contended that these regional 
Assistances Publiques ‘would benefit, of course, from the assistance of the civil servants 
of the DDASS, but equally, from the contribution of people having different backgrounds 
and approaches.’” *
Such 'mitr-corps rivalry structured the opposition of the DB and DCP to the
extension of the hospital directors’ financial freedom, particularly the possibility of
placing funds on the open market. Any redefinition of the traditional roles of ordonnateurs
and comptables threatened the clients of the DCP, who made the defence of the status quo
a ^cousus belli of the Finance Ministiy’**^ (see Chapter Two).The DCP feared the
atomisation of financial management systems within public hospitals, which it argued
would weaken the capacity of central government to oversee the financial management
of public hospitals. Equally, it stressed that Evin’s proposals would transfer the financial
costs o f4000 civil servants onto public hospitals and the Social Security funds with the
additional risk of provoking social unrest over changing pay and conditions.*” Indeed, it
claimed that it was possible to loosen the rules governing comptables and ordonnateurs
within existing arrangements.
As in most negotiations, Evin and his cabinet sacrificed what they perceived to be
minor concerns to the DB and the DCP in order to ensure the overall coherence of the
proposed legislation. For example, they retreated from the conflict surrounding the
reorganisation of the comptable within public hospitals. Here, Vincent argued that the
changes presented by the DCP were not substantial. As predicted by the Evin cabinet, its
bargaining resources were increased by the prior agreement to the adoption of the EPS:
‘in 1990 at the time that we did the bill, we brought out the EPS, [and] the 
[Finance] Ministry tore into it with an unbelievable violence and we said:
"We worked on this together, it's a framework", [...] While we were at it, 
we won all the rulings on it.’**'*
However, health and social affairs had to suffer the removal from the Bill of the right of
hospital directors to place funds on financial markets. The Finance Ministry did not reject
the placing of funds, but believed that the remuneration of funds should remain within
existing controls and institutions. Health accepted changes in the wording of the article,
but sought to maintain the article for ‘effect’. The exact measures under the article were
left to be decided in the Council of State by decree.**^
In fact, the Evin cabinet believed the coherence of the Bill rested upon its capacity
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to refute the DB’s criticisms of the proposed system of regional planning. The cabinet 
thus sought to swing debate away from cost containment towards the issue of service 
delivery, pointing out that the aim of the Health Map was to isolate need rather than 
match the level of services to the resources of the Social Security funds. In any case, it 
argued that the combination of both projet medical and projet d!établissement provided 
both financial and organisational approaches. It cast doubt on the Assistance Publique 
as an exemplary case of hospital management, and dismissed regional Assistances 
Publiques as an unnecessary undermining of national-local policy coordination. These 
arguments were supported by the Civil Service Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior 
which, in particular, sought to defend the interests of ‘its’ corps of prefects against the 
expansionist aspirations of the Inspection des Finances. The Interior Ministry argued that 
the DB’s proposals undermined the principle of the unity of representation of the state as 
embodied in the office of the Prefect."^ Like the Evin cabinet, it also poured scorn on the 
managerial efficiency of Assistance Publique, arguing that individual hospitals under 
such management structures had little or no incentive to improve their own billing and 
accounting procedures. It claimed that the DB proposals would reduce the administrative 
autonomy of public hospitals whilst allowing mediocre hospitals to live off the back of the 
more dynamic establishments."^
However, alongside this vocal support from the Interior ^frnistry, the Evin 
cabinet exploited the parliamentary concerns of Matignon and its desire to entice centrist 
deputies to support the legislation. Typically, it stressed that to prioritize only financial 
concerns within the functions of the Health Map, as argued by the DB, would not only 
send a disastrous message to the National Assembly, but would also have no medical 
justification or legitimacy for hospital personnel. Indeed, the cabinet assumed that the 
National Assembly would not accept a Bill creating regional Assistances Publiques which 
were in opposition to decentralisation and, the participation of mayors and boards of 
trustees in local decision-making."^ The DB thus won few significant concessions because 
Matignon lined up behind the Evin cabinet ‘the Prime Minister practically accepted all 
that we proposed.
Evin and the DH entered the parliamentary debate with its Bill relatively unscathed 
as the corps of hospital directors, or rather Couty and Vincent, fought off the territorial
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aspirations of the Inspecteurs des Finances. However, the interests of the corps did not 
seemingly dictate all the positions adopted by the DH. The DB argued in favour of 
increased managerial responsibilities for hospital directors, particularly in relation to 
boards of trustees. It was the DH that rejected this proposal, arguing that the legitimacy 
of individuals on boards of trustees made such a course of action im possible.Such 
incidents revealed the complicated nature of the relationship between the directors inside 
the ministry and those inside the SNCH’s leadership.
7.4 PARLIAMENTARY CONSTRAINTS AND 
GOVERNMENT CONCESSIONS
In October 1990, Matignon appointed Bruno Durieux to the post of Junior Minister of 
Health. Rumours of the imminent appointment of a Junior Nfinister had been circulating 
since January when Evin signalled his desire to lighten his ministerial workload in order 
to devote more time to his duties as Rocard's lieutenant within the PS.*^ Durieux, a 
minister of ouverture, was drawn from the ranks of the CDS and was a close ally of 
Raymond Barre, the former Prime Minister. Barre now advocated a constructive case-by- 
case examination of legislation proposed by the Rocard government. Durieux’s 
appointment marked the first stq) in Rocard's attempts to avoid the use of Article 49.3 to 
force the Bill through the National Assembly; a measure which would vividly demonstrate 
the failing majority and limitations of the méthode Rocard. Indeed, Durieux's own political 
existence became entwined with his ability to win the support of sufficient UDC deputies 
to avoid the use of Article 49.3.
Coming after the final round of interministerial negotiations, the new minister’s 
arrival was too late to influence the nature of the Bill to be presented to the National 
Assembly. The Evin Bill was finally adopted, little changed by its passage through the 
statutory consultative bodies, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 19 December 
1990.^^  ^ It subsequently began its passage through the National Assembly on 10 April 
1991 monitored by both Evin and Durieux, who appointed another hospital director, 
Patrice Mordelet, to his cabinet. The UDC held out the possibility that its support could 
be forthcoming if its amendments were accepted by the Rocard government. Méhaignerie, 
its leader in the Assembly, intimated that the UDC would vote for the Bill.^ ^^  Neverthe-
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less, Mitterrand authorised the use of Article 49.3 on the opening day of the debate in the 
National Assembly.
The hesitations of the UDC leadership triggered a tug of war between the Rocard
government and the RPR and the UDF. Evin and Durieux tried to lure the UDC away
from the RPR and the UDF. The RPR’s negotiations were led by Debré, the former leader
of Solidarité Médicale. He strived to maintain the allegiance of the UDC to the Right and
thereby force Rocard to retreat towards the use of Article 49.3. Indeed, on the opening
day of the parliamentary debate, the RPR and the UDF concluded an electoral pact with
the UDC; a day later, it dragged the UDC further back into its ranks by laying down a
vote of confidence in the government over its involvement in the Urbatechnic financial
affair. Caught in the middle, the UDC maximised the number of its amendments
accepted by the Rocard government and underlined its importance to the Right. The
interministerial decisions taken at Matignon were superseded by new concerns:
‘Suddenly, the debate became political and Matignon reasoned differently 
and all the technical aspects of the Finance Ministry lost weight in relation 
to the political objectives of the Prime Minister of the day.’^^ ^
In fact, Durieux was intent on leaving his personal stamp on the Bill, if possible 
in the fields of planning and evaluation. In March, as he tabled possible amendments, 
he returned to the issue of the internal organisation of public hospitals, trying to cultivate 
medical support by enabling hospitals (and not the Minister) to designate heads of services 
and redefine the structure of departments.^^’ However, this measure was unpopular with 
medical trade unions, provoking Durieux to offer to withdraw it.^ °^ The paths open to 
Durieux were limited because he enjoyed little support within his own party. The UDC 
announced that it would run a candidate against Durieux in the following legislative 
elections, maintaining that he had joined the presidential majority despite his claims to 
have retained his CDS membership card.*^  ^The majority against Durieux within the CDS 
had ‘visibly no reason to give any presents to [their] former centrist friend held up today 
for public humiliation for “treason”.
For its part, the SNCH proposed 41 amendments to the Bill.^ ^^  These amendments 
proposed both further bottom-up consultation throughout the definition of regional 
planning targets and extended managerial autonomy for public hospitals. Planning was to 
be opened to local politicians and representatives in bottom-up plans which devised
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regional objectives after consultation and the completion of hospital development projects. 
Indeed, for the SNCH, contractualisation should imply reciprocal obligations and rights 
by all involved. The counterpart of such responsibility, evaluation, was absent in the 
SNCH’s view. They called for the accreditation of hospitals by regional state-led 
organisations for limited time periods like private clinics. Equally, in defence of the 
conception of hôpital-entreprise, the hospital director trade union pursued its claims for 
fiirther public-private harmonisation and the transformation of hospitals into EPICs, with 
participation in public-private partnerships, such as groupements d'intérêts économiques 
(GIEs) or sociétés d'économie mixte, where directors could alone manage accounts and 
place funds. These primary proposals of the SNCH sat alongside a plethora of managerial 
innovations and time-honoured concerns: the separation of fixed and unfixed costs, the 
simplification of budgets, the creation of a collège des cadres, the presentation of hospital 
development projects by directors and the involvement of directors in the renewal of heads 
of services and the appointment of hospital doctors.
Within the rounds of parliamentary negotiations, the SNCH was advantaged by 
the fact that the negotiations of the UDC were led by Jean-Pierre Foucher, the former 
minister, Jacques Barrot and, most importantly, Dominique Paillé. The UDC adopted 
many of the union’s amendments, hardly surprising given Paillé’s network of links within 
the c o r p s The UDC trio prioritised amendments which increased the managerial 
autonomy of public hospitals through reductions in the controls by DDASS and the 
transformation of hospitals into EPICs or, at least, the right of hospitals to undertake 
GIEs.^* However, Paillé was to all intents and purposes constrained by the responsibili­
ties of his office as general secretary of the UDC: ‘He played his own personal card [...] 
his priority was to manage his own g r o u p . T h i s  said, he took on a leading role in a 
network of ENSP directors leading negotiations. Chassaniol paid him daily visits on behalf 
of Vincent who thought that, as Director of Hospitals, he should not be seen taking on an 
overt role in policy-making.
Thus, the progress of the Bill through the National Assembly became the concern 
of a clique of ENSP hospital directors. Indeed, although negotiations were publicly led 
by the ministers, concessions were hammered out by the directors involved in the 
formulation of the Bill. The work of the two cabinets was coordinated by Couty and
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Chodorge who belonged nominally to both cabinets. Vincent at the DH exploited the
rivalry between the two cabinets to generate his own freedom of manoeuvre, particularly
since Vincent, Chassaniol and Barberousse, all benefited from the knowledge accumulated
since the early stages of the formulation of the Bill.^ *^ Couty worked hand in hand with
Chassaniol who acted as a shuttle between the various individuals. ‘It progressively
became a law of hospital directors since there was Chassaniol, Vincent on the DH side [...]
Couty, Mordelet and myself [Chodorge] in the cabinets. Paillé’  ^contribution simply
completed the circle.
With these directors in place, the Coz leadership did not impose any collective
organisational response by the SNCH as a whole in the consultative lobbies of the
National Assembly. Once again, it pursued its strategy of being an external spur towards
more radical reform, attempting more to influence future policy commitments and
maintain the SNCH at the forefront of debates rather than to acquire short-term gains. For
example, the Coz leadership was aware that the EPIC framework was never considered
by the Evin cabinet, the DH or the PS, to be a viable alternative to the EPS. It was thus
left to particular directors to lobby politicians personally: ‘It was individuals, [...], like
Christian Paire who played a role in the shadows. But, it was not the SNCH as an
institution.’^ ^Rather than the SNCH, the conférence led by Trazzini extensively lobbied
the National Assembly. Its priority was to force through the acceptance of hospital
participation in groupements d'intérêt économiques. Once again, its lobbying was
organised through the formal channels of discussions with the Commission of Social
Affairs, but also through individual initiatives at the local level:
‘Me, I brought together Senators in Picardie and the MPs, chairs of the 
boards o f trustees who are elected politicians and that I did on the basis 
o f the reports of the conférence.’ '^^ ^
The conférence targeted UDC deputies, aware that within the UDC, both Barrot and
Méhaignerie were embarrassed by the possibility of not voting for the law.^ '*^  As Chodorge
argues, the Coz leadership was more concerned with applying pressure to obtain the
settlement over hospital director bonuses which would satisfy the pecuniary demands of
the rank-and-file.
The first tentative approaches of the Evin cabinet and Durieux towards the UDC 
came through the deposition of three amendments clarifying the differences between
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services and departments whilst imposing common appointment procedures for ail head 
doctors. The amendments were deposited in the name of the PS because the 
government believed that amendments emanating from the party would be looked upon 
more favourably than those from the pen of Durieux.^ "^  ^ They identified internal 
organisation as a principal area for negotiation and compromise because it was of 
symbolic importance to the competing interests of professions within public hospitals, but 
these issues were not considered by the Evin team to be essential to the success of the 
Bill.^^  ^ Hospital doctor trade unions also targeted internal organisation as their key 
battlefield, with the medical lobby within the National Assembly mobilised against any 
efforts to increase the responsibilities of hospital directors: ‘They were not in the RPR or 
the PS, they were PU-PH [hospital doctors] and they were saying: "We not going to let 
ourselves be taken for a ride by the hospital directors”. A t  one point during the 
parliamentary session, there were just 12 doctors in the Assembly chamber debating the 
Bill.^^*
Although seeking to broker a negotiation with the UDC, the Rocard government 
was keen to balance concessions to the UDC against the demands of the PS which refused 
to sanction the dilution of departments’ distinctiveness and the transformation of public 
hospitals into EPICs. Unlike the Rocard government, the PS preferred to use Article 49.3 
rather than to dilute the Bill.^ '*^  With the approach of regional and cantonal elections, the 
bipolarisation of the French electoral system risked, in any case, denying the UDC 
leadership its parliamentary autonomy, forcing it back to the RPR-UDFopposition and its 
traditional electorate. These concerns were amplified by the weight of financial scandals 
which hung over the government and Rocard’s continued tenure at Matignon. While the 
first reading of the Evin Bill was taking place, Mitterrand obliged Rocard to withdraw 
plans to reform the electoral system for regional elections. Bérégovoy suspended all 
debate on the reform of saving banks.
This said, the Evin team began to bow to the demands of the UDC, with Evin 
intervening on at least two occasions to attempt to force through agreement on planning 
and systems of accreditation. Opposition to the proposed reforms of planning and internal 
organisation led Durieux to reserve voting on these articles, having granted concessions 
to the centrists. Over time, the Rocard government agreed to the inclusion of GIE forms
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of co-operation for public hospitals and made concessions on internal organisation/^^ It 
accepted the right of appeal to the Mnister over regional plans and acknowledged the 
creation of regional medical commissions to evaluate hospitals/^^ In addition, it agreed 
to the UDC demands to reduce further the controls exercised by DDASS and to shorten 
the delays to control financial decisions. It also agreed to hospitals raising supplementary 
funds through, for example, the exploitance of patents. These concessions went some 
way to responding to the set of amendments tabled by the UDC. In fact, at the end of 
April, the UDC spent an hour meeting with representatives of the PS and government, but 
although ‘it folded, it did not b r e a k . A t  the same time, whilst the UDC persisted in its 
demands for concessions on internal organisation and the representation of private clinics 
on planning committees, Dd^ré busied himself attempting to organise a vote of confidence 
in the government should it employ Article 49.3.^^
However, the negotiations of an agreement with the UDC were increasingly 
hampered by the fallout of the financial afi&irs surrounding the Rocard government. On 
22 ^)iil, Durieux feced with no majority, delayed any vote on the Bill. At the end of the 
afternoon, the UDC made known its opposition to the whole of the Bill (Evin having 
spent the whole day locked in discussions).^’* Barrot acknowledged that the hospital 
reform suffered fi*om the concurrent resurgence of the alleged scandals and aimounced 
that the UDC would not associate itself with any possible vote of confidence if Rocard 
was to invoke Article 49.3.^’^  Faced with little choice but to invoke Article 49.3, Durieux 
delayed not only the vote, but also the discussion of the internal organisation of public 
hospitals.^^ With the opposition wedded to the distinction between services and 
departments, Durieux, taking his opportunity to mark the text, proposed the Durieux 
amendment, which became known as the canendement libertaire. Drawn up by Couty, 
Vincent, Durieux and Laurent, his directeur du cabinet, on a Sunday afternoon, this 
amendment gave hospitals the possibility to adopt any model of organisation they 
wished. It was a last ditch attempt to bring the UDC back on board.
However, the UDC still considered the Bill to be too far removed fi*om its 
concerns, failing to respond to the issues of improved representation for private clinics in 
regional planning committees, ignoring the managerial autonomy of public hospitals in the 
statute of EPS, and under-representing nurses in decision-making bod ies .Wi th  no
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majority, Rocard retreated to the use of Article 49.3 on 29 April 1991. The government 
accepted all previously negotiated amendments despite opposition from the With 
no vote of confidence raised by the RPR and the UDF, the Bill was considered adopted 
in its first reading on 30 April 1991.^^ Immediately, the urgency and the centrality of the 
debate for the opposition dissipated. After a failure to agree common amendments by 
representatives of the Senate and National Assembly, its second reading in the National 
Assembly brought no recourse to Article 49.3, because Raymond Barre and three centrists 
abstained and the government gained the support of independent deputies and of the 
centrist deputy, Gérard Vignoble. When the Bill returned to the Assembly for its final 
vote, Rocard had left Matignon and the text had an uneventful passage through the 
Assembly enjoying the continued support of Vignoble and independent deputies.
CONCLUSIONS
In evaluating the influence of an pressure group or a profession on policy-making, it is 
important to adopt a realistic assessment of how much state and public administrative 
arrangements can ever approximate the optimal point of any single vested interest, rather 
than balancing out different concerns. The rise of hospital directors to a central position 
within both the internal management of hospitals and the wider systems of fimding and 
state management controls, gave the corps and the SNCH a particularly all-encompassing 
view of how hospital reform should be undertaken. But, as the grassroots pressure within 
SNCH demonstrated, hospital directors were no different from any of the other 
professional groups and union interests in mixing together ‘philosophical’ arguments for 
overall system configurations and more directly self-interested pleading for group 
advantages and concessions. Thus, it was inherently likely that the SNCH would have 
points of disagreement with the eventual law, because it must necessarily take account of 
a wider range of interests. The SNCH had also moved on in terms of its professional 
discourse, pushing ahead the development of new policies and options to which it had to 
be committed if it was not to lose any agenda-setting capability for the future.
It would be easy to conclude from the SNCH’s formal absence from directly 
influential negotiations with, or demand-setting, to government that the union and the
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corps were somehow inessential to the hospital reform, and that, in the explicit demands 
they did formulate (such as EPIC status), the union was unsuccessful. Apparently, the 
union’s influence qua union only weighed on the debate over whether hospital directors 
or hospital doctors presented the projet médical and the projet d'établissement. Such an 
interpretation would be fundamentally wrong-headed, however, because the agenda for 
the 1991 reform was set fundamentally in the 1980s by the development of the union’s and 
the corps’ internal discourses, and because hospital directors were the key people 
responsible for securing the surprisingly consensual institutionalization of this discourse 
into law. The SNCH so much ‘owned’ the reforms that were implemented by Evin, his 
cabinet and the DH that their formal subscription to more radical reorganization 
possibilities was effectively side-lined.
The informal influence of the union cadres and the profession’s internal cohesion 
as a key actor in health policy networks both reached an ^ g e e  during the hospital reform 
process, especially with the appointment of Vincent to serve as the head of the DH. With 
this key agency on-side, the whole reform process successfully recovered ground tracked 
over back and forth unsuccessfully by apparently much stronger governments of the 
1980s. Together with hospital director colleagues in the various cabinets and advising 
parties in the National Assembly, Vincent played a key role in seeing his own ideas bearing 
fruit, leading one interviewee to conclude: ‘The 1991 law was the law of Gérard 
V i n c e n t . I n  particular, the negotiations between Evin and the UDC during the first 
reading in the National Assembly were led on both sides by hospital directors of the ENSP 
generation united by common aflSliations. So, it was little wonder that the Evin cabinet 
and the DH were able to reorientate measures previously lost to Finance Ministry at 
Matignon, in particular the inclusion of the possibilities of co-operation for public 
hospitals.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CHANGES IN NETWORKS AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS
By the start of the 1990s, the corps of hospital directors occupied some of the highest 
paid posts in the French civil service. Its ENSP training programme mirrored the 27 
month cursu of ENA and, one of its own key figures, Vincent, was the first hospital 
director and the first graduate of the ENSP assistanat to become the head of the 
Direction des Hôpitaux (DH). This consolidation of the corps took almost 30 years, 
commencing with the creation of the ENSP programme for hospital directors in the early 
1960s. It continued through the affirmation of the managerial functions of hospital 
directors and the expansion of the assistanat generation in the 1970s. And, it culminated 
in the 1980s with the 1988 revision of the terms and conditions of hospital directors and 
the SNCH’s rise to policy infiuence behind Vincent and the hospital law of 1991. These 
two phenomena symbolised the maturity of the corps and of the ENSP programme, the 
full institutionalisation of the corps and the union within the policy network, and the 
passage of its discourse into official policy.
This chapter stands back fi*om the twists and turns of the SNCH’s policy and 
performance throughout the hospital management reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s 
to examine how the corps emeiged and came to occupy so critical a position in a crowded 
policy field, in con^etition with so many long-established professional interests, inside the 
national and regional administration of the state, and inside the hospital system at a local 
level. Policy communities and networks are often treated in a rather static manner, and it 
is a standard criticism of the policy networks founding literature that it provides little idea 
of the dynamics of network change, the emergence of new dominant discourses and the 
creation of new coalitions. The literature’s emphasis on stability and incremental change, 
on the ability of policy networks and communities to damp down cycling of policy 
changes, and to stabilize the otherwise chaotic and ever-shifting coalitions forecast by 
rational choice theory - all these are advantages. But how then do policy networks ever 
get to be fundamentally reconfigured? How do new groups with new ideas emerge and
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acquire influence?
The short answer charted in these pages is that major policy changes often are a 
bit chaotic, with a good deal of tracking back and forward in short term*wobbles’. In the 
French context (and in Britain) powerful central government departments often tackle 
major long-run problems and the need for structural reforms by trying first one thing and 
then another. But, behind these policy vacillations and often partly failed innovations, 
there can be a longer-run dynamic of more coherent and consistent change. These 
strategic shifts can emerge when actors at difièrent levels get ‘lucky’ by finding coalitional 
partners with congruent interests, whose combined and complementary efforts can help 
them achieve a fundamental restucturing of a policy network. Normally central 
government ministers and departments are severely constrained in their efforts to push 
through reform in health care systems by the entrenched interests of grassroots 
professionals, who impose severe ‘agency’ costs upon the ‘principals’.^  But, once in a 
lifetime, central policy-makers identify an insurgent group inside health policy networks 
whose own interests fit more closely with their needs, offering the prospect of radically 
reducing agency costs if only this group can be built up and its grassroots influence 
boosted.
In the French public health care system, by the 1980s, hospital directors could 
form a useful counterweight deep inside public hospitals to the entrenched power of 
hospital doctors and the medical profession (just as health care managers within the 
British NHS played a very similar role in more or less the same period ). Of course, the 
emergent corps still had a struggle on its hands to establish itself as a coherent 
professional group, to develop its own internal cohesion, and to prove itself a reliable and 
influential coalitional partner for central government ministers and departments. The new 
corps could not risk arousing unmanageable antagonisms fi’om other groups in the health 
care sector or creating more management difSculties than could be solved inside hospitals. 
For the corps and the union leadership of SNCH, as well as for rival groupings of hospital 
directors, issues of how to steer a course successfully through contradictory threats, 
pressures and opportunities were never easy. The threat of central government 
opportunism was always present, of ministers involving the corps in their reform efforts, 
but without pushing through any compensating increases in their professional recognition.
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remuneration or policy influence. Equally, there was always a threat that the corps ’ 
strategic ideas for achieving management reforms in hospitals could be adopted by the 
central state as a cover for straightforward cutback management policies. Deciding 
whether the central state could be trusted was made additionally difBcult for the SNCH 
leadership by the constant rotation of jninisters, cabinets* personnel, lines of 
communication with Matignon and the Elysée, let alone, changes in partisan control of 
government. And, all the sometimes subtle and sometimes radical changes in style which 
accompanied these constant reconfigurations posed additional problems for the union 
leadership.
So, we should not expect to find, and nor do we see, any simple linear progress 
story of constantly increasing influence from the hospital directors or from the SNCH. 
Nor were there constantly improving or ‘ever closer’ relations between the corps and the 
union on one side and the political hierarchy of ministers, cabinets and top departmental 
officials on the other. The co-operation across these two tiers was instead constructed 
intermittently and at many levels, in the debate over ideas emphasized in advocacy 
coalition accounts, but also in the classical interest group politics of salary levels, 
apprenticeship norms and corps privileges. The complexity of the SNCH leaderships’ 
calculations is shown in the internal politics of factions and groupings struggling for 
organisational and ideological cohesion first, and then for organisational or ideological 
hegemony within the profession.
The first section of the chapter recaps briefly on the internal changes in the 
resources and organisation of the corps of hospital directors. The second part analyses 
how the SNCH interacted with other actors and responded to the intervention of 
politicians in the management of health policy networks. The third section explores some 
of the wider implications of this case study of long-run network change for the policy 
networks literature and for models of French policy-making.
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8.1 CORPS CONSOLIDATION AND PROFESSIONALISATION
The leadership of the corps faced four associated tasks if they were to be successfiil in 
their attempt to professionalise the corps: the formation and mobilisation of an assistcmat 
generation, the management of trade union politics, the balancing of pecuniary and policy 
rewards throughout the corps, and finally, the construction of a substantive knowledge 
base and the development of organisational resources. The perceived significance of these 
tasks for the leadership of the corps was not stable, but waxed and waned over time as 
the corps focused, or was obliged to focus, its attention on different combinations of tasks 
which were not necessarily compatible with one another. More importantly, these tasks 
were often eased by the indirect results of state managers’ efforts to transform the 
management of public hospitals, and changes in the social and economic environment. In 
other words, the corps of hospital directors was advantaged as befits an organisational 
profession which, by definition, is dependent upon state patronage.
Overcoming the barriers to group mobilisation
In the 1970s, ENSP graduates had first to overcome the incentive of directors to ftee-ride 
in order to mobilise a collective attempt to achieve self-regulation in their organisation and 
working practices. These initial collective action difficulties were overcome by defining 
occupational group identities, building participation in social networks, developing the 
reputation of political entrepreneurs in the corps and securing favourable interventions 
from the French state. First, the creation of the ENSP programme put in place the 
institutional framework for the formation of a group identity of a new generation of 
hospital directors. The ENSP competitive entrance examination, the concours, 
homogenised the entry into the corps, imposing selection procedures at which university 
graduates or, more importantly, graduates of the institutes of political studies flourished. 
The selective soft incentives associated with the expression of group identity, rather than 
any pecuniary benefits derived from trade union membership at the commissions 
paritaires, led the most co/775-oriented graduates of the ENSP to join the SNCH, because 
their group identity was reflected in the constituency defended by the hospital director 
trade union. More importantly, the association of corps identity with passage through the
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ENSP led these ENSP graduates to define the boundaries of their specific identity set in 
opposition to the established non-ENSP directors within the leadership of the SNCH. The 
expression of ENSP codes and conventions by assistanat directors thus not only provided 
incentives for co/pj-oriented graduates to enter the SNCEl, but also clashed with the 
organisational culture of the trade union creating a dynamic for change within the trade 
union leadership.
Second, participation in social networks forged by directors at the ENSP 
continually reasserted the boundaries of the common identity set of assistanat graduates 
and reconstructed codes and conventions so that they gained force over time and more 
specific ‘factional’ identities could develop their own discourses and values within the 
overall occupational fi'ame. These factional networks facilitated both the mobilisation of 
directors and the creation and maintenance of leadership alliances. Social networks 
developed at the ENSP were behind the emergence of Grenoble 80 and the Paris 
modernisers behind Vincent They provided, through their reassertion of common identity 
sets, the foundations of the alliances of Grenoble SO with Vincent, and ultimately, its 
cohabitation in the national executive, the Bureau National (BN), with rival views, like 
those of Trazzini. Social ties also eased the entry of Coz into the Mncent faction and his 
subsequent election as president, which passed control of the leadership of the SNCH to 
its traditional ‘opposition’.
Third, the articulation of the group identity of hospital directors cannot be 
divorced fi*om the role of political entrepreneurs within the corps. Not all directors 
internalised the corps identity. Only the most corps-ontiAed people joined the SNCH and 
the reformist zeal of the SNCH leadership was always somewhat divorced from the 
grassroots membership of the trade union. Individual directors such as Vincent, Fischer 
and Coz were themselves pivotal in the articulation of the group identity of ENSP 
graduates. They gave birth to social networks and were able to act as brokers between 
distinct social networks. They then articulated within the health commissions of the SNCH 
and at annual conferences the discourse of managerialism and the demands for 
professionalisation. For instance, through his reputation, Vincent embodied the 
‘modernist’ image of the ENSP generation of hospital directors. Significantly, the 
leadership of key policy entrepreneurs were head directors who successfully negotiated
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the promotion bottleneck facing lower-ranked directors, intent mainly on rising through 
the classes of the corps. Over time, this pattern meant that hard incentives were added to 
the initially soft selective incentive for expressing a corps identity.
Yet, this construction of the ENSP group identity was not solely a bottom-up 
endogenous process whereby ENSP graduates themselves determined the nature of their 
own group identity. It was equally the product of a top-down exogenous process whereby 
the group identity of the corps was shaped by the external interventions of the French 
state as it formalised the civil service organisation of the corps. The progressive 
acquisition by hospital directors of the characteristic traits of a grands corps depended 
upon the tacit support of state officials. And, it institutionalised the wider practices of 
French civil service co/ps within the occupational group. The state expanded the numbers 
entering the corps in the 1970s and pushed through legislation, most notably in 1970, 
which legitimised the identity of a managerial class of hospital directors. Thus, it was state 
action which triggered the mobilisation of a group of political entrepreneurs within the 
corps who pieced together a modernising strategy which espoused demands for 
managerial autonomy. And, the prospect of further consolidation of state patronage for 
the occupational group was the vital glue, the immediate lure, which tied hospital directors 
into sustained mobilisation and a long-term effort to upgrade their status and expand the 
scope of their responsibilities.
Managing internal trade union politics
Once campaigns are established, they can quickly falter if their leaders fail to achieve the 
original aims, or iÇ after some success, they extend the aims of the campaign beyond the 
initial objectives accepted by the grassroots membership.^ To sustain their 
professionalisation drive, the ENSP graduates in the leadership of the SNCH thus had to 
construct a campaign strategy that would unite the different ranks of the union 
membership behind their modernising discourse. This task was hampered by the trade 
union orientation of the SNCH, which obliged its leadership to trade-off policy rewards 
and pecuniary benefits. They were also constrained by the competition of other unions 
and the ‘fixed’ demands of their own grassroots membership. The delivery of 
improvements in employment terms and conditions was not easily associated with the
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knowledge orientations of a professionalising organisation - which required the SNCH to 
function as an arena for debate and the production of knowledge in the corps, a lobby for 
health reform, and a limited regulatory body for hospital directors. This multi-tasking also 
took place within a trade union which was not solely a union for top hospital directors, 
but also a catch-all organisation for all ranks of hospital administrative personnel.
The SNCH leadership juggled these roles by campaigning for advances in 
improvements in pay and conditions, not as the outcome of traditiond forms of collective 
bargaining, but as the outcome of hospital management reforms which elevated the 
standing of the corps. This evolution towards the strategies and tactics of a health policy 
lobby emerged out of the failure of the Charlotte leadership’s ‘externalist’ strategy, and 
was epitomised by the modernisers’ adherence to the strategy defined at Macon by 
Vincent. Internally, this approach made it legitimate for the moderately modernising 
leadership to extend the SNCH’s knowledge and lobby orientations, as well as responding 
to the demands of both the supporters of Grenoble 80 and the Vincent’s ambitious 
modernisers in Paris. Externally, it cemented the SNCH’s constituency in relation to its 
rival trade unions and the Fédération Hospitalière de France (FHF). The approach 
asserted SNCH’s occupational trade unionism, political neutrality, and ambition to 
influence state policy. These commitments and aspirations reinforced the union’s 
competitive advantage over Force Ouvrière (FO), with its ties to the FHF, the 
Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) and the Confédération 
Générale du Travail (CGT). FO, CFDT and the CGT were unable to pursue moves 
towards the collective upward mobility of hospital directors fi’om within the confines of 
wider trade union structures. The conservative FHF remained a stout defender of the 
public hospital service, out of step with the moves towards managerial reform and cost 
containment.
The pursuit of the Macon strategy, once again, owed much to the capacity of 
political entrepreneurs within the SNCH leadership to drag the rank-and-file membership 
down the path of professionalisation and health care reform. Particularly with hôpital- 
entreprise, this course advanced the interests of head directors. In practice, the 
professionalisation of the corps pursued by the SNCH was the property of a band of 
approximately twelve ENSP graduates, revolving around the tandem of Vincent and Paillé
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in the early 1980s. At Macon, Vincent’s reputation throughout the corps swung 
conference delegates behind support for the global budget, which reversed the SNCH’s 
previous positions and forced it into the health policy arena. Vincent’s adoption of centrist 
positions made him the primary bridge-builder between the left and right of the trade 
union. Working with Paillé, his orchestration of the SNCH’s policy agenda relied upon 
a perpetual process of justification and persuasion by the leadership through conference 
debates, working groups and the production of substantive knowledge.
The leadership experienced some difficulties of internal cohesion and, in particular, 
elite-follower relations. Before the 1988 revision of the terms and conditions for hospital 
directors, the Vincent leadership &ced attacks firom the leaderships of Agir et Liberté and 
even Grenoble 80. Whilst not rejecting the Macon strategy, they demanded a more 
aggressive pursuit of pecuniary benefits by the Vincent leadership (much like the attacks 
on Chailotte). The Vincent leadership persistently attempted to jump onto the bandwagon 
of government reform, only to bale out again at a later date as the balance of advantages 
and costs in being associated with a 6iled or unpopular reform changed. The conditions 
attached to the endorsement o f the global budget to appease delegates at Macon 
ultimately forced the SNCH leadership to retreat back into the conservative coalition, with 
its attacks on the global budget proposals mirroring those of the FHF. Likewise, the 
feilure of the Macon strategy to deliver pecuniary benefits came to dominate the SNCH’s 
twists and turns throughout the introduction of departments. At this time, the leadership’s 
short-term needs to deliver improved terms and conditions to the grassroots membership 
overwhelmed the modernisation ethos inherent within the Macon strategy. Unable to 
advance its demands for improved terms and conditions under both the Mauroy and 
Fabius governments, the union’s leaders used its support for departments as a resource 
in its bargaining strategies with the Parti Socialiste (PS) government. With no immediate 
gains, they withdrew co-operation entirely firom the implementation of departments and 
lobbied against the last-ditch attempts of Terquem to introduce departments before the 
March 1986 legislative elections.
Thus, the leadership juggled the competing roles of the SNCH through the pursuit 
of a Macon strategy which tied pecuniary benefits to policy rewards. However, its success 
ultimately depended upon the capacity of the Vincent leadership to deliver the expected
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pecuniary benefits to the grassroots membership. The SNCH leadership never fully 
abandoned the tactics of Charlotte and the tensions within the Macon strategy were 
relieved by the improvements in pay and conditions agreed in 1988.
Mobilising resources at the disposal of the corps
An individual group seeking to gain entry into a policy network fi*om which it has 
previously been excluded may make some headway because of its bargaining strategies, 
but its progress will depend much more on increasing the resources at its disposal. Behind 
the Macon strategy, the SNCH increased its hold over the elections to the commissions 
paritaires as FO support declined. The leadership was able to draw upon the rise within 
the corps fi-om 1985 of the assistanat graduates and the hold of ENSP graduates over the 
representative bodies within the corps. From 1985, ENSP graduates began to arrive in the 
First Class of hospital directors, thereby improving the reputation of the corps.
Imbued with the organisational values of the French civil service, ENSP graduates 
reproduced the ideology of the grands corps in an attempt to increase the resources at 
their disposal. They vaunted the traits of expertise and extensive training. And, like the 
grands corps before them, they claimed to monopolise the value-fi’ee representation of the 
public interest, using a legitimising cloak of managerialism. Management was represented 
as a distinct organisational function with its own separate expertise, which was founded 
upon a discourse of increases in productivity through fi*eedom to manage.^
From the mid-1970s onwards, the corps undertook a rapid turnover in its accepted 
best practices as it constructed its own body of substantive knowledge, particularly within 
working parties of the SNCH. With the emergence of the ENSP generation in the SNCH 
fi’om 1976, assistanat graduates undertook a prolonged campaign to build up intellectual 
capital - punctuated by the annual reports at conference in the 1970s, and the publication 
of both 200 Propositions in 1985 and the Trazzini report in 1987. These developments 
within the SNCH were nourished by the grassroots activities of leading individuals within 
the corps and the redefinition o f ‘best practice’ which took place within the professional 
networks of hospital directors. Individual initiatives were popularised in professional 
journals, such as Gestions Hospitalières, and then mirrored over time in the training 
programme of the ENSP.
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The articulation of this substantive knowledge base was wrapped up with wider 
political discourses as competing factions injected new practices into the SNCH on the 
back of discreet partisan affiliations. As the Left emerged in the late 1970s, socialist 
sympathisers within the leadership of Grenoble 80 promoted wider conceptions of public 
health and participatory management within public hospitals. This health manifesto 
inspired by the PS was then confronted by those supporters of the gaullist Rassemblement 
pour la République (RPR), Grenon and Trazzini, who injected the values of the market- 
inspired hôpital-entreprise into SNCH conferences and forums. The dialectic of debate, 
its framing, was driven by partisan competition. However, ironically, these partisan 
cleavages occurred in a trade union defined by its political neutrality and were subsumed 
by the ENSP identity and the primacy of the management function. The rival school of 
statists and autonomists within the leadership from the mid-1980s, mushroomed alongside 
largely party political divisons - with Grenoble 80 remaining somewhat divorced from the 
autonomist ranks of Trazzini and Grenon. But, these lines of cleavage were cross-cut by 
the professional cleavages dividing directors in regional teaching hospitals and general 
hospitals and ENSP social networks.
In addition, members of the corps entered the health commissions of the main 
political parties so that, from 1985 onwards, hospital directors contested the 
predominance within such commissions of hospital doctors and énarques. Couty rose 
within the PS. Trazzini voiced SNCH concerns in the RPR. Paillé lobbied within the CDS. 
This reinforcement of the organisational resources of the SNCH was overseen by Vincent 
and Paillé. The SNCH leadership instructed its members to exploit their traditional ties 
with mayors. The publication of 200 Propositions was deliberately timed to mark the 
electoral campaign of 1986. Paillé’s appointment as the trade union’s first ever national 
delegate, augmented its lobbying capacity. Indeed, Paillé was widely seen as a ‘political 
animal’ and formed an influential partnership with Vincent at the head of the trade union.
The SNCH leadership thus constructed a professionalising strategy which 
facilitated its entry into health policy networks. It reinforced this strategy after Macon 
with the rapid turnover of its substantive knowledge, practising entry into a range of 
political parties, and expanding the SNCH’s organisational capacity through the 
appointment of a national delegate. In fact, the union’s inconsistent support for hospital
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reforms contrasted with its consistent stress on increasing the knowledge and expertise 
of the corps of hospital directors. Pressures for pecuniary benefits primarily constrained 
the level of support for government measures, but they did not hinder making the Macon 
strategy more concrete through the development of the union’s advocacy and lobbying 
resources.
Overall, through reducing the costs of collective mobilisation, the SNCH was able to 
‘revalue’ its existing resources, to exploit some previously untapped resources and to 
change its stock by developing some new resources (see Table 8.1). The emergence of the 
generation imbued with the ENSP identity facilitated the construction of a collective 
strategy of upward social mobility. This drive for professionalisation was supported 
oiganisationally by the SNCH, which benefitted firom the entry of the most co/pj-oriented 
graduates in the 1970s. These ENSP graduates not only improved the reputational 
resources of the corps, but also worked within the corps and the SNCH to assert their 
own codes and conventions. The Macon strategy subsequently eased elite-follower 
relations by tying pecuniary benefits to the reform of hospital management practices. To 
this end, the corps overhauled its expertise and knowledge base in the 1980s, cementing 
its organisational networks through the entry of directors into political parties.
Table 8.1: Bottom-up endogenous resource change in the SNCH
SNCH and Bottom-Up Endogenous-Led Change
Revaluation of 
resources




entry into parties, 
arrival of ENSP 
graduates







Throughout this transition, the SNCH undertook a number of tasks normally 
associated with separate organisations. The task of managing union politics and alliances
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was central to the ENSP graduates’ agenda between 1976 and the Macon compromise 
and, then again, in 1989 following Vincent’s departure (see Table 8.2). Building a better 
knowledge base was a consistent concern of the SNCH leadership, but waned in 
importance after the publication of the Trazzini report and the rally behind the conception 
of public hospitals as établissements publics de santé. Pecuniary benefits and policy gains 
were both pursued from Macon onwards, but the settlement broke down in the mid-1980s 
as pecuniary benefits dominated over the pursuit of policy rewards. Policy gains then 
returned to the agenda after the 1988 settlement. The management of these tasks was 
facilitated by the group identity of the ENSP graduates, the significance of social networks 
and the role of policy entrepreneurs within the corps. However, the construction of a 
group identity was never a primary objective of the ENSP graduates. This identity was 
constructed and reconstructed throughout the process of consolidation and 
professionalisation of the corps. Yet, it was cemented externally by the formalisation of 
the corps by the French state. Indeed, the resources at the disposal of groups can be 
revalued by other actors as they grow in utility or salience or, actors can be advantaged 
whereby they benefit through the actions of another actor or person. So, although the 
ENSP generation pieced together the modernising strategy within the SNCH, the catalyst 
for their emergence within the corps cannot be divorced from the management of the 
corps by the state.












1989-1991 . - < a # !# # # # :
Notes: Shaded areas indicate prominence on the agenda of the ENSP generation.
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8.2 HOW THE STATE MANAGED HEALTH POLICY NETWORKS AND
ITS IMPACTS ON THE CORPS
Top politicians can manage health policy networks through a series of network 
restructuring paths lying between exit and voice in one dimension, and expansion and 
consolidation on another dimension. In the case of the French public health system, these 
political interventions were more than sporadic external shocks to existing networks. They 
were persistent attempts to restructure these networks through the imposition of top- 
down changes in the regulation and financing of the health policy sub-system, and through 
fostering bottom-up changes in professional groups and the local management of public 
hospitals. Ministers’ and national departments’ costly crusades were triggered by the 
perception of declining quality in health care. Bureaucratic officials and ministers across 
government, not only within Health and Social Affairs, but also within Finance, Matignon 
and the Elysée, recognised declines in the quality of the outcomes produced in hospital 
management as early as 1976, when concerns over the long-term deficit of the health 
sickness fiinds were voiced. Demographic pressures, technological innovation in medical 
specialisms, changing consumer expectations and perceived 'unlimited’ demand added to 
the problems. In addition, contingent professional changes, not least the growth of a 
hospital bureaucracy and the fi-agmentation of medical services, destabilised the historic 
compromise which had previously governed the French public hospital service. The ward 
fiefdoms which guaranteed medical autonomy inevitably led to fi-agmentation and 
discontent within the ranks of junior doctors.
This section analyses the top-down strategies adopted by politicians and considers 
how these strategies impacted upon the resources and opportunities open to the SNCH 
and the corps of hospital directors. The first part examines the evolution of the priorities 
and objectives o f ministers fi’om the initial perception of decline in the quality of 
outcomes. The second part analyses how successive governments employed a series of 
network restructuring paths to induce change within health policy-making. The final part 
assesses how far the management of health policy networks consolidated the SNCH’s 
influence and that of the hospital directors’ corps within health policy-making.
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Ministers^ Shifting Agendas
Network restructuring was driven by the different values and objectives imported into the 
management of health policy networks by successive sets of ministers and senior state 
officials, most notably the ‘political’ appointees within ministerial cabinets. Upon arrival 
in office, ministers did not necessarily share the entrenched rules and norms which 
governed relations within established health policy networks. Rather, they had their own 
distinct priorities which were formulated outside the network.'* The concerns to impose 
cost containment, driven by Barre and then Farge, alienated ministers’ traditional partners 
in the DH, the FHF, the medical elite in the regional teaching hospitals and even the 
SNCH. These distinct priorities, coupled with the turnover of ministerial chairs, meant 
that ministers could break the routine of policy network consultation. Ralite and 
Questiaux relegated to the background concerns over health spending against the advice 
of senior bureaucrats like Marmot whilst Bérégovoy implemented the global budget. 
Blighted in the medical community by his communist affiliations, Ralite ignored the 
established rules of consultation even before he released for consultation the draft decree 
on departments. Dufoix reneged on the agreement on departments negotiated by Hervé 
and began private negotiations with the leaders of the conférences. Evin arrived in office 
with the expressed intention of revisiting the debate over departments and revising the 
system of hospital planning. Durieux, as the conditions of his appointment dictated, 
intervened in the parliamentary negotiations of the 1991 Hospital Law to stamp his 
influence over the text. So, ministers and senior state managers were often unpredictable 
policy actors.
In part, these interventions were designed to manage some short-term crisis or to 
achieve short-term payoffs for ministers. Farge was appointed by Giscard to cap hospital 
spending by the presidential elections of 1981. His short-term mandate guided his use of 
network restructuring strategies, the internalisation of policy-making, and his reluctance 
to launch the long-term implementation of the global budget. The appointment of 
Terquem to push forward the introduction of departments, like previous hesitations by 
Hervé and Dufoix, was another attempt to achieve short-term payoffs. After the 
hesitations of the Mauroy and Fabius governments, it was supposed to regain the support 
of left-wing doctors before the March 1986 legislative elections. The origins of the
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decision by Evin to rewrite the public hospital legislation lay in discussions with his 
cabinet about the best strategy to manage the ‘crisis’ that was mushrooming in public 
hospitals, particularly the discontent of nurses.
Ministers were also side-tracked by the desire to accommodate the demands of 
party clienteles. The primarily top-down emergence of the global budget contrasts with 
the bottom-up emergence of departments, which built upon the client groups of the 
French socialist party and the gaullist RPR. Political parties are not homogenous 
organisations, but are coalitions of interests embedded within networks of organisational 
interests and groups. These clienteles are sources of initiatives which do not fit within the 
rules and behaviour of the established policy community because they are intra-party 
processes and can have atypical dynamics. Where political parties have formal ties with 
interest groups or are ‘captured’ by a group, politicians are likely to engage in network 
structuring if their clienteles are closed out of the decision-making process. Such network 
restructuring is particularly likely to occur when partisan cleavages structure a firagmented 
professional group universe, as in the case of the dififerential support of hospital doctors 
for parties of the right. The PS’s few connections with hospital doctors, and its prolonged 
absence fi*om ofitice, acted as a source of dynamism within the policy subsector, paving 
the way for network restructuring strategies. In 1981, it brought into office individuals 
ûom Santé et Socialisme and elevated Peigné and his supporters. However, these groups 
lost such privileged access once the RPR and the giscardian Union pour la Démocratie 
Française (UDF) returned to office and the Chirac government reinstated individuals from 
the conférence vAûôd. ministerial cabinets. This inconclusive differential support promoted 
Evin to draw hospital directors into the ranks of decision-makers as he sought to create 
an alliance of modernisers.
However, ministers also took short-term actions which appeared to go against 
their chances of re-election. Debré was ignored by the Chirac government. Dufoix sought 
a negotiated compromise with the conférence, ignorant of Peigné’s demands. The 
formulation of the global budget, by its very nature, provided only difiuse gains for 
potential beneficiaries outside the national state, whilst the costs to individuals were direct 
and its effects were highly visible and traceable to government leaders.
Health and Social Affairs ministers were also unable to insulate themselves fi'om
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the broader policy concerns, particularly economic concerns, of senior core executive 
actors - expressed in interventions from the Finance Ministry, the Matignon and the 
Elysée, who possessed a broader concern with policy dilemmas than health policy network 
actors. Senior core executive actors parachuted into health like-minded individuals with 
externally-defined agendas to control costs. Barre and Giscard imposed Farge. Mitterrand 
and Mauroy imposed Bérégovoy, who assembled a team of advisers led by the financial 
manager, Naouri. However, the Elysée and Matignon intervened only sporadically in the 
implementation of departments, advancing the interests of doctors at various stages. Evin 
came up against the DB as the 1991 Hospital Law became embroiled with internal PS 
battles and battles between the competing bureaucratic interests of ministries.
However, ministers did not simply inject short-term concerns into the network 
restructuring of health policy networks. Neither should they be classified as non-strategic 
actors. There was policy learning by ministers and cabinets, as Evin and Couty 
demonstrated in the formulation of the 1991 Hospital Law, an organisational reform 
which did not resurrect the spectre of departments. Indeed, the introduction of 
departments was never a priority of Matignon and the Elysée under the PS, and from 
1987, the introduction of departments was a 'settled' issue. Likewise, although the launch 
of the global budget stuttered throughout the 1970s, the permanency of stringent controls 
on hospital spending was not questioned from the mid-1980s. Such policy learning 
supports conceptions of adaptive interventionism by ministers rather than knee-jerk 
reaction in non-strategic directions. Ministers might not be dictated to by the norms of 
behaviour within policy networks, but there is a departmental history or conception of 
ideas to guide their actions. Reforms such as departments and reform of the private sector 
had been suggested and discussed long-before the arrival of the French Socialists in ofiSce. 
Most importantly, in health policy subsystems, both different governments and grassroots 
participants shared an interest in defining a workable compromise to regulate the delivery 
of services and allocation of resources.
The tools of network management
With the imposition of top-down controls on financial aggregates, the Barre government 
began to lay the foundations of a rival policy network. It assembled a loose linkaging of
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Inspecteurs des FinmcesvAûàn.ihQ ministerial divisions of health and social security and 
the administrative leadership of the health sickness fimds, the Caisse Nationale de 
VAssurance Maladie des Travailleurs Salariés (CNAMTS). This community of actors 
was committed to centralised budgetary controls, sharing a strategic perception of the 
requirements of hospital management reform which owed much to their common corps 
socialisation and interests. This loose network was not a formal policy community, but 
rather a first step towards ‘exit’. It internalised policy formulation in the hands of ministers 
and state managers, divorcing financial reform firom any external partners. More 
importantly, the imposition of top-down controls on financial aggregates created 
difficulties for most of the traditional partners of the DH, because the Barre government 
opted out of the DH’s established relations with the regional teaching hospital elite and 
the FHF. Farge and his colleagues simply made arbitrary controls on public hospital 
spending against what they interpreted to be the interests of a set of pro-spending local 
cartels involving mayors, doctors and hospital directors alike.
In the formulation of the global budget, three key state managers (Naouri, 
Kervasdoué and Marmot) dominated the formulation of a replacement for the patient-day 
rate. Intermittent interventions by hospital doctors were disregarded by this trio, 
particularly as the representative organisations of medical professionals were distracted 
by the threats posed to the state-profession compromise by the abolition of private pay 
beds and the introduction of departments. In fact, hospital doctors deliberately divorced 
themselves fi*om debates surrounding the introduction of the global budget, believing 
themselves to lack the requisite expertise to intervene in its formulation. However, even 
where expertise was recognised, the issue of legitimacy was exploited by state managers 
to isolate the CNAMTS: it was labelled by the Inspecteurs des Finances, and the hospital 
directors for that matter, as a private organisation which was unrepresentative of the 
public interest. The introduction of the global budget with only concessions to changing 
managerial and organisational practices in public hospitals consolidated the capacity of 
state managers to ‘exit’ in the short-term fi*om the established policy networks. It did gain 
some hold over global hospital spending, although such a crude cap on expenditures did 
little to advance the redistribution of budgets between hospitals and ‘fi*oze’ the then 
existing distribution of services between public hospitals. The failure o f other groups to
291
buy into cost containment meant that moves towards management change were lacking 
and the initial phase was simply to cap spending.
This strategy of top-down internalisation of policy formulation was not mirrored 
in the pursuit of organisational change in public hospitals. The interventions of the 
communist Jack Ralite, and, for that matter, his very appointment, broke the rules of 
consultation between the state and the medical profession and questioned the boundaries 
of the state-profession compromise, thereby triggering the mobilisation of hospital doctor 
trade unions. It tied the Mauroy and Fabius governments into a series of consolidations 
and expansions of the membership of policy networks as they strived to broker 
agreements within the medical community. Uncertain of the support of hospital doctors, 
Hervé oscillated between answering the demands of the modernising Peigné, the alleged 
left-winger Derenne and the conservative trade unions and the conférences. Dufoix 
subsequently reversed these overtures to Peigné and his supporters and attempted to re­
establish privileged relations with the conférences. With the conférences ultimately 
reneging on their agreement with Dufoix, the Fabius government appointed Terquem to 
push through departmentalisation on the back of Peigné and Gatelmand; he failed to do 
so because the issue was already dead and just waiting for the re-election of the Right.
The PS’s failure to broker a compromise between the competing factions of the 
medical profession was confirmed by the Chirac government, which allied itself firmly with 
the leaders of the conférence for regional and teaching hospitals. After the crisis of 
relations between the PS and hospital doctors, the Chirac government, through its 
appointment of Pellerin as advisor to Barzach, awarded the traditional medical elite 
privileged access to the hospital policy-making process. Barzach’s 1987 legislation 
mirrored the policy proposals of the conférence as the right-wing government, eager to 
trade with the conférence, stood out against the influence of both the left-leaning pro­
department doctors, in particular. Peigné, and the radical conservative wing of the elite 
mandarins led by Debré.
Behind the ruptures of the opening and closing of access to different groups within 
the medical profession, politicians persistently sought to construct and advantage the 
resources of the more managerialist sections within the medical profession. Even the 
Chirac government’s settlement endorsed a compromise acceptable to the conférence and
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not its vocal supporters behind Debré, leaving decisions to reorganise services in the hands 
of doctors themselves, but acknowledging the principle of limited performance 
measurement (hampered in practice by the scarce resources at the disposal of the Health 
Ministry) and the obligation to attribute more responsibilities to junior doctors. More 
importantly, at key stages of the moves towards departmentalisation, the PS responded 
to the demands of the INMH, bringing Peigné into the core of decision-makers, because 
he had access to the Elysée. Government backing of Peigné, who came out in favour of 
departmentalisation, fragmented his support within his federation and forced the rupture 
between the INMH and other trade unions.
Politidans’ backing for Pdgné continued under the Rocard government where he 
was brought into the policy-making process surrounding the 1991 Hospital Law by Evin, 
who tied him to the government’s proposals - commissioning him to report on the future 
of the public hospital service and appointing him to the Couty Commission. His 
involvement within the Couty Commission brought together an emerging advocacy 
coalition within hospital personnel. The PS encouraged the managerialist INMH to break 
off from more conservative trade unions, who mobilised collectively by the late 1980s in 
the Coordination. Thus, the PS continued the Barrist attempts to construct an alternative 
policy network within the hospital management policy sub-system. It sought to create a 
'partner’ to negotiate with the financial 'community’ of state managers who had invaded 
the management of hospital spending.
The reinforcement of potential allies was encouraged by the state’s involvement 
in the production of substantive knowledge and promotion of methods of managerial 
innovation. Ralite commissioned reports on hospital reoiganisation, as did Bérégovoy who 
also commissioned reports on regional health planning. This process was continued under 
Barzach, who commissioned Trazzini to write a report on the possibilities of introducing 
hôpital-entreprise. These reports played an important role in the popularisation of change 
and practices within the medical profesâon and amongst hospital directors. Nowhere was 
this more apparent than during the formulation of the 1991 Hospital Law when Evin 
commissioned a series of reports to inform hospital reform and the Couty Commission, 
following the méthode Rocard  ^engaged in a period of grassroots consultation and the 
popularisation of new practices. So, politicians sought influence by managing the
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construction of new practices and effecting changes in the substantive knowledge base for 
grassroots management.
Successive ministers also repeatedly exploited top-down controls on financial 
aggregates to foster changes in the accepted working practices of public hospitals. 
Although a relatively blunt instrument for state managers, the imposition of ever more 
stringent taux directeurs, particularly after the short-lived expansionism of 1981 and 1982, 
became not simply a means of limiting the deficit of the health sickness fimds, but also a 
means of facilitating cultural change within the local management of public hospitals. The 
replacement of the inflationary patient-day rate with the global budget removed control 
of financial aggregates firom hospital directors and doctors, but devolved responsibility for 
cutback management. Bérégovoy popularised the principle of the redeployment of existing 
sources, which posited that public hospitals were not to receive additional finance, but 
instead to raise resources through efficiency gains. This transformation of the budgetary 
rules and procedures acted as a catalyst for the redefinition of the established best 
practices within hospital management.
Whilst these top-down controls increased ‘stress’ in the system, politicians also 
introduced new institutional mechanisms to guide implementation structures and decision­
making processes. The global budget introduced cost centres, centres de responsabilités, 
and the move towards departments tried to institute new managerial responsibilities for 
head doctors as well as new practices of accountability. The return to services was not 
without its constraints on hospital doctors, since the Chirac government enshrined the 
penalisation of poor management (see above). It reduced the tenure of head doctors to 
five years, with their re-appointment dependent upon satisfactory reports on their 
management and their future plans for development. In fact, the outcome power of 
hospital doctors led the state to foster the growth of hospital director-hospital doctor 
tandems as the strategic apex of public hospitals. The tandem of chair of the hospital 
medical commission and hospital director was progressively elevated in importance, while 
the influence of the Mayor and the Board of Trustees was typically reduced. This 
reinforcement of a reconfigured strategic apex was coupled with attempts to both fill in 
the middle-line of clinical managers, and to redefine collective medical responsibility (as 
seen in the introduction of departments and the remodelling of the hospital medical
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commission). Consecutive reforms extended the consultative powers of the hospital 
medical commission to develop an overt decision-making role within the running of 
public hospitals. The 1991 Hospital Law gave it the role of preparing the projet médical 
upon which the director based the projet Rétablissement which itself was presented jointly 
by the director and the chair of the hospital medical commission (after a hard fought 
parliamentary battle on this provision).
The planning ethos of the 1991 legislation also saw politicians attempting to 
introduce a variant of managed competition as a mechanism to allocate resources within 
the hospital management system. With the right of patients to choose the care of their 
choice enshrined within legislation, hospitals were now obliged to produce development 
plans which after submission to regional health boards, would be judged both alongside 
other proposals and alongside the regional priorities for health care provision. This mild 
competitive tendering or bidding process sat alongside attempts to devolve managerial 
dedsions down to hospital directors, ftee to manage at the grassroots. Its encouragement 
o f entrepreneurial innovation fostered change in the balance of professional groups, 
weakening the influence of both hospital doctors and local Mayors. Despite its claims to 
promote managerial autonomy, the legislation enhanced the intervention of regional health 
boards, thereby reducing the local capacity to determine the overall pattern of service 
delivery. With the health rickness fimds, the CNAMTS, quasi-excluded from negotiations, 
the managerial network was boosted by this legislation - which sought to foster the 
development of a cadre of regional health inspectors, nurse managers and the tandem of 
hospital directors and chairs of hospital medical commissions. -
Hospital directors and network management
Throughout the introduction of the global budget and departments, the SNCH did not 
possess the necessary reputational resources to forge privileged relations with the PS 
government, or the Barre government before it. This weakness stemmed from the 
perception held by ministers and bureaucrats that the corps lacked outcome power. 
Crystallizing the views of the financial community at the end of the 1970s, Farge did not 
consider hospital directors to have the necessary resources to counter the influence of the 
medical profession within public hospitals - an attitude shared by Bérégovoy, Naouri,
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Kervasdoué and Hervé. These perceptions were reinforced by the competition between 
the Inspection des Finances and the corps of hospital directors. The dominance of the 
Inspection des Finances within the central administration ensured that hospital directors’ 
aspirations were relegated as part of its territorial battles with the rival corps.
Throughout the feilure to implement departments, the SNCH was crowded out of 
the policy arena by the fragmented hospital doctor trade union movement and its well- 
established conférences. At no time did the SNCH leadership intervene so as to either 
stand against the challenge of the likes of Debré in defence of departments or try to act 
as a policy broker between the competing coalitions surrounding departmentalisation. 
Within the trade union, Vincent was not fully committed to the introduction of 
departments against the wishes of the medical profession. Instead, improvements in pay 
and conditions came to dominate the SNCH’s responses to the attempts by Hervé and 
Dufobc to broker a compromise with hospital doctors. The beliefs of state managers and 
ministers that the SNCH lacked outcome power was thus reinforced by the internal 
contradictions and mixed messages sent by the hospital director trade union - a weakness 
which b li^ e d  the trade union leadership’s influence during the formulation of the global 
budget and the introduction of departments.
This said, ministers and state managers did sponsor the development of the corps 
and frdlitate the development of organisational resources by the SNCH leadership. The 
successive steps in the formalisation of the corps of hospital directors, such as the 1984 
reinforcement of the authority of directors, were matched by informal inducements for 
change as ministers tried to use ‘voice’ options to change the working practices of 
hospital doctors and directors. Supported openly by Kervasdoué, Bérégovoy publicly 
derided the managerial qualities of hospital directors, cajoling them to espouse new 
practices. The utility of such interventions was limited. Whilst Bérégovoy engaged in a 
war of attrition with public hospital directors, he lobbied Mitterrand to create a Conseil 
Général des Hôpitaux so that he could remove allegedly incompetent directors from their 
posts. With Bérégovoy’s support, Kervasdoué introduced the HEC training programme 
for senior directors, which spread private management techniques down through the 
corps. However, such direct interventions in the internal management of the corps were 
restricted, as the outroar surrounding both Bérégovoy’s and Barzach’s interventions in
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iie appointment o f directors demonstrates.
In fact, the policy failures of the SNCH in the early 1980s stand in marked contrast 
to their successful negotiation of improved terms and conditions under Barzach. The 
Chirac government isolated itself from the SNCH’s attempts to exert policy influence in 
the 1987 legislation, but it recognised its trade union objectives of pecuniary rewards for 
its grassroots membership. After the dissatisfrction of Rayroles and the PS, these rewards 
upgraded the corps, making the posts of hospital directors some of the highest paid posts 
in the civil service. Ironically, these statutory improvements came when the SNCH had 
neither representation within ministerial cabinets nor access to the closed arena of policy 
formulation. Instead, the SNCH forged ties with the RPR whilst in opposition, exemplified 
by the discourse of hôpital-entreprise and its popularisation by Trazzini and Grenon. Yet, 
the SNCH leadership initially backed the influence of Debré which waned after the 1986 
legislative elections. The union leadership thus relied upon Vincent’s network and his ties 
withBérard to gain prhdleged access to Matignon. However, Matignon revised the terms 
and conditions of the corps without the SNCH exerdsing its influence over the direction 
of the hospital policy programme of the Chirac government, and without the SNCH 
forming an integral part of its support coalition within the hospital policy subsystem. The 
SNCH seemed to benefit primarily from the emergence of a fashionable managerialist 
stance and new attempts made by the state to cement a managerialist coalition and 
acquire a potential corporatist partner.
The SNCH was gaining credibility through helping push ahead substantive 
knowledge, much of which was sponsored by the French state. The SNCH leadership 
participated in this experience of policy innovation, presenting itself as ‘leaders’ in the 
market for new ideas. The union manipulated its discourse in response to the evolving 
concerns of politicians as it attempted to maximise the salience of its own resources. 
Vincent endorsed hôpital-entreprise because it gained favourable responses in the media 
and articulated the evolution of managerialist practices from managers as controllers to 
managers as leaders, motivating teams working in looser systems of formal control. 
However, despite adopting a more autonomist managerial discourse under Coz, the 
SNCH sat firmly at the head of a dominant advocacy coalition which proposed regional 
planned markets as the most efficient response to the demands of cost containment. The
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planned competition of the 1991 Hospital Law mirrored the discourse of the SNCH under 
Vincent and that of the 200 Propositions.
The corps swept into pivotal positions within the decision-making process 
surrounding the 1991 legislation, as Evin brought together a network of modernisers. This 
elevation of the SNCH was facilitated by its identification with the issue of regional 
planning and the failure o f the Left to cement clientelistic networks with Peigné and the 
modernisers within hospital doctor trade unions. Although the French state sought to 
force changes within the INMH, with Peigné absent through his involvement in the Couty 
Commisaon, his replacement, Stanislas Johannet, resigned because of his fiustration with 
grassroots hostility to managerial change and demands for improvements in pay and 
conditions. In addition, throughout the formulation of the 1991 Hospital Law, hospital 
doctors tended to contest issues about medical organisation within public hospitals rather 
than the backbone of the reform, which was its renovation of hospital planning.
The SNCH benefitted fi’om the short-term crisis experienced by Evin and his desire 
to ward off further discontent in public hospitals after the nurses’ strikes. These benefits 
were amplified by Coz’s personal relationship with Evin, the weakness of the Rocard 
government’s parliamentary majority, and the contingent responses of ministers to hospital 
reform. With Vincent and his team at the DH, Couty and Chodorge in the cabinet and 
Coz at the head of the SNCH, a network of ENSP graduates assembled behind the 
Minister for Solidarity, Health and Social Protection. This network was subsequently 
advantaged by the institutional framework and priorities of the Rocard government. As 
the Bill floundered in the National Assembly, hospital directors including Paillé were able 
to come to prominence in negotiating the legislation’s passage through the Assembly. The 
organisational networks constructed by the SNCH appeared to have reaped their full 
benefit as the 1991 Hospital Law became ‘the law of Gérard Vincent.’^
Behind the long sequence of bottom-up and top-down contingent changes lay, 
nonetheless, the assertion of the corps within a rising advocacy coalition, and the 
sponsorship of the corps by successive governments. Thus» the SNCH gained its highpoint 
in terms of policy influence in 1990 and 1991 whilst its trade union objectives were 
attained in 1988. With the implementation of the 200 Propositions  ^the cycle which started 
with the emergence of the ENSP generation was complete. This emergence of the SNCH
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occurred as the previously established partners of the Health Ministry were relegated to 
second tier actors. Over time, the Inspection des Finances, and the INMH were 
encouraged to ‘invade’ areas previously monopolised by the FHF and elite hospital 
doctors. Although the SNCH was a nodal actor which straddled the issues of planning and 
finance as well as internal hospital organisation, it was crowded out in the 1980s by the 
grands corps and hospital doctors. Its changing alliance strategies were only tacit alliances 
then, and the union suffered fi'om its weak outcome power. However, the corps continued 
to benefit fi'om state sponsorship and the emergence of a managerialist advocacy coalition. 
These external factors then combined with the work of the union leadership in promoting 
ideas as well as grassroots changes in the corps and the organisational networks of the 
trade union to give much more influence to hospital directors when Evin sought to solve 
short-term unrest in public hospitals through the rewriting of the 1970 Hospital Law.
CONCLUSIONS: INTERPRETING THE SHIFTS IN FRENCH 
HEALTH POLICY NETWORKS
By stressing the longer-term favourable shifts brought about by the complex courtship 
dance of the hospital directors corps on one side, and of national politicians and state 
agencies on the other, the previous two sections return us squarely to the broader issues 
of interpretation raised in Chapter One. Like any other conscientious empirical research 
in public policy, this study has thrown up results which are susceptible of interpretation 
at a number of explanatory or analytic levels and in a number of different ways.® Thus, 
conventional pluralists might draw comfort fi'om the complexity and detailing of the story 
told in Chapters Two to Seven, arguing that it illustrates the haphazard process of 
individual politicians and changing coalitions of interest groups interacting in a series of 
rushed decisions and processes, seeking always in an incremental way to push through 
marginal changes fi'om the status quo while maximizing levels of agreement. They could 
illustrate their account with the many instances of stops and starts, changes of direction, 
neglect of opportunities and misperceptions of interests by different actors. In their view, 
the hospital directors might be seen as a pivotal group in a finely balanced interest group 
sub-sector, who played a clever tactical hand, maintaining good relations with a wide 
range of interests, cultivating their political contacts to achieve ‘insider’ status, exploiting
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opportunities that came along, and shrewdly investing in building up the interest group’s 
internal resources for the future.
On the other hand, neo-Maixist authors could plausibly point to the central state’s 
attitudes on public hospitals being fundamentally set by broad-scale external shifts in the 
political economy, especially internationalisation, marketisation, technological 
development and decentralisation.^ In their view, the relentless push for achieving financial 
cutbacks, rationing resource allocations for public hospitals and curbing the bargaining 
power of their workforces, were the long-run constants behind the French state’s shifting 
exploration of different * solutions’ to immediate crises or conflicting interest group 
pressures. The hospital directors were just another techno-bureaucratic occupational 
group, with no more claim than the next group along to become recognised as a grands 
corps profession. They nonetheless got lucky, because they oflfered the state apparatus a 
means of implementing retrenchment and the enforcement of economic rationalization in 
public health care under the guise of a socially neutral managerialism.
The evidence presented here does not rule out either of these models decisively. 
The vagaries of the political process and the shifting short-term configurations of interest 
groups were terribly important in how the particular sequence of attempted reforms 
panned out, but, in itsel( this fact does not invalidate a long-run neo-Marxist account. 
Equally, important though they were, the factors stressed by pluralists (such as the cycle 
of month-by-month and week-to-week fluctuations in the political fortunes of elected 
politicians and their advisors and governments) were clearly not all there was to the 
evolution of French public health policy networks. The long-run trend beneath the 
wobbles is an inq>ortant ‘&ct’ in itself that needs more of an explanation than just that the 
SNCH or the corps played their cards right (in such a crowded and competitive interest 
group space) or just happened to get lucky in attracting central state assistance.
By contrast, a general neo-pluralist approach seems to best fit the kind of analysis 
set out here. It focuses directly on corporatist links and exchanges between state and 
organized interests. It takes seriously the role of professionalism, the development of 
ideas, and the creation of overarching 'advocacy coalitions’ in shifting the terms and 
terrain of public policy debates. It stresses the genuine and ineradicable difficulties 
confironted by top policy-makers in making decisions with relatively poor information and
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foresight possible, and often confronting ‘wicked’ problems under conditions of severe 
constraints. In Majone’s important insight, the solution is a division of labour.* The key 
locus of development for new ideas is in policy communities and networks, with insurgent 
or consolidating groups (like the SNCH and the hospital directors’ corps) as a key source 
of dynamism and change within networks. The key locus of selection of policy ideas is the 
political arena, for here a shifting cast of politicians and their assistant entrepreneurs and 
advisors scan for new ways of addressing intractable problems that fit with the politicians’ 
own needs and orientations. Attractive solutions are those which seem to promise low 
transactions costs® by proposing as an agent institutions or groups whose interests are 
more congruent with legislators’ interests than others; by allocating risks to social actors 
who can best insure against them; and by offering the prospect of a relatively long-lived 
and well-accepted solution, that will not simply be reversed in a few years’ time by a new 
and different majority coalition of legislators or a differently-structured set of top policy 
elites. In this woiid, actors whose solutions seem to work (like the SNCH and the wider 
corps) can command a higher price for their involvement in coalitions or networks. And, 
governments who pick up on such solutions will achieve some of their objectives, 
stabilizing (if not actually solving) their problems in some dimensions.
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RESEARCH METHODS APPENDIX
This study focuses upon the emergence of hospital directors as a new and influential actor 
in French health policy debates. The first half of the study provides a detailed analysis of 
the bottom-up changes inside the corps of hospital directors and its major trade union, the 
Syndicat National des Cadres Hospitaliers (SNCH). The second half of the study 
examines the process of hospital management reform in the 1980s, and the involvement 
of hospital directors in successive policy initiatives. It examines three case studies of 
hospital reform: the introduction of the global budget in 1983, the failed introduction of 
departments in the mid-1980s and the renovation of hospital planning in 1991. These case 
studies are both sufficiently similar and distinct to draw comparative lessons about the 
campaigns of hospital directors. They cover different fianctional tasks and patterns of 
policy-making as well as varying levels of success for hospital directors in advancing their 
demands for pecuniary gains and the long-term goal of professionalisation. In addition, 
the timescale of more than ten years allows full analysis of the complex dynamics of policy 
networks. Indeed, the sequencing of case studies facilitates the drawing of conclusions as 
to the patterns of change and the capacity for ‘learning’ by the actors involved.
The fieldwork for the research involved an initial period of almost twelve months 
research in France fi’om October 1991 to September 1992. This first period of fieldwork 
involved study at both the Université de Paris-I within the health policy unit led by 
Michelle Fardeau and the Centre de Gestion at the Ecole Polytechnic supervised by 
Gérard de Pouvourville. Whilst at the Université de Paris-I, I attended the first semester 
of the course in public hospital management for students preparing the entrance 
examination for the hospital director training programme at the Ecole Nationale de la 
Santé Publique. Equally, I visited Monika Steffen and Bruno Jobert at the Institut des 
Etudes Politiques de Grenoble. This initial period of research was supplemented by 
essentially two further shorter visits to France in November 1992 and May 1993. These 
two later visits were dedicated to the completion of further rounds of interviews with elite 
policy actors.
The internal evolution and changing policy commitments of the SNCH were 
documented by a systematic and detailed survey of Hospitalier-Actualités, its monthly
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information newsletter for the members of the SNCH, and its quarterly journal 
L 'Hospitaliery which later became Le rumvel hospitalier. These publications are the voice 
o f the SNCH leadership and grassroots members. They contain regular minutes of the 
meetings of its national executive and editorials from the leadership as well as policy 
declarations, conference proceedings and open forums for debate within the corps. I 
undertook the survey of these SNCH publications at its national office at Hôtel-Dieu in 
Paris with the assistance of the national delegate, Michel Fallot, and his administrative 
staffi Upon repeated visits to these offices, I gained full access to the archives of the 
hospital director trade union.
To support this archival research at the headquarters of the SNCH, I undertook 
further surveys of the medical press, the national press and official publications in order 
to plot the changing stances and reactions to government reforms of the multiple public 
hospital lobbies. The survey of the medical press focused primarily upon the leading daily 
newspaper for doctors. Le Quotidien du Médecin, and its archives in Paris which cover 
the M  period of this study. Similarly, I surveyed leading national papers, in particular. Le 
Monde, using here at the press cuttings services at the Insitut des Etudes Politiques in 
Paris. These two surveys were supplemented by a fiirther survey at press cuttings library 
at the Ecole Nationale de la Santé Publique (ENSP) in Rennes and an examination of the 
Revue Hospitalière de France and the circulars of the Fédération Hospitalière de France 
at its head offices in Paris.
Finally, I completed my analysis of documentation and records with an 
examination o f official publications and internal government reports. For the case study 
of the formulation of the 1991 Hospital Law, I was granted access by Mr. Gérard Vmcent, 
the then Director of Hospitals, and his technical advisor, Mr. Jean-Luc Chassaniol, to the 
full library resources and official papers of the Direction des Hôpitaux (DH) throughout 
the formulation of the 1991 Hospital Law. I was thus able to analyse both the personal 
memos and internal notes o f the DH and the whole of its comniunication with the 
ministerial cabinet o f Claude Evin, the Minister of Solidarity, Health and Social 
Protection, fellow administrative divisions within central government, and its consultation 
with external groups. I also gained access to the minutes of all the intermmisterial 
negotiations surrounding the formulation of the 1991 Hospital Law.
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Alongside this analysis of diverse sources of documentation, I also undertook 
during fieldwork in France an extensive series of in-depth interviews with central figures 
in the SNCH over the period of 1976 to 1991 and with politicians, elite bureaucrats and 
group leaderships involved in the decision-making processes of the three selected case 
studies. Overall, I undertook a total of 62 interviews over a period of approximately 18 
months (see below). The interviews, apart firom a few exceptions, were all taped and 
lasted on average between one and two hours, although the longest involved four hours 
of conversations with Pierre Rayroles, the hospital director and former technical advisor 
to Edmond Hervé, Junior Minister for Health firom 1983 to 1986. Indeed, most 
interviews involved, in addition to the formal and taped discussions, a series of more 
informal conversations and time spent meeting with hospital staff and colleagues of the 
interviewee. The interviews took place across France and I visited hospitals as far north 
as Compiègne and as 6 r  south as Bordeaux. This geographical spread was necessary to 
gain an appreciation of the different working environments of hospital directors and 
because the management structures of iht Assistance Publique in Paris is unrepresentative 
o f other public hospitals in France. Thus I visited all categories of public hospitals, 
including, not only hospitals in ih^Assistcmce Publique, but also the Hospices Civils de 
Lyon, the regional hospital at Bordeaux and the general hospitals at Blois and Orleans.
I selected the interviews on the basis of three categories of actors, although, 
obviously, certain individuals such as Gérard Vmcent, the ‘leader’ of the ENSP 
generation, president of the SNCH firom 1982 to 1990 and then the Director of Hospitals 
fall into more than one category. The first category which I selected was that of elite 
dedsion-makers such as ministers, members of their cabinets and leading bureaucrats in 
ministerial services. This category also included the leading personalities of hospital doctor 
trade unions and public hospital lobbies such as the FHF and the consultative bodies for 
hospital doctors. These actors were identified by press reports, officials publications and 
other interviewees who recognised the dgnificance of certain actors. The second category 
was that of hospital directors who had been leading activists within the SNCH throughout 
the period under study, in particular, those directors involved in the factional politics of 
the 1970s and the 1980s. These directors were identified by a survey of the membership 
of the BN from 1976 to 1991 and by the conference proceedings and interventions
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detailed in the SNCH journal, L ^ Hospitalier. The final category selected was that of a 
cross-section of hospital directors throughout the different classes of the corps. I identified 
the interviewees in this category through breakdowns of the graduations of hospital 
directors firom the ENSP and the listings of directors in the Bottin Administratif. It 
included not only head directors, but a cross-section of assistant directors in Paris and as 
far afield as Grenoble and Saint-Etierme.
LIST OF INTERVIEWS
I provide below a list o f the interviews undertaken. This list provides the full name of the 
individuals involved, the date on which the interview took place and the significant 
responsibilities exercised by these individuals during the period covered by this study. 
In alphabetical order with relevant responsibilities when interviewed.
1. Christian Anastasy, Hospital Director and former Technical Advisor to François 
Delafosse at Direction des Hôpitaux^ 03 February 1992.
2. Georges Andreu, Head of Blood Transfusion Service at Hôtel-Dieu (Assistance 
Publique), 04 December 1991.
3. Patrice Barberousse, Hospital Director and Technical Advisor to Gérard Vincent, 
Director of Hospitals at Direction des Hôpitaux, 13 May 1993.
4. Guy Berger, Director of the Cabinet of Michèle Barzach, Junior Minister for Health, 
04 February 1992.
5. Marc Buisson, Head Director at the Specialised Hospital of Poissy, 23 March 1992.
6. Marie-Christine Bunnier, Director o f Financial Services at the General Hospital of 
Versailles, 25 March 1992.
7. Philippe Cadène, General Delegate of the Fédération Hospitalière de France, 11 May 
1993.
8. Michel Calmon, Assistant to the General Delegate, Philippe Cadène, at the Fédération 
Hospitalière de France, 22 April 1992.
9. Maurice Campillo, Assistant to the General Delegate, Philippe Cadène, at the 
Fédération Hospitalière de France, 28 April 1992.
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10. Robert Cappe, Head Director at the General Hospital of St. Germain-en-Laye, 04 
March 1992.
11. Bernard Campens, Head Director of the General Hospital of Corbeil, 19 February 
1992.
12. Maiie-Thérèse Chaplain, Technical Advisor at the Direction Générale de la Santé, 09 
December 1991.
13. Jean-Luc Chassaniol, Hospital Director, Technical Advisor to Gérard \%cent. 
Director ofHospitals at the 16 December 1991 and 27 November
1992.
14. Gilbert Chodorge, Hospital Director at the General Hospital of Orsay and Technical 
Advisor to Claude Evin, Minister of Solidarity, Health and Social Protection, 19 June
1992.
15. Jean Choussat, Director of Hospitals, General Director of Assistance Publique de 
Paris and Director of the Budget, 24 January 1991.
16. Dominique Coudreau, Director of the CNAMTS, 26 November 1992 and 14 May
1993.
17. Edouard Couty, Head Director, Technical Advisor to Claude Evin, Minister of 
Solidarity, Health and Social Protection, and Leader of the Couty Commission, 24 
November 1992.
18. Jacques Coz, Head Director, leader of Grenoble 80, member of the National 
Executive o f the SNCH and president of the SNCH, 11 May 1993.
19. Marie^Madeleine Dautel, Technical Advisor at Direction des Hôpitaux, 24 January
1992.
20. Jean de Kervasdoué, Director of Hospitals, 18 February 1992.
21. Prof. Bernard Debré, founder of Solidarité Médicale, 20 July 1992.
22. François Delafosse, Director of Hospitals, 04 February and 02 March 1992.
23. Philippe Domy, Head Director at the General Hospital of Compiègne and Member of 
the conférence des directeurs des CHG, 03 July 1992.
24. Claude Ducreux, Hospital Doctor and Leader of the Coordination Syndicale des 
Médecins, Biologistes et Pharmaciens des Hôpitaux Publics, 05 May 1992.
25. Jean Farge, Minister of Social Security, 15 May 1993.
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26. Madame Gay, Assistant Hospital Director at the St. Cyr General Hospital at 
Villeneuve-sur-Lot, 26 June 1992.
27. Loïc Gefifroy, Hospital Director and Advisor to the President of the CNAMTS, 18 
May 1993.
28. Marie-Françoise Gonner, Assistant Hospital Director at the Regional Hospital of 
Grenoble, 21 February 1992.
29. Jean-Pierre Gusching, Head Director at the General Hospital of Blois and National 
Delegate for Hospital Directors in the SNCH, 16 March 1992.
30. Alain Halbout, Head Director at the Regional Hospital of Rouen and President of 
SNCH, 17 March 1992.
31. Charles Henri-Filipi, Director of the Cabinet of Georgina Dufoix, \finister of Social 
Affairs, 07 July 1992.
32. Edmond Hervé, Junior Minister for Health, 24 February 1992.
33. Prof. Jean-François Lacronique, Assistant Director to Jean Choussat at Direction 
Générale de la Santé et des Hôpitaux, 10 February 1992.
34. Jacques Latrille, Director of the Cabinet of Jack Ralite, Minister of Health, 23 June 
1992.
35. Joseph Le Bechec, Head Director at the General Hospital of Créteil, 28 February
1992.
36. Robert Le Berre, Assistant General Director at the Regional Hospital of Saint- 
Étienne, 13 March 1992.
37. Pierre Le MauÇ Head Director at the Regional Hospital of Bordeaux, 23 June 1992.
38. Patrice Legrand, Technical Advisor at CNAMTS under Dominique Coudreau, 17 May
1993.
39. Alain Lepère, Head Director at Cochin Hospital in Paris and President of the Syndicat 
National des Cadres Hospitaliers-Force Ouvrière (FO), 16 June 1992.
40. Jean Marmot, Head of the Direction de la Sécurité Sociale, 14 February 1992.
41. Jean-Charles Naouri, Director of the Cabinet of Pierre Bérégovoy, Minister of Social 
Affairs, 12 May 1993.
42. Roland GUivier, Head Director, member of Grenoble 80 and member of the National 
Executive of the SNCH, 30 June 1992.
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43. Louis Omnès, Head Director at the Laënnec Hospital in Paris, 26 February 1992.
44. Dominique Paillé, National Delegate of the SNCH and General Secretary of Union 
du Centre (UDC), 18 March 1992.
45. Christian Paire, Head Director and member of the National Executive of the SNCH, 
06 July 1992.
46. Thérèse Pierre, Hospital Director at the Sainte-Arme Hospital in Paris, 02 July 1992.
47. Claude Pigement, member of Santé et Socialisme and Health Policy Delegate for the 
Parti Socialiste^ 26 November 1992.
48. Prof. Francis Peigné, leader oîIntersyndicale Nationale des Médecins Hospitaliers 
(INMH) and member of Couty Commission, 23 November, 1992.
49. Prof. Denys PeUerin, Vice-President of the Conférence nationale des Présidents des 
CMEs des CHUs and Technical Advisor to Michèle Barzach, Junior Minister for Health, 
25 November 1992.
50. Pierre Rayroles, Head Director and Technical Advisor to Edmond Hervé, Junior 
Minister of Health, 27 February 1992.
51. Gaston Rimarebc, Director of Cabinet to Edmond Hervé, Junior Minister of Health, 
06 February 1992.
52. Prof. Jean-Yves Rochet, Head Doctor at Hospices Civiles de Lyon and President of 
the Conférence nationale des Présidents des CMEs des CHU, 23 April 1992.
53 .Louis Rolland, Head Director and member of the National Executive of the SNCH, 01 
July 1992.
54. Gérard Sacco, Head of Hospital Director Training Programme at the ENSP, 06 March 
1992.
55. Didier Tabuteau, Director of the Cabinet of Claude Evin, Minister of Solidarity, 
Health and Social Protection, 25 November 1992.
56. Prof. Georges Tchobrputsky, Head Doctor at Hôtel-Dieu Hospital (Assistance 
Publique), 02 December 1991.
57. Jean Terquem, Advisor to François Mitterrand and Specialist Advisor on 
departmentalisation to Georgina Dufoix, Minister of Social Affairs, 25 June 1992.
58. Christine Thayer, Technical Advisor at Direction des Hôpitaux, 17 May 1993.
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59. Michel Tirel, Assistant General Director at Regional Hospital of Rennes, 06 March 
1992.
60. Maurice TouUalan, Head Director at the General Hospital of Argenteuil, 03 March 
1992.
61. Gérard Vincent, Head Director, President of the SNCH and Director of Hospitals, 17 
May 1993.
62. Etienne Weill, Hospital Doctor and Leading Activist in the Syndicat National des 
Médecins Practiciens Hospitaliers (SNMPH).
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